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  Abstract	  
A	  Working	  Machine	  Patronage	  Jobs	  and	  Political	  Services	  in	  Argentina	  Virginia	  Oliveros	  	  Why	   does	   the	   control	   of	   patronage	   significantly	   increase	   a	   party’s	   chances	   of	   staying	   in	  power?	  What	   do	   public	   employees	   do	   that	   affect	   electoral	   competition?	  What	  motivates	  public	   employees	   to	   do	   it?	   In	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   seek	   to	   describe	  what	   it	   is	   that	   public	  employees	  do	  that	  affects	  electoral	  competition	  and	  to	  establish	  why	  they	  do	  it.	  I	  argue	  that	  patronage	   jobs	   are	   distributed	   to	   supporters	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   political	  services.	  Since	  government	  jobs	  are	  expensive,	  the	  type	  of	  political	  support	  that	  is	  expected	  in	   exchange	   for	   public	   sector	   employment	   goes	   far	   beyond	   the	   simple	   act	   of	   voting.	  Patronage	   employees	  perform	  a	  number	   of	   different	   political	   activities	   that	   are	   essential	  for	  attracting	  and	  maintaining	  electoral	  support.	  	  
However,	  a	  citizen	  who	  receives	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  she	  will	  provide	  political	  services	  in	  return	  can	  easily	  renege	  on	  her	  side	  of	  the	  contract	  after	  
getting	  the	  job.	  Why	  would	  public	  sector	  employees	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  patronage	  contract	   after	   receiving	   the	   job?	   Existing	   explanations	   are	   based	   either	   on	   fear	   of	  punishment	   (clients	   comply	  with	   their	   side	  of	   the	  agreement	  because	   they	  are	  afraid	   the	  patron	  will	  cut	  off	  the	  benefit	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so)	  or	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity	  (clients	  comply	  with	   the	   agreement	   because	   they	   want	   to	   help	   the	   person	   that	   have	   helped	   them).	  
Departing	   from	   these	   explanations,	   I	   argue	   that	   patronage	   employees	   engage	   in	   political	  activities	  that	  support	  politicians	  (patrons)	  because	  their	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  their	  patrons.	  Put	  simply,	  their	  incentives	  are	  aligned.	  	  
What	  makes	  patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining	  without	  punishment	  or	  reciprocity	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  (because	  only	  supporters	  can	  credibly	  commit	   to	  provide	  political	   support),	  whose	   fates	  are	   tied	   to	   the	  political	   fate	  of	  the	   politician	   who	   has	   hired	   them.	   Patronage	   jobs	   (and	   working	   conditions)	   held	   by	  supporters	   will	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   (the	   patron)	   but	   not	   by	   a	  competing	   politician,	   because	   supporters	   of	   the	   incumbent	   cannot	   credibly	   commit	   to	  provide	   political	   services	   for	   the	   opposition.	   Supporters,	   then,	   have	   large	   incentives	   to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  stay	  in	  power,	  which	  makes	  their	  original	  commitment	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   a	   credible	   one.	   This	   alignment	   of	   interests	  between	   patrons	   and	   clients	   (or	   politicians	   and	   patronage	   employees)	  makes	   patronage	  contracts	  incentive-­‐compatible	  and	  therefore	  self-­‐sustaining.	  	  
I	  test	  the	  empirical	  implications	  of	  my	  theory	  using	  an	  original	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  survey	  of	  1200	   local	  public	  sector	  employees	  that	   I	   fielded	   in	  three	  Argentine	  municipalities	  (Salta,	  Santa	  Fe,	  and	  Tigre).	  Using	  list	  experiments—a	  technique	  that	  provides	  respondents	  with	  the	  anonymity	  needed	  to	  obtain	  accurate	  information	  about	  sensitive	  topics—	  I	  show	  that	  a	  considerable	  proportion	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  are	   involved	   in	  political	  activities.	  To	  establish	  why	   public	   sector	   employees	   provide	   these	   political	   services	   I	   use	   two	   survey	  experiments	   that	  allow	  me	   to	   identify	  employees’	   comprehension	  of	   the	   likely	  effect	  of	   a	  change	  in	  municipal	  government.	  The	  results	  strongly	  support	  the	  empirical	  predictions—public	   employees	   believe	   that	   their	   jobs	   are	   tied	   to	   the	   political	   success	   of	   the	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  1	  	  
Chapter	  1	  
Introduction	   	  
	  During	   the	   winter	   of	   2009,	   I	   was	   returning	   from	   a	   two-­‐hour	   interview	  with	   two	   public	  employees,	  José	  and	  Pablo.1	  The	  three	  of	  us	  needed	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  so	  we	  were	  sharing	  a	  taxi.	  As	  soon	  as	  we	  got	  into	  the	  car,	  both	  of	  them	  started	  to	  make	  various	  phone	  calls.	  The	   following	   is	  part	  of	  one	  of	   those	  conversations.	   “How	  many?”	  asked	  José	  and	   someone	   replied	   on	   the	   other	   side	   of	   the	   line.	   “Great!	   Thanks!”	   he	   responded	   in	  excitement	  and	  hung	  up.	  So	  Pablo	  asked,	  “So?	  How	  Many?”	  “15!,”	  replied	  José	  with	  obvious	  satisfaction.	  “Awesome!	  Five	  for	  María,	  four	  for	  Cecilia,	  three	  for	  Susana…,”	  said	  Pablo,	  and	  looking	   in	  my	  direction	  he	  added,	   “You	  see,	   this	   is	  political	   activism.	  Live”.2	  So—with	  my	  most	  innocent	  voice—,	  I	  asked:	  “How	  many	  what?”	  While	  José	  seemed	  quite	  uncomfortable	  with	   the	   disclosure	   of	   this	   information	   in	   my	   presence,	   Pablo	   quickly	   replied	   “Welfare	  Benefits!	  (Planes	  Sociales!)”	  	  
The	   goal	   of	   this	   dissertation	   is	   to	   explore	   this	   phenomenon.	   Pablo	   and	   José	   are	  public	  sector	  employees	  and	  both	  of	  them	  are	  also	  relatively	  important	  brokers	  (punteros	  or	   referentes)	   in	   their	   respective	  municipalities.3	  Both	   of	   them	  obtained	   their	   jobs	   in	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Names	  have	  been	  changed	  to	  ensure	  anonymity.	  Personal	  Interview,	  La	  Plata,	  August	  5	  2009.	  2	  “Ves,	  esto	  es	  militancia,	  en	  vivo	  y	  en	  directo.”	  All	  translations	  from	  Spanish	  to	  English	  are	  mine.	  3	  In	   Argentina,	   both	   the	   term	   “puntero”	   and	   “referente”	   mean	   broker.	   However,	   the	   term	   “puntero”	   has	   a	  relatively	  negative	  connotation	  so	  brokers	  usually	  prefer	  to	  call	  themselves	  “referentes”.	  “Militante”	  (political	  activist)	   has	   a	   relatively	   neutral	   connotation,	   and	   it	   is	   used	   to	   refer	   to	   those	   with	   a	  more	   passive	   role	   in	  politics	  than	  brokers.	  
	  2	  	  government	   because	   they	   were	   important	   local	   brokers	   embedded	   within	   politically	  influential	  clientelistic	  networks.	  Of	  course,	  not	  all	  public	  employees	  are	  partisan	  brokers—or	  even	  political	  activists	  (militantes)—and	  both	  brokers	  and	  public	  sector	  employees	  are	  involved	   in	   a	   number	   of	   different	   political	   activities	   beyond	   distributing	   social	   welfare	  benefits	  for	  the	  poor	  to	  their	  “friends.”	  While	  not	  all	  public	  employees	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services,	  the	  use	  of	  public	  employment	  to	  fund	  the	  salaries	  of	  political	  workers	  (patronage)	  is	  certainly	  not	  an	  unusual	  phenomenon.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	   to	   establish	   what	   public	   employees	   actually	   do	   under	   patronage	   “contracts”	   and	  why	  they	  do	   it.	   It	  aims	   to	  understand	   the	  specific	  mechanisms	  behind	   the	  electoral	   returns	   to	  patronage	  politics.4	  	  
Over	  the	  last	  decade,	  political	  clientelism	  in	  developing	  countries	  has	  become	  one	  of	  the	  most	  studied	  topics	   in	  political	  science.	  Although	  the	  debate	   is	   far	   from	  being	  settled,	  the	   empirical	   works	   of	   Auyero	   (2000),	   Kitschelt	   and	  Wilkinson	   (2007a),	   Magaloni	   et	   al.	  (2007,	  2012),	  Nichter	  (2008),	  Stokes	  and	  her	  co-­‐authors	  (2004,	  2005,	  2007,	  2010,	  2012),	  Szwarcberg	   (2009,	   2012),	   Wantchekon	   (2003),	   and	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	   (2006,	   2008a,	   2012)	  among	   many	   others,	   have	   substantively	   improved	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   topic. 5	  However,	  most	   of	   the	   research	   on	   clientelism	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   exchange	   of	   goods	   for	  votes	  (vote	  buying),	  while	  relatively	  little	  has	  been	  done	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  exchange	  of	  jobs	  for	  political	  support	  (patronage)	  works.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Throughout	   this	   dissertation	   I	   define	  patronage	   as	   the	  discretionary	   and	  personalized	   exchange	   of	   public	  sector	  jobs	  for	  political	  support.	  I	  use	  the	  term	  patronage	  contract	  in	  an	  informal	  way	  to	  denote	  that	  patrons	  and	  clients	  engage	  in	  a	  contract-­‐like	  exchange	  relationship	  in	  which	  politicians	  provide	  public	  sector	  jobs	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	  support.	  Patronage	  contracts	  are	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  agreements	  between	  those	  that	  get	  (or	  expect	  to	  get)	  a	  patronage	  job	  (the	  client)	  and	  those	  that	  get	  (or	  expect	  to	  get)	  political	  support	  in	  return	  (the	  patron).	  I	  discuss	  this	  definition	  and	  the	  more	  general	  definition	  of	  clientelism	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  5	  There	  is	  also	  a	  broad	  formal	  literature:	  Dixit	  and	  Londregan	  (1996),	  Medina	  and	  Stokes	  (2002),	  Morgan	  and	  Vardy	  (2011),	  and	  Robinson	  and	  Verdier	  (2003),	  among	  others.	  
	  3	  	   Moreover,	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   clientelism	   focuses	   on	   how	   political	  competition	  and/or	  poverty	   influence	   the	  choices	  of	  patrons	  and	  clients.	  Despite	   the	   fact	  that	   vote	   buying	   and	   patronage	   are	   devices	   intended	   to	   affect	   electoral	   results,	   the	  literature	  has	  mainly	  studied	  them	  as	  dependent	  variables.6	  In	  fact,	  most	  of	  the	  studies	  on	  clientelism	  simply	  assume	  that	  clientelism	  works	  as	  an	  electoral	  strategy	  (Stokes	  2007).7	  In	  relation	   to	   patronage	   politics,	   the	   conventional	   wisdom	   is	   that	   the	   control	   of	   patronage	  significantly	   increases	  a	  party’s	  chances	  of	   staying	   in	  power,	  but	  we	  still	  know	  very	   little	  about	   the	  specific	  mechanisms	  that	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  patronage	  contracts	  and	  political	  competition.	  We	  know	  even	  less	  about	  what	  sustains	  these	  contracts.	  
In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  seek	  to	  describe	  what	  it	  is	  that	  public	  employees	  do	  that	  affects	  electoral	   competition	   and	   to	   establish	   why	   they	   do	   it.	   I	   argue	   that	   patronage	   jobs	   are	  distributed	   to	   supporters	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   political	   services.	   Since	  government	   jobs	  are	  expensive,	   the	  type	  of	  political	  support	   that	   is	  expected	   in	  exchange	  for	   public	   sector	   employment	   goes	   far	   beyond	   the	   simple	   act	   of	   voting.	   Patronage	  employees	  perform	  a	  number	  of	  different	  political	  activities	  that	  are	  essential	  for	  attracting	  and	  maintaining	  electoral	  support.	  However,	  a	  citizen	  who	  receives	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Poverty	  has	  long	  been	  considered	  a	  powerful	  predictor	  of	  clientelism.	  Whether	  poor	  people	  value	  a	  handout	  more	  than	  wealthy	  people	  or	  whether	  poor	  people	  are	  more	  risk	  averse	  and	  hence	  value	  more	  a	  benefit	  today	  rather	  than	  a	  promise	  for	  tomorrow,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  literature	  links	  clientelism	  with	  poverty	  (Stokes	  2007).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  prevailing	  approaches	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  competition	  and	  clientelism	  have	  opposite	  expectations	  (Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  2008a,	  2012).	  Some	  authors	  have	  linked	  clientelism	  with	  situations	  of	  low	   competition	   (Fox	   1994;	   Geddes	   1994;	   Grzymala-­‐Busse	   2003;	   Hale	   2007;	  Magaloni	   et.	   al	   2007);	   while	  others	  argue	  that	  more	  competitive	  environments	  make	  votes	  more	  valuable	  and	  thus	  increase	  the	  incentives	  to	  use	   clientelism	   to	  obtain	   them	  (Keefer	  2002;	  Krishna	  2007;	  Remmer	  2007;	  Robinson	  and	  Verdier	  2003,	  Scott	  1969).	  Finally,	  in	  recent	  years,	  some	  authors	  have	  combined	  the	  general	  agreement	  about	  the	  poverty	  of	  potential	  clients	  and	  the	  predictions	  about	  political	  competition,	  and	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  the	  interaction	  of	  both	   that	   best	   predicts	   clientelistic	   practices	   (Kitschelt	   and	  Wilkinson	  2007b;	  Magaloni	   et	   al.	   2007;	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  2008a,	  2012).	  7	  This	  tendency	  has	  started	  to	  change	  in	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  years,	  particularly	  with	  the	  growing	  literature	  on	  the	  electoral	  returns	  of	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs.	  	  
	  4	  	  the	  understanding	  that	  she	  will	  provide	  political	  services	  in	  return	  can	  easily	  renege	  on	  her	  side	  of	  the	  contract	  after	  getting	  the	  job.	  Why	  would	  public	  sector	  employees	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  patronage	  contract	  after	  receiving	  the	  job?	  Existing	  explanations	  are	  based	  either	  on	  fear	  of	  punishment	  (clients	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  the	  patron	  will	  cut	  off	  the	  benefit	   if	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so)	  or	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity	  (clients	  comply	  with	  the	  agreement	  because	  they	  want	  to	  help	  the	  person	  that	  have	  helped	  them).	  	  
By	   treating	   both	   patrons	   and	   clients—in	   this	   case,	   politicians	   and	   public	  employees—as	   equally	   sophisticated,	   self-­‐interested	   individuals,	   my	   argument	   departs	  from	  existing	  accounts	  that	  tend	  to	  portrait	  clients	  as	  passive,	  non-­‐strategic	  and/or	  myopic	  actors.8	  What	  makes	  patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining	  without	  punishment	  or	  reciprocity	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  (because	  only	  supporters	  can	  credibly	  commit	   to	  provide	  political	   support),	  whose	   fates	  are	   tied	   to	   the	  political	   fate	  of	  the	   politician	   who	   has	   hired	   them.	   Patronage	   jobs	   (and	   working	   conditions)	   held	   by	  supporters	   will	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   (the	   patron)	   but	   not	   by	   a	  competing	   politician,	   because	   supporters	   of	   the	   incumbent	   cannot	   credibly	   commit	   to	  provide	   political	   services	   for	   the	   opposition.	   Supporters,	   then,	   have	   large	   incentives	   to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  stay	  in	  power,	  which	  makes	  their	  original	  commitment	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   a	   credible	   one.	   This	   alignment	   of	   interests	  between	   patrons	   and	   clients	   (or	   politicians	   and	   patronage	   employees)	  makes	   patronage	  contracts	  incentive-­‐compatible	  and	  therefore	  self-­‐sustaining.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  I	  discuss	  this	  point	  in	  chapter	  6.	  
	  5	  	   I	  test	  the	  empirical	  implications	  of	  my	  theory	  using	  an	  original	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  survey	  of	  1200	  municipal	   public	   sector	   employees	   that	   I	   fielded	   in	   three	   Argentine	  municipalities	  (Salta,	   Santa	   Fe,	   and	   Tigre).	   To	   elicit	   accurate	   information	   and	  minimize	   potential	   social	  response	   bias,	   I	   implemented	   two	   different	   strategies.	   The	   first	   consists	   of	   a	   set	   of	  techniques	  to	  earn	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  respondents	  by	  guaranteeing	  the	  full	  confidentiality	  of	  the	   most	   sensitive	   questions.	   The	   second	   strategy	   incorporates	   the	   use	   of	   list	  experiments—a	  technique	  that	  provides	  respondents	  with	  the	  anonymity	  needed	  to	  obtain	  accurate	   information	   about	   sensitive	   topics.	   Using	   these	   methods,	   I	   show	   that	   a	  considerable	  proportion	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  are	   involved	   in	  political	  activities.	  To	  establish	  why	   public	   sector	   employees	   provide	   these	   political	   services	   I	   use	   two	   survey	  experiments	   that	  allow	  me	   to	   identify	  employees’	   comprehension	  of	   the	   likely	  effect	  of	   a	  change	  in	  municipal	  government.	  The	  results	  strongly	  support	  the	  empirical	  predictions—public	  employees	  believe	  that	  their	   jobs	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  success	  of	  the	   incumbent	  politician.	  Finally,	  I	  complement	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  survey	  results	  with	  a	  series	  of	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	   of	   public	   sector	   employees,	   brokers,	   and	   politicians.	   I	   conclude	   with	   a	   brief	  analysis	  of	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  that	  considers	  the	  external	  validity	  of	  the	  results	  and	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  theory.	  	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  I	  begin	  by	  defining	  clientelism	  and	   patronage.	   Second,	   I	   discuss	   the	   political	   and	   economic	   effects	   of	   patronage.	   I	   then	  describe	  the	  empirical	  strategy,	  the	  logic	  for	  the	  selection	  of	  Argentina	  as	  a	  case,	  and	  some	  characteristics	  of	  Argentina	  that	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  for	  this	  dissertation.	  Finally,	  this	  chapter	  provides	  a	  preview	  of	  the	  argument	  and	  presents	  the	  plan	  of	  the	  dissertation.	  
	  
	  6	  	  
1.1	   Defining	  Clientelism	  and	  Patronage	  
Throughout	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   define	   clientelism	   as	   the	   discretionary	   and	   personalized	  
exchange	   of	   goods	   or	   favors	   for	   political	   support.9	  I	   refer	   to	   patronage	   as	   a	   sub-­‐type	   of	  clientelism,	  in	  which	  the	  good	  that	  is	  exchanged	  is	  a	  public	  sector	  job.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  first	  provide	   a	   detailed	   definition	   of	   clientelism	   and	   then	   focus	   on	   the	   specificities	   of	   the	  clientelistic	  exchange	  when	  the	  good	  being	  exchanged	  is	  a	  public	  job.	  	  
The	  characterization	  of	  the	  clientelistic	  exchange	  as	  personalized,	  individualized	  or	  direct	   (and	   often	   face-­‐to-­‐face)	   helps	   differentiate	   clientelism	   from	   other	   forms	   of	  distributive	  politics	  such	  as	  pork	  barrel	  politics,	  in	  which	  the	  exchange	  involves	  a	  group	  of	  voters.	  In	  contrast	  to	  pork	  barrel	  politics,	  where	  everyone	  who	  lives	  in	  a	  certain	  area	  would	  receive	  a	  benefit	  (e.g.	  electricity	  or	  a	  long-­‐needed	  road	  repair),	  individuals	  that	  are	  not	  part	  of	   a	   clientelistic	   exchange	   can	   be	   excluded	   from	   the	   benefit.	   Clientelism	   thus	   can	   be	  individually	  targeted.	  To	  be	  clear,	  most	  politicians	  target	  benefits	  to	  particular	  segments	  of	  the	   population	   “based	   upon	   their	   perception	   that	   particular	   groups	   of	   voters	  will	   prefer	  policy	  packages	  from	  which	  their	  own	  groups	  will	  benefit”	  (Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  2007b,	  10).	  The	  expectation	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  that	  members	  of	  the	  benefiting	  groups	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  vote	  for	  the	  politician	  or	  party	  that	  implemented	  the	  policies	  in	  question.	  However,	  the	  targeting	  is	  not	  personal,	  but	  aimed	  at	  a	  group	  that	  can	  be	  defined	  in	  abstract	  terms	  (as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  This	   definition	   is	   very	   close	   to	   those	   provided	   by	   Kitschelt	   and	  Wilkinson	   (2007b),	   Piattoni	   (2001)	   and	  Stokes	   (2007),	   among	   others.	   Kitschelt	   and	  Wilkinson	   (2007b,	   2)	   define	   clientelism	   as	   “a	   transaction,	   the	  direct	  exchange	  of	  a	  citizen’s	  vote	  in	  return	  for	  direct	  payments	  or	  continuing	  access	  to	  employment,	  goods,	  and	  services.”	  For	  Stokes	  clientelism	  is	  “the	  proffering	  of	  material	  goods	  in	  return	  for	  electoral	  support,	  where	  the	   criterion	   of	   distribution	   that	   the	   patron	   uses	   is	   simply:	   did	   you	   (will	   you)	   support	   me?”	   (2007,	   605).	  Finally,	  Piattoni	  (2001,	  4)	  define	  it	  as	  “the	  trade	  of	  votes	  and	  other	  types	  of	  partisan	  support	  in	  exchange	  for	  public	  decisions	  with	  divisible	  benefits.”	  For	  a	  distinction	  between	  clientelism	  and	  other	   forms	  of	   electoral	  strategies	  (including	  programmatic	  ones)	  see	  Stokes	  (2009).	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  in	  programmatic	  politics)	  or	  based	  on	  geography	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  pork	  barrel	  politics)—within	  those	  groups,	  individuals	  cannot	  be	  excluded.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  clientelistic	  exchange	  the	  benefit	  is	  not	  only	  targeted	  but	  it	  is	  targeted	  at	  the	  individual	  level.	  	  
Moreover,	   patrons	   “know”	  who	   receives	   a	   benefit.	   In	  modern	   clientelism,	   though,	  clients	   usually	   have	   little	   or	   no	   personal	   contact	   with	   the	   patron.	   Rather,	   the	   personal	  connection	  is	  with	  brokers	  or	  some	  other	  type	  of	  middlemen.	  These	  intermediaries	  make	  sure	  to	  emphasize	  how	  personal	  the	  connection	  is.	  They	  routinely	  and	  publicly	  emphasize	  their	  “service	  to	  the	  people”	  and	  stress	  “their	  particular	  efforts	  to	  obtain	  the	  goods,	  [...]	  thus	  creating	   the	   appearance	   that	   were	   they	   not	   there,	   the	   benefits	   would	   not	   be	   delivered”	  (Auyero	  et	   al.	   2009,	  5).	  The	   fact	   that	   the	  goods	  distributed	   through	   clientelism	  are	  often	  private—as	   opposed	   to	   public	   goods—,	   makes	   credit-­‐claiming	   comparatively	   easier	  (Desposato	   2007).	   However,	   as	   Weitz-­‐Shapiro	   (2008a)	   argues,	   credit-­‐claiming	   might	   be	  harder	   in	   certain	   cases,	   such	   as	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   targeted	   government	   programs.	   In	  those	  cases,	  patrons	  and	  brokers	  have	  to	  make	  an	  extra	  effort	  to	  convince	  the	  clients	  of	  the	  personalized	  and	  discretionary	  characteristic	  of	   the	  benefit.10	  This	  personal	  dimension	  of	  the	   clientelistic	   exchange	   implies	   that	   clientelistic	   relations	   are	   sustained	   over	   longer	  periods	  of	  time	  (Auyero	  2000;	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  2007b;	  Szwarcberg	  2009;	  Zarazaga	  2012).	  
The	   clientelistic	   exchange	   is	   also	   discretionary	   because	   the	   patron	   (or	   broker)	  enjoys	   considerably	   discretion	   (or,	   at	   least,	   can	   make	   clients	   believe	   so)	   to	   decide	   who	  receives	  a	  benefit.	  There	  is	  no	  set	  of	  formal	  rules	  that	  stipulates	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  For	   a	   description	  of	   the	   strategies	   that	   politicians	   can	  use	   to	   create	   or	   increase	   the	  perception	  of	   voters	  regarding	   discretion	   in	   the	   implementation	   of	   social	  welfare	   policy,	   see	   Chapter	   4	   in	   this	   dissertation	   and	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  (2008a,	  chapter	  2).	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  clientelistic	  exchange.	  As	  I	  will	  discuss	  below,	  most	  of	  the	  literature	  chooses	  to	  characterize	  the	   clientelistic	   exchange	   as	   contingent	   on	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   client	   rather	   than	   simply	  discretionary.	  My	  choice	  of	  the	  term	  discretion	  includes	  those	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  patron	  or	  the	  broker	  decides	  to	  exclude	  someone	  from	  receiving	  the	  benefit	  because	  he	  believes	  that	  the	   person	   is	   not	   fulfilling	   her	   side	   of	   the	   agreement	   by	   providing	   the	   expected	   political	  support.	   I	  choose	  this	  broader	  characterization	  for	  reasons	  that	   I	  discuss	   in	  the	   following	  paragraphs.	   Finally,	   I	   explicitly	   rely	   on	   the	   word	   “favors”	   instead	   of	   “services”—a	   term	  commonly	   used	   in	   definitions	   of	   clientelism—	   to	   emphasize	   the	   personal	   connections	  involved,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  extraordinary	  characteristic	  of	  the	  service	  provided.	  A	  favor,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  a	  special	  service	  that	  goes	  beyond	  what	  is	  due	  or	  usual.	  	  
Political	  support	  involves	  a	  number	  of	  different	  activities	  that	  range	  from	  the	  simple	  act	   of	   voting	   to	   participating	   in	   political	   meetings,	   attending	   rallies,	   or	   helping	   with	  electoral	   campaigns.	   In	   return,	   patrons	   provide	   different	   types	   of	   goods,	   ranging	   from	  handouts,	   favors,	   and	   money	   to	   unemployment	   benefits,	   housing	   subsidies,	   and	   public	  sector	   jobs.	   The	   existing	   literature	   provides	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   examples	   of	   the	   types	   of	  goods	   and	   favors	   that	   can	   be	   distributed	   through	   clientelistic	   exchanges:	   clothing,	  mattresses,	   medicine,	   milk,	   corrugated	   metal,	   construction	   materials,	   blankets,	   hangers,	  utility	  bill	  payments,	  money,	  eyeglasses,	  chickens,	  trees,	  and	  magnets	  in	  Argentina	  (Brusco	  et	  al.	  2004);	  medicine,	  health	  exams,	  dentures,	  wheelchairs,	  orthopedic	  boots,	  and	  female	  sterilization	   in	  Brazil	   (Nichter	  2011);	  property	   tittles,	   subsidized	  housing	  and	   food,	  work	  opportunities,	  and	   licenses	   to	  sell	  merchandise	   in	   flea	  markets	   in	  Mexico	  (Magaloni	  et	  al.	  2007);	   furniture,	  animals,	   food,	   tools,	  and	  construction	  materials	   in	  Nicaragua	  (Gonzalez-­‐Ocantos	  et	  al.	  2012);	  money	  in	  Taiwan	  (Wang	  and	  Kurzman	  2007);	  and	  public	  sector	  jobs	  
	  9	  	  in	  Italy	  (Chubb	  1981,	  1982;	  Golden	  2003)	  and	  the	  United	  Sates	  (Banfield	  and	  Wilson	  1963;	  Folke	  et	  al.	  2011;	  Johnston	  1979;	  Wolfinger	  1972).	  
As	   this	   list	  of	  examples	  shows,	   the	  good	  or	   type	  of	   favor	   itself	  does	  not	  determine	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  clientelistic	  exchange.11	  Although	  all	  the	  examples	  here	  are	  private	  goods,	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  distribute	  private	  goods	  through	  programmatic	  politics.	  As	  Stokes	  (2009)	  notes,	   in	   advanced	   democracies	   most	   welfare-­‐state	   policies	   are	   targeted	   yet	  programmatic.12	  In	  these	  cases,	  there	  is	  a	  set	  of	  rules	  that	  stipulate	  under	  what	  conditions	  citizens	   should	   receive	   certain	   benefits	   and	   all	   citizens	   that	   satisfy	   those	   requirements	  actually	  receive	  the	  benefit,	  without	  any	  bias	  or	  discretion.	  A	  group	  of	  people	  is	  defined	  in	  abstract	   terms	   —for	   instance	   the	   elderly,	   the	   unemployed,	   pregnant	   women—and	   all	  people	  thus	  defined	  receive	  the	  benefit.	  No	  member	  within	  the	  abstractly	  defined	  group	  of	  beneficiaries	  can	  be	  excluded.	  
The	  characterization	  of	  an	  exchange	  as	  clientelistic	  depends	  on	  the	  discretional	  and	  transactional	  nature	  of	  the	  exchange	  and	  not	  on	  the	  type	  of	  good	  that	  is	  being	  provided.	  An	  exchange	  is	  clientelistic	  because	  the	  patron	  provides	  a	  discretional	  favor	  or	  good	  (a	  job,	  in	  the	  case	  of	   this	  dissertation)	  with	  the	  expectation	  of	  receiving	  political	  support	   in	  return.	  Either	   the	   patron	   promises	   to	   deliver	   the	   good	   after	   the	   client	   provides	   the	   political	  support;	  or	  the	  patron	  provides	  the	  good	  or	  favor	  with	  the	  expectation	  that	  the	  client	  will	  provide	  political	  support	  afterwards.	  Note	  that	  the	  actual	  exchange	  only	  needs	  to	  take	  place	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Of	   course,	   pure	   public	   goods	   (such	   as	   clean	   air	   or	   national	   defense)	   are,	   by	   definition,	   impossible	   to	   be	  subjected	  to	  a	  clientelistic	  exchange	  because	  no	  one	  can	  be	  excluded	  from	  benefiting	  from	  the	  good.	  12	  See	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	   (2008a;	  2012)	   for	  an	  example	  of	  how	   the	  same	  program	  (a	   targeted	   food	  distribution	  program	   in	   Argentina)	   can	   be	   distributed	   via	   clientelism	   or	   in	   a	   non-­‐clientelistic	   way.	   Recent	   studies	   of	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs	  in	  Mexico	  (De	  la	  O	  2013)	  and	  Brazil	  (Zucco	  forthcoming)	  that	  show	  that	  distribution	  in	  these	  cases	  was	  in	  fact	  programmatic,	  provide	  further	  evidence	  that	  the	  type	  of	  good	  (in	  this	  case	  a	  welfare	  benefit)	  in	  itself	  does	  not	  imply	  clientelism.	  
	  10	  	  in	   expectation	   for	   the	   clientelistic	   arrangement	   to	   exist.	   As	   I	   will	   discuss	   at	   length	   in	  chapter	  2,	  clients	  always	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  taking	  the	  benefit	  and	  then	  reneging	  on	  the	  clientelistic	  contract	  by	  not	  providing	  the	  promised	  political	  support;	  patrons,	  in	  turn,	  can	  also	  fail	  to	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  bargain	  by	  requesting	  political	  support	  in	  advance,	  and	  then	  failing	  to	  deliver	  the	  promised	  benefits.	  
But	   what	   exactly	   do	   I	   mean	   by	   the	   transactional	   nature	   of	   the	   agreement?	   Most	  definitions	   of	   clientelism	   in	   the	   contemporary	   literature	   such	   as	  Kitschelt	   and	  Wilkinson	  (2007b)	  and	  Stokes	  (2007,	  2009)	  emphasize	  the	  quid-­‐pro-­‐quo	  nature	  of	  the	  exchange	  in	  a	  very	  specific	  way.	  The	  provision	  of	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  are	  contingent	  upon	  the	  specific	  actions	   of	   the	   client:	   “patrons	   concede	   rewards	   to	   voters	  who	   support	   them	   and	   punish	  those	  who	  don’t”	  (Medina	  and	  Stokes	  2007,	  75).	  For	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007b,	  9)	  a	  clientelistic	   exchange	   is	   constituted	   by	   three	   components:	   “contingent	   direct	   exchange,	  predictability,	  and	  monitoring.”	  For	  them,	  there	  is	  a	  key	  distinction	  between	  programmatic	  politicians	   and	   clientelistic	   ones—the	   former	   do	   not	   engage	   in	   contingent	   exchanges	   so	  they	  “do	  not	  try	  to	  monitor	  or	  enforce	  conformity	  of	  voters	  with	  certain	  party	  preferences,	  while	  clientelistic	  patrons	  most	  definitely	  engage	   in	  such	  practices”	   (2007,	  22).	  Similarly,	  for	  Stokes	  (2009,	  14),	  politicians	  offer	  material	  benefits	  and	  services,	  “only	  on	  the	  condition	  that	   the	   recipient	   returns	   the	   favor	  with	   a	   vote	   (…)	   The	   voter	   suffers	   a	   punishment	   (or	  reasonably	  fears	  that	  she	  will	  suffer	  one)	  should	  she	  defect	  from	  the	  implicit	  bargain	  of	  a	  goody	  for	  a	  vote.”	  1314	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  a	  similar	  perspective,	   see	  also	  Grzymala	  Busse	   (2008),	  Hicken	  (2011),	  Magaloni	  et	  al	   (2007),	  Nichter	  (2008),	  Szwarcberg	  (2009),	  and	  Weitz-­‐	  Shapiro	  (2008a,	  2012).	  14	  There	   is	   another	   school	   of	   thought	   in	   the	   clientelism	   literature	   that	   claims	   that	   feelings	   of	   reciprocity,	  rather	  than	  monitoring	  and	  punishment,	  are	  at	  the	  core	  of	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  (Finan	  and	  Schecheter	  2012;	  
	  11	  	   From	   this	   perspective,	   there	   are	   two	   more	   necessary	   conditions	   to	   classify	   an	  exchange	  as	  clientelistic.	  First,	  the	  patron	  can	  know,	  infer,	  or	  (at	  the	  very	  least)	  be	  able	  to	  make	  the	  client	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  monitor	  the	  political	  behavior	  required	  by	  the	  clientelistic	   exchange.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   electoral	   support,	   this	   might	   involve	   some	   sort	   of	  mechanism	   that	   allows	   for	   the	   violation	   of	   the	   secrecy	   of	   the	   ballot	   or	   make	   the	   client	  believe	   that	   this	   is	   a	   real	   possibility.	   In	   these	   cases,	   party	   machines	   with	   an	   army	   of	  politicians	   and	   brokers	   “deeply	   embedded	   in	   social	   networks”	   are	   required	   to	   select	  appropriate	   clients	   and	   monitor	   their	   behavior	   (Stokes	   2009,	   14).15	  Second,	   the	   client	  should	  believe	  that	  she	  could	  be	  punished	  if	  she	  reneged	  on	  her	  side	  of	  the	  agreement.	  For	  a	  clientelistic	  exchange	  to	  take	  place,	   the	  patron	  should	  be	  able	  to	   identify	  non-­‐compliers	  and	  credibly	  commit	  to	  punish	  them.16	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Lawson	  and	  Greene	  2012).	  From	   this	  perspective,	   clients	   comply	  with	   their	  part	  of	   the	  agreement	  because	  they	   want	   to	   help	   the	   person	   that	   has	   helped	   them.	   And,	   of	   course,	   fear	   of	   punishment	   as	   an	   intrinsic	  characteristic	  of	  the	  clientelistic	  exchange	  is	  absent	  from	  their	  definition.	  I	  discuss	  this	  perspective	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2.	  15	  “Their	  social	  proximity	  allows	  them	  (politicians	  and	  brokers)	   to	  gather	   information	  about	  who	  votes	  and	  whom	  they	  vote	   for—even	  assuming	  the	  secret	  ballot,	   they	  can	  make	  reasonably	  accurate	   inferences	  about	  individual	   voting	   patterns”	   (Stokes	   2009:	   14).	   See	   also	   Schaffer	   (2007)	   and	   Lehoucq	   (2007).	   Going	   even	  further,	   Stokes	   (2009,	   24)	   proposes	   to	   distinguish	   between	   “distributions	   undertaken	   by	   modern	   parties	  (which	   cannot	   enforce	   quid-­‐pro-­‐quo	   arrangements	   and	   rely	   on	   voter	   goodwill)	   from	   those	   undertaken	   by	  machines	  (which	  can	  impose	  punishments	  on	  defectors)”.	  Only	  in	  the	  second	  type	  of	  parties—more	  common	  in	  developing	  countries—is	  clientelism	  possible.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  dense	  organization	  “does	  not	  necessarily	  indicate	  clientelism.”	  This	  type	  of	  organization	  can	  be	  the	  result	  of	  earlier	  labor	  organization	  or	  even	  ideology	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Sweden,	  Finland,	  or	  Denmark	  (Grzymala	  Busse	  2008,	  669).	  Moreover,	  even	  politicians	  and	  brokers	  that	  belong	  to	  machine	  parties	  can	  decide	  whether	  to	  monitor	  and	  punish	  or	  not	  (Szwarcberg	  2009).	  16	  However,	  even	  authors	  who	  claim	  that	  some	  form	  of	  monitoring	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  punishment	  are	  intrinsic	  components	  of	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  often	  find	  themselves	  making	  exceptions	  to	  this	  definition	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  it	  to	  real	  examples.	  For	  instance,	  when	  studying	  clientelism	  in	  advanced	  democracies,	  Kitschelt	  (2007,	   303)	   states:	   “In	   established	   post-­‐industrial	   democracies	  monitoring	   clientelistic	   exchange,	   let	   alone	  enforcement,	  are	  not	  based	  on	  heavy-­‐handed	  violations	  of	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  vote.	  It	  is	  rather	  indirectly	  based	  on	  social	  pressure,	  mediated	  by	  membership	  and	  activism	  in	  political	  parties,	  unions,	  business,	  professional	  associations,	  and	  churches.”	  Also	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007c)	   take	  a	  step	  back	  and	  talk	  about	  “indirect	  monitoring	   and	   enforcement”	   (325)	   and	   “’soft’	   monitoring	   and	   incentives”	   (326):	   “The	   monitoring	   and	  enforcement	  of	  clientelistic	  citizen-­‐politician	  linkages	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  process	  in	  which	  patrons	  at	  every	  step	  monitor	  their	  clients	  and	  intervene	  to	  punish	  free-­‐riders.	  Clientelism	  involves	  a	  complex	  web	  of	  relations	  in	  which	  monitoring	  and	  enforcement	  is	  practices	  in	  a	  highly	  indirect	  and	  concealed	  fashion”	  (19).	  
	  12	  	   My	   understanding	   of	   clientelism	   is	   different.	   I	   do	   not	   assume	   that	   clientelistic	  exchanges	   require	  monitoring	   of	   specific	   voting	   decisions	   or	   political	   behavior,	   nor	   that	  clients’	   fear	  of	  punishment	   is	   their	  main	   reason	   for	   fulfilling	   their	   side	  of	   the	  agreement.	  Whether	   monitoring	   and	   the	   fear	   of	   punishment	   actually	   happen	   are	   both	   questions	  subjected	   to	  empirical	   research	  and	  not	  an	   intrinsic	  part	  of	   the	  definition	  of	   the	  concept.	  How	  patron	  and	  client	  can	  assure	  compliance	  with	  the	  contract	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  in	  chapter	  2.	  Put	  it	  simply,	  in	  a	  clientelistic	  exchange	  both	  sides	  expect	  to	  obtain	  something	  from	  the	  other	  one;	  but	  whether	  and	  why	  the	  contract	  is	  respected	  and	  patrons	  and	   clients	   actually	   obtain	   what	   they	   want	   are	   empirical	   questions	   and	   not	   constituent	  parts	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  concept.	  
To	   be	   sure,	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	   that	   monitoring	   of	   political	   behavior	   or	   fear	   of	  punishment	  are	  never	  present	   in	  clientelistic	  exchanges,	   I	  am	  only	  arguing	  that	   these	  are	  not	   necessary	   characteristics	   of	   these	   types	   of	   arrangements	   and	   as	   such,	   should	   not	   be	  considered	   as	   intrinsic	   parts	   of	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   concept.	   There	   is,	   as	   I	   argue	   in	   this	  dissertation,	   another	   possibility	   to	   explain	   why	   clients	   comply	   with	   their	   side	   of	   the	  agreement	  that	  departs	  from	  existing	  accounts.	  Without	  being	  coerced	  to	  do	  so,	  clients	  can	  make	  an	  active	  and	  conscious	  decision	  to	  support	  their	  patron	  because	  they	  think	  that	  it	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  do	  so.	  If	  clients	  believe	  that	  their	  political	  support	  is	  important	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  of	  the	  patron	  or	  broker	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  flow	  of	  benefits,	  clients	  have	  strong	  incentives	  to	  provide	  such	  support.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Auyero	  (2000)	  and	  more	  recently	  Zarazaga	  (2012),	  the	  literature	  on	  clientelism	  has	  mainly	  ignored	  this	  alternative	  mechanism	  to	  sustain	  the	  clientelistic	  exchange.	  Since	  this	  alternative	  mechanism	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  my	  argument,	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  point	  in	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2.	  	  
	  13	  	  
1.1.1	  Patronage	  
I	  define	  patronage	  as	  the	  exchange	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	  for	  political	  support.	  In	  this	  sense,	  patronage	  is	  a	  sub-­‐type	  of	  clientelism,	  but	  certainly	  not	  the	  only	  one.17	  I	  use	  the	  term	  patronage	   “contract”	   in	   an	   informal	   way	   to	   denote	   that	   patrons	   and	   clients	   engage	   in	  
contract-­‐like	   exchange	   relationships	   in	   which	   politicians	   provide	   public	   sector	   jobs	   in	  exchange	   for	   political	   support.	   Patronage	   contracts	   are	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   agreements	  between	  those	  that	  get	  (or	  expect	  to	  get)	  a	  patronage	  job	  (the	  client)	  and	  those	  that	  get	  (or	  expect	  to	  get)	  political	  support	  in	  return	  (the	  patron).	  The	  term	  refers	  both	  to	  the	  provision	  of	   political	   support	   in	   expectation	   of	   getting	   a	   job	   and	   to	   the	   provision	   of	   support	   after	  getting	   the	   job,	   and	   it	   is	   a	   type	   of	   clientelistic	   exchange	   only	   available	   to	   those	   in	  government.	   Since	   “patronage	   involves	   large	   rewards	   (a	   steady	   and	   secure	   income),	   it	   is	  exchanged	  not	  for	  a	  single	  vote	  but	  for	  a	  broader	  electoral	  support”	  (Stokes	  2009,	  15).	  In	  fact,	  as	  I	  will	  show	  in	  chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  public	  sector	  employees	  provide	  different	  types	  of	  political	   services	   such	   as	  helping	  with	   campaigns,	   attending	   rallies,	  monitoring	   elections,	  and	  granting	  favors	  to	  voters,	  among	  other	  activities.	  
This	  definition	  of	  patronage	  does	  not	  imply	  anything	  about	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  client	  (the	  job	  receiver).	  The	  general	  understanding	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  usually	  distributed	   to	   supporters—and	   this	   is	   the	   case	   in	   the	   research	   conducted	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  There	  is	  no	  consensus	  in	  the	  literature	  about	  the	  term	  patronage.	  For	  instance,	  for	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007a)	   and	   Chandra	   (2007),	   clientelism	   and	   patronage	   are	   interchangeable	   terms.	   As	   Piattoni	   (2001,	   4)	  points	  out,	  the	  different	  uses	  of	  the	  two	  terms	  are	  in	  part	  linguistic	  –	  patronage	  is	  more	  commonly	  used	  in	  the	  English	  speaking	  countries	  while	  clientelism	  is	  more	  used	  in	  countries	  that	  predominately	  use	  the	  Romance	  languages.	  For	  others,	  however,	  both	  terms	  refer	  to	  different	  phenomenon	  in	  a	  different	  way	  than	  the	  one	  I	  use	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   For	   Schaffer	   (2007,	   5),	   patronage	   refers	   to	   a	   distributional	   strategy	   consisting	   of	  providing	   material	   support	   “within	   the	   context	   of	   enduring	   asymmetric,	   but	   reciprocal	   relationships,”	   as	  oppose	  to	  vote-­‐buying	  that,	  for	  him,	  only	  happens	  at	  election	  time.	  Finally,	  Stokes	  (2007)	  and	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  (2008a)	  define	  patronage	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  is	  defined	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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  this	   dissertation	   as	   well—but	   it	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   be	   a	   supporter	   to	   be	   involved	   in	   a	  patronage	   exchange.	   As	   I	   will	   explain	   in	   chapter	   2,	   supporters	   are	   good	   candidates	   for	  patronage	  positions	  because	  they	  are	  likely	  more	  willing	  to	  provide	  political	  services.	  But	  this	   is	   also	   possible	   with	   an	   appointee	   that	   gets	   the	   job	   through	   pure	   personal	   (non-­‐partisan)	  connections	  (Scherlis	  2009).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  only	  characteristic	  of	  the	  client	  that	  matters	   for	   this	   definition	   is	   that,	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	   job,	   she	   agrees	   to	  work	   for	   the	  patron	  providing	  political	  services.	  
It	   is	   also	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   types	   of	   political	   services	   that	   employees	  provide	   to	   their	   bosses	   are	   very	   diverse.18	  The	   ones	   studied	   here	   are	   some	   of	   the	  most	  common	   among	   mid	   and	   low-­‐level	   positions	   in	   the	   bureaucracy,	   but	   these	   are	   very	  different	  from	  the	  ones	  often	  provided	  by	  political	  appointees	  in	  high-­‐level	  positions.	  The	  political	  support	  provided	  by	  those	  appointed	  to	  patronage	  jobs	  at	  high-­‐level	  positions	  are	  more	  related	  to	  the	  control	  over	  public	  policies.	  Politicians	  want	  to	  appoint	  someone	  they	  trust	  to	  those	  areas	  that	  they	  consider	  important	  for	  their	  administration,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  bureaucrat	  will	  implement	  the	  policies	  preferred	  by	  the	  politician	  or	  to	  make	  their	  implementation	  easier.	  To	  make	  this	  distinction	  clear,	  Müller	  (2006)	  proposes	  to	  refer	  to	   the	   former	   type	   of	   patronage	   as	   “service	   patronage”	   (the	   distribution	   of	   public	   sector	  jobs	   in	   exchange	   for	   the	   client’s	   political	   support	   “outside”	   the	   job),	   and	   to	   the	   latter	   as	  “power	  patronage.”	  And,	  of	   course,	  patronage	  appointments	  at	  high	   levels	  make	   it	   easier	  for	  parties	  and	  politicians	  to	  get	  public	  employees	  to	  do	  them	  favors,	  make	  exceptions,	  or	  look	   the	   other	   way,	   making	   power	   patronage	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   personal	   and	   political	  corruption	   (related	   to	   the	   financing	   of	   politics),	   clientelism	   (especially	   in	   the	   form	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Chapter	  2	  describes	  these	  services	  in	  more	  detail.	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  manipulation	  of	  targeted	  public	  programs),	  and	  pork-­‐barrrel.	  
Other	   scholars	   have	   proposed	   a	   definition	   of	   patronage	   irrespective	   of	   what	   the	  client	   gives	   in	   return	   for	   the	   job	   appointment	   (Kopecký	   and	   Mair	   2006,	   2012;	   Scherlis	  2008).	  For	  them,	  patronage	  refers	  to	  the	  discretionary	  power	  to	  appoint	  people	  to	  public	  and	  semi-­‐public	  sector	  jobs,	  without	  any	  reference	  to	  what	  the	  patron	  receives	  in	  return.	  In	  the	  definition	  I	  choose	  to	  use	  in	  this	  dissertation	  what	  the	  patron	  gets	  are	  in	  fact	  political	  services	   (or	   political	   support),	   and	   since	   this	   dissertation	   focuses	   on	   mid	   and	   low-­‐level	  positions,	   the	   types	   of	   political	   services	   that	   I	   consider	   are	   the	   ones	   covered	  by	  Müller’s	  concept	  of	  “service	  patronage.”	  	  
	  
1.2	  Why	  Study	  Patronage?	  	  
Why	   focus	   on	   public	   employment?	  Why	   focus	   on	   the	   exchange	   of	   public	   sector	   jobs	   for	  political	  support	  as	  opposed	  to	  some	  other	  form	  of	  clientelism?	  As	  mentioned,	  much	  of	  the	  contemporary	   literature	   has	   put	   its	   attention	   on	   the	   exchange	   of	   goods	   or	   favors	   for	  electoral	  support	  (vote-­‐buying)	  but	  we	  still	  know	  very	   little	  about	  the	  exchange	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	  for	  political	  support	  (patronage).	  This	  is	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  patronage	  has	  been	   found	   in	  countries	  all	  over	   the	  world,	   from	  Italy	   (Chubb	  1981,	  1982;	  Golden	  2003),	  Greece	  (Papakostas	  2001;	  Pappas	  2009),	  and	  the	  United	  Sates	  (Banfield	  and	  Wilson	  1963;	  Folke	   et	   al.	   2011;	   Johnston	   1979;	   Wolfinger	   1972)	   to	   Bulgaria,	   Hungary	   and	   the	   Czech	  Republic	  (Kopecký	  and	  Spirova	  2011),	  Argentina	  (Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2004,	  2012;	  Calvo	  and	  Ujhelyi	   2012;	   Kemahlioglu	   2006,	   2011;	   Remmer	   2007;	   Scherlis	   2009),	   Nigeria	   (Bratton	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  2008),	  and	  Ghana	  and	  South	  Africa	  (Kopecký	  2011).19	  Finally,	  not	  only	   it	   is	  a	  widespread	  phenomenon	   about	   which	   we	   know	   very	   little,	   but	   more	   importantly	   it	   is	   one	   that	   has	  significant	  economic	  and	  political	  consequences.	  
It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  the	  distribution	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	  with	  political	  motivations	  could	  affect	  the	  quality	  of	  public	  administration	  and	  generate	  economic	  inefficiencies.	  Since	  in	   patronage	   contracts	   the	   criteria	   for	   selecting	   new	   employees	   is	   their	   willingness	   or	  capacity	   to	  deliver	  political	  services	   instead	  of	   their	  skills	   for	   the	   job,	  education	  or	  merit,	  there	   is	  no	  mechanism	  to	  prevent	  unqualified	  citizens	  from	  getting	  hired,	   leading	  to	  poor	  public	   administration.	   Note,	   however,	   that	   the	   effects	   of	   hiring	   potentially	   unqualified	  workers	   are	   limited	   by	   the	   fact	   that	  many	   jobs	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   do	   not	   require	   very	  sophisticated	  skills.	  As	  Roniger	  (2004,	  366)	  points	  out,	  in	  today	  polities,	  “most	  clientelistic	  intercessions	  operate	  above	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  minimal	  capacity	  requirements	  for	  entry	  into	  the	  administration.”	  In	  fact,	  the	  majority	  of	  jobs	  require	  very	  low	  qualifications	  so	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  partisan	  bias	  in	  hiring	  low	  skilled	  workers	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  public	  administration	  is	  fairly	  limited.	  	  
However,	  even	  if	  limited,	  when	  the	  partisan	  bias	  in	  hiring	  does	  affect	  the	  quality	  of	  the	   administration,	   economic	   resources	   end	  up	  being	  wasted.	   If	   the	   employees	  hired	  are	  unqualified	   for	   the	   job,	   with	   the	   same	   number	   of	   employees	   the	   output	   in	   terms	   of	  production	   is	   lower	   than	   it	   would	   have	   been	   in	   the	   case	   with	   qualified	   individuals.	  Moreover,	   if	   political	   appointees	   devote	   part	   of	   their	   working	   hours	   to	   the	   provision	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  As	  Kitschelt	   and	  Wilkinson	   (2007b,	   3)	   have	   pointed	   out	   clientelism	   is	   still	   present	   in	   advance	   industrial	  democracies	  such	  as	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Italy	  and	  Japan,	  —even	  though	  the	  view	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  was	  that	   clientelism	   it	   was	   a	   characteristic	   of	   backwards	   societies	   that	  would	   disappear	   in	   the	  modern	  world,	  clientelism	  is	  still	  present	  in	  advance	  industrial	  democracies	  such	  as	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Italy	  and	  Japan.	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  political	   services,	   less	   time	   is	   devoted	   to	   ordinary	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   working	   tasks.	   More	  generally,	   if	   the	   reason	   for	   hiring	   is	   to	   obtain	   political	   support,	   the	   size	   of	   the	   public	  administration	  can	  expand	  beyond	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  administration	  itself	  to	  instead	  reflect	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  the	  patron	  (Kemahlioglu	  2006).	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  patronage	  systems	  in	  which	  the	  incumbent	  parties	  “earn	  political	  rents”	  from	  the	  employment	  relationships	  it	  creates,	  there	  is	  “an	  incentive	  to	  provide	  more	  employment	  than	  the	  efficient	  level”	  (Baland	  and	  Robinson	  2007,	  129).20	  	  
Spending	  on	  patronage,	  in	  turn,	  leads	  to	  the	  under-­‐provision	  of	  public	  goods—when	  public	  money	  is	  used	  for	  political	  gain,	  less	  is	  available	  for	  public	  goods	  (Lizzeri	  and	  Persico	  2001;	  Magaloni	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Persson	  and	  Tabellini	  1999).	  Moreover,	  empirical	  studies	  have	  shown	   that	   professional	   bureaucracies	   in	   which	   hires,	   promotions,	   and	   dismissals	   are	  insulated	   from	  electoral	   politics	   are	   associated	  with	   economic	   growth	   (Evans	   and	  Rauch	  1999),	  poverty	  reduction	  (Henderson	  et	  al.	  2003),	   less	  corruption	  (Dahlström	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Rauch	   and	   Evans	   2000),	   investment	   in	   infrastructure	   (Rauch	   1995),	   and	   higher	  bureaucratic	   performance	   (Rauch	   and	   Evans	   2000).21	  Note,	   however,	   that	   in	   some	   cases	  the	   level	  of	  public	  employment	   is	   “not	   chosen	  only	   from	   the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   ‘productive	  efficiency,’”	  but	  as	  a	  redistributive	  device	  to	  transfer	  income	  from	  the	  middle	  class	  to	  more	  disadvantaged	  citizens	  (Alesina	  et	  al.	  2000,	  219).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Baland	  and	  Robinson	  (2007)	  refer	  to	  rural	  employers	  that	  “sell”	  the	  votes	  of	  their	  employees,	  but	  the	  logic	  of	  their	  argument	  applies	  to	  patronage	  contracts	  in	  public	  administration	  as	  well.	  	  21	  Ultimately,	  the	  more	  general	  argument	  behind	  many	  of	  these	  specific	  results	  is	  that	  elected	  officials	  behave	  differently	  than	  non-­‐elected	  officials	  (because	  they	  face	  different	  incentives,	  have	  different	  time	  horizons	  or	  have	  different	  expertise	  and/or	   information).	  The	   literature	  on	  this	   issue,	  especially	   in	  American	  Politics,	   is	  extensive	  and	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  chapter.	  See	  Iaryczower	  et	  al.	  (forthcoming)	  for	  a	  review.	  
	  18	  	   In	   spite	   of	   this,	   some	   scholars	   have	   argued	   that	   a	   complete	   insulation	   of	   the	  bureaucracy	  from	  politicians	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  desirable	  scenario.	  For	  instance,	  far	  from	  the	   idea	   of	   patronage	   generating	   inefficiencies,	   Müller	   (2007,	   258)	   has	   argued	   that	  patronage	  can	  be	  used	  to	  increase	  policy-­‐making	  capacity:	  “(b)y	  planting	  their	  trustees	  in	  the	   administration	   and	   the	  public	   sector	  more	   generally,	   political	   parties	   can	  make	   their	  policies	   better	   informed	   and	   smooth	   their	   implementation.”	   From	   the	   principal-­‐agent	  perspective,	   often	   used	   to	   study	   bureaucracies	   in	   the	   developed	  world,	   one	   of	   the	  main	  problems	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	  politicians	   (principals)	  and	  bureaucrats	   (agents)	   is	  how	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  politician	  can	  delegate	  responsibility	  to	  the	  bureaucrat	  and	  still	  obtain	   his	   preferred	   outcome.22	  Patronage	   appointments	   are	   a	   possible	   solution	   to	   this	  problem—with	  full	   freedom	  to	  appoint	  supporters	  the	   likelihood	  that	  the	   interests	  of	   the	  bureaucrat	  mirror	  those	  of	  the	  politician	  increases	  considerably.	  In	  this	  line,	  Grindle	  (2012,	  154)	  has	  argued	  that	  in	  some	  Latin	  American	  cases	  “the	  patronage	  systems	  encouraged	  the	  responsiveness	   of	   bureaucratic	   actors	   to	   executive	   policy	   leadership.”	   Although	   these	  arguments	  apply	  mainly	  to	  the	  behavior	  of	   the	  high	  public	  officials	  who	  determine	  policy	  implementation	  and	  not	   the	  middle	  and	   low-­‐level	  public	   employees	   that	   are	   the	   focus	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  political	  appointees	  at	  any	   level	  might	  be	  more	  enthusiastic,	  responsive,	  and	  loyal	  workers	  when	  they	  share	  the	  preferences	  of	  politicians.	  	  
The	   distribution	   of	   patronage	   jobs	   also	   has	   a	   number	   of	   serious	   political	  consequences	  that	  can	  have	  considerable	  impact	  on	  political	  competition	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  democracy.	  Control	  of	  patronage	  jobs	  significantly	  increases	  an	  incumbent’s	  probability	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  The	  literature	  on	  this	  topic	  is	  vast	  (especially	  the	  formal	  one).	  See	  Gailmard	  and	  Patty	  (2012)	  for	  a	  review.	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  getting	   reelected,	   reducing	   the	   level	   of	   electoral	   competition.23	  Beyond	   the	   principled	  reasons	  —	  discussed	   below—	   for	   opposing	   this	   unfair	   advantage,	   a	   decrease	   in	   political	  competition	  is	  also	  costly,	  as	  competitive	  elections	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  number	  of	  positive	  empirical	   outcomes.	   Many	   empirical	   studies	   show	   that	   increased	   political	   competition	  improves	   government	   performance	   by	   making	   politicians	   more	   responsive	   to	   their	  constituencies. 24 	  Higher	   levels	   of	   competition	   have	   been	   associated	   with	   decreased	  corruption	   (Rose-­‐Ackerman	   1978),	   greater	   spending	   in	   primary	   education	   in	   Mexico	  (Hecock	  2006),	   steeper	   economic	   growth	   in	   the	  U.S.	   states	   (Besley	   et	   al.	   2007),	   stronger	  rule	   of	   law	   in	   Argentina	   (Bill	   Chavez	   2003,	   2007),	   less	   politicization	   of	   the	   state	   in	   East	  Central	   Europe	   (Grzymala-­‐Busse	   2003),	   and	   the	   likelihood	   of	   bureaucratic	   reform	  involving	  meritocratic	  recruitment	   in	  Latin	  America	  (Geddes	  1994)	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Ting	  et	  al.	  2012).	  
Moreover,	  the	  use	  of	  any	  state	  resource	  for	  electoral	  competition	  provides	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  to	  the	  incumbent	  party.	  In	  this	  sense,	  patronage	  has	  much	  in	  common	  with	  the	  targeted	  manipulation	  of	  public	  programs	  and	  pork-­‐barrel	   spending.	   In	  all	   three	  of	   these	  cases	  the	  electoral	  playing	   field	   is	  skewed	   in	   favor	  of	   the	   incumbent	  party.	  Elections	  may	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  See	  chapter	  2	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  this	  literature	  and	  its	  main	  findings.	  24	  Note	  that	  in	  countries	  with	  “widespread	  institutional	  weakness”	  (Murillo	  and	  Levitsky	  2005)	  like	  Argentina	  and	   many	   others	   in	   Latin	   America,	   political	   competition	   is	   an	   even	   a	   more	   important	   mechanism	   of	  accountability.	   In	   these	  countries,	   “whenever	  existing	   formal	  rules	  and	  procedures	  were	  perceived	  to	  harm	  the	   short-­‐term	   interests	   of	   powerful	   actors,	   the	   rules	   were	   circumvented,	   manipulated,	   or	   changed.”	  Politicians	   in	   weak	   institutional	   democracies	   are	   then	   subjected	   to	   very	   low	   levels	   of	   horizontal	  accountability	  and	  enjoy	  ample	  opportunities	  to	  break	  and	  change	  the	  rules,	  but	  they	  still	  have	  to	  win	  elections.	  In	  fact,	  the	  strength	  of	  institutions	  is	  the	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  low	  levels	  of	  competition	  in	  places	  like	  Argentina	  and	  what	  Pempel	  (1990)	  has	  called	  “uncommon	  democracies,”	  advanced	  democracies	  of	  one-­‐party	   dominance	   such	   as	   Japan	   or	   Sweden.	   According	   to	   Pempel,	   one	   of	   the	   undesirable	   consequences	   of	  single	  party	  dominance	  is	  that	  “the	  longer	  a	  party	  is	  in	  power,	  the	  greater	  the	  opportunity	  it	  has	  to	  use	  state	  resources	   to	   shape	   and	   reshape	   its	   following”	   (p.7).	   The	   reason	   why	   weak	   competition	   has	   more	   serious	  consequences	  in	  a	  context	  of	  weak	  institutions	  is	  that	  those	  opportunities	  are	  considerably	  broader.	  
	  20	  	  still	  be	  competitive,	  but	  with	  the	  political	  use	  of	  state	  resources	  by	  the	  incumbent	  party	  to	  finance	  political	  workers,	  elections	  are	  less	  fair	  for	  the	  non-­‐incumbent	  parties.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  generates	  perverse	  incentives	  among	  politicians.	  If	  politicians’	  success	  in	  the	  polls	  strongly	  depends	  on	  the	  political	  services	  provided	  by	  public	  employees,	  they	  have	  “little	  reason	  to	  care	   about	   the	   formulation	   of	   policies,	   the	   construction	   of	   programmatic	   parties,	   and	  practices	  of	  accountability”	  (Schaffer	  2007,	  11).	  
As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   unfair	   incumbency	   advantage,	   democratic	   accountability	  also	  suffers.	  With	  fair	  competition,	  elections	  provide	  information	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  citizens’	   preferences,	  which	  makes	   it	   easier	   for	   these	   preferences	   to	   be	   represented	   and	  translated	  into	  public	  policies	  (Stokes	  2007,	  2009).	  If	  incumbents	  have	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  for	   electoral	   competition,	   elections	   tend	   to	   be	   less	   informative	   about	   the	   distribution	   of	  citizens’	   preferences.	   This	   in	   turn	   can	   affect	   levels	   of	   satisfaction	  with	   the	   functioning	   of	  democracy	   and	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   elected	   leaders.	   In	   a	   study	   of	   party	   competition	   in	  Latin	  America,	  Kitschelt	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  show	  that	  the	  level	  of	  confidence	  citizens	  express	  in	  democratic	  practices	  in	  their	  countries	  are	  lowest	  where	  programmatic	  party	  competition	  is	   weak.	   Similarly,	   empirical	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   higher	   levels	   of	   (perceived)	  corruption	   (Anderson	   and	   Tverdova	   2003;	   Seligson	   2002;	   Weitz-­‐Shapiro	   2008b)	   and	  clientelism	   (Kitschelt	   2007)	   reduce	   confidence	   in	   democratic	   institutions.	   In	   many	  countries	   in	   Latin	   American	   such	   popular	   dissatisfaction	   has	   lead	   in	   the	   last	   years	   to	  important	  street	  protests	  and	  even	  removal	  of	  presidents.	  
Understanding	  how	  patronage	  contracts	  work	  is	  also	  important	  because	  they	  likely	  are	   a	   prerequisite	   for	   many	   other	   forms	   of	   clientelism	   and	   corruption.	   In	   the	   words	   of	  Piattoni	  (2001,	  7)	  clientelism	  “implies”	  patronage:	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“In	  order	  to	  bend	  the	  administrative	  decision-­‐making	  process	  to	  
particularistic	   criteria,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   electoral	   return	   that	   this	  
would	  yield,	  the	  elected	  officials	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  put	  pressure	  
on	   career	   officials,	   hence	   to	   control	   (albeit	   informally)	   their	  
hiring,	  firing,	  and	  advancement.”	  	  	  
Bureaucrats	   have	   control	   over	   a	   wealth	   of	   resources	   that	   can	   be	   used	   (and	   abuse)	   for	  political	  and/or	  personal	  gain.	  Having	  “friends”	  appointed	  to	  certain	  positions,	  politicians	  will	   often	   find	   it	   easy	   to	   get	   patronage	   employees	   to	   do	   them	   a	   “favor”	   and	   provide	  resources	   required	   for	   clientelistic	   exchanges	   (Muller	   2007),	   as	  well	   as	   for	   personal	   and	  political	   corruption.	   Similarly,	   Kopecky	   et	   al.	   (2008,	   7)	   argue	   that	   patronage	   is	   the	  “necessary	  condition”	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  vote	  buying,	  pork	  barrel,	  and	  corruption:	  	  
“Insofar	  as	  a	  party	  does	  not	  control	  state	  agencies	  it	  will	  hardly	  
be	   in	   the	  position	   to	  develop	   large-­‐scale	   clientelistic	   exchanges,	  
to	   favor	   specific	   constituencies	   through	   the	   allocation	   of	   funds,	  
or	  to	  make	  illegal	  use	  of	  public	  resources	  for	  private	  gains.”25	  	  	  
Moreover,	   although	   hardly	   ever	   the	   main	   focus	   of	   analysis,	   most	   empirical	   studies	   of	  clientelism	  refer	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  work	  of	  brokers	  and	  activists.	   For	   instance,	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   his	   well-­‐known	   book	   about	   clientelism	   in	  Argentina,	  Auyero	   (2000)	   includes	  a	   list	  of	  eleven	  actors	   (plus	   four	  elected	  officials)	   that	  are	   relevant	   in	   the	   local	   network	   he	   is	   studying.	   Of	   those	   eleven	   actors,	   four	   are	   public	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  In	  Politician’s	  Dilemma,	  when	  discussing	  presidential	  appointment	  strategies,	  Geddes	  (1994,	  140)	  argues:	  “To	  deliver	   particularistic	   benefits	   to	   large	  numbers	   of	   voters,	   the	  president	   needs	   loyalists	   in	   all	   agencies	  that	  deal	  with	   the	  public	   for	  any	  purpose.	  Politicians	  must	  have	  bureaucratic	  colleagues	  on	  whom	  they	  can	  call	   to	   expedite	   pension	   payments,	   telephone	   hookups,	   and	   import	   licenses,	   approve	   loans,	   choose	   the	  teachers	  for	  local	  schools,	  and	  arrange,	  expedite,	  or	  fund	  exceptions	  to	  anything	  else	  affected	  by	  government	  regulation.”	  Similarly,	  for	  Müller	  (2007,	  266):	  “Probably	  more	  important	  than	  jobs	  in	  the	  bureaucracy	  itself	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  bureaucrats	  control	  access	  to	  other	  resources	  that	  can	  be	  used	  in	  the	  clientelistic	  exchanges.”	  See	  also	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007b,	  36-­‐40).	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  employees	  and	  the	  fifth	  works	  part	  time	  for	  the	  municipality	  on	  a	  temporary	  contract.	  After	  introducing	  the	  main	  political	  broker	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  (Matilde)	  on	  page	  1,	  three	  young	  men	  are	   introduced:	  one	   is	  a	  public	  employee	  and	  the	  other	  one	  “is	  unemployed,	  but	  has	  been	   showing	   up	   at	   Matilde’s	   UB26	  for	   the	   last	   four	   months;	   he	   expects	   to	   obtain	   a	  municipal	  job	  soon.”	  In	  general,	  although	  very	  few	  studies	  outside	  the	  US	  focus	  specifically	  on	  public	   employment,	   there	   is	   considerable	  agreement	   that	  public	   sector	   jobs	  are	  a	  key	  component	   of	   electoral	   machines	   (see,	   for	   example,	   Levitsky	   2003;	   Szwarcberg	   2009;	  Zarazaga	  2012).27	  
Finally,	  besides	  the	  possible	  economic	  inefficiencies	  associated	  with	  the	  distribution	  of	   patronage	   jobs,	   its	   effects	   on	   political	   competition	   and	   accountability,	   and	   the	  possibilities	   for	   other	   forms	   of	   clientelism	   and	   corruption	   that	   patronage	   jobs	   facilitate,	  there	   is	   still	   another	   serious	   effect	   that	   the	   politicization	   of	   the	   administration	   can	  generate.	   The	   existence	   of	   bias	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   public	   sector	   jobs	   raises	   serious	  questions	   about	   the	   independence	   of	   public	   administration	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   equal	  access	   to	   the	   state.	   When	   clear	   rules	   for	   hiring	   and	   promotion	   do	   not	   exist,	   public	  employees	   “owe”	   their	   job	   to	   the	   patron	   that	   discretionally	   decides	   on	   hiring.	   In	   this	  context,	   the	  bureaucracy	   lacks	   independence	  and	   this	   lack	  of	   independence	  could	   lead	   to	  lack	   of	   impartiality	   vis	   à	   vis	   citizens.	   As	   Chandra	   (2004,	   87)	   points	   out,	   in	   patronage	  democracies	   “proximity	   to	  a	   state	  official	   increases	  a	  voter’s	   chances	  of	  obtaining	  valued	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  UB	  (Unidad	  Básica)	  is	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Peronists	  in	  Argentina	  called	  their	  grassroots	  offices;	  the	  other	  main	  traditional	  party	  in	  Argentina,	  the	  Radical	  Party	  (UCR)	  called	  their	  offices	  Comités	  (committees)	  27	  The	  machine	   politics	   literature	   in	   the	  U.S.	   has	  more	   explicitly	   recognized	   and	   studied	   the	   importance	   of	  “jobs	   for	   the	   boys”	   for	   the	   sustenance	   of	   the	   machine.	   See	   chapter	   2	   for	   a	   more	   complete	   review	   of	   the	  literature	   on	   clientelism	   that	   has	   acknowledged	   the	   importance	   of	   public	   sector	   jobs	   to	   fund	   the	   work	   of	  activists	  and	  brokers.	  
	  23	  	  state	  resources	  and	  services.”	  What	  happen	  to	  those	  citizens	  with	  no	  “proximity	  to	  a	  state	  official”?	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  Chubb	  (1981,	  120)	  points	  out,	  “an	  able	  administrator	  can	  (…)	  transform	   a	   routine	   bureaucratic	   procedure	   into	   a	   personal	   favor.”	   In	   contexts	   of	  widespread	  patronage,	  public	  positions	   that	   channel	   those	   favors	  are	   filled	  with	  partisan	  workers	   that	   provide	   political	   support	   to	   their	   patrons.	   Would	   a	   citizen	   that	   is	   clearly	  identified	   with	   the	   opposition	   get	   equal	   treatment?	   Would	   a	   citizen	   with	   no	   personal	  connections	  to	  anyone	  on	  the	  public	  sector	  payroll	  even	  bother	  asking	  for	  help?	  When	  the	  public	   administration	   is	   filled	   with	   patronage	   employees,	   ordinary	   citizens	   might	   feel	  excluded.	  Whether	  this	  impression	  of	  uneven	  access	  to	  the	  state	  is	  real	  or	  not,	   it	  could	  be	  enough	   to	  keep	  away	   those	  without	  personal	   connections.	  As	  Cox	  and	  McCubbins	   (1986,	  385)	  puts	  it:	  “Insofar	  as	  politicians	  can	  design	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  bureaucratic	  decisions	  are	  made,	  they	  can	  also	  (at	  least	  indirectly)	  influence	  the	  set	  of	  citizens	  that	  bring	  demands	  or	  complaints	   before	   the	   bureaucracy	   for	   redress.”	   And	   when	   those	   without	   personal	  connections	  are	  poor—as	   is	  usually	   the	   case—patronage	   is	   linked	  not	  only	   to	  an	  uneven	  access	   to	   the	   state	   and	   therefore	   weak	   rule	   of	   law,	   but	   it	   also	   becomes	   a	   means	   of	  reproducing	  existing	  inequalities.	  
	  
1.3	   Challenges	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  Patronage	  	  
Although	   patronage	   is	   often	   perfectly	   legal,	   it	   constitutes	   a	   “gray	   area”	   of	   acceptable	  practice	   (van	   de	   Valle	   2007,	   52),	   which	   makes	   it	   particularly	   difficult	   to	   study.	   The	  challenges	  seem	  so	  serious	  that	  Geddes	  (1994,	  105)	  has	  stated	  that	  simply	  “there	  is	  no	  way	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  to	  measure	  amounts	  of	  patronage.”	  Long	  before	  that,	  Wilson	  (1961,	  372)	  wrote:	  “So	  much	  secrecy	  is	  maintained	  in	  city	  politics	  that	  no	  exact	  data	  on	  patronage	  may	  ever	  be	  obtained	  in	  cities	  of	  any	  size.”	  Different	  strategies	  have	  been	  used	  in	  the	  contemporary	  literature	  to	  handle	  this	  problem	  and	  generate	  systematic	  data	  to	  study	  patronage	  politics.	  
Taking	  advantage	  of	   the	   fact	   that,	   in	  some	  contexts	   like	  Argentina	  and	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries,	  civil	  service	  rules	  are	  weak	  or	  non-­‐existent,	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  tried	  to	  get	  around	  the	  problem	  of	  measuring	  patronage	  by	  using	  proxies,	  such	  as	  the	  total	  number	   of	   public	   employees	   (Calvo	   and	  Murillo	   2004),	   number	   of	   temporary	   employees	  (Kemahlioglu	   2006,	   2011)	   or	   spending	   in	   personnel	   (Brusco	   et	   al.	   2005;	   Gordin	   2002;	  Keefer	  2005;	  Remmer	  2007).	  However,	  while	  strict	  and	  clear	  civil	  service	  rules	  are	  usually	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  patronage,	  lack	  of	  those	  rules	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  public	   sector	   jobs	   are	   distributed	   through	   patronage	   contracts.	   Moreover,	   these	   figures	  could	   also	   easily	   hide	   patronage	   appointments.	   For	   instance,	   all	   those	   measures	   would	  remain	  stable	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  new	  incumbents	  fire	  employees	  hired	  by	  the	  previous	  administration	   and	   replace	   them	   with	   their	   own	   supporters,	   without	   increasing	   the	  number	  of	  employees	  or	   the	  spending	  on	  salaries	  (Scherlis	  2009).	  Estimates	  by	  proxy	  do	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  was	  given	  with	  the	  expectation	  of	  getting	  political	  support	  in	  return.28	  	  
Moreover,	   the	   challenge	   is	   not	   only	   to	   be	   able	   to	   assess	   whether	   public	   jobs	   are	  distributed	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	  services	  but	  also	  to	  be	  able	  to	  study	  the	  type	  of	  political	  support	  that	  public	  employees	  provide	  to	  their	  bosses	  and	  the	  reasons	  behind	  this	  support.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  For	  a	  longer	  discussion	  about	  the	  problems	  associated	  with	  this	  type	  of	  measures	  in	  general	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Argentina	  in	  particular,	  see	  Scherlis	  (2009,	  39-­‐42).	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  However,	  asking	  either	  politicians	  or	  public	  employees	  about	  these	  political	  services	  is	  also	  problematic.	  As	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007c,	  323-­‐327)	  argue,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  both	  patrons	   and	   clients	   have	   incentives	   to	   misreport	   clientelistic	   exchanges.	   In	   the	   case	   of	  patronage,	  public	  employees	  could	  be	  reluctant	   to	  admit	   that	   their	   job	   is	  a	  patronage	   job	  because	   that	  could	   imply	   that	   they	  did	  not	   really	   “earn”	   it.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   the	  patron,	   admitting	   the	   existence	   of	   patronage	   jobs	   is	   even	   more	   problematic	   because	   it	  implies	  the	  use	  of	  state	  resources	  for	  political	  purposes.	  Even	  when	  clientelism	  is	  often	  not	  illegal,	  politicians	  may	  answer	  questions	  about	  clientelism	  “as	  valence	  questions	  on	  which	  they	  suspect	  most	  citizens	  and	  observers	  to	  be	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  issue	  (against)”	  (Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  2007c,	  326).	  29	  
In	   the	   research	   carried	   out	   for	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   avoided	   the	  use	   of	   proxies,	   and	  tried	   to	  mitigate	   the	   problems	   associated	  with	   asking	   sensitive	   questions	   directly	   to	   the	  actors	  involved.	  As	  I	  explain	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  3,	  I	  test	  the	  empirical	  implications	  of	   my	   theory	   using	   an	   original	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   survey	   of	   1200	   municipal	   public	   sector	  employees	  that	  I	  fielded	  in	  three	  Argentinean	  municipalities.	  To	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  this	  presents	  the	  first	  systematic	  attempt	  to	  measure	  the	  types	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  political	  services	   that	  employees	  hired	  through	  patronage	  contracts	  provide	  to	   their	  patrons.	  Still,	  eliciting	   such	   potentially	   sensitive	   information	   from	   respondents	   using	   standard	   survey	  methods	  could	  be	  difficult.	  To	  minimize	   the	  social	   response	  bias	   (whether	   in	   the	   form	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  To	  get	  around	  this	  problem,	  some	  scholars	  have	  opted	  recently	  to	  implement	  expert	  surveys.	  For	  instance,	  Herbert	   Kitschelt	   runs	   a	   cross-­‐country	   project	   that	   includes	   nearly	   90	   countries	   at	   Duke	   University	  (“Democratic	   Accountability	   and	   Linkages	   Survey	   Project”),	   which	   aims	   to	   get	   information	   from	   every	  country	  with	  multi	  party	  elections	  on	  leadership	  accountability	  (see	  Kitschelt	  et	  al.	  2009).	  Peter	  Mair	  and	  Petr	  Kopecký	  directed	  another	  expert	  survey	  in	  fifteen	  European	  countries	  and	  five	  new	  democracies	  that	  focuses	  on	  party	  patronage	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Kopecký,	  et	  al.	  2012).	  See	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  (2007c,	  327-­‐329)	  for	  an	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  alternative.	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  inaccurate	  answers	  or	  refusals),	  I	  designed	  a	  series	  of	  list	  experiments.	  These	  experiments	  provide	  respondents	  with	  the	  anonymity	  needed	  to	  be	  able	  to	  obtain	  accurate	  information	  about	  their	  political	  activities.	  Further,	  the	  use	  of	  survey	  experiments	  allows	  me	  to	  assess	  why	  public	   sector	   employees	   comply	  with	   their	   side	   of	   the	   patronage	   contract.	   Finally,	   I	  complement	   the	   analysis	   of	   the	   survey	   results	  with	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   of	   public	   sector	  employees,	  brokers	  and	  politicians.	  
	  
1.4	  Why	  Argentina?	   	  
While	   the	   theory	   developed	   and	   tested	   in	   this	   dissertation	   applies	   to	   many	   countries	  without	   strict	   civil	   service	   rules,	   Argentina	   offers	   the	   perfect	   setting	   in	   which	   to	   begin	  testing	   it.	   Once	   infamous	   for	   its	   political	   instability,30	  Argentina	   is	   today	   infamous	   for	   its	  clientelistic	  politics.	  Whether	  fairly	  deserve	  it	  or	  not,	  Argentinean	  clientelism	  has	  become	  the	   focus	   of	   a	   lot	   of	   scholarly	   attention:	   Auyero	   (2000),	   Calvo	   and	   Murillo	   (2004,	  forthcoming),	  Calvo	  and	  Ujhelyi	  (2012),	  Kemahlioglu	  (2006,	  2011),	  Levitsky	  (2003),	  Lodola	  (2005),	  Remmer	  (2007),	  Stokes	  and	  her	  coauthors	  (2004,	  2005,	  2006,	  2012),	  Szwarcberg	  (2009,	  2012),	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  (2006,	  2008a,	  2012),	  and	  Zarazaga	  (2012),	  just	  to	  mention	  a	  few	  examples.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Argentina	   has	   been	   a	   stable	   democracy	  with	   free	   and	   fair	   elections	   since	   1983.	   The	   Partido	   Justicialista	  (Peronist	   or	   PJ),	   and	   Unión	   Cívica	   Radical	   (Radicals	   or	   UCR)	   have	   dominated	   electoral	   competition	   in	  Argentina	   for	   the	   last	   60	   years.	   Since	   the	   return	   of	   democracy	   in	   1983,	   the	   PJ	   has	   won	   the	   presidential	  election	   five	   times	   (1989,	   1995,	   2003,	   2007	   and	   2011),	  while	   the	  UCR	  has	  won	   it	   twice	   (1983	   and	   1999).	  Regardless	  of	  which	  party	  won	  the	  presidential	  election,	  the	  PJ	  has	  managed	  to	  control	  the	  Senate,	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  governorships	  and	  local	  governments,	  and	  usually	  a	  plurality	  of	  seats	   in	  the	  Lower	  House	  during	  the	  entire	   1983-­‐2011	   period.	   Since	   the	   2001	   political	   and	   economic	   crisis,	   UCR	   has	   lost	   a	   lot	   of	   its	   national	  presence	   in	   the	   Argentinean	   political	   system	   but	   still	   preserves	   considerable	   importance	   for	   local	   and	  provincial	  elections.	  
	  27	  	   Together	  with	  this	  well-­‐documented	  widespread	  clientelism,	  Argentina	  provides	  an	  especially	   good	   setting	   to	   study	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   patronage	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	  Argentina	  lacks	  stable	  civil	  service	  rules	  and	  has	  a	  large	  public	  sector	  with	  “well-­‐developed	  patronage	   systems”	   (Calvo	   and	   Ujhelyi	   2012).	   Moreover,	   it	   has	   an	   extensive	   level	   of	  decentralization	   that	   results	   in	   significant	   variation	   in	   the	   size	   and	   the	   characteristics	   of	  public	   employment	   across	   provinces	   and	   municipalities. 31 	  Finally,	   although	   some	  provincial	  regulations	  apply	  to	  municipal	  public	  employment,	  control	  over	  local	  personnel	  is	  the	  exclusive	  responsibility	  of	   local	  governments—a	  fact	  that	   increases	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  patronage	  even	  more.	  	  
The	  Argentine	  Constitution	  has	  guaranteed	  job	  stability	  for	  public	  employees	  since	  1949	   (Art.	   14bis).	   National,	   provincial	   and	   local	   employees	   often	   enjoy	   tenure	   rights	  (normally	  after	  a	  year)	  and	  cannot	  be	  fired	  once	  they	  have	  achieved	  a	  permanent	  position.	  However,	   the	   tenure	   system	   is	   systematically	   bypassed	   with	   the	   increasing	   use	   of	  temporary	   contracts.	   Any	   Argentine	   administration	   (national,	   provincial,	   and	   local)	   is	  constituted	  by	  two	  main	  groups	  of	  employees—permanent	  employees	  (with	  tenure,	  or	  the	  legally	   guarantee	   expectation	   of	   tenure	   after	   a	   short	   period)	   and	   temporary	   employees	  (with	   contracts	   subjected	   to	   renewal,	   often	   on	   yearly	   basis).	   In	   spite	   of	   the	   stability	   of	  employment	  that	  permanent	  employees	  enjoy,	  Argentina	  lacks	  stable	  civil	  service	  rules	  and	  —although	  there	  were	  various	  attempts	  to	  create	  a	  meritocratic	  system	  of	  recruitment—	  most	  appointments	  are	  still	  discretionary.	  In	  general,	  there	  are	  no	  standardized	  exams	  for	  entrance	   and	   there	   exists	   no	   independent	   agency	   to	   oversee	   and	   coordinate	   hiring	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Argentina	   is	   a	   federal	   republic	   with	   a	   presidential	   system,	   extensive	   decentralization	   and	   significant	  regional	   variation.	   It	   has	   23	   provinces	   divided	   into	   more	   than	   2000	   local	   governments	   (around	   1200	  municipalities	  and	  800	  comunas),	  and	  a	  capital	  city	  (Buenos	  Aires)	  with	  a	  semi	  autonomous	  status.	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  promotions.	  The	  government	   (national,	  provincial,	   and	   local)	   can	   then	  politically	  appoint	  followers	   to	   public	   jobs	   either	   by	   enlarging	   the	   public	   sector	   or	   replacing	   temporal	  employees.	  As	  far	  as	  permanent	  personnel	  are	  not	  touched,	  every	  new	  president,	  governor	  and	  mayor	   enjoys	   considerable	  discretion	   to	   appoint	  new	  personnel.32	  As	   it	  will	   be	   clear	  from	   the	   evidence	   presented	   in	   chapters	   3	   to	   5,	   this	   discretion	   is	   use	   (and	   abuse)	  extensively	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  patronage	  contracts.	  	  
Note	  that,	  in	  spite	  of	  all	  the	  attention	  that	  the	  literature	  has	  given	  to	  the	  Argentinean	  case,	  Argentina	  is	  not	  an	  outlier	  among	  Latin	  American	  countries—at	  least	  for	  the	  specific	  type	   of	   clientelistic	   exchange	   that	   is	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   dissertation.	   In	   an	   Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank	  (IDB)	  evaluation	  of	  bureaucracy	  and	  civil	  service	  systems	  across	  Latin	  American	   countries,	   Argentina	   is	   placed	   in	   the	   group	   of	   countries	   with	   intermediate	  development	  of	  the	  civil	  service,	  together	  with	  Colombia,	  Mexico,	  Uruguay,	  and	  Venezuela	  (Echebarría	   2006;	   see	   also	   Zuvanic	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   all	   Latin	   American	  countries	   have	   established	   a	   career	   public	   service,	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  merit	   is	   the	   only	  criteria	  used	  for	  hiring,	  firing,	  and	  promotion	  varies	  enormously	  across	  countries.	  With	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  Brazil,	  in	  all	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries	  civil	  service	  systems	  exist	  in	  parallel	   to	  political	   criteria	   for	  hiring,	   firing,	   and	  promotions	   (Grindle	  2012;	   Iacoviello	  2006;	  Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010).33	  
In	  sum,	   the	  combination	  of	  well-­‐documented	  and	  widespread	  patronage	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  decentralization	  that	  results	  in	  significant	  variation	  in	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32 	  See	   Bambaci	   et	   al.	   (2007),	   Ferraro	   (2011),	   Grindle	   (2012),	   Scherlis	   (2009)	   and	   Chapter	   6	   in	   this	  dissertation	  for	  more	  details.	  33	  Chapter	  6	  describes	  and	  discusses	  in	  depth	  how	  Argentina	  compares	  to	  other	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  
	  29	  	  settings	   in	   which	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   taking	   place,	   makes	   Argentina	   a	   particularly	  useful	   laboratory	   for	   studying	  patronage	  politics.	   Since	  my	  purpose	  here	   is	   to	   study	  how	  patronage	  works	   and	   not	   to	   establish	  whether	   patronage	   exists,	   the	   choice	   of	   a	   country	  with	  well-­‐known	  patronage	  politics	  seems	  appropriate.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	  Argentina	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  an	  outlier	  in	  terms	  of	  patronage	  appointments,	  at	  least	  for	  Latin	  American	  standards,	  which	  makes	  the	  evidence	  presented	  in	  this	  dissertation	  relevant	  for	  other	  Latin	  American	  cases.	  Finally,	  the	  subnational	  variation	  that	  exists	  in	  Argentina	  allows	  me	  to	  test	  my	  theory	  in	  very	  different	  settings—which	  makes	  the	  expectation	  of	  the	  portability	  of	  the	  results	   to	   other	   settings	   more	   plausible—without	   losing	   the	   advantages	   of	   conducting	  research	  in	  only	  one	  country.34	  
	  
1.5	   Preview	  of	  the	  Argument	  and	  Contributions	  
Why	   does	   the	   control	   of	   patronage	   significantly	   increase	   a	   party’s	   chances	   of	   staying	   in	  power?	  What	   do	   public	   employees	   do	   that	   affect	   electoral	   competition?	  What	  motivates	  public	  employees	  to	  do	  it?	  In	  chapter	  2,	  I	  develop	  a	  theory	  that	  seeks	  to	  understand	  what	  it	  is	   that	  public	   employees	  do	   that	   affects	   electoral	   competition	  and	  why	   they	  do	   it.	  Here,	   I	  present	  a	  preview	  of	  that	  argument.	  
Consistent	   with	   the	   general	   understanding	   in	   the	   literature,	   I	   argue	   that	   public	  sector	   jobs	   are	   disproportionally	   distributed	   to	   political	   supporters.	   However,	   since	  government	   jobs	  are	  expensive,	   the	  type	  of	  political	  support	   that	   is	  expected	   in	  exchange	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Of	  course,	  testing	  the	  theory	  in	  only	  one	  country	  can	  raise	  some	  concerns	  about	  the	  generalizability	  of	  the	  argument.	  I	  address	  this	  issue	  in	  chapter	  6	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  
	  30	  	  for	  public	  sector	  employment	  goes	  far	  beyond	  the	  simple	  act	  of	  voting.	   In	  fact,	  politicians	  distribute	   many	   low	   and	   mid-­‐level	   positions	   in	   the	   bureaucracy	   with	   the	   goal	   of	  maintaining	   a	   network	   of	   activists	   on	   the	   ground	   that	   performs	   a	   number	   of	   different	  political	  activities—such	  as	  helping	  with	  electoral	  campaigns	  or	  attending	  rallies—that	  are	  essential	  for	  attracting	  and	  maintaining	  electoral	  support.	  	  
Patronage	   jobs	   then	   provide	   politicians	   in	   power	   with	   a	   very	   powerful	   tool—an	  army	  of	  political	  workers.	  However,	   these	   types	  of	   contracts	   are	  hard	   to	   enforce	   for	   two	  reasons.	  First,	  because	  the	  law	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  enforce	  the	  contracts,	  they	  must	  be	  self-­‐enforcing.	  Second,	  since	  the	  exchange	  is	  non-­‐simultaneous,	  both	  politicians	  and	  clients	  face	  a	   commitment	   problem.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   sector	   jobs	   for	   political	  support,	  politicians	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  “wasting	  jobs”	  on	  employees	  that,	  once	  hired,	  would	  not	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  contract.	  Clients,	  in	  turn,	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  providing	  services	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  a	  future	  job	  from	  a	  candidate	  that,	  once	  in	  office,	  would	  renege	  on	  his	  side	  of	  the	   agreement	   and	   withhold	   the	   job	   offer.	   This	   dissertation	   focuses	   on	   the	   former	  commitment	  problem	  (what	  happens	  once	  the	  job	  has	  been	  delivered	  with	  the	  promise	  of	  political	  support	  in	  return).	  Why	  would	  public	  employees	  uphold	  their	  end	  of	  the	  contract	  and	  provide	  political	  services	  even	  after	  receiving	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  job?	  	  
A	  citizen	  who	  receives	  a	  public	   job	  with	  the	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  understanding	  that	  she	  will	   provide	  political	   services	   in	   return	   can	  easily	   renege	  on	  her	   side	  of	   the	   contract	  after	  getting	  the	  job.	  As	  Stokes	  (2007)	  points	  out,	  we	  would	  expect	  clientelistic	  relations	  to	  be	  full	  of	  opportunities	  for	  defection	  and	  betrayal.	  Why	  would	  employees	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  contract	  after	  receiving	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  job?	  How	  can	  the	  mayor	  make	  sure	  not	  to	   “waste”	   jobs	   on	   citizens	   that	   will	   not	   fulfill	   their	   side	   of	   the	   patronage	   contract?	   The	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  literature	  so	  far	  has	  provided	  two	  main	  answers	  to	  this	  question:	  norms	  of	  reciprocity	  and	  fear	  of	   retaliation.	  According	   to	   the	   first	   set	  of	   theories,	  norms	  of	   reciprocity	  enforce	   the	  clientelistic	  exchange;	  clients	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  because	  they	  want	  to	  help	   those	   who	   helped	   them.	   In	   other	   words,	   clients	   help	   the	   patron	   out	   of	   feelings	   of	  gratitude.	   Recent	   studies	   have	   shown	   that	   reciprocity	   might	   play	   a	   role	   in	   vote	   buying	  (Finan	   and	   Schecheter	   2012;	   Lawson	   and	   Greene	   2012).	   From	   this	   perspective,	   public	  employees	   respect	   their	   side	   of	   the	   contract	   and	   provide	   political	   services	   because	   they	  want	  to	  help	  the	  person	  who	  has	  helped	  them.	  	  
The	   logic	   of	   the	   second	   set	   of	   theories	   is	   different.	   From	   this	   perspective,	   clients	  comply	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  that	  the	  patron	  will	  cut	  off	  the	  benefits	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so.	  In	   fact,	  a	   lot	  of	   the	  contemporary	   literature	  on	  clientelism	  has	   focused	  on	  the	  monitoring	  and	   commitment	   problems	   that	   are	   associated	   with	   this	   perspective	   (see,	   for	   example,	  Brusco	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  2007;	  Nichter	  2008;	  Stokes	  2005	  and	  2007;	  and	  Robinson	  and	  Verdier	  2003).	  As	  discussed	   in	   section	  1.1,	   for	  many	  of	   the	  authors	   in	   this	  school	  of	   thought,	   the	   ability	  of	   the	  patron	   to	   identify	  non-­‐compliers	   and	  punish	   them	   is	  what	  makes	   an	   exchange	   truly	   clientelistic.	   For	   them,	   the	   defining	   feature	   of	   clientelistic	  exchanges	  is	  that	  they	  are	  contingent	  on	  the	  client’s	  behavior.	  If	  the	  client	  does	  not	  behave	  according	   to	   her	   patron's	   wishes—which	   requires	   either	   the	   ability	   to	   monitor	   or	   the	  client’s	   belief	   that	   this	   is	   possible—,	   the	   patron	   has	   the	   power	   to	   punish	   the	   client	   by	  withdrawing	   or	   withholding	   the	   benefit.	   From	   this	   perspective	   then,	   the	   commitment	  problem	  is	  solved	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  fear—public	  employees	  provide	  political	  services	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  that	  the	  patron	  will	  cut	  off	  the	  benefit	  and	  fire	  them	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so.	  
	  32	  	   I	  argue	   that	   there	   is	  a	   third	  alternative	   that	  ensures	   that	  public	  employees	  uphold	  their	   part	   of	   the	   patronage	   contract	   and	   provide	   political	   support	   for	   the	   politician	   that	  have	  giving	  them	  these	  valued	  positions.	  Public	  sector	  employees	  (clients),	  I	  argue,	  engage	  in	  political	   activities	   that	   support	  politicians	   (patrons)	  because	   their	   fates	  are	   tied	   to	   the	  political	  fate	  of	  their	  patrons.	  Put	  simply,	  their	  incentives	  are	  aligned.	  	  
One	   reason	   for	   this	   incentive	   alignment	   is	   that	   politicians	   are	   generally	   able	   to	  appoint	   employees	   who	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   in	   the	   first	   place.	  Politicians	  want	  to	  distribute	  patronage	  jobs	  to	  those	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  comply	  with	  the	   patronage	   agreement	   and	   provide	   political	   services.	   However,	   finding	   these	   types	   of	  employees	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task.	  Potential	  employees	  can	  promise	  future	  compliance	  but	  for	  the	  promise	  to	  be	  credible	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity	  or	  punishment	  for	  non-­‐compliers	   it	   has	   to	   be	   incentive-­‐compatible.	   Only	   if	   potential	   employees	   can	   credibly	  commit	   to	  provide	  political	   support	   in	   the	   future,	  patronage	  contracts	  are	   self-­‐sustaining	  without	   punishment	   and	   reciprocity.	   The	   need	   to	   make	   patronage	   contracts	   incentive-­‐compatible	   leads	   to	   the	   distribution	   of	   these	   jobs	   to	   supporters.	   All	   potential	   clients	   (or	  employees)	  can	  promise	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  in	  the	  future,	  but	  only	  supporters	  can	  make	  these	  promises	  credible.	  Patronage	  jobs	  and	  working	  conditions	  held	  by	  supporters	  will	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   who	   have	   hired	   them	   but	   not	   by	   a	  competing	  politician.	  Supporters	  then	  have	  large	  incentives	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  (their	  patron)	  stay	  in	  power,	  which	  makes	  their	  original	  commitment	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  credible.	  	  
Politicians	  use	  referrals	  and	  personal	  and	  partisan	  connections	  to	  screen	  potential	  clients	  and	  separate	  supporters	  from	  non-­‐supporters.	  All	  things	  equal,	  supporters	  are	  more	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  likely	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  agreement	  and	  provide	  political	  services	  because	  they	  are	  more	  likely	   to	   actually	   support	   the	   party	   or	   the	   politician	   than	   non-­‐supporters,	   making	   the	  provision	   of	   political	   services	   less	   costly	   for	   them.	   But,	   of	   course,	   perceptions	   could	   be	  misleading.	  Patronage	  employees	  could	  pretend	  to	  have	  certain	  political	  preferences	  to	  get	  a	  job,	  change	  their	  minds	  about	  their	  political	  preferences,	  or	  simply	  reduce	  the	  effort	  they	  are	   willing	   to	   devote	   to	   political	   work.	   Again,	   since	   the	   exchange	   is	   not	   simultaneous,	  employees	  with	  patronage	  jobs—even	  perceived	  supporters—	  still	  have	  the	  possibility	  of	  not	  complying	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  after	  receiving	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  job.	  Being	  a	   supporter—or,	   more	   accurately,	   being	   perceived	   as	   one—is	   not	   in	   itself	   enough	   to	  guarantee	  compliance	  with	  the	  patronage	  agreement.	  
What	  explains,	  then,	  that	  patronage	  agreements	  are	  in	  fact	  respected?	  What	  makes	  patronage	   contracts	   self-­‐enforcing	   is	   the	   belief	   on	   the	   part	   of	   patronage	   employees	   that	  their	   jobs	   are	   tied	   to	   the	   political	   success	   of	   their	   patron.	   Public	   employees	   under	  patronage	  contracts	  believe	  that	  if	  the	  incumbent	  loses	  the	  election,	  their	  own	  jobs	  could	  be	  in	   jeopardy.	   Once	   perceived	   as	   a	   supporter	   of	   the	   incumbent	   politician,	   patronage	  employees	  have	  low	  expectations	  of	  keeping	  their	  jobs	  and	  their	  working	  conditions	  if	  the	  opposition	  were	  to	  win.	  A	  new	  politician	  will	  want	  patronage	  jobs	  to	  be	  distributed	  to	  those	  more	   likely	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   for	   him	   and	   only	   his	   supporters	   can	   credibly	  commit	  to	  do	  that	  in	  the	  future,	  so	  old	  employees	  will	  be	  replaced	  or	  demoted.	  Supporters	  of	  the	  incumbent	  then	  have	  a	  huge	  incentive	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  try	  to	  keep	  the	  incumbent	   that	   have	   hired	   them	   in	   power.	   In	   other	   words,	   when	   supporters	   get	   the	  patronage	   jobs,	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   incentive-­‐compatible	   and	   the	   commitment	  problem	  associated	  with	  the	  non-­‐simultaneity	  of	  the	  exchange	  disappears.	  Supporters	  with	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   jobs	  understand	   that	   it	   is	  on	   their	  best	   interest	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   to	  help	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   remain	   in	   power.	   And	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	   alignment	   of	  interests	   between	   patrons	   and	   clients	   (or	   elected	   politicians	   and	   patronage	   employees)	  what	  makes	  patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining.	  
By	  providing	  a	  direct	  assessment	  of	  the	  specific	  mechanisms	  that	   lie	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	   effect	   of	   patronage	   on	   political	   competition,	   my	   dissertation	   makes	   three	   main	  contributions.	   First,	   it	   presents	   the	   first	   systematic	   attempt	   to	   measure	   the	   types	   and	  extent	  of	  political	   services	   that	  employees	  hired	   through	  patronage	  contracts	  provide	   for	  their	  patrons.	  I	  also	  provide	  a	  novel	  explanation	  about	  the	  enforcement	  of	  these	  patronage	  contracts.	  By	  treating	  both	  patrons	  and	  clients—in	  this	  case,	  public	  employees—as	  equally	  sophisticated,	   self-­‐interested	   individuals,	   my	   argument	   departs	   from	   existing	   accounts	  based	   either	   on	   feelings	   of	   reciprocity	   or	   fear	   of	   punishment.	   I	   argue	   that	   public	   sector	  employees	   comply	   with	   the	   patronage	   contract	   because	   their	   interests	   are	   aligned	   with	  those	   of	   their	   patrons.	   Patronage	   contracts	   then	   do	   not	   always	   indicate	   passive	   clients	  acting	  out	  of	  fear	  and	  behaving	  against	  their	  preferences.	  Clients	  (in	  this	  case,	  public	  sector	  employees)	  can	  make	  sophisticated	  calculations	  when	  deciding	  whether	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  agreement	   or	   renege.	   Finally,	   by	   showing	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   lists	   experiments	   to	   elicit	  truthful	   responses	   to	   sensitive	   topics,	   my	   dissertation	   also	   makes	   a	   methodological	  contribution.	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1.6	   Plan	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  
The	  rest	  of	  the	  dissertation	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  Chapter	  2	  introduces	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	   of	   patronage	   and	   derives	   its	   empirical	   implications.	   After	  a	   discussion	   on	   the	  relationship	   between	   patronage	   jobs	   and	   political	   competition	   and	   a	   description	   of	   the	  types	  of	  political	  services	  that	  public	  employees	  provide	  to	  their	  bosses,	  I	  develop	  a	  novel	  theory	  that	  seeks	  to	  understand	  the	  reasons	  behind	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services.	  Why	  would	  employees	  uphold	  their	  end	  of	  the	  patronage	  contract	  and	  provide	  political	  services	  even	  after	   receiving	  the	  benefit	  of	   the	   job?	  Departing	   from	  existing	  accounts,	   I	  argue	  that	  clients	   (employees)	   fulfill	   their	   side	   of	   the	   contract	   because	   their	   incentives	   are	   aligned	  with	  those	  of	  their	  patrons	  (politicians).	  	  
	   Chapter	  3,	  4	  and	  5	  offer	  the	  main	  empirical	  tests	  of	  this	  theory.	  After	  showing	  that	  patronage	   jobs	  are	   in	   fact	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters,	  Chapter	  3	  uses	   list	  experiments	   embedded	   in	   an	   original	   survey	   of	   1200	   public	   employees	   to	   measure	   the	  types	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  political	  services	  that	  patronage	  employees	  provide	  to	  their	  bosses	  during	   elections—namely,	   attending	   rallies,	   helping	   with	   electoral	   campaigns	   and	  monitoring	   elections.	   Chapter	   4	   focuses	   on	   one	   political	   service	   that	   employees	   do	   in	  between	  elections—providing	  favors.	  Both	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  show	  that,	  as	  predicted	  by	  the	  theory,	  supporters	  are	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services.	  Chapter	  5	  tests	  the	   argument’s	   central	   implication,	   that	   public	   sector	   employees	   fulfill	   their	   side	   of	   the	  patronage	   contract	   by	   providing	   political	   services	   in	   pursuit	   of	   their	   own	   personal	  interests.	  Using	  survey	  experiments,	  I	  provide	  evidence	  that	  patronage	  employees	  believe	  that	  their	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  their	  patron,	  providing	  a	  good	  incentive	  for	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  Although	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  is	  that	  the	  control	  of	  patronage	  significantly	  increases	  a	  party’s	  chance	  of	  staying	  in	  power,	  we	  still	  know	  very	  little	  about	  the	  specific	  mechanisms	  that	   explain	   the	   relationship	   between	   patronage	   contracts	   and	   political	   competition.	  We	  know	  even	  less	  about	  what	  sustains	  these	  contracts.1	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  clientelism	  has	  shown	  a	  spectacular	  growth	  in	  the	  last	  decade,	  most	  of	  the	  research	  on	  clientelism	   has	   focused	   on	   vote	   buying	   (the	   exchange	   of	   goods	   or	   favors	   for	   votes),	   but	  relatively	  little	  has	  been	  done	  to	  understand	  how	  patronage	  (the	  exchange	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	   for	   political	   support)	   works.	   Only	   a	   few	   scholars	   have	   looked	   systematically	   at	   the	  effect	  of	  patronage	  on	  political	  competition	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  
In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   seek	   to	   develop	   a	   theory	   to	   understand	  what	   is	   it	   that	   public	  employees	  do	  that	  affects	  electoral	  competition,	  and	  to	  establish	  why	  they	  do	  it.	  Consistent	  with	   the	   general	   understanding	   in	   the	   literature,	   I	   argue	   that	   public	   sector	   jobs	   are	  disproportionally	   distributed	   to	   supporters.	   Besides	   doing	   their	   regular	   jobs,	   these	  supporters—now	  under	  patronage	  contracts—	  are	  expected	  to	  provide	  a	  range	  of	  political	  services	  for	  the	  politician	  that	  hired	  them	  (their	  patron).	  However,	  a	  citizen	  who	  receives	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Recall	  that	  I	  define	  patronage	  as	  the	  exchange	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	  for	  political	  support.	  Patronage	  contracts	  are	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  agreements	  between	  those	  that	  get	  (or	  expect	  to	  get)	  a	  patronage	  job	  (the	  client)	  and	  those	   that	   get	   (or	   expect	   to	   get)	   political	   support	   in	   return	   (the	   patron).	   See	   the	   introduction	   for	   a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  definition.	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public	  sector	  job	  with	  the	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  understanding	  that	  she	  will	  provide	  political	  services	  in	  return	  can	  easily	  renege	  on	  her	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  after	  getting	  the	  job.	  Why	  would	   public	   sector	   employees	   comply	   with	   their	   side	   of	   the	   patronage	   contract	   after	  receiving	  the	  job?	  What	  is	  their	  incentive	  to	  comply?	  	  
Patronage	  employees	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  that	  the	  patron	  will	  cut	  off	  the	  benefit	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so,	  or	  because	  of	  feelings	  of	   reciprocity.	   Departing	   from	   existing	   explanations,	   I	   argue	   that	  what	  makes	   patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining	  without	  punishment	  or	  reciprocity	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  patronage	  jobs	  are	   distributed	   to	   supporters	   (because	   only	   supporters	   can	   credibly	   commit	   to	   provide	  political	  support),	  whose	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  the	  politician	  that	  hires	  them.	  Patronage	   jobs	   and	   working	   conditions	   held	   by	   supporters	   will	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	  incumbent	   politician	   but	   not	   by	   an	   opposition	   politician,	   because	   supporters	   of	   the	  incumbent	  cannot	  credibly	  commit	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services	  for	  the	  opposition.	  As	   a	   result,	   supporters	   have	   strong	   incentives	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   to	   help	   the	  incumbent	  stay	  in	  power,	  making	  their	  original	  commitment	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  a	  credible	   one.	   Patronage	   employees	  understand	   that	   it	   is	   in	   their	   best	   interest	   to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  politician	  remain	  in	  power.	  And	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  alignment	   of	   interests	   between	   patrons	   and	   clients	   what	   makes	   patronage	   contracts	  incentive-­‐compatible	  and	  therefore	  self-­‐sustaining	  over	  time.	  
The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  discuss	  the	  relationship	  between	  patronage	  jobs	  and	  political	  competition.	  In	  section	  2,	  I	  describe	  the	   types	   of	   political	   services	   that	   public	   employees	   under	   patronage	   contracts	   often	  provide	  to	  their	  patrons.	  In	  section	  3,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  commitment	  issues	  associated	  with	  the	  
	  	  
39	  
clientelistic	   exchange	   and	   the	   existing	   explanations	   for	   the	   solution	   to	   this	   problem.	   In	  section	  4,	  I	  present	  a	  novel	  theory	  about	  what	  sustains	  these	  patronage	  contracts	  and	  how	  the	   commitment	   problem	   is	   solved.	   In	   section	   5	   I	   briefly	   discuss	   the	   potential	   collective	  action	   problems	   that	   could	   arise	   from	   my	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage.	   Section	   6	  outlines	  the	  empirical	  implications	  and	  the	  scope	  conditions	  of	  the	  theory	  developed	  here.	  The	  last	  section	  concludes.	  
	  
2.1	   Patronage	  Jobs	  and	  Political	  Competition	  
The	  conventional	  wisdom	  both	  in	  the	  traditional	  literature	  on	  machine	  politics	  in	  American	  cities	  and	   in	  more	  recent	  studies	   is	   that	   the	  control	  of	  patronage	  significantly	   increases	  a	  party’s	   chances	   of	   staying	   in	   power.	   Despite	   this	   widespread	   perception,	   there	   is	  surprisingly	   little	   systematic	   evidence	   of	   the	   electoral	   returns	   of	   patronage	   jobs.	   As	  mentioned	   in	   the	   introduction,	   part	   of	   the	   reason	   we	   know	   so	   little	   about	   this	   issue	   is	  because	   it	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   collect	   systematic	   and	   reliable	   data	   on	   patronage.	   In	  contexts	  with	  weak	  or	  no	  civil	  service	  systems,	  some	  scholars	  have	  used	  different	  “proxies”	  such	   as	   the	   number	   of	   public	   sector	   employees	   (Calvo	   and	   Murillo	   2004),	   number	   of	  temporary	  employees	  (Kemahlioglu	  2006;	  2011)	  or	  spending	   in	  personnel	  (Gordin	  2002;	  Keefer	  2005;	  Nazareno	  et	  al.	  2006;	  Remmer	  2007)	  in	  order	  to	  study	  the	  electoral	  returns	  to	  patronage.	   However,	   even	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   civil	   service	   rules,	   a	   high	   number	   of	   public	  sector	   jobs	   (or	   high	   spending)	   is	   neither	   a	   necessary	   nor	   a	   sufficient	   condition	   for	   the	  existence	  of	  patronage.	  A	  public	  sector	  job	  that	  is	  distributed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  civil	  service	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rules	   does	   not	   necessarily	   mean	   that	   it	   is	   distributed	   with	   the	   expectation	   of	   obtaining	  political	  support	  in	  return.	  
Even	   in	   the	   American	   politics	   literature,	   which	   has	   studied	   machine	   politics	   for	  more	  than	  fifty	  years,	   the	  effect	  of	  patronage	  on	  elections	  has	  only	  recently	  become	  clear	  (Folke	  et	  al.	  2011).	  Taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  adoption	  of	  civil	  service	  reforms	  took	   place	   at	   different	   times	   across	   US	   states,	   Folke	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   use	   a	   difference-­‐in-­‐difference	   design	   to	   show	   that	   having	   access	   to	   state-­‐level	   patronage	   increased	   the	  probability	   of	   winning	   state	   elections.	   In	   Argentina,	   using	   provincial-­‐level	   data	   on	   the	  number	   of	   public	   employees,	   Calvo	   and	   Murillo	   (2004)	   show	   that	   public	   employment	  boosts	  incumbent	  electoral	  support	  when	  the	  Peronist	  party	  is	  in	  power.	  Using	  data	  from	  1987-­‐2005,	   Scherlis	   (2005)	   argues	   that	   provinces	   in	   Argentina	   with	   higher	   levels	   of	  patronage	  present	  lower	  levels	  of	  political	  alternation	  and	  more	  “closed”	  and	  stable	  party	  systems.	   Similarly,	   building	   on	   rentier	   theories	   of	   the	   state,	   Gervasoni	   (2010)	   finds	   a	  negative	  relationship	  between	   the	  size	  of	   the	  provincial	  payroll	  and	   levels	  of	   subnational	  political	   contestation.2	  Finally,	  using	  original	   survey	  data,	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	   (forthcoming	  2013)	  show	  that	  the	  expectation	  of	  receiving	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  voting	  intentions	  of	  respondents	  in	  Argentina	  (and	  Chile).	  	  
Beyond	   the	   Argentine	   case,	   scholars	   have	   called	   attention	   to	   the	   importance	   of	  public	  sector	  employees	  in	  helping	  the	  incumbent	  stay	  in	  power	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  countries.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  In	   contrast,	   Nazareno	   et	   al.	   (2006)	   find	   that	   there	   are	   no	   positive	   electoral	   returns	   to	   patronage	   at	   the	  municipal	   level	   in	  Argentina.	  They	   speculate	   that	   this	   result	  might	  be	  explained	  by	   the	  negative	  effect	   that	  patronage	   has	   for	   those	   that	   are	   paying	   (as	   taxpayers)	   but	   are	   not	   enjoying	   the	   benefits	   of	   these	   jobs.	  However	  interesting,	  their	  results	  are	  hard	  to	  evaluate	  because	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  important	  selection	  bias	  in	  their	  data.	  Their	  sample	  includes	  only	  six	  provinces	  (out	  of	  24),	  which	  were—as	  they	  admit—	  not	  selected	  randomly,	   but	   by	   availability	   of	   the	   data.	   Plausibly,	   provinces	  with	   higher	   levels	   of	   patronage	   have	   larger	  incentives	  to	  withhold	  this	  information.	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Chubb	   (1981,	   1982)	   shows	   the	   importance	   of	   patronage	   jobs	   in	   helping	   the	   Christian	  Democrats	   build	   a	   monopolistic	   system	   of	   power	   in	   Palermo	   that	   lasted	   for	   more	   than	  thirty	  years.	  McMann	  (2006)	  explains	  the	  persistence	  of	  hybrid	  regimes	  at	  the	  subnational	  level	   in	  Russia	  and	  Kyrgyztan	  as	  a	   consequence	  of	   the	   lack	  of	   “economic	  autonomy”	   (the	  ability	  to	  make	  a	  living	  independent	  of	  the	  state).	  For	  him,	  in	  those	  areas	  where	  the	  state	  dominates	   economic	   opportunities	   and	   there	   are	   very	   few	   job	   options	   outside	   the	   state,	  incumbents	  have	  nothing	  to	  fear.	  Using	  a	  time-­‐series	  cross-­‐sectional	  dataset	  and	  examples	  from	  Mexico	  and	  Botswana,	  Greene	  (2010)	  argues	  that	  patronage	  jobs	  (among	  other	  state	  resources)	  are	  a	  key	  explanation	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  authoritarian	  dominant	  party	  regimes.	  	  
In	  sum,	  there	  is	  widespread	  agreement	  that	  the	  control	  of	  patronage	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  winning	  elections,	  even	  if	  this	  consensus	  is	  not	  always	  based	  on	  systematic	  evidence.	  Less	  clear	  in	  many	  of	  the	  studies	  cited	  are	  the	  specific	  mechanisms	  that	  explain	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  distribution	  of	  patronage	   jobs	  and	  electoral	  outcomes.	  With	  the	   possible	   exception	   of	   some	   post-­‐Soviet	   states,	   it	   is	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   the	   votes	   of	  public	  employees	  are	  enough	  to	  win	  an	  election.	  Patronage	  jobs	  are	  in	  fact	  exchanged	  for	  a	  kind	   of	   political	   support	   that	   goes	   far	   beyond	  mere	   votes.	   Although	  not	   the	   only	   kind	   of	  support	   possible,	   in	   this	   dissertation	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   political	   services	   provided	   by	   public	  employees	  at	  low	  and	  mid	  level	  positions.3	  The	  traditional	  literature	  on	  machine	  politics	  in	  the	  US	  has	   long	  recognized	  the	  central	  role	  of	   “jobs	   for	   the	  boys”	   in	   funding	  the	  salary	  of	  party	  workers	   (see,	   for	   instance,	  Bansfield	  and	  Wilson	  1963;	  Pollock	  1937;	  Wilson	  1961;	  Wolfinger	  1972).	  But	  more	  recently,	  public	  employment	  in	  new	  democracies	  (where	  weak	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  describe	  the	  services	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  political	  support	  provided	  by	  public	  employees	  at	  higher	  ranks.	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civil	  service	  systems	  allow	  for	  ample	  opportunities	  for	  patronage)	  has	  received	  very	  little	  scholarly	   attention.	  Most	   of	   the	   research	  on	   clientelism	  has	   focused	  on	  vote	  buying	   (and	  more	   recently,	   turnout	   buying)	   and	   relatively	   little	   has	   been	   done	   to	   understand	   how	  patronage	   works.	   Moreover,	   the	   few	   extant	   studies	   on	   patronage	   focus	   on	   explaining	  variation	  in	  the	  use	  or	  existence	  of	  patronage	  (Grzymala-­‐Busse	  2003,	  Remmer	  2007)	  and	  not	  on	  how	  it	  works	  or	   its	  consequences.	  As	  a	  result,	  most	  of	  what	  we	  know	  today	  about	  public	  sector	  employees	  as	  political	  workers	  is	  based	  on	  studies	  in	  which	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  interest	  is	  not	  the	  public	  sector,	  but	  clientelism.4	  
Most	  contemporary	  studies	  on	  clientelism	  recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	  as	  a	  key	  component	  of	  electoral	  machines,	  especially	  as	  a	  way	  of	  financing	  the	  work	  of	  brokers.	   Remmer	   (2007)	   argues	   (following	   Stokes	   2005)	   that	   the	   efficacy	   of	   clientelism	  strongly	   depends	   on	   the	   capacity	   of	   politicians	   to	   monitor	   electoral	   behavior	   and	   the	  distribution	  of	  public	   jobs	   to	  brokers	  who	  gather	   information	  about	  voters	  and	  deal	  with	  their	   material	   needs	   is	   critical	   to	   enhance	   this	   capacity.	   For	   Szwarcberg	   (2009),	   social	  welfare	   programs	   and	   public	   employment	   in	   Argentina	   “constitute	   the	   sources	   of	  clientelistic	  mobilization”.	  In	  what	  is	  probably	  the	  biggest	  survey	  of	  brokers	  conducted	  to	  date	  (800	  interviews	  in	  four	  Argentinean	  provinces),	  30	  percent	  of	  the	  brokers	  interviewed	  (excluding	   those	   that	   hold	   public	   office)	   reported	   being	   public	   sector	   employees.	   In	   fact,	  public	   employment	   was	   the	   largest	   single	   occupation	   mentioned	   (Stokes	   et	   al.	   2012).	  Zarazaga	   (2012)	   also	   conducted	   a	   survey	   of	   brokers	   (120	   cases,	   using	   a	   snowball	  technique)	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  (Argentina)	  in	  which	  he	  found	  that	  fifty	  percent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Important	  exceptions	  to	  this	  are	  Calvo	  and	  Uhjleyi	  (2012)	  and	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (2004,	  2012),	  who	  have	  put	  public	  sector	  employees	  at	  the	  center	  of	  their	  studies.	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of	   the	   brokers	   interviewed	   reported	   being	   public	   sector	   employees.	   In	   general,	   although	  very	   few	   studies	   outside	   the	   US	   focus	   specifically	   on	   public	   employment,	   there	   is	  agreement	   that	   public	   sector	   jobs	   are	   a	   key	   component	   of	   electoral	   machines	   (see	   also	  Auyero	  2000;	  Levitsky	  2003;	  Scherlis	  2009).	  
Patronage	  jobs	  are	  then	  mentioned	  in	  the	  clientelism	  literature	  as	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  (probably	  the	  most	  important	  one)	  in	  which	  the	  work	  of	  brokers	  is	  financed.	  Although	  this	  type	   of	   research	   provides	   a	   lot	   of	   insights	   about	   the	   political	   activities	   of	   some	   public	  employees,	   not	   all	   patronage	   employees	   are	   brokers,	   and	   brokers	   are	   not	   the	   only	   ones	  involved	   in	   political	   activities	   that	   affect	   electoral	   competition.	   Most	   scholars	   focus	   on	  brokers	  because	  they	  are	  key	  actors	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  electoral	  and	  political	  activities,	  but	  a	  lot	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  under	  patronage	  contracts	  that	  are	  not	  brokers	  are	  nevertheless	  involved	   in	   the	  provision	  of	  political	   services.	  We	  know	  very	   little	   about	   the	   activities	  of	  these	  less	  important,	  but	  still	  fundamental,	  political	  actors.	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  study	  the	  political	   support	   provided	   by	   all	   types	   of	   public	   employees	   under	   patronage	   contracts,	  including	  brokers	  as	  well	  as	  those	  more	  anonymous	  employees	  that	  also	  provide	  political	  services.	   In	   the	  next	   section,	   I	   describe	   in	  detail	   the	   types	  of	   political	   services	   that	   these	  employees	  usually	  provide	  to	   their	  patrons	  and	  that	  are	  at	   the	  core	  of	  understanding	  the	  effect	  of	  patronage	  politics	  on	  political	  competition.	  
	  
2.2	   Political	  Services	  
Public	  sector	  employees	  provide	  politicians	  with	  an	  army	  of	  potential	  political	  workers.	  In	  contexts	  of	  weak	  or	  non-­‐existent	  civil	  service	  rules,	  as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  in	  most	  Latin	  American	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countries	   (Grindle	   2012;	   Iacoviello	   2006;	   Zuvanic	   et	   al.	   2010),	   the	   possibility	   to	  discretionarily	  appoint	  public	  sector	  workers	  provides	  politicians	  in	  office	  with	  a	  powerful	  tool	   that	   can	   be	   used	   for	   political	   gain.	   However,	   not	   every	   job	   in	   the	   public	   sector	   is	  distributed	   for	  political	   reasons.	  Most	  parts	  of	   the	  public	  sector—even	   in	  contexts	  where	  there	   is	   widespread	   patronage—is	   dedicated	   to	   the	   delivery	   of	   public	   services	   and	   the	  administration	  of	  state	  resources.	  A	  politician	  who	  wants	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  cannot	  distribute	  every	  public	  sector	   job	   in	  exchange	   for	  political	   services	  without	  affecting	  his	  capacity	   to	  administrate	   efficiently	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	   his	   chances	   of	   reelection.	   The	   potential	  electoral	   returns	  of	  political	   appointees	  as	  well	   as	   the	   “on-­‐the-­‐job	  productivity”	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  are	  both	  essential	   for	  a	  politicians’	   survival	   (Calvo	  and	  Murillo,	  2012).5	  Without	   a	   functioning	   bureaucracy,	   the	   potential	   electoral	   gains	   from	   the	   distribution	   of	  patronage	  jobs	  become	  counterproductive.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  some	  jobs	  are	  in	  fact	  distributed	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	  support	  and	  these	   types	  of	   jobs	  are	   the	   focus	  of	   this	  dissertation.	  Patronage	  employees	  are,	  of	  course,	  expected	   to	   vote	   for	   the	   patron	   that	   appointed	   them,	   but	   the	   type	   of	   support	   that	   is	  expected	   in	   exchange	   for	   a	   position	   in	   the	   public	   administration	   goes	   far	   beyond	   that.	  Indeed,	   however	   high	   the	   number	   of	   public	   employees	   it	   seems	   extremely	   unlikely	   that	  their	  votes	  could	  be	  enough	  to	  substantively	  affect	  electoral	  outcomes,	  so	  using	  public	  jobs	  to	  buy	  votes	  would	  be	  expensive	  and	  inefficient	  (Kemahlioglu	  2006;	  Piattoni	  2001;	  Scherlis	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A	  former	  mayor	  from	  a	  municipality	  in	  the	  province	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  clearly	  illustrates	  this	  point:	  “It	  is	  not	  the	  same	   to	  spend	  50%	  of	  your	  municipal	  budget	  on	  personnel	   salaries	   from	  having	  80%	  of	   it	  allocated	   to	  salaries.	   [With	   80%]	   you	   cannot	   do	   anything	   else.	   (…)	   You	   have	   to	   be	   efficient.	   If	   you	   have	   around	   three	  thousand	   public	   employees	   you	   can	   also	   add	   100,	   150,	   200	   [employees]	   that	   are	   exclusively	   dedicated	   to	  political	  activities	  (…)	  But	  you	  cannot	  have	  a	  thousand	  or	  two	  thousand	  political	  employees	  because	  it	  would	  be	  horrific	  and	  scandalous”	  (cited	  in	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2012,	  5).	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2009).6	  Distributing	  public	  sector	  jobs	  has	  become	  increasingly	  costly,	  particularly	  after	  the	  neo-­‐liberal	  reforms	  implemented	  in	  the	  1990s	  in	  Latin	  America	  that	  dramatically	  reduced	  the	  size	  of	  the	  state	  apparatus.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  exchange	  of	  patronage	  jobs	  for	  mere	  votes	  has	  become	  an	  even	  more	  inefficient	  strategy	  for	  politicians	  (Kemahlioglu	  2006).	  But	  the	   increasing	   cost	   of	   distributing	  public	   sector	   jobs	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  politicians	  have	  ceased	  to	  use	  them	  for	  political	  gain.	  It	  simply	  means	  that	  politicians	  expect	  more	  than	  just	  a	   vote	   in	   return	   (Calvo	   and	   Murillo	   2012;	   Calvo	   and	   Ujhelyi	   2012;	   Kemahlioglu	   2006;	  Scherlis	  2009;	  Stokes	  2009).	  	  
The	   type	  of	   political	   support	   that	   patronage	   employees	  provide	   to	   their	   bosses	   in	  exchange	  for	  their	  positions	  varies	  considerably	  according	  to	  the	  level	  of	  the	  position.	  The	  political	   services	   that	   are	   the	   focus	   of	   this	   dissertation	   are	   some	   of	   the	   most	   common	  among	  mid-­‐	  and	   low-­‐level	  positions	   in	   the	  bureaucracy.	  These	  services	  are	  very	  different	  from	   those	   typically	   provided	   by	   high-­‐level	   political	   appointees.	   The	   political	   support	  provided	  by	  those	  appointed	  to	  patronage	  jobs	  at	  high-­‐level	  positions	  are	  usually	  related	  to	  securing	   control	   over	   public	   policies.	   Politicians	   want	   to	   appoint	   someone	   they	   trust	   to	  those	   areas	   that	   they	   consider	   important	   for	   their	   administration	   to	  make	   sure	   that	   the	  bureaucrat	   will	   implement	   the	   policies	   preferred	   by	   the	   politician	   or	   to	   “smooth	   the	  implementation	  of	  policies”	  (Müller	  2006,	  191).	  Müller	  refers	  to	  this	  type	  of	  patronage	  as	  “power	   patronage”	   (the	   allocation	   of	   important	   positions),	   and	   he	   differentiates	   it	   from	  “service	  patronage”,	  which	  refers	   to	   the	  distribution	  of	  public	  sector	   jobs	   in	  exchange	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	   is	   not	   necessarily	   true	   for	   intra-­‐party	   politics.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Argentina,	   very	   few	   people	   used	   to	  participate	   in	   intra-­‐party	   elections,	   especially	  when	   compared	   to	   general	   elections	  Since	   the	  2011	  national	  election,	  however,	  there	  are	  mandatory	  (both	  for	  parties	  and	  voters)	  simultaneous	  primaries	  for	  presidential	  and	  legislative	  positions.	  In	  August	  2011	  the	  first	  election	  was	  held	  under	  this	  law	  and	  the	  turnout	  was	  above	  70	  percent.	  See	  Kemahlioglu	  (2006)	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  internal	  party	  politics	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  patronage	  jobs	  in	  Argentina	  (and	  Turkey).	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the	  client’s	  political	  support	  “outside”	  the	  job.	  From	  the	  principal-­‐agent	  perspective,	  often	  used	   to	   study	   bureaucracies	   in	   the	   developed	   world,	   one	   of	   the	   main	   problems	   in	   the	  relationship	  between	  politicians	  (principals)	  and	  bureaucrats	  (agents)	  is	  how	  to	  make	  sure	  that	   the	   politician	   can	   delegate	   responsibility	   to	   the	   bureaucrat	   and	   still	   obtain	   his	  preferred	   outcome.	   Patronage	   appointments	   are	   an	   easy	   solution	   to	   this	   problem—with	  patronage	  appointments	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  bureaucrat	  mirror	  those	  of	  the	   politician	   increases	   considerably.	   In	   addition	   to	   guaranteeing	   control	   over	   decision-­‐making	  processes,	  political	  appointments	  at	  high	  and	  medium	  levels	  of	  the	  administration	  can	   also	   be	   motivated	   by	   other	   goals,	   including	   maintaining	   the	   party	   leadership,	  reinforcing	  or	  enlarging	   the	  governmental	  coalition,	  and	  bargaining	  with	  elective	  officials	  (Kopecky	  and	  Mair	  2006;	  Scherlis	  2009;	  Wilson	  1961).7	  
However,	  “power	  patronage”	  can	  also	  be	  used	  for	  less	  noble	  purposes	  than	  to	  solve	  problems	   of	   delegation	   and	   control.	   Having	   supporters	   appointed	   to	   relevant	   positions	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  parties	  and	  politicians	  to	  get	  public	  sector	  employees	  to	  do	  them	  favors	  or	   make	   exceptions	   for	   them	   (Geddes	   1994;	   Gingerich	   2007;	   Grzymala	   Busse	   2008;	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  2007b;	  Kopecky	  et	  al.	  2008;	  Müller	  2006,	  2007;	  Piattoni	  2001).8	  In	  this	  way,	  patronage	  appointments	  at	  high	   levels	  are	  usually	  a	  prerequisite	   for	  corruption	  (both	   for	   personal	   and	   political	   gains)	   and	   different	   forms	   of	   particularistic	   distribution	  such	  as	  vote-­‐buying	  and	  pork-­‐barrel	  politics.	  The	  manipulation	  of	  targeted	  public	  programs	  for	  political	  gain—	  such	  as	  the	  allocation	  of	  welfare	  benefits,	  targeted	  food	  distribution	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Public	  employment	  can	  also	  be	  motivated	  by	  redistributive	  goals	  (Alesina,	  Baqir	  and	  Easterly	  2000;	  Alesina,	  Danninger,	  and	  Rostagno	  2001).	  8	  For	  an	  interesting	  comparative	  study	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  electoral	  systems	  on	  political	  corruption	  among	  high-­‐level	  public	  employees	  in	  Brazil,	  Bolivia,	  and	  Chile,	  see	  Gingerich	  (2007).	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conditional	  cash	  transfer	  programs—	  is	  considerably	  facilitated	  when	  the	  public	  employees	  involved	  in	  the	  implementation	  are	  supporters	  of	  the	  politician	  who	  is	  expected	  to	  benefit	  from	   the	   clientelistic	   exchange.9	  There	   are	   also	   many	   government	   activities	   that	   permit	  considerable	   discretion	   and	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   targeting	   such	   as	   business	   and	   market	  regulations,	   subsidies,	   loans,	   and	   procurement	   contracts	   for	   government	   infrastructure,	  just	   to	  mention	   a	   few	   (Kitschelt	   and	  Wilkinson	   2007b).	   In	   all	   these	   cases,	   the	   ability	   to	  discretionarily	  appoint	  supporters	  to	  key	  positions	  gives	  politicians	  ample	  possibilities	  for	  personal	   and	   political	   corruption.10 	  Finally,	   the	   diversion	   of	   state	   funds	   for	   political	  activities	  or	  the	  use	  of	  public	  property	  for	  political	  activities	  or	  campaigning	  also	  requires	  the	  presence	  of	  supporters	   in	  key	  administrative	  positions	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  collaborate	  with	  the	  politician.	  	  
The	  political	  services	  that	  I	  study	  here	  are	  of	  a	  different	  kind.	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  type	  of	  services	   usually	   provided	   by	   patronage	   employees	   in	  mid-­‐	   and	   low-­‐level	   positions.	  Mid-­‐	  and	   low-­‐level	   patronage	   employees	   are	   often	   involved	   in	   campaigning,	   organizing	   and	  attending	   rallies,	   voting	   in	   primaries,	   mobilizing	   voters	   both	   for	   primaries	   and	   general	  elections,	   organizing	   and/or	   attending	   political	   meetings,	   providing	   favors	   to	   citizens,	  distributing	  material	  incentives	  (vote-­‐buying),	  being	  party	  polling	  officials	  on	  election	  day,	  and	  other	  activities.	  As	  chapter	  3	  and	  chapter	  4	  will	  show,	  many	  public	  employees	  act	  as	  intermediaries	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   voters	   by	   providing	   different	   types	   of	  political	  services	  before,	  during,	  and	  after	  elections.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  See	   Weitz-­‐Shapiro	   (2008a,	   2012)	   for	   a	   very	   interesting	   study	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   a	   targeted	   food	  distribution	  program	  in	  Argentina	  that	  shows	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  head	  of	  the	  social	  welfare	  office	  in	  cases	  of	  manipulation.	  10	  See	  Hopkin	  (2004)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  growing	  illicit	  party	  fundraising	  associated	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  mass	  party	  model	  of	  funding.	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Public	   employees	   with	   patronage	   jobs	   owe	   their	   appointments	   to	   their	   patron—they	  have	  jobs	  that	  they	  could	  not	  have	  received	  were	  it	  not	  for	  the	  patron	  or	  the	  party	  of	  the	  patron.	  However,	  most	  of	   them	  combine	  their	  regular	   jobs	  at	   the	  administration	  with	  their	   duties	   “outside”	   the	   job	   (political	   services).	   Only	   the	  most	   important	   brokers	   have	  completely	  “no	  show”	  jobs.11	  As	  described	  by	  Banfield	  and	  Wilson	  (1963,	  119):	  
“To	  get	  the	  services	  of	  men	  with	  the	  ability	  and	  energy	  that	  the	  
jobs	  require,	  the	  machine	  must	  offer	  precinct	  captains	  and	  ward	  
leaders	   [brokers]	   substantial	   inducements.	   Captains	   are	   often	  
‘payrollers,’	   that	   is,	   they	  have	  appointive	   public	   jobs	   that	   could	  
not	   get	   or	   keep	   if	  were	   not	   for	   the	   party.	   Some	  have	   ‘no	   show’	  
jobs:	   they	   are	   carried	   on	   the	   public	   payroll	   without	   being	  
required	  to	  show	  up	  for	  work.	  A	  larger	  number	  have	  ‘show’	  jobs	  
and	  work	  like	  other	  employees—some	  more	  conscientiously	  than	  
most—but	   their	   absence	   on	   election	   day	   and	   on	   other	   special	  
occasions	  when	  the	  party	  needs	  them	  are	  overlooked”	  	  
Public	  employees	  with	  patronage	  contracts	  provide	  political	   services	  during	  primary	  and	  general	   elections,	   and	   also	   in	   between	   elections.	   In	   general	   elections,	   both	   during	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  There	  is	  anecdotal	  evidence	  in	  Argentina	  that	  some	  political	  appointments	  are	  occasionally	  (although	  rarely)	  made	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  fundraising	  by	  appointing	  someone	  who	  provides	  the	  name	  for	  the	  contract	  (sometimes	  in	  exchange	  for	  a	  percentage	  of	  the	  salary)	  but	  who	  is	  not	  expected	  to	  do	  anything	  in	  return	  —his/her	  salary	  is	  used	  for	  financing	  the	  party.	  This,	  of	  course,	  is	  illegal	  so	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  collect	  systematic	  data	  to	  test	  this	  use	  of	  public	   job	   contracts,	   but	   journalistic	   accounts	   in	   Argentine	   newspapers	   sometimes	   refer	   to	   it	   (see	   also	  Scherlis	   2009,	   218).	  Moreover,	   appointments	   are	   also	   occasionally	   (also	   rarely)	  made	   to	   help	   someone	   in	  particular	   or	   return	   a	   favor.	   In	   the	   Argentinean	   case,	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   more	   common	   among	   legislative	  employees	  than	  those	  appointed	  to	  the	  executive	  but,	  once	  again,	  the	  evidence	  on	  this	  issue	  is	  only	  anecdotal	  (Scherlis	   2009	   and	   personal	   interviews).	   During	   my	   fieldwork	   I	   encountered	   some	   situations	   where	   an	  appointment	  in	  the	  administration	  was	  made	  to	  help	  a	  widow	  of	  a	  former	  public	  employee,	  in	  one	  case,	  and	  a	  sick	  relative	  of	  an	  employee	  in	  another	  one.	  I	  also	  encountered	  cases	  of	  nepotism	  where	  the	  appointees	  were	  relatives	   of	   the	   councilmen	   who	   were	   to	   collect	   salaries	   but	   with	   no	   real	   intention	   of	   having	   the	   person	  working.	   Argentineans	   call	   these	   cases	   of	   no-­‐show	   jobs	   “gnocchi”	   (ñoquis,	   a	   potato	   based	   Italian	   pasta)	  because	  it	  is	  an	  Argentinean	  tradition	  to	  eat	  gnocchi	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  month	  and	  the	  name	  implies	  that	  these	  “fake”	   employees	   only	   show	   up	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   month	   to	   collect	   their	   paycheck.	   Note	   that	   the	   most	  influential	  brokers	  appearing	  on	  the	  payroll	  often	  have	  “no	  show”	  jobs	  but,	  in	  all	  three	  municipalities,	  other	  employees	  could	  perfectly	  distinguish	  employees	  that	  were	  doing	  full-­‐time	  political	  work,	  from	  the	  ones	  that	  collect	  their	  checks	  and	  were	  doing	  nothing	  in	  return.	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campaign	   and	   on	   election	   day,	   their	   role	   is	   crucial,	   especially	   since	   the	   availability	   of	  volunteers	   has	   decreased	   over	   the	   years.12	  Politicians	   at	   the	   provincial	   and	   local	   levels	  usually	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  resources	  to	  conduct	  capital-­‐intensive	  professional	  campaigns	  with	  extensive	  use	  of	  the	  media	  (Kemahlioglu	  2006).	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  “human-­‐intensive”	  activities	  such	  as	  “door-­‐to-­‐door”	  visits	  (called	  rastrillajes	   in	  Argentina),	  political	  meetings,	  painting	   graffiti,	   plastering	   posters,	   transporting	   voters	   to	   polling	   places,	   and	   organizing	  and	   attending	   rallies,	   among	   other	   activities,	   are	   still	   essential	   parts	   of	   campaigning	  (Kemahlioglu	   2006;	   Scherlis	   2009;	   Zarazaga	   2012).	   The	   most	   influential	   patronage	  employees	   on	   the	   payroll	   —brokers—	   are	   also	   key	   actors	   in	   vote	   buying	   strategies	  (Remmer	  2007;	  Stokes	  2005;	  Stokes	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Zarazaga	  2012).	  The	  day	  of	   the	  election,	  patronage	   employees	   also	   help	   by	   bringing	   voters	   to	   the	   polls	   and	   as	   partisan	  monitors	  (party	  polling	  officials).13	  In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  choose	  to	  focus	  on	  three	  activities	  that	  are	  essential	   for	   winning	   elections:	   helping	   with	   the	   campaign,	   attending	   rallies,	   and	  monitoring	  elections.14	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Jorge	  Fernández,	  a	  Peronist	  leader	  from	  Santa	  Fe,	  described	  this	  change	  in	  Argentina:	  “Up	  to	  1986	  or	  1987	  there	  was	  a	  high	  level	  of	  political	  mobilization	  [recall	  that	  Argentina	  returned	  to	  democracy	  in	  1983].	  There	  were	  robust	  political	  organizations	  with	  a	  strong	  presence	  of	  volunteer	  activists.	  There	  were	  neighborhood	  organizations	  and	  unions	   linked	   to	   the	  parties.	  With	  very	  scarce	  resources	  you	  ran	  a	  campaign.	  You	  hardly	  had	  to	  pay	  for	  anything,	  because	  everything	  was	  done	  by	  volunteers;	  people	  even	  contribute	  with	  their	  own	  money.	  But	  now,	  nothing	  of	  that	  is	  left…”	  (cited	  by	  Scherlis	  2009,	  209).	  13	  In	  Argentina,	  each	  party	  that	  competes	  in	  an	  election	  has	  the	  right	  to	  assign	  a	  partisan	  monitor	  (fiscal)	  by	  precinct	   (mesa),	   plus	   a	   head	   of	   monitors	   (fiscal	   general)	   by	   school	   (where	   the	   election	   takes	   place).	   In	  addition	   to	   these	  optional	  partisan	  monitors,	  Argentine	   electoral	   law	   requires	   at	   least	   one	  and	  up	   to	   three	  citizens	   (autoridades	   de	   mesa)	   selected	   by	   the	   government	   to	   monitor	   the	   election	   and	   count	   the	   votes.	  Although	  the	  citizens	  selected	  by	  the	  government	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  with	  authority	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  any	   electoral	   issue,	  Argentinean	  political	   parties	   consider	   it	   crucial	   to	   have	   their	   own	   election	  monitors	   to	  ensure	   that	   votes	   are	   fairly	   counted	  and	   that	  no	  monitor	   from	  another	  party	  would	  use	   any	   tricks	   to	   steal	  votes.	  See	  Chapter	  3	  for	  more	  details.	  14	  Helping	   with	   the	   campaign	   includes	   a	   lot	   of	   different	   activities	   such	   as	   organizing	   meetings	   or	   rallies,	  distributing	  material	  incentives	  (vote	  buying),	  and	  painting	  graffiti,	  among	  others.	  I	  specifically	  chose	  a	  broad	  concept	  to	  ensure	  that	  all	  types	  of	  campaigning	  activities	  were	  covered.	  All	  activities	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  are	  described	  in	  more	  detailed	  in	  Chapter	  3.	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Public	  sector	  employees,	  brokers,	  and	  activists	  in	  general	  are	  also	  critical	  in	  primary	  races.15	  In	   contrast	   to	   general	   elections—in	   which	   voting	   is	   mandatory	   and	   turnout	   is	  usually	   around	   80	   percent—	   very	   few	   people	   participate	   in	   intra-­‐party	   elections	   in	  Argentina.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   active	   role	   of	   patronage	   employees	   as	   voters	   and	  collaborators	  helping	  with	  mobilization	  efforts	  and	  electoral	  monitoring	  on	  election	  day	  is	  extremely	  important.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  “machine”	  in	  these	  elections	  with	  very	  low	  turnout	  has	  been	   emphasized	  by	   a	  number	  of	   scholars	   (De	  Luca	   et	   al.	   2006;	   Jones	   and	  Hwang	  2005;	  Kemahlioglu	  2006;	  Scherlis	  2009;	  and	  Zarazaga	  2012).	   In	  fact,	  according	  to	  De	  Luca	  et	  al.	  (2006,	   11):	   “Primary	   election	   results	   then	   indicate	   which	   party	   machine	   has	   the	   most	  resources	  (and	  makes	  the	  most	  efficient	  use	  of	  its	  resources),	  not	  which	  candidate	  (or	  list	  of	   candidates)	   is	   most	   popular	   among,	   or	   ideologically	   compatible	   with,	   the	   primary	  electorate.”16	  	  
However,	  since	  2011	  with	  the	   introduction	  of	  an	  electoral	   law	  that	  makes	   internal	  elections	   to	  select	   candidates	   for	   the	  presidency	  and	  national	   congress	  simultaneous	  and	  mandatory	  (both	  for	  parties	  and	  voters),	  the	  importance	  of	  public	  employees,	  brokers,	  and	  activists	   has	   considerably	   declined.	   With	   mandatory	   voting	   and	   therefore	   high	   turnout,	  internal	  elections	  for	  national	  candidacies	  have	  become	  similar	  to	  general	  elections.	  At	  the	  provincial	   and	   local	   level,	   though,	   electoral	   laws	   present	   significant	   variation;	   some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  See	   Kemahlioglu	   (2006)	   for	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   internal	   party	   politics	   on	   the	   distribution	   of	  patronage	  jobs.	  16 	  According	   to	   Jones	   and	   Hwang	   (2005,	   269):	   “Patronage,	   pork	   barrel	   activities,	   and	   clientelism	   are	  important	  for	  success	  in	  general	  elections,	  but	  are	  indispensable	  for	  success	  in	  primary	  elections.	  In	  addition,	  patronage,	   pork	   barrel,	   and	   clientelism-­‐based	   support	   often	   has	   the	   same	   anticipated	   effect	   on	   potential	  intraparty	  challengers	  that	  a	  large	  campaign	  war	  chest	  has	  in	  the	  United	  States;	  it	  causes	  them	  to	  desist	  from	  any	  attempt	  to	  defeat	  the	  party	  boss”.	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provinces	   have	  mandatory	   primaries	  while	   others	   preserve	   the	   old	   system	   (maintaining	  the	  central	  role	  for	  patronage	  employees,	  brokers	  and	  activists).	  
Finally,	   patronage	   jobs	   are	   also	   important	   on	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   administration	   in	  addition	   to	   around	   election	   time.	   One	   of	   the	   most	   important	   activities	   that	   patronage	  employees	   perform	   in	   between	   elections	   is	   providing	   favors.	   In	   places	   with	   weak	  institutions	  like	  Argentina,	  public	  officials	  usually	  have	  considerable	  discretion	  on	  how	  and	  when	  to	  enforce	  rules.	  In	  this	  situation,	  for	  many	  people—especially	  the	  poor—	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	   have	   regular	   access	   to	   someone	   at	   the	   government	   or	   to	   someone	   with	   access	   to	  government	  officials	  who	  can	  provide	  solutions	  to	  specific	  problems.	  The	  most	  politically	  influential	  and	  active	  patronage	  employees—brokers—	  do	  significantly	  more	  than	  specific	  favors	   to	   the	   citizens	   approaching	   the	   public	   administration	   seeking	   help.	   Brokers	   are	  usually	  in	  charge	  of	  facilitating	  the	  access	  of	  poor	  people	  to	  the	  state	  as	  well	  as	  helping	  the	  state	   reach	   poor	   populations	   (Auyero	   2000;	   Szwarcberg	   2009;	   Zarazaga	   2012).17	  Often	  brokers	  —sometimes	   patronage	   employees	   themselves—	   act	   as	   intermediaries	   between	  people	   in	   need	   of	   favors	   and	   the	   patronage	   employee	  who	   is	   in	   a	   position	   to	   help.	   This	  allows	  them	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  favors	  that	  would	  be	  impossible	  without	  these	   various	   connections	   to	   other	   patronage	   employees.	   In	   this	   dissertation	   I	   study	   the	  provision	  of	  favors	  by	  patronage	  employees	  to	  citizens,	  including	  both	  brokers	  and	  other—
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  As	   in	  many	   other	   developing	   countries,	   poor	   areas	   in	  Argentina	   are	   usually	   isolated	   from	   the	   centers	   of	  power	   (either	  because	  of	   real	   geographical	   distance,	   transportation,	   security,	   or	   culture).	  Brokers	   then	   are	  crucial	   intermediators	  between	  poor	  people	  and	  the	  distant	  state.	  At	   least	   in	  Argentina,	   they	  usually	   live	   in	  the	  same	  neighborhood	  as	  the	  people	  they	  help	  and	  they	  are	  essential	  inat	  providing	  information	  about	  their	  needs	  to	  politicians	  in	  order	  to	  find	  solutions	  to	  their	  problems.	  Often	  they	  are	  also	  in	  charge	  of	  organizations	  that	  provide	  different	  services	  to	  citizens	  such	  as	  sport	  clubs,	  soup	  kitchens,	  or	  health	  care	  centers	  (Auyero	  2000;	   Zarazaga	   2012).	   In	   Argentina,	   brokers	   can	   also	   be	   crucial	   in	   preventing	   or	   causing	   social	   unrest	  (Auyero	  2007;	  Zarazaga	  2012).	  See	  Auyero	  2000,	  Szwarcberg	  2009,	  and	  Zarazaga	  2012	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  description	  of	  what	  brokers	  do	  and	  their	  fundamental	  role	  in	  poor	  people’s	  lives.	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less	  influential—employees.18	  I	  care	  both	  about	  the	  direct	  demand	  for	  favors	  (from	  voters	  to	  patronage	  employees)	  and	  the	  indirect	  (through	  brokers)	  one.	  
In	  sum,	  public	  employees	  under	  patronage	  contracts	  constitute	  an	  invaluable	  army	  of	  political	  workers	  that	  provide	  different	  services	  to	  their	  patrons.	  Of	  course,	  the	  level	  of	  involvement	   of	   each	   individual	   varies	   considerably—while	   some	   are	   in	   charge	   of,	   for	  example,	   organizing	   the	   rallies,	   others	   just	   attend	   those	   rallies	   and	   often	   bring	   someone	  else	  with	   them	   to	   help	  with	  mobilization—and,	   as	  mentioned,	   some	  other	   employees	   do	  not	  provide	  any	  political	  service.	  Establishing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  public	  sector	  employees	  are	  involved	  in	  these	  political	  activities	  is	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  What	  we	  do	  know	   from	   the	   existing	   literature	   is	   that	   public	   sector	   jobs	   are	   one	   of	   the	  main	  ways	   of	  financing	  political	  work.	  The	  control	  of	  patronage	  jobs,	  allowing	  the	  incumbent	  to	  finance	  political	   services,	   provides	   these	   incumbents	   with	   an	   important	   advantage	   over	   their	  competitors	  and	  increases	  their	  probability	  of	  reelection.	  
	  
2.3	   The	  Commitment	  Problem	  and	  Existing	  Explanations	  
Patronage	  jobs	  provide	  politicians	  in	  power	  with	  a	  very	  powerful	  tool—an	  army	  of	  political	  workers.	   However,	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   far	   from	   being	   ideal.	   They	   are	   not	   easy	   to	  enforce	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  First,	  since	  the	  exchange	  is	  non-­‐simultaneous,	  a	  citizen	  who	  provides	  political	   services	  with	   the	  expectation	  of	  getting	  a	  public	  sector	   job	   is	  always	  at	  risk	  of	  facing	  a	  politician	  that	  can	  decide	  not	  to	  hire	  her	  after	  she	  has	  already	  provided	  the	  political	  services.	  Alternatively,	  a	  citizen	  who	  receives	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  with	  the	  implicit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See	  chapter	  4	  for	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  types	  of	  favors	  that	  patronage	  employees	  usually	  provide.	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or	   explicit	   understanding	   that	   she	  will	   provide	  political	   services	   can	   easily	   decide	  not	   to	  comply	  with	  her	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  after	  getting	  the	  job.	  Second,	  the	  law	  cannot	  be	  used	  to	  enforce	  these	  agreements	  so	  they	  have	  to	  be	  self-­‐enforcing	  (Piattoni	  2001;	  Robinson	  and	  Verdier	  2003).	  As	  Stokes	  (2007)	  points	  out,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  expect	  clientelistic	  relations	  to	  be	  full	  of	  opportunities	  for	  defection	  and	  betrayal.	  
In	  the	  first	  type	  of	  exchange—in	  which	  the	  political	  support	   is	  provided	  before	   the	  benefit	  is	  received—patrons	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  credible	  promises	  to	  clients	  in	  order	  for	   the	   patronage	   agreement	   to	   be	   successful.	   If	   the	   patron	   cannot	   credibly	   commit	   to	  distribute	  public	  sector	  jobs	  once	  the	  election	  is	  over,	  clients	  have	  no	  incentive	  to	  provide	  political	   services	   during	   the	   campaign.	   This	   type	   of	   commitment	   problem—in	   which	  politicians’	  credibility	  affects	   the	  actions	  of	  clients	   that	  arises	   in	  what	  Nichter	  (2009)	  has	  called	  “prospective	  clientelism”—gets	  ameliorated	  when	  the	  benefit	  being	  exchanged	   is	  a	  public	   sector	   job.	   As	   Robinson	   and	   Verdier	   (2003)	   point	   out,	   the	   distribution	   of	   public	  sector	   jobs	   has	   the	   advantage	   (over	   other	   types	   of	   goods)	   on	   being	   contingent	   on	   the	  politician	  winning	   the	   election,	  which	   is	   key	   for	   extracting	   effort	   from	   clients.	  When	   the	  benefit	   is	  outcome-­‐contingent	   (it	   is	  only	  distributed	   if	   the	  politician	  wins),	   clients	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  politician	  wins	  the	  election.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  politician,	  there	  is	  also	  an	  incentive	  to	  comply	  with	  his	  side	  of	  the	  agreement,	  not	  only	  because	  employees	  will	  be	  needed	  in	  the	  administration	  anyway,	  but	   also	   because	   the	   need	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   political	   services	   does	   not	   end	   with	   the	  election.19	  From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   patron,	   citizens	   that	   already	   provided	   political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  The	  argument	  provided	  by	  Robinson	  and	  Verdier	  (2003)	  about	  why	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  is	  a	  credible	  way	  for	  politicians	  to	  redistribute	  is	  different	  to	  the	  one	  just	  outlined.	  They	  argue	  that	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  a	  credible	  way	   of	   redistribution	   (in	   contrast,	   for	   example,	   to	   pure	   transfer	   of	   income)	   because	   patronage	   jobs	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services	  before	  the	  election	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  after	  the	  election,	  so	   there	   is	  an	   incentive	   for	   the	  politician	   to	  keep	  his	  promise	  of	  distributing	  jobs	  to	  those	  who	  helped	  him	  before	  the	  election.	  	  
More	  generally,	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  are	  usually	  based	  on	  long-­‐term	  interactions	  (Auyero	  2000;	  Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  2007b;	  Szwarcberg	  2009;	  Zarazaga	  2012).	  In	  these	  ongoing	   relationships,	   politicians	   care	   about	   reputation.	   According	   to	  Diaz	   Cayeros	   et	   al.	  (2012,	  121),	  “(a)	  party	  that	  consistently	  betrays	  its	  promises	  to	  deliver	  benefits	  to	  its	  most	  loyal	   supporters	   will	   be	   unable	   to	   sustain	   its	   electoral	   coalition	   over	   time.”	   Clients,	   of	  course,	  prefer	  dealing	  with	  brokers	  and	  patrons	  who	  have	  a	  “reputation	  for	  delivering	  on	  their	  promises”	  and	  brokers	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  keeping	  their	  promises	  to	  “gain	  the	   loyalty	  of	   their	   clients”	   (Zarazaga	  2012,	  28-­‐29).	  This	   concern	  about	   reputation	   raises	  the	  cost	  of	  non-­‐compliance	   for	  patrons	  and	  brokers.	  They	  can	  still	  opt	   to	  renege	  on	   their	  promises,	   but	   over	   time	   this	   strategy	   might	   not	   be	   sustainable.	   For	   all	   these	   reasons,	  opportunistic	  defection	  in	  “prospective	  clientelism”	  both	  by	  clients	  and	  politicians	  seems	  to	  be	   less	   important	   (particularly	  when	   the	   benefit	   exchanged	   is	   a	   public	   sector	   job	   that	   is	  contingent	  on	  the	  patron	  winning	  the	  election)	  than	  the	  possibility	  of	  defection	  when	  the	  benefit	  is	  distributed	  in	  exchange	  for	  future	  political	  support.	  The	  rest	  of	  this	  chapter	  (and	  this	  dissertation)	  focuses	  on	  the	  latter.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  distributed	  to	  members	  of	  the	  patron’s	  group	  (clients)	  generate	  rents	  for	  the	  patron.	  The	  reason	  for	  limiting	  the	   effect	   to	   clients	   is	   because	   close	   links	   between	   patrons	   and	   clients	   help	   ameliorate	   the	   moral	   hazard	  problem.	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  client,	  they	  argue,	  the	  key	  characteristics	  of	  public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  that	  they	  are	  selective	  and	  reversible	  so:	  a)	  when	  voting	  is	  observable,	  clients	  who	  do	  not	  vote	  according	  to	  their	  patron’s	  wishes	  are	  punished	  and	  do	  not	  get	  a	   job,	  and	  b)	  when	  voting	  is	  not	  observable,	   jobs	  still	  have	  the	  advantage	   of	   being	   contingent	   upon	   the	   patron	   winning	   the	   election	   (if	   too	   many	   clients	   defect	   from	   the	  clientelistic	  exchange,	  the	  patron	  loses	  the	  election	  and	  there	  are	  no	  jobs	  to	  distribute).	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The	  second	  type	  of	  exchange—	  in	  which	  the	  political	  support	   is	  provided	  after	   the	  benefit	   is	   received—is	  more	  problematic.	   In	   this	   case,	   politicians	   are	   at	   risk	  of	   “wasting”	  jobs	   on	   citizens	   that,	   once	   hired,	   would	   not	   comply	  with	   their	   side	   of	   the	   agreement.	   A	  citizen	   who	   receives	   a	   public	   sector	   job	   with	   the	   understanding	   that	   she	   will	   provide	  political	  services	  in	  return	  can	  easily	  renege	  on	  her	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  after	  getting	  the	  job.	  Why	  would	  public	  sector	  employees	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  patronage	  agreement	  
after	   receiving	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   job?	   How	   can	   the	   politician	   make	   sure	   that	   he	   is	   not	  ”wasting”	  jobs	  on	  citizens	  that	  will	  later	  not	  fulfill	  their	  side	  of	  the	  deal?	  	  
The	   literature	   so	   far	   has	   provided	   two	   main	   answers	   to	   this	   question:	   norms	   of	  reciprocity	   and	   fear	   of	   retaliation.	   According	   to	   the	   first	   set	   of	   theories,	   norms	   of	  reciprocity	   enforce	   the	   clientelistic	   exchange;	   clients	   fulfill	   their	   side	   of	   the	   agreement	  because	  they	  want	  to	  help	  those	  who	  have	  helped	  them.	  In	  other	  words,	  receiving	  a	  benefit	  engenders	   feelings	   of	   obligation	   and	   gratitude	   and	   clients	   help	   the	   patron	   out	   of	   these	  feelings.	  According	  to	  Scott	  (1972,	  93)	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  presence	  of	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity	  that	   distinguishes	   patron-­‐client	   relationships	   from	   relationships	   of	   pure	   coercion:	   “A	  patron	  may	  have	   some	  coercive	  power	  and	  he	  may	  hold	  an	  official	  position	  of	   authority.	  But	  if	  the	  force	  or	  authority	  at	  his	  command	  are	  alone	  sufficient	  to	  ensure	  the	  compliance	  of	   another,	   he	   has	   no	   need	   of	   patron-­‐client	   ties	   which	   require	   some	   reciprocity”.	   More	  recently,	  other	  scholars	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  reciprocity	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  clientelistic	  relationships,	   particularly	   vote-­‐buying.	   According	   to	   Schaffer	   (2007,	   193),	   for	   instance,	  “embedding	  vote-­‐buying	  within	   ritual	   gift	   exchange	  helps	  engender	   feelings	  of	  obligation	  among	   recipients,	   and	   can	   thus	   lower	   the	   rate	   of	   defection.”	   Lawson	   and	  Greene	   (2012)	  argue,	   based	   on	   survey	   experiments	   from	   Mexico,	   that	   the	   receipt	   of	   benefits	   creates	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feelings	   of	   obligation	   among	   clients	   who	   then	   “spontaneously”	   support	   their	   political	  patron.	  Finan	  and	  Schecheter	  (2012),	  in	  turn,	  also	  argue	  that	  vote-­‐buying	  agreements	  can	  be	   sustained	   by	   norms	   of	   reciprocity	   and	   they	   use	   survey	   and	   experimental	   data	   from	  Paraguay	   to	   show	   that	   brokers	   target	   reciprocal	   individuals.	  Dunning	   and	   Stokes	   (2007)	  find	  evidence	  of	  “negative”	  reciprocity	  in	  Mexican	  elections	  in	  which	  many	  PRI	  supporters	  who	  did	  not	  receive	  benefits	  before	  the	  election	  decided	  to	  vote	   for	  the	  opposition.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  public	  employees	  respect	  their	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  provide	  political	  services	  simply	  because	  they	  want	  to	  help	  the	  person	  who	  helped	  them.	  	  
The	  logic	  of	  the	  second	  set	  of	  theories	  is	  very	  different.	  From	  this	  perspective—the	  most	  accepted	  among	  scholars	  of	  clientelism	  —	  clients	  comply	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  that	  the	  patron	  will	  cut	  off	  the	  benefits	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so.	  Much	  of	  the	  contemporary	  literature	  on	   clientelism	   has	   focused	   on	   the	   monitoring	   and	   commitment	   problems	   that	   are	  associated	  with	  this	  perspective	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Brusco	  et	  al.	  2004;	  Nichter	  2008;	  Stokes	  2005,	   2007;	   Robinson	   and	   Verdier	   2003).	   For	   many	   of	   the	   authors	   that	   support	   this	  perspective,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  patron	  to	  monitor	  and	  punish	  accordingly	  is	  what	  makes	  an	  exchange	   truly	   clientelistic.	   For	   these	   scholars,	   the	   defining	   feature	   of	   clientelistic	  exchanges	   is	   that	   they	   are	   contingent	   upon	   the	   client’s	   behavior.20	  If	   the	   client	   does	   not	  behave	   according	   to	   her	   patron’s	   wishes—which	   requires	   either	   the	   patron’s	   ability	   to	  monitor	  or	  the	  client’s	  belief	  that	  this	  is	  possible—,	  the	  patron	  has	  the	  power	  to	  punish	  the	  client	  by	  withdrawing	  or	  withholding	  the	  benefit.	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  a	  patron	  to	  be	  able	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  political	  support	  associated	  with	  the	  benefit	  is	  in	  fact	  provided,	  he	  should	  be	  able	  to	  credibly	  commit	  to	  punish	  non-­‐compliers	  (and/or	  reward	  compliers).	  From	  this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  See	  Introduction	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  definitions	  of	  clientelism	  based	  on	  the	  fear	  of	  punishment.	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perspective,	   the	   commitment	   problem	   is	   solved	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   fear—public	   employees	  provide	  political	  services	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  that	  the	  patron	  will	  cut	  off	  the	  benefit	  and	  fire	  them	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  do	  so.	  	  
In	   the	   next	   section,	   I	   present	   another	   solution	   to	   the	   commitment	   problem	   that	  arises	  in	  clientelistic	  agreements	  because	  of	  the	  non-­‐simultaneity	  of	  the	  exchange.	  I	  argue	  that	   it	   is	   neither	   reciprocity	   nor	   fear	   of	   punishment	   that	   ensures	   that	   public	   employees	  uphold	  their	  part	  of	  the	  deal,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  their	  patron.	   In	   what	   I	   called	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage,	   clients’	   compliance	   with	  clientelistic	  agreements	  is	  ensured	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  incentives	  are	  aligned	  with	  those	  of	  their	  patrons—both	  the	  patron	  and	  client	  will	  benefit	  from	  the	  patron’s	  success.	  Of	  course,	  this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   fear	   of	   punishment	   or	   feelings	   of	   reciprocity	   are	   never	   present	   in	  clientelistic	   exchanges	  or	   that	   they	  are	  not	  possible,	   but	   rather	   that	  neither	  of	   these	   two	  factors	   are	   necessary	   characteristics	   of	   these	   types	   of	   arrangements. 21 	  The	   theory	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  provides	  a	  novel	  alternative	  to	  existing	  explanations.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  A	   substantial	   part	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   clientelism	   that	   deals	   with	   commitment	   issues	   has	   devoted	  considerable	   attention	   to	  discuss	  whether	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  monitor	   voting	  behavior	  under	   the	   secret	  ballot	  (see,	   for	   instance,	   Brusco	   et	   al.	   2004;	   Nichter	   2008;	   Stokes	   2005	   and	   2007;	   among	   others).	   In	   the	   type	   of	  political	  support	  that	  I	  study	  here	  (political	  services),	  the	  possibility	  of	  monitoring	  is	  not	  an	  issue.	  Most	  of	  the	  political	  activities	  (with	  the	  possible	  exception	  of	  the	  provision	  of	   favors)	  studied	  here	  are	  visible	  and	  thus,	  potentially	  easy	  to	  monitor.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  just	  because	  these	  activities	  can	  be	  monitored	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  being	  monitored.	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  that	  the	  activities	  provided	  by	  public	  employees	  are	  impossible	  to	  monitor,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  monitor	  behavior	  in	  well	  designed	  patronage	  contracts	  in	  which	   these	   jobs	   are	   distributed	   to	   supporters.	   Patronage	   employees	   provide	   services	   because	   their	  incentives	  are	  aligned	  with	  the	  incentives	  of	  their	  patron,	  not	  because	  they	  are	  being	  monitored.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  patrons	  and	  clients	  share	  the	  same	  interests,	  monitoring	  is	  not	  necessary.	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2.4	   Self-­‐	  Enforcing	  Patronage	  Contracts	  
What	  makes	  patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  fear	  of	  punishment	  and	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  (because	  only	  supporters	  can	  credibly	  commit	  to	  provide	  political	  support),	  whose	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  success	  of	  the	  patron.	  This	  is	  because	  patronage	  jobs	  (and	  working	  conditions)	  held	  by	  supporters	  will	  be	  maintained	  by	  the	  incumbent	  politician	  who	  hired	  them	  but	  not	  by	  a	  competing	  politician	  (because	  supporters	  of	  the	  incumbent	  cannot	  credibly	  commit	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  for	  the	  opposition).	  As	  a	  result,	  supporters	  have	  strong	  incentives	  to	  provide	  political	   services	   to	  help	   the	   incumbent	   (their	  patron)	   stay	   in	  power.	   In	  other	  words,	  patronage	  employees	  engage	  in	  political	  activities	  that	  support	  their	  patron	  because	  their	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  his	  political	  fate—the	  benefit	  of	  the	  job	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  politician	  staying	  in	  power.	  Put	  simply,	  their	  incentives	  are	  aligned.	  
Politicians	  want	  to	  distribute	  patronage	  jobs	  to	  those	  who	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  patronage	  agreement	  and	  provide	  political	  services.	  However,	  finding	  this	  type	  of	  employees	   is	  not	  an	  easy	   task.	  Employees’	  willingness	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   in	   the	  future	  is	  private	  information	  not	  fully	  available	  to	  politicians	  at	  the	  time	  of	  hiring.	  Potential	  employees	   can	   promise	   future	   compliance	   but	   for	   this	   promise	   to	   be	   credible	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity	  or	  punishment	  for	  non-­‐compliers,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  incentive-­‐compatible.	  Only	  if	  potential	  employees	  can	  credibly	  commit	  to	  provide	  political	  support	  in	  the	   future,	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   self-­‐sustaining	   without	   punishment	   and	   reciprocity.	  The	   need	   to	  make	   patronage	   contracts	   incentive-­‐compatible	   leads	   to	   the	   distribution	   of	  these	  jobs	  to	  prior	  supporters.	  All	  potential	  clients	  (or	  employees)	  can	  promise	  to	  provide	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political	   services	   in	   the	   future,	   but	   only	   supporters	   can	  make	   these	   promises	   credible.22	  Patronage	   jobs	   held	   by	   supporters	   will	   be	   maintained	   as	   they	   are	   by	   the	   incumbent	  politician,	   but	   not	   by	   a	   competing	   politician.	   Supporters	   then	   have	   strong	   incentives	   to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  (their	  patron)	  stay	  in	  power.	  	  
If	  politicians	  could	  somehow	  know	  ex	  ante	  how	  potential	  employees	  would	  behave	  once	  hired,	   then	  the	  problem	  of	  commitment	  associated	  with	   the	  non-­‐simultaneity	  of	   the	  patronage	  agreement	  would	  of	  course	  disappear.	  In	  other	  words,	  full	  information	  about	  the	  intentions	   of	   the	   citizens	   would	   prevent	   strategic	   defection	   and	   solve	   the	   commitment	  problem	   for	   politicians.	   As	   Calvo	   and	  Ujhelyi	   (2012)	   argue,	   there	   is	   heterogeneity	   in	   the	  willingness	   of	   potential	   public	   employees	   to	   provide	   political	   services;	   with	   complete	  information	   politicians	   would	   just	   simply	   hire	   the	   “right	   type”	   of	   citizens	   (those	   more	  willing	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   in	   the	   future).	  While	   the	   intention	  of	  potential	  public	  employees	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   once	   hired	   is	   private	   information,	   the	   political	  preferences	  of	  these	  potential	  employees	  regarding	  the	  politician	  at	  the	  time	  of	  hiring	  are	  not.23	  When	  hiring	  is	  mainly	  conducted	  through	  informal	  channels—as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  many	  new	  democracies	  with	  weak	   civil	   service	   systems—it	   is	   possible	   for	  politicians	   to	   access	  that	  information	  and	  use	  it	  for	  their	  own	  benefit.	  	  
Politicians	  then	  use	  referrals	  as	  well	  as	  personal	  and	  partisan	  connections	  to	  screen	  potential	  clients	  and	  to	  separate	  supporters	  from	  non-­‐supporters.24	  Supporters	  might	  like	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  following	  paragraphs,	  being	  a	  “true”	  supporter	  or	  not	  does	  not	  change	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  theory.	  What	  matters	  is	  whether	  or	  not	  potential	  employees	  are	  perceived	  as	  supporters.	  23	  See	  Calvo	  and	  Ujhelyi	  (2012)	  for	  an	  example	  of	  designing	  optimal	  patronage	  contracts	  with	  no	  information	  about	  individual	  political	  preferences.	  24	  Most	  scholars	  that	  think	  about	  clientelism	  as	  a	   long-­‐lasting	  relationship	  and	  not	  as	  a	  one-­‐shot	   interaction	  emphasize	  that	  patrons	  (or,	  more	  often,	  their	  brokers)	  know	  their	  clients	  very	  well	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Auyero	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the	  politician	  or	  the	  politician’s	  party	  for	  ideological	  or	  personal	  reasons,	  they	  might	  have	  connections	  with	  the	  party	  or	  they	  might	  just	  want	  to	  be	  perceived	  as	  supporters	  in	  order	  to	   obtain	   benefits.	   More	   importantly,	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters	   differ	   in	   their	  likelihood	   of	   providing	   political	   services	   in	   the	   future.	   All	   things	   being	   equal,	   those	  who	  demonstrate	  support	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  “right	  type”,	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  agreement,	  and	  provide	  the	  promised	  political	  services.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  actually	  support	   the	  party	  or	   the	  politician	  than	  non-­‐supporters,	  making	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services	  less	  costly	  for	  them.	  Citizens	  can	  make	  efforts	  to	  be	  visible	  for	  the	  patron	  and	  make	  sure	  they	  are	  identified	  as	  supporters—they	  can	  campaign	  on	  behalf	  of	  their	  patron	  before	  he	   is	   elected,	   and	  attend	  partisan	  meetings	  or	   rallies,	   among	  other	   things	   (Auyero	  2000;	  Nichter	  2009;	  Szwarcberg	  2009).25	  	  
Note	   that	   whether	   those	   who	   demonstrate	   support	   are	   sincere	   supporters	   or	  strategic	  actors	  with	  pure	  materialistic	  goals	  pretending	   to	  be	  supporters	  does	  not	  affect	  the	   empirical	   implications	   of	   the	   theory—for	   reasons	   developed	   in	   the	   following	  paragraphs,	   being	   a	   “real”	   supporter	   or	   just	   pretending	   to	   be	   one	   creates	   the	   same	  incentive-­‐compatible	   patronage	   contracts.	   Perceived	   political	   preferences	   at	   the	   time	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2000;	   Szwarcberg	   2009;	   Zarazaga	   2012;	   Zarazaga	   and	  Ronconi	   2012).	  Moreover,	   an	   important	   part	   of	   the	  literature	  on	  clientelism	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  discussion	  of	  who	  gets	  targeted	  in	  the	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  with	  the	  assumption	  (usually	  not	  directly	  problematized)	  that	  patrons	  and/or	  brokers	  can	  somehow	  screen	  core	  and	  swing	  voters	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Stokes	  2005	  and	  Nichter	  2008).	  To	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  Finan	  and	  Schecheter	  (2012)	  and	  Stokes	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  are	  the	  only	  studies	  providing	  systematic	  evidence	  that	  brokers	  do	  know	   the	  political	   preferences	  of	   their	   clients.	   Finan	  and	  Schecheter	   (2012)	  use	   survey	  data	   to	   investigate	  how	   well	   middlemen	   know	   their	   clients	   in	   rural	   Paraguay.	   According	   to	   their	   data,	   brokers	   correctly	  predicted	  the	  partisan	  identification	  of	  their	  clients	  in	  around	  80	  percent	  of	  cases.	  Stokes	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  based	  on	   a	   survey	   of	   800	   Argentinean	   brokers,	   also	   provide	   evidence	   of	   brokers	   knowing	   their	   clients’	   political	  preferences.	  25	  In	  Auyero’s	  words	  (2000,	  163):	  “Attendance	  at	  rallies	  is	  also	  considered	  a	  way	  of	  showing	  a	  broker	  that	  one	  is	  loyal,	  responsible,	  and	  ready	  to	  help	  out	  when	  needed—and	  therefore	  deserving	  of	  a	  job	  if	  and	  when	  one	  becomes	  available".	  Politicians	  seem	  to	  take	  these	  efforts	  seriously,	  as	  described	  by	  a	  public	  employee	  from	  Salta	  that	  works	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  mayor:	  “If	  a	  person	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  mayor’s	  victory,	  he	  has	  a	  right	  (“tiene	  cierto	  derecho”)	  [to	  get	  a	  job]”	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Salta,	  August	  10	  2011).	  
	  	  
61	  
hiring	  are	   then	  used	  by	  politicians	  as	  a	   “proxy”	   for	  citizens’	   future	  willingness	   to	  provide	  political	  services.	  	  
This	   is	  why	  public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters.	  But,	  of	   course,	   perceptions	   could	   be	   misleading.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   “true”	   supporters,	   those	  absolutely	   committed	   to	   the	   goals	   of	   the	   party	   or	   the	   politician,	   it	   might	   be	   possible	   to	  believe	   that	   their	   commitment	   is	   so	   strong	   that	   they	  will	   be	  willing	   to	  provide	   sustained	  political	  support	  for	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  needed.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  once	  citizens	  expect	   a	   party	   or	   a	   politician	   to	   distribute	   public	   sector	   jobs	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   perceived	  political	  preferences,	  citizens	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  misrepresent	  their	  preferences	  in	  order	  to	   get	   a	   job.26	  However,	   supporters	   are	   often	  neither	   completely	  partisan	   (or	   ideological,	  solely	  motivated	  by	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  party	  or	  the	  politician	  they	  support,	  or	  the	  group	  that	  the	   politician	   represents)	   nor	   completely	   opportunistic	   (only	   motivated	   by	   their	   own	  welfare)	  but	  some	  combination	  of	  both,	  and	  this	  combination	  might	  vary	  over	  time.	  Similar	  to	   Persson	   and	   Tabellini’s	   (2000)	   and	   Robinson	   and	   Torvik’s	   (2005)	   characterization	   of	  politicians	   as	   both	   partisan	   and	   opportunistic,	   I	   assume	   that	   supporters	   can	   care	  simultaneously	  about	  their	  own	  welfare	  (their	  jobs)	  and	  the	  future	  of	  the	  party	  or	  politician	  they	  support,	  but	  they	  care	  more	  about	  their	  own	  jobs.27	  Therefore,	  patronage	  employees	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  As	   an	   employee	   from	   Salta	   clearly	   exemplifies:	   “I’ve	   told	   you	   that	   I	   got	   this	   job	   through	  politics,	   but	   the	  thing	  is	  that	  I	  was	  politically	  active	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  job”	  (Personal	  Interview,	  Salta,	  June	  8	  2011).	  27	  This	  terminology	  is	  adapted	  from	  Persson	  and	  Tabellini’s	  (2000)	  characterization	  of	  politicians	  as	  partisan	  (those	  who	   care	   about	   the	  well-­‐being	   of	   particular	   groups	   of	   society)	   or	  opportunistic	   (those	  who	  want	   to	  maximize	  their	  own	  well	  being).	  I	  agree	  with	  this	  perspective	  (and	  with	  Robinson	  and	  Torvik	  2005),	  that	  it	  is	  possible	   to	   be	   both	   partisan	   and	   opportunistic.	   Following	   Robinson	   and	   Torvik’s	   (2001)	   assumption	   “that	  politicians	  maximize	  a	  weighted	  sum	  of	  their	  own	  welfare	  and	  the	  welfare	  of	   the	  group	  they	  represent,	  but	  where	  their	  own	  welfare	  is	  most	  important,”	  I	  characterize	  supporters	  as	  caring	  both	  about	  their	  own	  welfare	  (their	   jobs)	   and	   the	   future	  of	   the	  party	  or	  politician	   that	   they	   support,	   but	   caring	   about	   their	   own	  welfare	  more.	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  under	  normal	  conditions	  and	  when	  the	  benefit	  is	  as	  important	  as	  a	  job,	  personal	  welfare	  would	  matter	  more	  than	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  supported	  party	  or	  politician.	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could	  pretend	  to	  have	  certain	  political	  preferences	  to	  get	  the	  job,	  change	  their	  minds	  about	  their	  political	  preferences,	  or	  simply	  reduce	  the	  effort	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  devote	  to	  political	  work.	   Since	   the	   exchange	   is	   not	   simultaneous,	   employees	   with	   patronage	   jobs—even	  perceived	   supporters—	   still	   have	   the	   possibility	   of	   not	   complying	  with	   their	   side	   of	   the	  agreement	   after	   receiving	   the	   benefit.	   Being	   a	   supporter—or,	   more	   accurately,	   being	  
perceived	  as	  one—is	  not	  in	  itself	  enough	  to	  guarantee	  future	  compliance	  with	  the	  patronage	  contract.28	  
What	   explains,	   then,	   that	   patronage	   agreements	   are	   in	   fact	   respected?	   Why	   do	  public	  employees	  under	  patronage	  contracts	  keep	  providing	  political	  services	  after	  getting	  the	   job?	   Even	   when	   politicians	   are	   able	   to	   appoint	   employees	   who	   are	   more	   likely	   to	  provide	  political	  services	  in	  the	  first	  place	  because	  they	  might	  care	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  party	   (perceived	   supporters),	   this	   is	   not	   enough	   to	   guarantee	   compliance.	   What	   makes	  patronage	   contracts	   self-­‐enforcing	   is	   the	   belief	   on	   the	   part	   of	   patronage	   employees	   that	  their	   jobs	   are	   tied	   to	   the	   political	   success	   of	   their	   patron.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   civil	   service	  rules,	  the	  incentive	  structure	  of	  the	  patronage	  agreement	  is	  such	  that	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  job	  is	   contingent	   on	   the	   politician’s	   reelection.	   Public	   employees	   under	   patronage	   contracts	  believe	   that	   if	   the	   incumbent	   loses	   the	   election,	   their	   own	   jobs	   (or	   working	   conditions)	  could	  be	  in	  jeopardy,	  which	  provides	  a	  major	  incentive	  to	  want	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  stay	  in	   power.	   Since	   the	   interests	   of	   public	   sector	   employees	   under	   patronage	   contracts	   are	  then	   perfectly	   aligned	   with	   those	   of	   the	   incumbent	   politician—they	   both	   want	   that	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  In	  the	  words	  of	  a	  leader	  from	  the	  Chicago	  Machine	  quoted	  by	  Meyerson	  and	  Banfield	  (1955,	  70-­‐71):	  “What	  I	  look	  for	  in	  a	  prospective	  captain	  (…)	  is	  a	  young	  person—man	  or	  woman—who	  is	  interested	  in	  getting	  some	  material	   return	   out	   of	   his	   political	   activity.	   I	  much	   prefer	   this	   type	   to	   the	   type	   that	   is	   enthused	   about	   the	  ‘party	  cause’	  or	  all	  ‘hot’	  on	  a	  particular	  issue.	  Enthusiasm	  for	  causes	  is	  short-­‐lived,	  but	  the	  necessity	  of	  making	  a	  living	  is	  permanent.”	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politician	   to	   stay	   in	  office—	  and	  providing	  political	   services	   could	  help	  achieve	   this	   goal,	  the	  commitment	  problem	  associated	  with	  the	  non-­‐simultaneity	  of	  the	  clientelistic	  exchange	  disappears	  and	  patronage	  contracts	  become	  self-­‐enforcing.	  
But	  why	  do	  patronage	   employees	   believe	   that	   they	   could	   lose	   their	   jobs	   or	   suffer	  negative	  effects	  on	  their	  working	  conditions	  with	  a	  new	  administration?	  Perceived	  political	  preferences	  at	   the	   time	  of	  hiring	  have	   the	  same	  effect	  as	   the	  public	  pledges	  discussed	  by	  Kitschtelt	   and	  Wilkinson	   (2007,	   15),	   those	  whose	   support	   for	   the	   incumbent	   is	   publicly	  known	   “are	   effectively	   then	   cut	   off	   from	   any	   expectation	   of	   rewards	   if	   the	   opposition	  should	   win.”29	  Since	   the	   distribution	   of	   patronage	   jobs	   is	   based	   on	   perceived	   political	  preferences,	   once	   a	   client	   is	   hired	   as	   a	   supporter	   for	   a	   patronage	   job	  her	   “true”	   political	  preferences	   do	   not	  matter.	   Her	  perceived	   political	   preferences	  will	   dictate	   the	   treatment	  she	   will	   get	   from	   the	   opposition.	   Whether	   a	   patronage	   worker	   is	   a	   pure	   ideological	  supporter,	  a	  pure	  opportunistic	  one,	  or—more	  frequently—something	  in	  between,	  she	  will	  be	  perceived	  and	   treated	  as	  a	   supporter	  by	   the	  opposition.	  Using	   the	  same	   logic	   that	   the	  incumbent	  applied	  to	  hire	  his	  supporters,	  a	  new	  incumbent	  will	  replace	  old	  employees	  with	  his	  own	  supporters.	  A	  new	  politician	  will	  want	  patronage	   jobs	   to	  be	  distributed	   to	   those	  more	   likely	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   for	   him	   and	   only	   his	   supporters	   could	   credibly	  commit	   to	   do	   that	   in	   the	   future,	   so	   old	   employees	  will	   be	   replaced	   or	   sidestepped.	   As	   a	  result,	   supporters	  of	   the	   incumbent	  have	  a	  huge	   incentive	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   to	  try	  to	  keep	  the	  incumbent	  who	  hired	  them	  in	  power.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  See	  Nichter	   (2009)	   for	   and	   interesting	  example	  of	  how	  clients	   in	  Northeast	  Brazil	   strategically	  decide	   to	  reveal	   their	   preferences	   for	   candidates	   or	   hide	   them	  according	   to	   their	   expectations	   of	   being	   rewarded	  or	  punished	  after	  the	  election.	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Note	  that,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  politician,	  once	  the	  “right	  type”	  of	  patronage	  employee	   is	  hired,	   there	   is	   an	   important	   incentive	   to	  keep	  her	   in	   that	  position.	  Although	  this	  dissertation	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  understanding	  the	  incentives	  of	  patronage	  employees,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  think	  about	  politicians’	  incentives	  as	  well.	  Politicians,	  as	  mentioned,	  want	  to	  hire	   citizens	   that	  will	   comply	  with	   the	   patronage	   contract	   and	  provide	   political	   services.	  Once	   one	   of	   these	   types	   of	   employees	   is	   hired,	   she	   becomes	   more	   valuable	   over	   time.	  Similarly	   to	   the	   learning	   that	  happens	  with	  any	   regular	   job	   in	  which	  years	  of	   experience	  make	   workers	   more	   valuable,	   the	   experience	   in	   organizing	   political	   meetings	   or	   rallies,	  mobilizing	  citizens	  to	  these	  events,	  monitoring	  elections	  or	  knowing	  how	  to	  solve	  citizens’	  problems	   is	   extremely	   valuable	   to	   politicians.	   Over	   time,	   patronage	   employees	   become	  more	  skilled	  and	  their	  “off-­‐the-­‐job”	  productivity	  increases.	  Politicians	  then	  have	  important	  incentives	  to	  try	  to	  hire	  the	  right	  types	  of	  employees	  from	  the	  beginning	  and	  keep	  them	  in	  their	  positions	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  political	  experience.	  	  
In	   sum,	   what	   makes	   patronage	   contracts	   self-­‐sustaining	   without	   punishment	   or	  reciprocity	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  patronage	   jobs	  are	  distributed	   to	  supporters	   (or	  at	   least	   those	  perceived	  as	  such).	  This	   is	  the	  case	  because	  only	  supporters—whose	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	   fate	   of	   the	  politician	   that	   hired	   them—	  can	   credibly	   commit	   to	   provide	  political	  support	  in	  the	  future.	  Patronage	  jobs	  and	  working	  conditions	  held	  by	  perceived	  supporters	  will	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   (their	   patron)	   but	   not	   by	   a	   competing	  politician	   (because	   supporters	   of	   the	   incumbent	   cannot	   credibly	   commit	   to	   provide	  political	   services	   for	   the	   opposition).	   Once	   perceived	   as	   a	   supporter	   of	   the	   incumbent	  politician,	  patronage	  employees	  have	   low	  expectations	  of	  keeping	   their	   jobs	  and	  working	  conditions	  if	  the	  opposition	  were	  to	  win.	  Supporters	  then	  have	  large	  incentives	  to	  provide	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political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  In	  other	  words,	  when	  supporters	  get	  the	  patronage	  jobs,	  patronage	  contracts	  are	  incentive-­‐compatible	  and	  the	  commitment	  problem	  associated	  with	  the	  non-­‐simultaneity	  of	  the	  exchange	  disappears.	  Supporters	  with	  patronage	   jobs	  understand	   that	   it	   is	   in	   their	   best	   interest	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   to	  help	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   remain	   in	   power.	   And	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	   alignment	   of	  interests	   between	   patrons	   and	   clients	   (or	   elected	   politicians	   and	   patronage	   employees)	  what	  makes	  patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining.	  
	  
2.5	   A	  Note	  on	  the	  Collective	  Action	  Problem	  
In	   the	  previous	   section	   I	   argued	   that	   public	   employees	   comply	  with	  patronage	   contracts	  because	  they	  understand	  that	  it	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  try	  to	  keep	   their	   patron	   in	   power.	  More	   precisely,	   the	   aligned	   incentives	   theory	   indicates	   that	  public	   employees	   understand	   that	   it	   is	   in	   their	   best	   interest	   that	   political	   services	   are	  provided	  by	  someone	  so	  the	  incumbent	  politician	  gets	  reelected.	  One	  can	  imagine,	  then,	  that	  it	  would	  be	  more	   rational	   for	  each	  actor	   to	   let	  others	  provide	   the	   services	  and	  enjoy	   the	  benefit	  of	  having	  the	  politician	  reelected	  without	  putting	  in	  any	  effort.	  When	  clients	  are	  a	  group	  (like	  employees	  with	  patronage	  contracts)	  and	  not	   just	  one	   individual,	   there	   is	   the	  temptation	   to	   free-­‐ride	  on	  other	   clients’	   efforts.	  As	   long	   as	   a	   sufficient	   amount	  of	   people	  provided	   political	   services,	  whether	   one	   particular	   individual	   complies	   or	   not	  might	   not	  have	   a	   relevant	   effect	   on	   the	   outcome.	  Moreover,	   everyone	  will	   enjoy	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	  politician	   being	   reelected	   equally—those	   that	   provided	   services	   and	   those	   that	   did	   not.	  What	  is	  then	  the	  individual’s	  incentive	  to	  contribute?	  As	  with	  many	  other	  public	  goods	  (in	  
	  	  
66	  
this	   case,	   the	   reelection	   of	   the	   incumbent)	   that	   depend	  upon	   collective	   contributions	   (in	  this	  case,	  political	  services),	  there	  might	  be	  a	  temptation	  for	  each	  actor	  to	  let	  others	  make	  the	   effort.	   Since	  —in	   the	   absence	   of	   punishment—	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	   patron	   staying	   in	  power	  is	  non-­‐excludable,	  both	  those	  who	  comply	  with	  the	  patronage	  contract	  and	  provide	  political	  services	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  will	  equally	  enjoy	  the	  benefit	  of	  keeping	  the	  patron	  in	  power	  and	  thus	  their	  jobs.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Olson	  (1965,	  reprint	  2003,	  21):	  	  
“Though	  all	  the	  members	  of	  the	  group	  therefore	  have	  a	  common	  
interest	  in	  obtaining	  this	  collective	  benefit,	  they	  have	  no	  common	  
interest	  in	  paying	  the	  cost	  of	  providing	  that	  collective	  good.	  Each	  
would	  prefer	   that	   the	  others	  pay	   the	  entire	  cost,	  and	  ordinarily	  
would	  get	  any	  benefit	  provided	  whether	  he	  had	  borne	  part	  of	  the	  
cost	  or	  not”	  	  
There	   are,	   however,	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   that	   reduce	   the	   likelihood	   of	   widespread	   free-­‐riding	   in	   these	   instances,	  making	   cooperation	  more	   likely	   among	   public	   employees	  with	  patronage	   jobs.30	  First,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   benefit	   at	   stake	   (a	   job)	  might	   be	  important	  enough	  to	  provide	  a	  significant	  incentive	  for	  cooperation.	  When	  the	  benefit	  is	  so	  huge,	  more	  people	  are	  willing	  to	  pay	  the	  cost	  (provide	  services)	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  desirable	  outcome	  will	  actually	  happen.	  Of	  course,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  those	  less	  risk	  averse	  that	  are	  willing	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  of	  non-­‐provision,	  but	  the	  bigger	  the	  benefit,	  the	  more	  people	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  and	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  pay	  the	  cost.	  
Second,	   the	   cost	   of	   cooperation	   is	   not	   necessarily	   very	   high.	   Political	   services	   are	  often	   provided	   during	   regular	   working	   hours	   so	   the	   choice	   of	   public	   employees	   is	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Both	   laboratory	  experiments	  and	   field	   studies	  have	   shown	   that	   collective	  action	   succeeds	   far	  more	  often	  than	  expected	  according	  to	  Olson’s	  theory	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Ostrom	  2000	  for	  a	  discussion	  on	  this).	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between,	  for	  instance,	  attending	  a	  rally	  and	  staying	  at	  home,	  but	  between	  attending	  a	  rally	  and	   performing	   their	   regular	   “on-­‐the-­‐job”	   duties.	   Among	   the	   services	   analyzed	   here,	   the	  provision	  of	  favors	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  type	  of	  services	  that	  are	  often	  provided	  during	  regular	  working	   hours.	   As	   I	  will	   show	   in	   Chapter	   4,	   a	   favor	   is	   frequently	   just	   “a	   routine	  bureaucratic	   procedure”	   transformed	   into	   a	   “personal	   favor”	   by	   a	   patronage	   employee	  (Chubb	  1981,	  120).	  Moreover,	  because	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters,	  what	  employees	  are	  often	  asked	  to	  do	  is	  to	  provide	  services	  to	  their	  preferred	  politician.	  And,	  of	  course,	  providing	  political	  services	   for	  one’s	  preferred	  politician	   is	   less	  costly	  than	  doing	  it	  for	  the	  opposition.	  	  
Third,	   individual	   contributions	   are	   not	   necessarily	   individually	   irrelevant	   to	   the	  outcome.	  While	  it	  may	  have	  little	  impact	  whether	  one	  particular	  individual	  attends	  a	  rally,	  the	  cooperation	  of	  an	   individual	   in	  charge	  of	  mobilizing	  many	  others	   to	   the	  rally,	  may	  be	  quite	  important	  to	  its	  success.	  Monitoring	  elections,	  as	  I	  will	  describe	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  is	  also	  a	  key	  activity	  with	  a	  potentially	   important	   impact	  on	  political	  outcomes.	   It	   is	  a	  widespread	  belief	   among	   Argentinean	   politicians—	   a	   belief	   shared	   by	   scholars—	   that	   the	   ability	   to	  deploy	   election	  monitors	   to	   every	   single	   election	   booth	   is	   fundamental	   to	   succeed	   in	   an	  election	   (see,	  De	  Luca	  et	  al.	  2002,	  2006;	  Zarazaga	  2012;	  and	  Chapter	  3).	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  contribution	   that	   each	  patronage	   employee	  makes	   in	   her	   role	   as	   electoral	  monitor	   is	   far	  from	  being	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  outcome.	  
Finally,	   irrespective	   of	   the	   size	   of	   the	   administration,	   public	   employees	   usually	  interact	  only	  with	  a	  small	  group	  of	  people	  regularly	  and	  repeatedly.	  No	  matter	  how	  many	  public	  employees	  work	  at	  the	  administration,	  the	  amount	  of	  people	  that	  constitute	  “their”	  group	  is	  usually	  considerably	  smaller.	  Free-­‐riding	  on	  others’	  efforts	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	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politician	  stay	  in	  power	  could	  be	  harder	  to	  sustain	  when	  those	  on	  whom	  one	  is	  shirking	  are	  co-­‐workers	   that	   one	   has	   to	   face	   on	   a	   daily	   basis.31	  When	   an	   individual	   is	   part	   of	   a	  community—in	   this	   case,	   a	   group	   of	   employees—	   social	   or	   reputational	   concerns	   may	  outweigh	   any	   benefit	   that	   would	   result	   from	   free-­‐riding	   on	   others	   (Chong	   1991;	   Olson	  1965).	  	  
Of	   course,	   I	   am	   not	   arguing	   that	   collective	   action	   problems	   do	   not	   arise	   among	  patronage	   employees,	   but—for	   the	   reasons	   outlined	   above—	   I	   expect	   the	   likelihood	   of	  widespread	  free-­‐riding	  that	  might	  be	  detrimental	  to	  outcomes,	  to	  be	  small.32	  The	  possibility	  of	   free-­‐riding	   is	   always	  present	  but	   the	   specific	   costs	   and	  benefits	   involved	   in	  patronage	  contracts	   as	   well	   as	   the	   particular	   characteristics	   of	   the	   environment	   in	   which	   these	  contracts	  take	  place—the	  public	  administration—	  make	  cooperation	  more	  likely.33	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Using	   experimental	   evidence	   (from	   the	   lab)	   Ostrom	   and	   Walker	   (1997)	   have	   shown	   that	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  communication	   in	   a	   public	   good	   game	  produces	   substantial	   increases	   in	   cooperation.	   See	   also	  Ostrom	  and	  Walker	  (2005).	  32	  Although	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  of	  situations	  in	  which	  free-­‐riding	  could	  be	  more	   extensive.	   First,	   any	   situation	   in	  which	   the	   cost	   of	   participation	   is	   increased	  might	  make	   it	  more	  tempting	   for	   clients	   to	   free-­‐ride.	   For	   instance,	   if	   participation	   in	   politics	   involves	   physical	   risks	   (as	   in	  countries	  with	  widespread	  state	   repression	  or	   in	   the	  presence	  of	  violent	  political	  groups),	   clients	  might	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  free-­‐ride	  on	  others,	  even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs.	  Alternatively,	  if	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  job	  is	  reduced,	  it	  might	  not	  be	  considered	  important	  enough	  to	  overcome	  the	  temptation	  of	  letting	  others	  do	  the	  work.	  For	  instance,	  when	  finding	  a	  job	  outside	  the	  state	  is	  considered	  an	  attractive	  and	  easily	  achieved	  option,	  as	   is	   the	   case	   in	  more	   developed	   countries,	   the	   incentives	   to	   free-­‐ride	  might	   become	   larger	   still.	   It	   is	   also	  possible	   to	   imagine	   situations	   in	   which	   the	   contribution	   of	   each	   employee’s	   participation	   becomes	   less	  relevant.	   For	   instance,	   with	   very	   low	   levels	   of	   electoral	   competition,	   employees	   might	   feel	   that	   their	  cooperation	   is	  not	  necessary	   for	  winning	  the	  election	  and	  this	  general	   feeling	  might	  generate	  high	   levels	  of	  free	  riding.	  Finally,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  cooperation	  in	  small	  groups	  is	  easier	  because	  of	  the	  potential	  social	  or	  reputational	  costs	  of	  non-­‐cooperating,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  imagine	  employees	  who	  do	  not	  care	  about	  other	  people’s	  opinions	  and	  will	  still	  chose	  to	  free	  ride	  on	  others.	  In	  the	  end,	  “the	  world	  contains	  multiple	  types	  of	  individuals,	  some	  more	  willing	  than	  others	  to	  initiate	  reciprocity	  to	  achieve	  the	  benefits	  of	  collective	  actions”	  (Ostrom	  2000,	  138).	  33	  Both	  field	  studies	  of	  collective	  action	  and	  experimental	  research	  have	  shown	  that	  contextual	  factors	  affect	  the	  level	  of	  cooperation.	  See	  Ostrom	  2000	  for	  a	  review	  of	  this	  literature.	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2.6	   Empirical	  Implications	  and	  Scope	  Conditions	  
The	  previous	  sections	  developed	  a	  theory	  of	  self-­‐sustaining	  patronage	  contracts.	  Patronage	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  because	  supporters	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	   willing	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   in	   the	   future,	   and	   more	   importantly,	   they	   can	  credibly	   commit	   to	   do	   so.	   This	   is	   because	   patronage	   jobs	   held	   by	   supporters	   and	   the	  working	   conditions	   associated	   with	   those	   jobs	   will	   be	   maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	  politician	  who	  hired	  them	  if	  he	  gets	  reelected,	  but	  not	  by	  a	  politician	  from	  the	  opposition.	  Supporters	  thus	  have	  strong	  incentives	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  stay	  in	  power.	  Since	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  patronage	  employees	  and	  the	  politician	  are	  then	  the	   same—they	   both	   want	   the	   incumbent	   to	   get	   reelected—patronage	   contracts	   are	  incentive-­‐compatible	  and	  therefore	  sustainable	  without	  punishment.	  
This	  self-­‐sustaining	  theory	  of	  patronage	  has	  three	  main	  empirical	  implications	  that	  will	   be	   tested	   in	   the	   following	   chapters.	   First,	   patronage	   jobs	   are	   disproportionally	  distributed	   to	   supporters.	   Recall	   that	   not	   all	   jobs	   are	   patronage	   jobs	   so	   this	   implication	  does	   not	   mean	   that	   all	   jobs—not	   even	   the	   majority	   of	   them—will	   go	   to	   supporters.	  Empirically,	   the	  theory	  predicts	  simply	  that	  politicians	  hire	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  their	   own	   supporters.	   Second,	   since	   most	   patronage	   jobs	   are	   distributed	   to	   supporters,	  more	   supporters	   (than	   non-­‐supporters)	   should	   be	   involved	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   political	  services.	   Third,	   supporters	   are	   more	   involved	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   political	   services	   also	  because	   they	   strongly	   believe	   that	   their	   jobs	   are	   tied	   to	   the	   political	   success	   of	   the	  incumbent	  politician.	  I	  expect	  supporters	  to	  be	  more	  afraid	  of	  a	  new	  politician	  replacing	  the	  incumbent.	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A	   key	   assumption	   of	   the	   theory	  developed	  here	   is	   that	   patronage	   employees	   care	  about	   their	   jobs.	   As	   mentioned	   before,	   it	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   assume	   that	   patronage	  employees	   care	   only	   about	   their	   jobs.	   In	   fact,	   it	   might	   be	   that	   clients	   care	   both	   about	  keeping	   their	   jobs	   and	  about	  helping	   the	  politician	  or	   the	  party	   to	  whom	   they	  owe	   their	  jobs,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  important	  assumption	  of	  this	  theory	  that	  they	  care	  about	  their	  jobs	  more.	  If	  employees	   do	   not	   care	   enough	   about	  maintaining	   their	   jobs	   (or	   the	   working	   conditions	  associated	  with	   those	   jobs),	   the	   theory	  has	  very	   little	  explanatory	  power.	  This	  yields	   two	  more	   testable	   empirical	   implications.	   Employees	   who	   are	   typically	   less	   afraid	   of	   losing	  their	   jobs	  will	   therefore	  be	  expected	  to	  be	   less	   involved	   in	  the	  provision	  of	  services.	  Two	  characteristics	  of	  employees	  are	  particularly	  correlated	  with	  being	  more	  or	   less	  afraid	  of	  losing	  the	  job:	  education	  and	  type	  of	  contract.	  Those	  with	  more	  education,	  who	  thus	  have	  more	   outside	   options	   and	   those	   with	   tenure	   who	   can	   be	   subjected	   to	   changes	   in	   their	  working	  conditions	  but	  cannot	  be	  fired,	  have	  less	  to	  lose	  with	  a	  change	  in	  administration.	  I	  expect	   individuals	   with	   less	   fear	   of	   losing	   their	   jobs—namely	   these	   more	   educated	   and	  tenured	   employees—	   to	   be	   less	  willing	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   in	   order	   to	   help	   the	  mayor	  stay	  in	  power	  and	  secure	  their	  jobs.	  
More	  educated	  employees	  have	  more	  valuable	   skills	   and	   thus	  better	   labor	  market	  expectations	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   so	   public	   jobs	   are	   less	   valuable	   to	   them	   than	   to	   less	  educated	  employees	  with	  fewer	  outside	  options	  (Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2004,	  2012;	  Robinson	  and	  Verdier	  2003;	  Medina	  and	  Stokes	  2002,	  2007).	  34	  They	  are	  then	  generally	  less	  afraid	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Moreover,	  as	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (2004,	  2012)	  show,	  in	  Argentina	  the	  wage	  premium	  derived	  from	  a	  public	  job	  is	  higher	  for	  less	  educated	  employees.	  Public	  sector	  employees	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  education	  earn	  wages	  that	  are	  below	  their	  private	  market	  prices	  so	   less	  educated	  employees	  value	   their	   jobs	   in	   the	  public	   sector	  relatively	  more	  than	  employees	  with	  more	  education.	  Alesina,	  Danninger,	  and	  Rostagno	  (2001)	  find	  similar	  distributive	  effects	  of	  patronage	  in	  Italy.	  
	  	  
71	  
losing	   their	   jobs	   and	   will	   accept	   or	   comply	   with	   patronage	   contracts	   less	   often	   than	  individuals	  that	  have	  more	  to	  lose	  with	  a	  change	  in	  administration.	  In	  other	  words,	  higher	  levels	   of	   education	   should	   be	   associated	   with	   less	   willingness	   to	   accept	   a	   public	   job	   in	  exchange	  for	  political	  support.	  Empirically,	  I	  expect	  to	  see	  more	  educated	  employees	  being	  less	   involved	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   political	   services	   and	   less	   afraid	   of	   suffering	   negative	  changes	  with	  a	  new	  administration.35	  
A	   second	   characteristic	   that	   affects	   patronage	   employees’	   job	   security	   and,	   as	   a	  consequence,	   their	   willingness	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   patronage	   agreement	   is	   the	   type	   of	  employment	  contract	  under	  which	  they	  are	  hired.	  In	  Argentina,	  as	  in	  many	  other	  countries	  with	   civil	   service	   rules,	   some	   employees	   have	   tenure	   rights	   and	   cannot	   be	   fired,	   while	  others	   work	   under	   temporary	   contracts	   that	   need	   to	   be	   periodically	   renewed.	   Tenured	  employees	  (with	  permanent	  contracts)	  cannot	  be	  legally	  fired	  so	  they	  should	  have	  no	  fear	  of	   losing	   their	   jobs	  with	  a	  new	  administration.	  As	   I	  will	   show	   in	  Chapter	  5,	  public	   sector	  employees	  with	  these	  types	  of	  patronage	  jobs	  still	   fear	  negative	  changes	  in	  their	  working	  conditions	  with	  a	  new	  administration,	  but	   they	  have	  no	   fear	  of	   losing	   their	   jobs.	   I	   expect	  then	  that	  tenured	  employees	  will	  be	  less	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services	  than	  non-­‐tenured	  employees	  (who	  have	  more	  to	  lose	  from	  a	  new	  administration).36	  Certainly,	  I	  also	  expect	  them	  to	  be	  less	  afraid	  (than	  non-­‐tenured	  employees)	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs	  with	  a	  change	  in	  administration.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Recall	  that	  the	  types	  of	  political	  services	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  are	  those	  usually	  provided	  by	  political	  workers	  on	  the	  ground.	  It	   is	  possible	  that	  more	  educated	  employees	  are	   involved	  in	  other	  types	  of	  services	  not	  analyzed	  here.	  	  36	  In	   line	   with	   this	   expectation,	   Calvo	   and	   Murillo	   (2012)	   find	   that	   in	   Argentina	   low-­‐skilled	   workers	   with	  temporary	  contracts	  receive	  a	  higher	  wage	  premium	  than	  their	  counterparts	  with	  permanent	  contracts.	  For	  them,	  this	  shows	  that	  clients	  who	  provide	  the	  highest	  electoral	  returns	  (those	  more	  sensitive	   to	  clientelistic	  appeals)	  are	  more	  commonly	  targeted	  by	  politicians	  with	  these	  types	  of	  benefits	  (in	  this	  case,	  patronage	  jobs).	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In	  the	  case	  of	  education,	  there	  might	  a	  trade	  off	  between	  “on-­‐the-­‐job”	  productivity	  and	   “off-­‐the	   job”	   productivity.	  More	   educated	   employees	   are	   less	   sensitive	   to	   patronage	  exchanges	  and	  therefore	  less	  willing	  to	  provide	  political	  services.	  But	  education	  and	  skills	  are	  necessary	  conditions	  for	  certain	  types	  of	  jobs	  so	  politicians	  need	  to	  “sacrifice”	  potential	  political	   productivity	   for	   on-­‐the-­‐job	   productive	   for	   at	   least	   certain	   types	   of	   positions.	  Without	   a	   functioning	   bureaucracy,	   the	   potential	   electoral	   gains	   from	   the	   distribution	   of	  patronage	  jobs	  become	  counterproductive.	  Because	  of	  this,	  more	  educated	  employees	  have	  less	  to	  fear	  from	  a	  change	  in	  the	  administration	  (they	  have	  outside	  options),	  but	  they	  are	  also	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  fired	  (new	  politicians	  might	  need	  their	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  productivity).	  	  
This	  trade-­‐off,	  however,	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  the	  case	  of	  tenure	  rights.	  Since	  untenured	  employees	   are	   more	   sensitive	   to	   patronage	   agreements,	   politicians—	   all	   things	   equal—	  should	   always	   prefer	   patronage	   employees	   under	   temporary	   contracts	   than	   employees	  with	  tenure	  rights.	  Untenured	  employees	  have	  more	  to	  lose	  than	  tenured	  employees	  from	  a	  change	   in	   administration	   and	   are	   therefore	   more	   eager	   participants	   in	   the	   efforts	   (by	  providing	   political	   services)	   to	   keep	   the	   politician	   in	   power.	   The	   choice	   of	   contracts,	  however,	  is	  not	  at	  the	  complete	  discretion	  of	  incumbent	  politicians.	  Across	  countries,	  there	  are	   usually	   legal	   limits	   to	   the	   amount	   of	   time	   that	   an	   employee	   can	   be	   hired	   under	   a	  temporary	  contract.	  Moreover,	  every	  new	  incumbent	  receives	  a	  set	  of	  tenured	  employees	  that	   are	   already	   in	   the	   administration	  when	   he	   takes	   office.	   Although	   there	   is	   still	   some	  variation	  in	  politicians’	  willingness	  to	  distribute	  tenure	  rights	  across	  new	  employees,	   it	   is	  beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   dissertation	   to	   study	   this	   particular	   issue.	   For	   the	   argument	  developed	  here	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   take	   into	  account	   that	   although	  politicians	  might	  prefer	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non-­‐tenured	  contracts	   to	   tenured	  ones,	   they	   face	   limits	   (both	   legal	   and	  political)	   to	   their	  ability	  to	  choose	  the	  type	  of	  contract.	  
While	   the	   theory	   of	   patronage	   developed	   in	   this	   dissertation	   aims	   to	   provide	   a	  general	  theory	  of	  patronage	  beyond	  the	  Argentinean	  case	  where	  I	  test	  it,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	   explicit	   about	   the	   scope	   conditions	   of	   the	   theory.	   First,	   the	   theory	   developed	   here	  studies	   the	   commitment	   issues	   associated	   with	   patronage	   agreements,	   but	   patronage	  agreements	  are	  only	  possible	  in	  contexts	  of	  weak	  or	  non-­‐existent	  civil	  service	  systems.	  As	  we	  will	   see	   in	   chapter	  6,	   this	   is	   the	  norm	   in	  most	  Latin	  American	  countries	  as	  well	   as	   in	  many	  other	  young	  democracies.	  The	  argument	  presented	  here	  should	  be	   less	   informative	  about	   appointments	   in	   countries	   with	   strict	   regulations	   about	   hiring	   and	   firing	   public	  sector	  employees.	  	  
Second,	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   proposes	   a	   solution	   to	   the	  commitment	   issues	   that	   arise	   from	   the	   non-­‐simultaneity	   of	   the	   patronage	   exchange.	   The	  theory	  aims	  to	  explain	  why	  patronage	  employees	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  patronage	  contract	  by	  providing	  political	  services	  after	  getting	  a	  job.	  Recall	  that	  patronage	  is	  defined	  in	  this	  dissertation	  as	  the	  exchange	  of	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  for	  political	  support.	  The	  theory	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  focuses	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  patron	  that	  provides	  a	  job	  and	  the	  client	  that	  provides	  political	  services	  in	  return.	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  theory	  to	  explain	  the	  behavior	  of	  employees	  that	  were	  hired	  by	  previous	  administrations.	  One	   of	   the	   core	   arguments	   developed	   here	   is	   that	   patronage	   jobs	   are	   distributed	   to	  supporters	   (because	   only	   supporters	   can	   credibly	   commit	   to	   provide	   political	   support),	  whose	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  the	  politician	  that	  hired	  them.	  This	  theory	  cannot	  explain	  the	  behavior	  of	  employees	  that	  were	  not	  chosen	  by	  the	  incumbent	  politician.	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Third,	  this	  is	  a	  theory	  of	  patronage	  jobs	  distributed	  by	  an	  incumbent	  who	  wants	  to	  get	   reelected.	   The	   theory	   does	   not	   provide	   any	   insights	   about	   situations	   in	   which	   the	  politician	  is	  not	  seeking	  reelection,	  either	  because	  the	  law	  does	  not	  allow	  it	  or	  because	  of	  a	  personal	  decision.	  Finally,	  the	  argument	  assumes	  that	  partisan	  or	  political	  preferences	  are	  somehow	   informative.	   Although,	   as	   explained,	   supporters	   do	   not	   need	   to	   be	   “true”	  believers	  for	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  theory	  to	  hold,	  being	  perceived	  as	  a	  supporter	  needs	  to	  be	  meaningful.	  If	  citizens	  can	  identify	  themselves	  with	  one	  party	  or	  politician	  first,	  and	  then	  switch	  at	  no	  cost—as	  might	  be	  the	  case	  in	  countries	  with	  very	  weak	  party	  systems—then	  being	  perceived	  as	  a	  supporter	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  valuable	  information	  to	  the	  incumbent	  or	  the	  challenger.37	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  supporters	  can	  no	  longer	  credibly	  commit	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  in	  the	  future	  and	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  theory	  might	  not	  hold.	  
	  
2.7	   Conclusion	  	  
Departing	   from	   existing	   explanations,	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   posits	   that	  public	   employees	   engage	   in	   political	   activities	   that	   support	   the	   incumbent	   politician	  because	   their	   interests	   are	   aligned	   with	   the	   political	   success	   of	   that	   politician	   (their	  patron).	  Patrons	  do	  not	  need	  to	  monitor	  clients	  and	  threaten	  to	  punish	  non-­‐compliers,	  or	  rely	  on	  their	  feeling	  of	  reciprocity.	  To	  make	  patronage	  contracts	  work,	  politicians	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  screen	  supporters	  from	  non-­‐supporters	  and	  distribute	  patronage	  contracts	  only	  to	  the	  former.	  When	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  to	  supporters,	  patronage	  contracts	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  think	  about	  other	  types	  of	  identification	  that	  might	  replace	  partisan	  identification,	  such	  as	  religion	   or	   ethnicity.	   Further	   research	   is	   needed	   to	   establish	   whether	   these	   other	   types	   of	   identifications	  work	  similarly	  to	  partisan	  identification	  for	  patronage	  appointments.	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incentive-­‐compatible.	   Only	   supporters—whose	   fates	   are	   tied	   to	   the	   political	   fate	   of	   the	  politician	  that	  hires	  them—	  can	  credibly	  commit	  to	  provide	  political	  support	  in	  the	  future.	  Patronage	  jobs	  and	  working	  conditions	  held	  by	  perceived	  supporters	  will	  be	  maintained	  by	  the	   incumbent	   politician	   (their	   patron)	   but	   not	   by	   a	   competing	   politician	   (because	  supporters	  of	   the	   incumbent	   cannot	   credibly	   commit	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   for	   the	  opposition).	  Supporters	  then	  have	  large	  incentives	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  their	  patron	  to	  stay	  in	  power,	  and	  this	  alignment	  of	  interests	  between	  patrons	  and	  clients	  makes	  patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining.	  
The	   theory	   developed	   here	   does	   not	   argue	   that	   monitoring	   political	   behavior	   is	  impossible.	  Unlike	  the	  case	  of	  voting	  behavior	  under	  the	  secret	  ballot,	  there	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	   types	  of	  political	   services	  studied	  here	  are	  visible	   (with	   the	  possible	  exception	  of	   the	  provision	  of	  favors)	  and	  thus	  potentially	  easy	  to	  monitor.	  However,	   just	  because	  they	  can	  be	  monitored	  does	  not	  mean	  that	   they	  are	   in	   fact	  being	  monitored.	  When	  patronage	   jobs	  are	   distributed	   to	   supporters,	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   incentive-­‐compatible	   and	  monitoring	   (and	   the	   fear	   of	   punishment)	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   sustain	   the	   exchange.	  Patronage	   employees	   provide	   services	   because	   their	   incentives	   are	   aligned	   with	   the	  incentives	  of	  their	  patron,	  not	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  of	  being	  punished	  for	  their	  behavior.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  patrons	  and	  clients	  share	  the	  same	  interests,	  monitoring	  is	  not	  necessary.	  
When	   clients	   believe	   that	   it	   is	   in	   their	   best	   interest	   to	   help	   their	   patron	   stay	   in	  power	  the	  possibility	  of	  distributing	  patronage	  jobs	  provides	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  incumbency	  advantage	  with	  potentially	  important	  effects	  on	  electoral	  outcomes.	  Elections	  may	  still	  be	  competitive,	  but	  with	  the	  political	  use	  of	  state	  resources	  by	  the	  incumbent	  party	  to	  finance	  political	   workers,	   elections	   are	   less	   fair	   for	   the	   non-­‐incumbent.	   Moreover,	   if	   patronage	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Patronage	  Contracts	  and	  Political	  
Services.	  Evidence	  from	  List	  Experiments	  	  
“Patronage	  is	  used	  to	  induce	  (…)	  to	  work	  for	  the	  machine	  
by	  getting	  out	   the	  vote	  and	  dispensing	   favors	   to	  voters.”	  
(Wilson	  1961,	  371)	  
“The	   patronage	   system	   may	   be	   considered,	   too,	   as	   a	  
method	   of	   financing	   party	   activity.	   The	   operation	   of	   a	  
party	  organization	  requires	  the	  services	  of	  many	  men	  and	  
women....	  Indirectly,	  a	  considerable	  part	  of	  party	  expense	  
is	   met	   by	   the	   public	   treasury,	   and	   the	   chief	   means	   of	  
channeling	   public	   funds	   to	   party	   support	   is	   through	   the	  
appointment	  of	  party	  workers	  to	  public	  office.”(Key	  1964)	  	  
In	  chapter	  2,	   I	  argued	  that	  patronage	  contracts	  are	  distributed	  to	  supporters	   in	  exchange	  for	   different	   types	   of	   political	   services	   that	   go	   far	   beyond	   electoral	   support.	   Politicians	  choose	   to	   hire	   supporters	   because	   their	   commitment	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   in	   the	  future	   is	   credible.	   Indeed,	   public	   sector	   employees	   under	   patronage	   contracts	   often	   help	  during	  elections	  by	  attending	  rallies,	  helping	  with	  the	  campaign,	  and	  as	  electoral	  monitors,	  among	  other	   things.	   In	  between	  elections,	   they	  also	   fulfill	   their	   side	  of	   the	  agreement	  by	  dispensing	   favors	   to	   voters.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   test	   this	   claim	   using	   individual	   level	   data	  obtained	  from	  an	  original	  survey	  of	  public	  employees	  that	  I	  conducted	  in	  three	  Argentinean	  municipalities.	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In	   spite	   of	   the	   fact	   the	   patronage	   is	   a	   widespread	   phenomenon,	   the	   difficulty	   in	  collecting	   systematic	   data	   means	   that	   we	   actually	   know	   very	   little	   about	   how	   public	  employees	   are	   hired,	   who	   they	   are	   voting	   for,	   what	   they	   do,	   and	   why	   they	   do	   it.	   The	  challenges	   of	   collecting	   systematic	   data	   on	   patronage	   are	   so	   serious	   that	  Wilson’s	  more	  than	  fifty	  years	  old	  statement	  (1961,	  372)	  is	  still	  relevant:	  “So	  much	  secrecy	  is	  maintained	  in	  city	  politics	  that	  no	  exact	  data	  on	  patronage	  may	  ever	  be	  obtained	  in	  cities	  of	  any	  size.”	  In	  trying	   to	   deal	   with	   this	   measurement	   issue,	   scholars	   in	   Argentina	   have	   used	   different	  proxies	   for	   patronage,	   such	   as	   the	   total	   number	   of	   public	   employees	   (Calvo	   and	  Murillo	  2004),	   the	  number	  of	   temporary	   employees	   (Kemahlioglu	  2006,	   2011),	   and	   spending	  on	  personnel	   (Brusco	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Gordin	  2002;	  Remmer	  2007).	  However,	   the	   fact	   there	   is	  a	  high	  number	  of	  public	  employees	  or	  that	  a	  disproportionate	  amount	  of	  money	  is	  spent	  on	  public	  sector	  jobs	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  these	  jobs	  are	  patronage	  jobs.	  Moreover,	  the	  challenge	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  assessing	  whether	  or	  not	  public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  in	  exchange	   for	   political	   services.	   If	   jobs	   are	   indeed	   distributed	   for	   this	   reason,	   it	   is	   also	  important	  to	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  the	  type	  and	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  political	  support	  that	  public	  employees	  provide	   their	   bosses	   together	  with	   the	   reasons	  behind	   this	   support.	   To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  directly	  asking	  either	  patrons	  or	  clients	   is	  unlikely	  to	  yield	  useful	   insights	  because	  they	  both	  have	  incentives	  to	  lie	  (see	  chapter	  1).	  
Instead	  of	  using	  problematic	  proxy	  measures	  or	  direct	  survey	  questions	  to	  test	  the	  empirical	   implications	   of	  my	   theory,	   I	   take	   a	   different	   approach—one	   that	   allows	  me	   to	  elicit	  accurate	  information	  from	  the	  actors	  involved	  while	  minimizing	  social	  response	  bias	  (whether	   in	   the	   form	   of	   inaccurate	   answers	   or	   refusals).	   I	   use	   an	   original	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  survey	   of	   1200	   municipal	   public	   sector	   employees	   that	   I	   fielded	   in	   three	   Argentinean	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municipalities	   that	   incorporates	   two	   strategies	   for	   encouraging	   truthful	   responses	   about	  sensitive	  topics.	  The	  first	  one	  (following	  Scacco	  2009)	  consists	  of	  a	  number	  of	  techniques	  to	  earn	  the	  trust	  of	  the	  respondents	  by	  guaranteeing	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  most	  sensitive	  questions.	  The	  second	  one	  is	  the	  use	  of	  list	  experiments—a	  type	  of	  question	  that	  provides	  respondents	   with	   the	   anonymity	   needed	   to	   obtain	   accurate	   information	   about	   their	  political	  activities.	  	  
Using	   these	  methods,	   I	   study	  how	  public	  sector	   jobs	  are	  distributed	  and	  to	  whom,	  the	  electoral	  behavior	  of	  public	  employees,	  and	  the	  type	  and	  extent	  of	  the	  political	  services	  that	   they	  provide	   to	   the	  mayor.	  The	  results	  presented	   in	   this	  chapter	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  theoretical	  expectations	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  2.	  First,	   I	  am	  able	  to	  show	  that	  most	   jobs	  are	  distributed	  through	  informal	  channels.	  Then,	   I	  use	  an	   instrumental	  variable	  design	  to	  show	  that—because	  politicians	  use	   the	  political	  preferences	  of	   the	  citizens	  at	   the	   time	  of	  hire	  as	  a	  “proxy”	  for	  their	  willingness	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  on	  the	  job—public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters.	  Supporters	  who	  did	  not	  just	  vote	  for	  the	  mayor	  but	  also	  provide	  a	  number	  of	  different	  political	  services.	  Through	  the	  use	  of	  list	  experiments,	  I	  can	  estimate	  the	  exact	  proportion	  of	  employees	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  political	  activities,	  even	  though	  employees	  have	  incentives	  to	  lie	  about	  this	  behavior.	  To	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  systematic	  measurement	  of	  the	  types	  and	  extent	  of	  political	  services	   that	   employees	   hired	   through	   patronage	   contracts	   provide	   to	   their	   patrons.	  Finally,	   consistent	  with	   the	   theory	  developed	   in	   chapter	  2,	   I	   show	   that	   supporters	  of	   the	  mayor	  are	  disproportionally	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services.	  
This	  chapter	  is	  organized	  in	  six	  subsections	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  describe	  in	  detail	  the	  survey	  design	  and	  protocol	  of	  implementation,	  the	  list	  experiment	  technique,	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and	   the	   logic	   for	   the	   selection	   of	   municipalities,	   as	   well	   the	   main	   characteristics	   of	   the	  municipalities	  selected.	  In	  section	  two,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  ways	  that	  public	  employees	  get	  their	  jobs	  and	  show	  the	  predominance	  of	  informal	  mechanisms	  of	  recruitment.	  After	  this	  section,	  I	  use	  an	  instrumental	  variable	  design	  to	  show	  that	  public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters.	  In	  the	  fourth	  section,	  I	  present	  the	  list	  experiments'	  estimates	  of	  the	   provision	   of	   three	   types	   of	   political	   services:	   helping	   with	   electoral	   campaigns,	  attending	   rallies,	   and	   monitoring	   elections.	   In	   section	   six,	   I	   test	   the	   robustness	   of	   the	  results.	  The	  last	  section	  concludes.	  
	  
3.1	   Research	  Design	  
3.1.1	  The	  Survey	  	  
The	  data	  from	  the	  survey	  was	  gathered	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews	  of	  1184	  lower	  and	  mid-­‐level	  local	  public	  sector	  employees	  in	  the	  Argentinean	  municipalities	  of	  Salta	  (province	  of	  Salta),	   Santa	   Fe	   (province	   of	   Santa	   Fe)	   and	   Tigre	   (province	   of	   Buenos	   Aires).12	  Together	  with	   a	   team	   of	   research	   assistants,	   we	   interviewed	   around	   400	   employees	   in	   each	  municipality.	  On	  average,	  the	  survey	  interview	  lasted	  24	  minutes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  More	  information	  about	  the	  survey	  can	  be	  founded	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  2	  Top	   positions	   at	   all	   levels	   of	   government	   (national,	   provincial,	   and	   local),	   even	   in	   the	   cases	   were	   civil	  services	   regulations	   do	   exist,	   are	   discretionally	   appointed.	   Civil	   service	   systems	   usually	   include	   the	  specification	  of	   political	   positions	   for	   higher	   ranks	   in	  which	  hiring	  based	  on	  political	   affiliation	   is	   legal	   (as	  opposed	   to	   career	   position	   in	   which	   hiring	   is	   based	   on	   merit	   and	   qualifications).	   Top	   positions	   were,	  therefore,	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample.	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Within	  each	  municipality,	  I	  generated	  a	  random	  sample	  based	  on	  the	  official	   list	  of	  public	   employees	   (excluding	   elected	   officials	   and	   high-­‐level	   positions).3 	  The	   selected	  employees	   were	   then	   directly	   approached	   to	   interview	   at	   public	   offices	   during	   their	  working	  hours.	  Since	  the	  random	  sample	  was	  drawn	  from	  an	  official	  and	  complete	   list	  of	  public	  employees	  and	  the	  survey	  was	  administered	  during	  office	  hours	  at	  the	  municipality,	  both	  the	  permission	  and	  the	  collaboration	  of	  the	  local	  authorities	  were	  crucial.	  In	  order	  to	  minimize	   the	   probability	   of	   antagonizing	   the	   authorities	   and	   maximize	   the	   chances	   of	  getting	  their	  approval	  for	  the	  survey,	  I	  took	  two	  precautions.	  First,	  I	  purposely	  designed	  the	  survey	   instrument	   to	  be	  as	   short	  as	  possible	   to	  make	  sure	  employees	  would	  not	  be	  kept	  away	   from	   their	   jobs	   for	   long	   periods	   of	   time.	   Second,	   I	   excluded	   particularly	   direct	  sensitive	  questions	  (especially	  ones	  related	  to	  the	  mayor).	  Authorities	  in	  each	  municipality	  read	  the	  survey	  instrument	  carefully	  but	  did	  not	  censor	  any	  of	  the	  proposed	  questions.	  
I	  provided	  interviewers	  with	  lists	  of	  public	  employees	  in	  the	  random	  sample	  and	  the	  addresses	  of	  their	  respective	  places	  of	  work.	  Places	  of	  work	  ranged	  from	  offices	  at	  the	  City	  Hall	   or	   at	   decentralized	   offices	   (delegaciones)	   to	   parks,	   construction	   cites,	   cemeteries,	  hospitals,	  health	  centers,	  and	  the	  street	  itself.	  In	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  selected	  employee	  was	  not	   at	   the	   place	   of	  work	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   visit,	   or	   preferred	   to	   answer	   the	   survey	   at	   a	  different	  time	  of	  day,	   I	   instructed	  interviewers	  to	  make	  an	  appointment	  to	  return	  later.	   If	  the	   selected	   employee	   refused	   to	   answer	   the	   survey,	   or	   the	   interview	   could	   not	   be	  conducted	  after	  the	  second	  attempt,	  I	  replaced	  the	  respondent	  with	  the	  following	  name	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Information	   on	   public	   employment	   is	   not	   publicly	   available	   and	   Argentinean	   politicians	   are	   usually	   very	  reluctant	  to	  share	  it.	  The	  first	  challenge	  of	  the	  survey	  was	  therefore	  to	  get	  access	  to	  the	  data	  and	  this	  was	  only	  possible	  after	  being	  introduced	  to	  the	  authorities	  via	  personal	  connections	  and	  a	  number	  of	  interviews	  with	  public	   officials	   to	   introduce	  myself,	   explain	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   study,	   get	   the	   list	   of	   public	   employees	   and,	  finally,	  get	  the	  authorization	  to	  conduct	  the	  survey.	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the	  official	  list	  of	  public	  employees.	  I	  instructed	  the	  interviewers	  to	  make	  detailed	  records	  of	  failed	  interviews.	  Because	  there	  were	  survey	  and	  list	  experiment	  questions	  embedded	  in	  the	   survey	   with	   two	   conditions	   each—treatment	   and	   control—,	   two	   versions	   of	   the	  questionnaire	   were	   used.	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   survey	   and	   the	   list	   experiment	  questions,	   respondents	  were	  asked	  questions	   from	   identical	  questionnaires.	   Interviewers	  used	   the	   two	   different	   questionnaires	   in	   sequential	   order,	   assigning	   respondents	  alternatively	  to	  either	  the	  treatment	  or	  the	  control	  group.	  	  
Since	   the	   survey	   was	   conducted	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   at	   public	   offices,	   getting	   truthful	  answers	  from	  public	  employees	  presented	  a	  challenge.	  While	  high-­‐ranking	  public	  officials	  usually	  have	  their	  own	  offices,	  most	  public	  employees	  in	  Argentina	  share	  their	  workspaces	  with	  others.	  Public	  employees	  could	  be	  unwilling	  to	  reveal	  sensitive	  information	  in	  front	  of	  others,	   especially	   if	   they	   think	   that	   their	   jobs	   could	   be	   jeopardized	   by	   their	   answers.	  Following	  standard	  IRB	  procedures,	  all	  interviews	  started	  with	  the	  enumerators	  explaining	  the	   purpose	   of	   the	   survey	   and	   the	   confidentiality	   of	   all	   the	   data	   collected.	   Enumerators	  were	   instructed	   to	   emphasize	   the	   strictly	   academic	   purpose	   of	   the	   survey	   and	   to	   assure	  that	  respondents	  understood	  that	  the	  information	  would	  not	  be	  shared	  with	  the	  mayor	  or	  any	   other	   person.	   Besides	   this	   standard	   procedure,	   I	   implemented	   two	   distinct	   but	  complementary	   strategies	   to	   minimize	   social	   response	   bias	   (whether	   in	   the	   form	   of	  inaccurate	  answers	  or	  refusals).	  
First,	   as	   describe	   in	   section	   3.1.2	   below,	   I	   designed	   a	   series	   of	   survey	   list	  experiments	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  providing	  respondents	  with	  the	  anonymity	  needed	  to	  induce	  them	   to	   give	   accurate	   information	   about	   their	   political	   activities.	   Second,	   I	   followed	  Scacco’s	   (2009)	   strategy	   (originally	   developed	   to	   survey	   rioters	   in	   Africa),	   and	   split	   the	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questionnaire	   into	   two	   parts.	   The	   first	   one	   (Part	   A)	   had	   the	   background	   and	   general	  information	   about	   the	   respondent,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   less	   sensitive	  questions	   and	   a	   series	   of	  lists	  experiments.	  The	  second	  one	  (Part	  B)	  had	  the	  most	  sensitive	  questions	  about	  voting	  behavior,	   ideology,	   and	  political	   preferences.	  Each	  part	   of	   the	  questionnaire	  was	  marked	  with	  a	  different	  survey	  identification	  number	  that	  could	  only	  be	  matched	  with	  a	  document	  not	  available	  to	  the	  enumerators	  at	  any	  time.	  Apart	   from	  this	  number,	   the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  questionnaire	  had	  no	   information	  (such	  as	  age,	  gender,	  occupation,	  or	  place	  of	  work)	  that	  could	  be	  used	  to	   identify	  the	  respondent.	  Enumerators	  administered	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	   questionnaire,	   while	   the	   sensitive	   part	   (Part	   B)	   was	   read	   and	   filled	   out	   by	   the	  respondents	  themselves.4	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  other	  employees	  in	  the	  office	  were	  neither	  able	  to	  hear	  the	  questions	  nor	  the	  answers.	  This	  part	  of	   the	  questionnaire	  was	  designed	  to	  be	  short	   and	   very	   easy	   to	   understand	   with	   only	   closed-­‐ended	   questions.	   Finally,	   the	  respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  store	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  questionnaire	  in	  a	  sealed	  cardboard	  box	   similar	   to	   a	   ballot	   box	   (something	   familiar	   to	   Argentineans	   since	   paper	   ballots	   and	  cardboard	  ballot	  boxes	  are	  still	  used	  in	  Argentinean	  elections).5	  	  
I	  instructed	  the	  enumerators	  to	  provide	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  these	  procedures	  before	   handing	   Part	   B	   of	   the	   questionnaire	   to	   the	   respondents	   and	   to	   make	   sure	  respondents	   understood	   that	   the	   confidentiality	   of	   their	   responses	   was	   fully	   protected.	  Their	  understanding	  was	  fundamental	  to	  guaranteeing	  the	  success	  of	  the	  technique.	  Was	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Literacy	  rates	  are	  very	  high	  in	  Argentina	  so	  there	  was	  no	  concern	  that	  the	  respondents	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  read	  and	  fill	  the	  Part	  B	  of	  the	  questionnaires	  by	  themselves.	  In	  fact,	  according	  to	  the	  Argentina	  2010	  census,	  only	   1.96%	   of	   the	   total	   population	   older	   than	   10	   years	   old	   is	   illiterate	   and	   public	   sector	   employees	   are	  probably	  more	  educated	  than	  the	  national	  average.	  5	  In	  a	  few	  cases,	  respondents	  asked	  enumerators	  to	  fill	  part	  B	  for	  them	  (asking	  directly).	  Enumerators	  were	  instructed	  to	  agree	  with	  these	  requests,	  but	  Part	  B	  was	  still	  stored	  in	  the	  cardboard	  box	  when	  the	  survey	  was	  completed.	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in	  fact	  successful?	  To	  test	  the	  success	  of	  the	  strategies	  implemented,	  in	  the	  last	  round	  of	  the	  survey	  conducted	   in	  Salta	  between	   June	  and	  August	  2011,	   I	   included	  one	  extra	  question.	  The	  new	  question	  asked	  about	  voting	  intentions	  in	  the	  next	  presidential	  election	  that	  was	  to	  be	  held	  two	  months	  after	  the	  survey	  was	  conducted	  (in	  October).	  The	  precise	  wording	  of	  the	  question	  was:	   “Finally,	   could	  you	   tell	  me	   for	  whom	  are	  you	  going	   to	  vote	   in	   the	  next	  presidential	  election?”6	  Responses	  were	  coded	  1	  if	  the	  respondent	  mentioned	  the	  party	  of	  the	   mayor	   (Peronism)	   or	   any	   candidate	   from	   that	   party,	   and	   0	   otherwise.7	  Half	   of	   the	  respondents	  were	  asked	  this	  question	  directly	  by	  the	  enumerator	  at	  the	  end	  of	  Part	  A	  of	  the	  questionnaire;	   the	   other	   half	   found	   this	   question	   at	   the	   end	   of	   Part	   B	   to	   answer	   by	  themselves.	   Table	   3.1	   presents	   the	   differences	   in	   means	   between	   the	   responses	   to	   the	  question	  when	  asked	  directly	  (in	  Part	  A)	  and	  when	  filled	  by	  respondents	  (in	  Part	  B).	  
	  
Table	  3.1:	  Voting	  intentions	  in	  next	  presidential	  election,	  by	  way	  of	  asking	  	  	   	  	  Asking	  directly	  by	  enumerator	  (Part	  A)	   0.48	  (0.04)	  N=193	  Filled	  by	  respondents	  themselves	  (Part	  B)	   0.42	  (0.04)	  N=196	  Difference	   0.06	  (0.05)	  N=389	  	  	   	  	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variances,	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  In	  Spanish:	  “Por	  último,	  ¿podría	  decirme	  a	  quien	  va	  a	  votar	  en	  las	  próximas	  elecciones	  presidenciales?”	  7	  All	  references	  to	  peronist	  labels	  (peronism,	  kirchnerism,	  “Frente	  para	  la	  Victoria”)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  name	  of	  the	  main	  peronist	  candidate,	  Cristina	  Kirchner,	  where	  coded	  as	  1s.	  The	  exception	  was	  Duhalde	  (7	  respondents	  in	  Salta	  reported	  intentions	  to	  vote	  for	  him)	  that,	  although	  being	  a	  peronist,	  was	  running	  in	  clear	  opposition	  to	  the	  incumbent	  president	  at	  the	  time.	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When	   asked	   directly	   about	   presidential	   voting	   intentions	   (in	   Part	   A),	   48	   percent	   of	   the	  respondents	   answered	   that	   they	  would	   vote	   for	   the	   party	   of	   the	  mayor	   (the	   Peronism).	  However,	  when	  respondents	  were	  answering	  the	  questions	  by	  themselves	  (in	  Part	  B),	  42	  percent	  reported	  that	  they	  would	  vote	  for	  the	  Peronist	  party.	  Although	  the	  results	  suggest	  that	   employees	   over-­‐report	   their	   intention	   to	   support	   the	   party	   of	   the	   mayor	   in	   the	  presidential	  election	  when	  asked	  directly	  in	  front	  of	  others,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  means	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant.	  	  
However,	   according	   to	   the	   theory	   developed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   patronage	   jobs	   are	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  so	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  them	  to	  have	  any	  fear	  of	  making	  their	  political	  preferences	  public	  (since	  their	  preferences	  are	  aligned	  with	  the	  preferences	  of	   the	  mayor).	   Indeed,	   as	  we	  will	   see	  below	   in	   section	  3.3,	   a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  public	   sector	   jobs	   are	   distributed	   to	   supporters.	   Therefore	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	  differences	  in	  responses	  when	  asking	  the	  question	  directly	  and	  when	  letting	  the	  employees	  answering	  it	  by	  themselves	  are	  not	  significant.	  Only	  the	  employees	  that	  are	  not	  supporters	  might	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	  give	  untruthful	  responses	  in	  front	  of	  others	  about	  their	  political	  preferences.	  Table	  3.2	  thus	  presents	  the	  differences	  in	  means	  between	  the	  responses	  to	  the	  question	   when	   asked	   directly	   (in	   Part	   A)	   and	   when	   filled	   by	   respondents	   (in	   Part	   B)	  according	   to	  whether	   they	  reported	  voting	   for	   the	  mayor	   in	   the	  previous	  election	  or	  not.	  The	  question	  asked	  for	  whom	  they	  voted	  in	  the	  last	  mayoral	  election,	  and	  responses	  were	  coded	  1	  if	  the	  respondent	  voted	  for	  the	  incumbent	  mayor,	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  
86	  
Table	  3.2:	  Voting	  intentions	  in	  next	  presidential	  election,	  by	  way	  of	  asking	  and	  
support	  for	  the	  mayor	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Mayor	  Voters	   Non-­‐Mayor	  Voters	  Asking	  directly	  by	  enumerator	  (Part	  A)	   0.54	   0.21	  (0.04)	   (0.07)	  N=147	   N=33	  Filled	  by	  respondents	  themselves	  (Part	  B)	   0.53	   0.05	  (0.04)	   (0.03)	  N=155	   N=42	  Difference	   0.01	   0.16**	  (0.06)	   (0.08)	  N=302	   N=75	  	  	   	  	   	  	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variances	  with	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  	  
Among	   those	   who	   reported	   voting	   for	   the	   incumbent	   mayor	   (column	   1),	   the	   different	  question	   asking	   procedures	   do	   not	   seem	   to	  matter.	   However,	   among	   those	  who	   did	   not	  vote	  for	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  in	  the	  last	  election	  (column	  2),	  asking	  directly	  or	  not	  yields	  different	  results.	  When	  asked	  directly,	  21	  percent	  of	  non-­‐mayor	  voters	  answered	  that	  they	  would	  vote	  for	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  in	  the	  next	  presidential	  election.	  When	  asked	  in	  the	  private	   questionnaire	   (Part	   B),	   only	   5	   percent	   answered	   that	   they	   would	   vote	   for	   the	  Peronist	   presidential	   candidate.	   A	   two-­‐tailed	   t-­‐test	   confirms	   that	   this	   difference	   (16	  percentage	   points)	   is	   statistically	   significant	   at	   the	   95	   percent	   level.	   It	   might	   seem	  problematic	   to	   use	   a	   question	   about	   voting	   behavior	   to	   test	   the	   efficacy	   of	   the	   different	  questioning	  procedures	  since	  this	  question	  could	  be	  itself	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  problems	  of	  social	  response	  bias.	  Moreover,	  this	  question	  was	  included	  in	  Part	  B	  of	  the	  questionnaire,	  the	  usefulness	  of	  which	  I	  am	  testing	  here.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  change	  in	  procedure	  made	  no	  difference	  for	  those	  who	  voted	  for	  the	  mayor	  but	  made	  a	  significant	  difference	  for	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those	  who	  did	  not	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  splitting	  the	  questionnaire	  worked	  in	  the	  expected	  way,	  making	  a	  difference	  only	  for	  the	  types	  of	  employees	  that	  had	  an	  incentive	  to	  lie.	  
	  
3.1.2	  List	  Experiments	  
Together	   with	   the	   questions	   about	   voting	   behavior	   and	   political	   preferences,	   questions	  about	   political	   services	   were	   the	   hardest	   to	   ask.	   As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	  employees	  could	  be	  unwilling	   to	  reveal	   that	  kind	  of	   information	   in	   front	  of	  others	   (recall	  that	  the	  interviews	  were	  done	  at	  public	  offices),	  but	  it	  was	  also	  possible	  that	  they	  would	  be	  unwilling	   to	   reveal	   that	   information	   in	   private	   or—even	   worse—	   provide	   inaccurate	  answers.	   To	   get	   around	   this	   problem—	   to	   increase	   the	   response	   rate	   and	  produce	  more	  valid	   estimates—	  questions	   about	  political	   services	   combined	   relatively	  direct	  questions,	  with	  questions	  in	  the	  sensitive	  part	  of	  the	  survey	  (Part	  B,	  filled	  out	  by	  employees	  on	  their	  own)	  that	  guaranteed	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  responses,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  list	  experiments	  that	  guaranteed	  the	  anonymity	  of	  the	  responses.8	  
The	  logic	  of	  the	  list	  experiment	  technique	  is	  very	  simple.	  First,	  the	  survey	  sample	  is	  split	   into	   random	  halves:	   a	   treatment	   and	   a	   control	   group.	   Each	   group	   is	   read	   the	   same	  question	  and	  shown	  a	  card	  with	  a	  number	  of	  response	  options.9	  Cards	  for	  the	  control	  and	  treatment	  group	  differ	  only	   in	   the	  number	  of	  response	  categories.	  List	  experiments	  work	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  To	  see	  the	  effects	  of	  social	  desirability	  bias	  on	  responses	  to	  a	  similar	  topic,	  see	  the	  work	  of	  Gonzalez-­‐Ocantos	  et	  al.	  (2012).	  By	  comparing	  responses	  to	  direct	  questions	  with	  responses	  to	  list	  experiments,	  they	  show	  the	  existence	  of	  important	  social	  desirability	  bias	  on	  questions	  about	  clientelism	  in	  Nicaragua.	  For	  general	  advice	  on	  how	  to	  design	  list	  experiments,	  see	  Glynn	  (2013).	  	  9	  The	  list	  of	  responses	  was	  not	  read	  aloud	  to	  increase	  privacy.	  Recall	  that	  most	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  front	  of	  others.	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by	  aggregating	   the	   item	  we	  care	  about	  (the	  “treatment”	  or	   “sensitive”	   item)	  with	  a	   list	  of	  other	  items.	  Respondents	  are	  asked	  to	  report	  the	  number	  of	  items	  on	  the	  list	  that	  applies	  to	  them,	   but	   not	   which	   ones.	   For	   example,	   one	   of	   the	   political	   services	   studied	   in	   this	  dissertation	  is	  the	  provision	  of	  favors	  to	  citizens.	  Asking	  directly	  about	  this	  issue	  could	  be	  problematic	   because	   respondents	   could	   get	   offended,	   refuse	   to	   answer,	   or	   provide	  untruthful	  responses.	  List	  experiments	  provide	  a	  good	  solution	  to	  get	  around	  this	  problem.	  In	  this	  example,	  both	  groups	  were	  read	  the	  following	  question:	  
Now	  I	  am	  going	  to	  hand	  you	  a	  card	  that	  mentions	  a	  number	  of	  activities.	  Please,	  I	  would	  like	  for	  you	  to	  tell	  me	  HOW	  MANY	  of	  those	   you	   did	   in	   the	   last	   week.	   Please,	   do	   not	   tell	   me	   which	  ones,	  just	  HOW	  MANY.	  	  	  The	  control	  group	  received	  a	  card	  with	  the	  following	  activities:	  (A)	  Talk	  about	  politics	  with	  someone	  (B)	  Try	  to	  convince	  someone	  of	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  some	  politician	  (C/D)	   Try	   to	   convince	   someone	   of	   the	   strengths	   and	  weaknesses	  of	  some	  public	  policy	  	  (D/E)	   Have	   a	   serious	   fight	   with	   someone	   due	   to	   political	  differences10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  This	  unlikely	  response	  was	  included	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  changes	  of	  “ceiling	  effects”	  (see	  Kuklinski	  et	  al.	  1997).	  “Ceiling	  effects”	  occur	  when	  respondents	  select	  the	  entire	   list	  of	  possible	  responses.	   In	  this	  case,	   the	  respondent	  would	  be	   simply	  accepting	   to	  have	  performed	  all	   activities	   (including	   the	   sensitive	  one)	   so	   the	  level	  of	  anonymity	  that	  the	  list	  experiment	  was	  supposed	  to	  achieve	  would	  have	  been	  ruined	  and	  the	  claim	  about	  list	  experiments	  improving	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  estimates	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  sustain.	  An	  alternative	  to	  the	  use	   of	   unlikely	   events	   is	   to	   include	   items	   that	   are	   negatively	   correlated	   (see	   Glynn	   2013),	   which	   is	   the	  strategy	  I	  used	  in	  some	  of	  the	  other	  list	  experiments.	  A	  similar	  problem,	  called	  “floor	  effects”,	  may	  arise	  if	  the	  control	   questions	   are	   expected	   to	   be	   negative	   for	  many	   respondents.	   In	   this	   case	   (as	  with	   ceiling	   effects),	  respondents	   in	   the	   treatment	   group	   may	   fear	   that	   answering	   the	   question	   truthfully	   would	   reveal	   their	  positive	  answer	   for	   the	  sensitive	   item.	  To	  minimize	   this	  effect,	   item	  A	  was	   included	  (because	   talking	  about	  politics	   is	  very	  common	  among	  people	  working	   in	   the	  public	  sector).	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note,	  however,	   that	  both	  the	  presence	  of	  ceiling	  or	  floor	  effects	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  underestimation	  of	  the	  population	  proportion	  of	  those	  who	  would	  provide	  a	  positive	  answer	  for	  the	  sensitive	  item	  (both	  types	  of	  problems	  lower	  the	  observed	  mean	  response	  of	  the	  treatment	  group)	  (Blair	  and	  Imai	  2012).	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The	   treatment	   group	  was	   given	   a	   similar	   card,	  with	   an	   extra	   activity	   placed	   in	   the	   third	  position:	  
(C)	   Help	  someone	  with	  an	  errand	  or	  task	  (tramite	  o	  gestión)	  at	  the	  City	  Hall	  11	  	  
The	  question	  does	  not	  ask	  the	  respondent	  to	  tell	  the	  enumerator	  the	  specific	  activities.	  The	  respondent	   just	   has	   to	   tell	   the	   interviewer	   how	  many	   of	   those	   activities	   she	   did,	   so	   the	  question	  provides	  the	  respondent	  with	  full	  anonymity	  for	  her	  responses.	  Providing	  that	  the	  entire	   list	   does	   not	   apply	   (no	   one	   in	   the	   treatment	   group	   provides	   a	   “5”	   answer),	  respondents	  can	  be	  assured	  that	  no	  one	  can	  know	  their	  answer	  to	  the	  sensitive	  question.	  Thus,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   respondents	   understand	   that	   the	   anonymity	   of	   their	   responses	   is	  protected,	  list	  experiments	  generate	  more	  accurate	  responses	  than	  direct	  questioning	  and	  thus	  a	  more	  valid	  estimate	  of	  the	  frequency	  of	  the	  item	  we	  care	  about.	  Since	  respondents	  were	   randomly	   assigned	   to	   the	   treatment	   and	   control	   groups,	   and	   as	   long	   as	   the	  randomization	   was	   successful,	   the	   two	   groups	   would	   be	   identical,	   on	   average,	   on	   both	  observable	  and	  unobservable	  characteristics.12	  Therefore,	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  respondents	  providing	   favors	   can	  be	   simply	  derived	  by	   comparing	   the	   average	   response	  among	   the	   treatment	   group	   and	   the	   average	   response	   among	   the	   control	   group. 13	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  wording	  in	  Spanish	  for	  this	  example	  was:	  “Ahora	  le	  voy	  a	  entregar	  una	  tarjeta	  donde	  figuran	  una	  serie	  
de	  actividades	   [ENTREGAR	   TARJETA].	   Quisiera,	   por	   favor,	   que	  me	   señale	  CUÁNTAS	  de	   ellas	   realizó	  Ud.	   en	   la	  
última	   semana.	   Por	   favor,	   no	   me	   diga	   cuáles,	   sino	   solamente	   CUÁNTAS.”	   The	   response	   categories	   were:	  “Charlar	   de	   política	   con	   alguien,”	   “Intentar	   convencer	   a	   alguien	   de	   las	   virtudes	   o	   defectos	   de	   algún	  
político.”Intentar	  convencer	  a	  alguien	  de	  las	  virtudes	  o	  defectos	  de	  alguna	  medida	  política,”	  “Pelearse	  seriamente	  
con	  alguien	  por	  diferencias	  políticas,”	  and	  the	  tratment	  item	  was	  “Ayudar	  a	  alguien	  con	  algún	  trámite	  o	  gestión	  
en	  la	  municipalidad.”	  	  12	  See	  Table	  A4	  and	  Table	  A5	  in	  the	  Appendix	  for	  randomization	  checks.	  13	  The	  internal	  validity	  of	  the	  list	  experiment	  technique	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  length	  of	  a	  list	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  responses	  independent	  of	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  list.	  Indeed,	  Kiewiet	  de	  Jonge	  and	  Nickerson	  
	  	  
90	  
Differences	  in	  the	  means	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  provide	  a	  point	  estimate	  of	  the	  number	  of	  people	  that	  reported	  providing	  favors.	   If	  no	  one	  was	  providing	  favors,	   there	  will	  be	  no	  difference,	  on	  average,	  in	  the	  mean	  number	  of	  reported	  activities	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  In	  this	  example,	  the	  average	  number	  of	  activities	  indicated	  by	  the	  control	  groups	  was	  1.14	  and	   the	   average	   number	   indicated	   by	   the	   treatment	   groups	   was	   1.58,	   and	   so	   we	   can	  conclude	  that	  44%	  of	  respondents	  provided	  favors	  (1.58-­‐1.14=0.44).14	  
List	   experiments	   are	   not	   the	   only	   existing	   method	   to	   obtain	   valid	   estimates	   of	  attitudes	  and	  activities	  thought	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  social	  desirability	  bias.	  Another	  interesting	  alternative	  is	  the	  use	  of	  randomization	  response	  designs	  such	  as	  the	  one	  used	  by	  Gingerich	  (2006,	  2010)	  to	  ask	  bureaucrats	  about	  corruption	  in	  Bolivia,	  Brazil	  and	  Chile.15	  I	  choose	  to	  use	   list	   experiments	   instead	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons.	   Two	   characteristics	   of	   the	   list	  experiments	  seem	  particularly	  crucial	   for	   the	   type	  of	   survey	   that	   I	   conducted.	  One	  of	   the	  main	  advantages	  of	  the	  list	  experiment	  (over	  alternatives	  such	  as	  the	  randomized	  response	  technique)	   is	   its	   simplicity,	   both	   for	   the	   researcher	   (or	   enumerators)	   and	   respondents,	  which	  makes	  it	  very	  easy	  to	  implement.	  Because	  of	  this,	  respondents	  tend	  to	  show	  a	  good	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  technique	  works	  to	  provide	  anonymity,	  and	  therefore	  they	  tend	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2011)	  find	  that	  list	  experiments	  do	  not	  overestimate	  the	  incidence	  of	  behavior	  or	  attitudes	  and	  that,	  for	  high	  incidence	  behaviors,	  they	  actually	  tend	  to	  underestimate.	  Holbrook	  and	  Krosnick	  (2010),	   in	  turn,	  tested	  the	  effect	   of	   list’s	   length	   by	   including	   a	   non-­‐existing	   behavior	   (taken	   a	   vacation	   to	   a	   fictional	   place)	   on	   a	   list	  experiment	  and	  find	  no	  effect	  of	  list’s	  length	  on	  responses.	  	  14	  Although	   there	   have	   been	   some	   recent	   developments	   on	   how	   to	   use	   list	   experiments	   with	  multivariate	  regression	   analysis	   (see,	   for	   instance,	   Blair	   and	   Imai	   2012;	   Corstange	   2009;	   Glynn	   2013;	   Imai	   2011),	  difference-­‐in-­‐means	  estimators	  are	  still	  the	  standard	  for	  list	  experiments	  (Gonzalez-­‐Ocantos	  et	  al.	  2012).	  One	  of	   the	   main	   advantages	   of	   using	   difference-­‐in-­‐means	   estimators	   is	   that	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   make	   any	  functional	  form	  assumptions.	  15	  The	  randomized	  response	  methodology	  works	  by	  introducing	  noise	  to	  responses	  (respondents	  flip	  a	  coin	  or	  use	  a	  spinner	  to	  determine	  whether	  to	  answer	  the	  sensitive	  item	  or	  the	  non-­‐sensitive	  item),	  which	  protects	  individual	  answers	  but	  enables	  the	  researcher	  (who	  knows	  the	  probability	  distribution	  of	  the	  realizations	  of	  the	   device	   used)	   to	   estimate	   the	   frequency	   of	   the	   behavior	   under	   study.	   See	   Corstange	   (2009)	   for	   a	   brief	  discussion	  of	  different	  techniques	  to	  neutralize	  response	  bias.	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to	   trust	   it	   as	   a	   method	   to	   protect	   their	   responses	   (Coutss	   and	   Jann,	   2011).	   Since	   I	  interviewed	   low	  and	  middle	  rank	  employees,	  many	  of	   them	  with	   low	   levels	  of	  education,	  this	  was	  an	  important	  advantage	  over	  other	  alternatives.	  
Although	  the	  list	  experiment	  technique	  is	  fairly	  easy	  to	  implement	  and	  understand,	  it	   is	   still	   more	   demanding	   than	   responding	   to	   a	   simple,	   direct	   closed-­‐ended	   question.	  Careful	  survey	  implementation	  was	  therefore	  crucial	  to	  obtain	  accurate	  responses.16	  If	  the	  enumerators	  did	  not	  provide	  clear	  instructions,	  respondents	  might	  not	  understand	  that	  the	  anonymity	   of	   their	   responses	  was	   protected	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	   provided	   inaccurate	  responses.	   Besides	   the	   extensive	   training	   that	   the	   enumerators	   received,	   I	   took	   three	  precautions	  to	  decrease	  the	  chances	  of	  respondents	  not	  understanding	  the	  instructions.	  
First,	   I	  asked	  the	  enumerators	  to	  give	  the	   instructions	  for	  the	  question	  clearly	  and	  slowly	  and	  to	  provide	  an	  example.	  Second,	  the	  cards	  with	  the	  list	  of	  items	  contained	  letters	  instead	  of	  numbers	  to	  facilitate	  the	  detection	  of	  lack	  of	  understanding	  in	  the	  respondents.	  During	   the	   pre-­‐test	   of	   the	   survey,	   I	   uncovered	   two	   types	   of	   error	   responses	   from	  employees	  who	  did	  not	  follow	  the	  instructions.	  One	  type	  occurred	  when	  employees	  gave	  a	  count	  of	  the	  frequency	  of	  doing	  each	  of	  the	  items	  instead	  of	  counting	  the	  items	  on	  the	  list.	  The	  second	  one	  was	   just	  mentioning	   the	   item	  or	   items	   from	  the	   list	   that	  applied	   to	   them	  one	  by	  one.	  In	  this	  second	  case,	  the	  use	  of	  letters	  made	  the	  confusion	  with	  the	  instructions	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Careful	  implementation	  is	  always	  important	  when	  conducting	  surveys,	  but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  list	  experiment	  this	   is	   particularly	   crucial	   because	   there	   is	   an	   unavoidable	   efficiency	   cost	   associated	   with	   the	   use	   of	   list	  experiments.	   List	   experiments	  may	   reduce	   bias	   by	  minimizing	   the	   incentives	   for	   respondents	   to	   lie,	   but	   it	  does	  it	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  efficiency	  (the	  standard	  errors	  around	  the	  list	  experiment	  estimates	  are	  larger	  than	  they	  would	  have	  been	  with	  a	  direct	  question	  with	  no	  response	  bias)	  (Blair	  and	  Imai	  2012;	  Corstange	  2009).	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more	   evident	   to	   the	   enumerators.17	  I	   asked	   the	   enumerators	   to	   provide	   the	   instructions	  again	   if	   respondents	   replied	   in	   any	  of	   the	   two	  ways	  mentioned	  or	   in	   any	  other	  way	   that	  showed	   a	   lack	   of	   understanding	   of	   the	   instructions.	   Since	   the	   survey	   included	   four	   list	  experiments,	  interviewers	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  explain	  the	  procedure	  again	  if	  the	  response	  for	  the	   first	   list	   experiment	   alerted	   them	   of	   any	   misunderstanding.18	  Finally,	   I	   put	   the	   list	  experiment	   with	   the	   least	   sensitive	   item	   first.	   If	   respondents	   did	   not	   understand	   the	  instructions	   but	   did	   not	   feel	   any	   social	   desirability	   bias	   in	   answering	   the	   question,	   they	  would	   more	   likely	   just	   identify	   the	   items	   on	   the	   list	   one	   by	   one	   (instead	   of	   refusing	   to	  answer	  or	  providing	  untruthful	  responses).	  This	  gave	  the	  enumerators	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  detecting	  lack	  of	  understanding	  so	  that	  they	  could	  repeat	  the	  instructions.19	  
Using	  this	  technique,	  I	  asked	  about	  four	  different	  political	  services:	  providing	  favors	  (see	   chapter	   4),	   attending	   rallies,	   helping	   with	   electoral	   campaigns,	   and	   monitoring	  elections.	  Before	  analyzing	  the	  results	  from	  the	  list	  experiments,	  I	  briefly	  explain	  the	  logic	  for	   the	   selection	   of	   municipalities	   and	   provide	   some	   of	   their	   basic	   socio-­‐demographic	  characteristics.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  I	   thank	   Anastasia	   Peralta	   Ramos,	   one	   of	   the	   enumerators	   that	   helped	  with	   the	   survey	   in	   Tigre,	   for	   this	  simple	   yet	   effective	   suggestion.	   I	   did	   not	   collect	   systematic	   data	   on	   this	   particular	   issue,	   but	   my	   own	  experience	  doing	  160	  surveys	  myself	  suggests	  that	  it	  was	  an	  effective	  technique	  to	  help	  detect	  problems.	  18	  Of	  course,	  it	  was	  not	  always	  possible	  to	  detect	  lack	  of	  understanding	  and/or	  trust	  in	  the	  technique.	  19	  Note	  that	  the	  enumerators	  explained	  the	  instructions	  as	  many	  times	  as	  necessary	  to	  answer	  the	  questions,	  but	   they	  never	  explained	  how	  the	   list	  experiment	  worked	  and	  which	  one	  was	  the	   item	  on	  the	   list	  we	  cared	  about.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  eliminate	  the	  possibility	  that	  respondents	  were	  over-­‐reporting	  the	  sensitive	  item	  just	   to	   please	   the	   enumerators,	   as	   Ahart	   and	   Sackett	   (2004)	   suggested	   could	   have	   been	   driving	   the	   list	  experiment	  results	  in	  Dalton	  et	  al.	  (1994).	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3.1.3	  Selecting	  Municipalities	  within	  Argentina	  
Since	  Argentina	  has	  1195	  municipalities	  spread	  over	  23	  provinces,20	  conducting	  the	  survey	  on	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  all	  municipalities	  was	  simply	  not	  feasible.21	  In	  order	  to	  make	  the	   research	   tractable	   and	   still	   obtain	   a	   sample	   with	   variation	   across	   municipalities,	   I	  selected	   three	   very	   distinct	  municipalities	   from	   three	   different	   provinces	   for	   the	   survey:	  Salta	   (Province	   of	   Salta),	   Santa	   Fe	   (Santa	   Fe),	   and	   Tigre	   (Conurbano	  Bonaerense,	   Buenos	  Aires).	   The	   three	   municipalities	   vary	   significantly	   in	   their	   political	   and	   economic	  characteristics,	   providing	   a	   good	   opportunity	   to	   test	   how	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	  patronage	   developed	   in	   chapter	   2	   travels	   across	   different	   political	   and	   economic	  environments.	  
The	   City	   of	   Salta	   (536,000	   inhabitants)	   is	   the	   poorest	   of	   the	   three	  municipalities	  included	  in	  the	  survey	  with	  over	  21%	  of	  its	  residents	  living	  in	  poverty,22	  and	  more	  than	  half	  of	   the	  population	  without	  health	   insurance.	  Around	  60	  percent	  of	   the	  population	  has	  not	  finished	   high	   school	   and	   only	   9	   percent	   hold	   a	   college	   degree.	   Politically,	   Salta	   has	   been	  dominated	  by	  the	  Peronist	  Party	  since	  1983,	  except	  in	  1991-­‐1995	  and	  1997-­‐1999	  when	  a	  provincial	   party	   (Partido	   Renovador	   de	   Salta	   -­‐	   PRS)	   managed	   to	   win	   the	   municipal	  executive.	  Since	  2003,	  the	  city	  has	  been	  governed	  by	  the	  Peronist	  Miguel	  Isa	  (with	  the	  PRS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  The	  city	  of	  Buenos	  Aires,	  host	  of	  the	  federal	  government,	  was	  excluded	  because	  of	  its	  unique	  status,	  which	  provides	  local	  authorities	  with	  more	  prerogatives	  than	  a	  municipal	  government	  but	  less	  than	  a	  province.	  21	  If	  we	  include	  the	  smaller	  counterparts	  of	  the	  municipalities,	  comunas,	  Argentina	  has	  more	  than	  2000	  local	  governments.	  22	  Throughout	   this	   dissertation,	   I	   measure	   poverty	   with	   the	   most	   widely	   used	   measure	   of	   poverty	   in	  Argentina—	  “unsatisfied	  basic	  needs”	  or	  NBI	  (necesidades	  básicas	  insatisfechas).	  A	  household	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  unsatisfied	  basic	  needs	  if	  it	  meets	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  five	  characteristics	  that	  are	  considered	  indicators	  of	  poverty	  in	  Argentina:	  Density	  of	  more	  than	  three	  persons	  per	  room	  (crowding),	  living	  in	  a	  precarious	  house	  (housing),	  not	  having	  an	  indoor	  flush	  toilet	  (sanitation),	  having	  a	  child	  between	  6	  and	  12	  years	  old	  that	  is	  not	  attending	  school	  (school	  attendance),	  having	  four	  or	  more	  persons	  per	  person	  working	  and	  a	  household	  head	  with	  2	  or	  fewer	  years	  of	  elementary	  school	  (subsistence	  capacity).	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as	  a	  minor	  partner).	  Isa	  was	  reelected	  in	  2007	  with	  46	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  against	  another	  Peronist	  candidate,	  and	  was	  recently	  (in	  2011)	  reelected	  again	  with	  49	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  (with	  a	  margin	  of	  victory	  of	  20	  percentage	  points	  over	  the	  runner-­‐up).	  
The	  municipality	  of	  Santa	  Fe	  is	  located	  in	  the	  central	  part	  of	  the	  country	  in	  one	  of	  the	  richest	   provinces.	   With	   a	   population	   of	   around	   485,000	   inhabitants,	   it	   is	   the	   provincial	  capital	  and	  the	  second	  biggest	  city	   in	  the	  province	  of	  Santa	  Fe.	  Although	  the	  municipality	  itself	  is	  not	  the	  richest	  one	  in	  the	  province,	  it	  is	  fairly	  rich	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  With	  14	  percent	  of	  its	  residents	  living	  in	  poverty,	  59	  percent	  with	  health	  insurance	  and	  11	  percent	  with	  a	  college	  degree,	  it	  is	  the	  richest	  municipality	  included	  in	  the	  survey.	  In	  spite	   of	   being	   governed	   by	   the	   Peronist	   Party	   for	  most	   of	   the	   period	   since	   the	   return	   of	  democracy	  in	  1983,	  both	  the	  city	  and	  the	  province	  of	  Santa	  Fe	  are	  today	  among	  the	  most	  competitive	   electoral	   arenas.	   In	   2007,	   a	   coalition	   between	   the	   Radical	   Party	   and	   the	  Socialist	   Party	   won	   the	   gubernatorial	   and	   the	   Santa	   Fe	   mayoral	   elections,	   and	   Mario	  Barletta	   from	   the	   Radical	   Party	   became	   the	   mayor	   with	   33	   percent	   of	   the	   votes	   and	   a	  margin	   of	   victory	   of	   less	   than	   two	  percentage	   points	   over	   the	   Peronist	   candidate.	   In	   the	  2009	  elections	  for	  the	  City	  Council,	  the	  coalition	  between	  the	  Radical	  Party	  and	  the	  Socialist	  Party	   obtained	   38	   percent	   of	   the	   votes	   and	   a	  margin	   of	   victory	   of	   13	   percentage	   points.	  After	   the	   survey	  was	   conducted,	   in	   July	   2011,	  Mario	   Barletta	  was	   succeeded	   by	   another	  radical	  winning	  with	  45	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  a	  margin	  of	  victory	  of	  7	  points.23	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Barletta	  decided	  not	  to	  run	  for	  reelection,	  and	  instead	  he	  tried	  to	  obtain	  the	  candidacy	  for	  the	  governorship	  of	   the	   coalition	   between	   the	   radical	   and	   the	   socialist	   party.	   However,	   he	   lost	   the	   primary	   against	   the	  candidate	  from	  the	  socialist	  party,	  and	  the	  electoral	  law	  in	  Santa	  Fe	  did	  not	  allow	  him	  to	  run	  for	  the	  mayoral	  election	  after	  losing	  the	  gubernatorial	  primary.	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Finally,	  Tigre	  (376,000	  inhabitants)	   is	   located	   in	  the	  province	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	   in	  a	  region	   referred	   to	  as	  Conurbano	  Bonaerense.24	  This	   region	  contains	  around	  25	  percent	  of	  the	   electorate	   of	   the	   country	   and,	   as	   a	   consequence,	   it	   has	   attracted	   the	   attention	   of	  politicians,	   journalist,	   and	   academics	   alike.	   Much	   of	   the	   vast	   literature	   on	   Argentinean	  clientelism	   has	   focused	   on	   this	   area. 25 	  The	   electoral	   importance	   of	   the	   Conurbano	  
Bonaerense	   was	   the	   central	   reason	   for	   including	   the	  municipality	   of	   Tigre.	   Because	   it	   is	  located	   in	   an	   area	   that	   composes	   such	   a	   huge	   part	   of	   the	   Argentine	   electorate,	  understanding	   how	  political	   competition	  works	   in	   this	   area	   is	   central	   to	   understand	   the	  Argentine	  electoral	  market	  more	  generally.	  Although	  not	  among	  the	  poorest	  municipalities	  in	  the	  Conurbano,	  20	  percent	  of	  Tigre’s	  residents	  live	  in	  poverty,	  and	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  population	   has	   no	   health	   insurance.	   Around	   17	   percent	   of	   its	   residents	   have	   no	   formal	  education	  or	  have	  not	  finished	  elementary	  school,	  55	  percent	  have	  not	  finished	  high	  school,	  and	   only	   7	   percent	   have	   a	   college	   degree.	   Politically,	   the	   municipality	   of	   Tigre	   was	  governed	  by	  the	  radical	  party	  between	  1983-­‐1987	  and	  by	  a	  personalistic	  municipal	  party	  (Acción	  Comunal)	  from	  1987	  till	  the	  death	  of	   its	  party	  leader	  in	  November	  2006.	  In	  2007,	  Peronist	   Sergio	   Massa	   won	   the	   election	   with	   46	   percent	   of	   the	   votes,	   with	   a	   margin	   of	  victory	  of	  four	  percentage	  points	  over	  Acción	  Comunal	  (42%).	  In	  the	  2009	  council	  elections,	  the	  Peronist	  Party	  increased	  its	  vote	  share	  to	  53	  percent,	  while	  Acción	  Comunal,	  in	  second	  place,	  received	  only	  26	  percent	  of	  the	  votes.	  In	  2011,	  after	  the	  survey	  was	  finished,	  Sergio	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  Conurbano	  Bonaerense	  consists	  of	  24	  municipalities	  that	  surround	  the	  City	  of	  Buenos	  Aires.	  It	  hosts	  a	  population	  of	  around	  10,000,000	  inhabitants	  (1/4	  of	  the	  total	  country	  population.)	  25	  Examples	   include	   Auyero	   (2000),	   Levitsky	   (2003),	   Zarazaga	   (2012)	   among	   others.	   In	   the	   recent	   years,	  however,	  interest	  in	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  country	  has	  been	  increasing	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Brusco	  et	  al.	  2005	  and	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  2008a,	  2012).	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Massa	  was	   reelected	  with	   the	   largest	  margin	   of	   victory	   of	   all	   districts	   in	   the	   Conurbano	  
Bonaerense	  receiving	  73	  percent	  of	  the	  votes	  over	  the	  Acción	  Comunal's	  6	  percent.	  
Although	   the	  municipalities	   for	   the	   survey	  were	   not	   selected	   at	   random,	   they	   are	  representative	  of	  the	  diverse	  economic	  and	  political	  realities	  of	  the	  country.	  By	  including	  a	  municipality	   from	   the	   poorer	   north	   mainly	   dominated	   by	   the	   Peronist	   party	   (Salta),	   a	  municipality	   from	   the	   relatively	   richer	   and	  more	   competitive	   center	   (Santa	   Fe),	   and	   one	  from	   the	   Conurbano	   Bonaerense	   (Tigre),	   I	   capture	   the	   regional	   diversity	   of	   Argentine	  politics.	   Given	   the	   important	   differences	   in	   political	   and	   economic	   characteristics	   across	  the	   three	   selected	   municipalities,	   a	   theory	   that	   works	   in	   all	   three	   places	   makes	  generalization	  from	  only	  three	  cases	  more	  plausible.	  
	  
Table	  3.3:	  Socio-­‐demographic	  and	  political	  characteristics	  of	  the	  municipalities	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Salta	   Santa	  Fe	   Tigre	  Province	   Salta	  (North)	   Santa	  Fe	  (Center)	   Buenos	  Aires	  (CB)	  Mayor	   Miguel	  Angel	  Isa	   Mario	  Barletta	   Sergio	  Massa	  Mayor	  in	  power	   2003-­‐present	   2007-­‐2011	   2007-­‐present	  Mayor’s	  party	   Peronist	   Radical	   Peronist	  Electoral	  Competition	   Low	   High	   Middle/Low	  	   	   	   	  Population	  2001	   472,971	   369,589	   301,223	  Population	  2010	   536,113	   485,345	   376,381	  %	  w/college	   9%	   11%	   7%	  %	  w/health	  insurance	   48%	   59%	   45%	  %	  poverty	   21%	   14%	   20%	  	   	   	   	  




The	   municipalities’	   public	   sectors	   share	   a	   similar	   structure,	   with	   some	   tenured	  employees	  along	  with	  some	  untenured	  employees	  that	  resembles	  the	  way	  the	  national	  and	  provincial	  public	  sectors	  are	  organized	  in	  Argentina.	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  differences	  across	  the	  municipalities,	  the	  most	  important	  being	  the	  proportion	  of	  tenured	  employees.	  The	  municipality	  of	  Santa	  Fe	  pays	  salaries	  to	  5070	  people.	  Excluding	  elected	  officials	  (the	  mayor	   and	   the	   13	   councilmen),	   top	   positions	   (categoría	   superior)	   such	   as	   advisors,	  secretaries,	   deputy-­‐secretaries,	   directors	   and	   deputy-­‐directors,	   and	   teachers,	   the	   payroll	  consists	  of	  4528	  workers.26	  Of	  those,	  2611	  (55%)	  are	  permanent	  employees	  (with	  tenure).	  Most	  employees	  (63%)	  are	  older	  than	  40	  years	  old,	  36	  percent	  are	  women	  and	  45	  percent	  got	  their	  job	  with	  the	  current	  administration.	  Tigre	  pays	  salaries	  to	  2569	  people.	  Excluding	  elected	  officials	   (the	  mayor	  and	  24	  councilmen)	  and	  top	  positions,	   the	  payroll	  consists	  of	  2406	   workers.	   Of	   those,	   only	   475	   (19.7%)	   are	   permanent	   employees	   (have	   tenure).	  Although	  comparative	  data	  is	  not	  available,	  anecdotal	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  number	  of	  tenure	   jobs	   is	   relatively	   smaller	   than	   in	   other	   Argentinean	   municipalities.27	  This	   is	   an	  important	  detail	  because	  mayors	  can	  appoint	  new	  employees	  either	  by	  enlarging	  the	  public	  sector	   or	   by	   not	   renewing	   the	   contract	   of	   temporary	   employees	   and	   hiring	   new	   ones.	  Because	   only	   20	   percent	   of	   jobs	   are	   tenured,	   the	   opportunities	   for	   patronage	   are	  substantial.	  Women	  constitute	  45	  percent	  of	  the	  sample	  and	  the	  average	  age	  is	  41.	  Among	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Teachers	  were	  excluded	  for	  two	  main	  reasons.	  First	  of	  all,	  not	  all	  Argentinean	  municipalities	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  schools	  (Tigre	  and	  Salta,	   for	   instance,	  have	  no	  schools	  under	  their	  supervision)	  so	  I	  excluded	  teachers	  to	  keep	   the	   different	   samples	  more	   comparable.	   Second,	   the	   process	   of	   hiring	   and	   firing	   teachers	   is	   different	  from	   other	   type	   of	   public	   employment	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   appointment	   and	   promotion	   of	   teachers	   is	  regulated	  by	   agencies	   that	   are	   independent	  of	   the	  mayor.	  This,	   of	   course,	   does	  not	  mean	   that	   teachers	   are	  completely	  isolated	  from	  political	  pressures	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Murillo	  and	  Ronconi	  2004	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  political	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  incumbent	  on	  the	  number	  of	  strikes	  on	  Argentina),	  but	  the	  scope	  for	  patronage	  is	  undeniable	  smaller—at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Argentina—	  than	  for	  other	  public	  employees.	  27	  According	  to	  the	  head	  and	  the	  director	  of	  the	  personnel	  office	  in	  Tigre,	  Tigre	  is	  an	  exception	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Conurbano.	  According	  to	  them,	  municipalities	  in	  that	  area	  usually	  have	  an	  equal	  number	  of	  permanent	  and	  temporary	  employees.	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  Tigre,	  July	  15	  2010.	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the	  2406	  public	  sector	  employees	  in	  the	  sample,	  1034	  (45%)	  got	  their	  job	  with	  the	  current	  administration.	   Finally,	   the	  municipality	   of	   Salta	   pays	   salaries	   to	   4619	   people.	   Excluding	  elected	   officials	   and	   top	   positions,	   the	   payroll	   consists	   of	   4263	   employees.	   Of	   those,	   77	  percent	   are	   permanent	   employees	   and	   47	   percent	   were	   hired	   by	   the	   current	  administration.	   Almost	   half	   of	   the	   tenured	   employees	   (47%)	   obtained	   tenure	   with	   the	  current	  administration	  (recall	  that	  mayor	  in	  Salta	  was	  the	  only	  one	  of	  the	  three	  that	  was	  in	  power	  since	  2003).	  Women	  constitute	  37	  percent	  of	  the	  sample	  and	  the	  average	  age	  is	  47.	  
	  
Table	  3.4:	  Characteristics	  of	  public	  sectors	  across	  municipalities	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Salta	   Santa	  Fe	   Tigre	  Total	  N	  in	  payroll	   4619	   5070	   2569	  Total	  N	  in	  the	  sample	   4263	   4528	   2409	  	   	   	   	  Tenured	  Employees	   77%	   58%	   20%	  Got	  job	  in	  current	  administration	   47%	   45%	   43%	  Women	   37%	   36%	   45%	  Older	  than	  40	   70%	   63%	   53%	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	  Data	  from	  Santa	  Fe	  is	  from	  June	  2010;	  data	  from	  Tigre	  is	  from	  July	  2010,	  data	  from	  Salta	   is	   from	  May	  2011.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   Salta,	  data	  was	  missing	   from	   the	  official	   records	  particularly	   for	  year	  of	  hiring	  and	  age	  (1/5	  of	   the	  observations	  have	  missing	  data).	  See	  Tables	   A1,	   A2	   and	   A3	   in	   Appendix	   A	   for	   more	   information	   and	   survey	   sample	  representativeness.	  	  
3.2	   Getting	  the	  Job	  
Consistent	   with	   Argentine	   conventional	   wisdom	   as	   well	   as	   the	   existing	   literature,	   most	  public	  employees	  reported	  having	  found	  their	  jobs	  through	  informal	  channels.	  Around	  65	  percent	   of	   respondents	   found	   their	   job	   through	   someone	   (an	   acquaintance,	   friend,	   or	  relative)	   that	  worked	   at	   the	  municipality,	   13	  percent	   of	   the	   respondents	   have	   submitted	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their	   information	   or	   resume	   to	   the	   municipality	   and	   were	   later	   contacted	   by	   the	  authorities,	  5	  percent	  used	  to	  be	  beneficiaries	  of	  a	  workfare	  program	  and	  were	  then	  hired	  as	   regular	   employees,	   2	   percent	   used	   to	   be	   interns	   at	   the	   municipality	   and	   were	   hired	  afterwards,	  and	  only	  6	  percent	  of	  the	  respondents	  found	  out	  about	  the	  job	  through	  public	  advertisement	  and/or	  entrance	  exams	  (also	  publicly	  advertised).	  Interestingly,	  6	  percent	  of	  the	  respondents	  reported	  to	  have	  found	  their	  job	  specifically	  through	  political	  channels.28	  	  
	  
Table	  3.5:	  How	  did	  you	  find	  out	  about	  this	  job?29	  	   	   	   	  	  	   N	   %	   	  Through	  someone/an	  acquaintance	  that	  worked	  at	  the	  municipality	   352	   30%	  
64%	  Through	  a	  friend/relative	  that	  worked	  at	  the	  municipality	   328	   28%	  “Through	  politics”	   69	   6%	  Submitted	  a	  resume	  to	  the	  municipality	   156	   13%	   	  Through	  an	  employment	  agency/the	  media/	  newspapers/	  adds	   40	   3%	   	  Previous	  beneficiary	  of	  a	  welfare	  program	   55	   5%	   	  Previous	  internship	  at	  the	  municipality	   25	   2%	   	  Entrance	  examinations	   18	   2%	   	  Some	  other	  way	  &	  missing	   141	   12%	   	  	   1184	   100%	   	  	   	   	   	  	  
Moreover,	  employees	  were	  asked	  how	  important	  they	  thought	  personal	  connections	  were	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  job	  in	  the	  area	  they	  worked.	  The	  response	  categories	  were	  very	  important,	  important,	   not	   very	   important,	   and	   not	   at	   all	   important.	   The	   majority	   of	   respondents	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Some	  examples	  of	  answers	  that	  specifically	  mentioned	  politics	  as	   the	  means	  of	   finding	  out	  about	   the	   job:	  “Through	   politics”;	   “Through	   a	   politician”;	   “Through	   a	   local	   broker”;	   “I	   used	   to	   work	   for	   a	   Peronist	  councilman”;	   “I	   used	   to	  work	   in	   politics	  with	   someone	   at	   the	  municipality”;	   “Because	   of	   political	   activism,	  social	   activism.”	  This,	   of	   course,	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   there	  were	  no	  political	   contacts	  on	   the	  other	   informal	  channels	  but	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  some	  employees	  did	  not	  have	  any	  problems	  to	  openly	  admitting	  the	  political	  connection.	  29	  The	  wording	  in	  Spanish	  was	  the	  following:	  “¿Se	  acuerda	  cómo	  se	  enteró	  de	  este	  trabajo?”	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considered	   personal	   connections	   to	   be	   important	   (28%)	   and	   very	   important	   (29%);	  whereas	   only	   24	   percent	   thought	   that	   they	   were	   not	   at	   all	   important	   and	   16	   percent	  thought	  that	  personal	  connections	  were	  not	  very	  important.	  Both	  the	  results	  from	  Table	  3.5	  and	   the	   proportion	   of	   employees	   that	   consider	   personal	   connections	   to	   be	   important	   in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  job	  show	  the	  existence	  of	  significant	  discretion	  in	  the	  hiring	  of	  employees	  in	  the	  municipalities	  studied.	  
	  
3.3	  Who	  Gets	  Hired?	  	  
As	   described	   in	   chapter	   2,	   the	   general	   understanding	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   public	   sector	  employment	   is	   that,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   effective	   civil	   service	   rules,	   public	   sector	   jobs	   are	  allocated	  mainly	  to	  supporters.	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  general	  agreement,	  most	  of	  the	  evidence	  we	  have	  about	  public	  sector	  employees’	  voting	  behavior	  and/or	  partisan	  identification	  in	  the	  developing	   world	   is	   based	   on	   aggregate	   and	   often	   unreliable	   data. 30 	  Not	   only	   are	  governments	  that	  extensively	  use	  patronage	  more	  reluctant	  to	  share	  information,	  but	  also	  getting	   truthful	   answers	   from	   public	   employees	   is	   difficult.	   So,	   are	   public	   sector	   jobs	  distributed	  to	  supporters?	  If	  the	  answer	  is	  positive,	  we	  should	  see	  public	  sector	  jobs	  being	  mainly	   distributed	   through	   informal	   channels	   (as	   seen	   in	   Table	   4.5),	   but	   also	   a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  supporters	  of	  the	  incumbent’s	  party	  among	  public	  employees	  hired	  by	  the	  current	  administration.	  In	  order	  to	  identify	  support	  for	  the	  mayor	  or	  the	  party	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (2013),	  one	  of	  the	  very	  few	  papers	  on	  patronage	  that	  use	  individual	  level	  data,	  provide	  evidence	  that	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  (defined	  as	  “in-­‐network”	  voters).	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of	  the	  mayor,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  two	  questions.31	  The	  first	  one	  asked	  for	  whom	  they	  had	  voted	  in	  the	  last	  mayoral	  election.	  Responses	  were	  coded	  1	  if	  the	  respondent	  said	  they	  had	   vote	   for	   the	   current	   mayor	   (Mayor	   Voter)	   in	   the	   last	   mayoral	   election,	   and	   zero	  otherwise.32	  Second,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  report	  if	  they	  identified	  themselves	  with	  a	  political	  party,	  and	  those	  that	  replied	  affirmatively	  to	  this	  question	  were	  asked	  with	  which	  party	   they	   identified	   themselves.	   This	   variable	   (Mayor	  Party)	   takes	   on	   the	   value	   1	   if	   the	  respondent	   said	   that	   she	   identified	   herself	   with	   the	   party	   of	   the	   Mayor,	   and	   zero	  otherwise.33	  Table	  3.6	  presents	  employees’	  self-­‐reported	  mayoral	  vote	   in	   the	   last	  election	  (2007	  for	  Tigre	  and	  Santa	  Fe,	  2011	  for	  Salta).	  
	  
Table	  3.6:	  Public	  employees	  last	  election	  self–reported	  mayoral	  vote	  	   	   	   	   	  
	  
All	  observations	   Without	  non-­‐registered	  voters	   Without	  non-­‐	  voters	  
Without	  missing,	  DK/NA,	  blank	  and	  null	  Not	  registered	   71	  (6%)	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Did	  not	  vote	   39	  (3%)	   4%	   	   	  Missing/	  DK/NA	   224	  (19%)	   20%	   21%	   	  Blank	  or	  Null	   18	  (2%)	   2%	   2%	   	  Others	   151	  (13%)	   14%	   14%	   18%	  Current	  Mayor	   681	  (58%)	   61%	   63%	   82%	  	   1184	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Recall	  that	  the	  political	  questions	  were	  asked	  in	  a	  separate	  questionnaire	  (Part	  B)	  to	  increase	  the	  response	  rate	  and	  improve	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  responses.	  32	  Respondents	  that	  were	  not	  registered	  to	  vote	  in	  that	  municipality	  were	  coded	  as	  missing.	  Note	  that	  voting	  is	   mandatory	   in	   Argentina	   and,	   although	   the	   sanctions	   for	   no	   voting	   are	   hardly	   ever	   enforced,	   turnout	   is	  usually	  high	  (around	  75-­‐80	  percent).	  33	  Missing	   values	   were	   coded	   as	   zero,	   but	   an	   alternative	   codification	   of	   this	   variable	   with	   missing	   values	  coded	  as	  missing	  was	  also	  tried	  in	  all	   the	  analyses	  presented	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  results	  were	  substantively	  identical.	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Table	  3.6	  shows	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  employees	  reported	  having	  voted	  for	  the	  current	  mayor.	  Of	  all	  respondents,	  681/1184	  (58%)	  reported	  having	  voted	  for	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  in	  the	  last	  election.	  Excluding	  all	  the	  employees	  that	  did	  not	  answer	  the	  question,	  voted	  blank	  or	  null,	   did	   not	   vote	   or	   were	   register	   to	   vote	   in	   another	   district,	   the	   number	   rises	   to	   82	  percent	   of	   responses.	   Only	   18	   percent	   reported	   having	   voted	   for	   another	   candidate.34	  Moreover,	  if	  public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  disproportionately	  distributed	  to	  supporters,	  we	  should	  find	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  voters	  and	  supporters	  of	   the	  respective	  mayor’s	  party	  among	  employees	  who	   got	   their	   job	   during	   the	   current	   administration.	   Table	   3.7	   compares	   the	  proportion	   of	   voters	   and	   self-­‐reported	   sympathizers	   with	   the	   party	   of	   the	   incumbent	  mayor	  across	  employees	  who	  got	   their	   jobs	  during	   the	   current	   administration	  and	   those	  who	  got	  them	  before.	  
	  
Table	  3.7:	  Relationship	  between	  current	  administration	  jobs	  and	  
support	  for	  the	  mayor	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Mayor	  Voters	   Mayor’s	  Party	  Supporters	  Current	  Administration	   0.72	   0.42	  (0.02)	   (0.02)	  N=492	   N=499	  Previous	  Administrations	   0.53	   0.31	  (0.02)	   (0.02)	  N=619	   N=577	  Difference	   0.19**	   0.11**	  (0.03)	   (0.03)	  N=1111	   N=1076	  	  	   	  	   	  	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variances	  and	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  data	  about	  public	  employees’	  voting	  behavior	  to	  compare	  these	  numbers	  to,	  it	  might	  be	  indicative	  to	  remember	  that	  Massa	  (Tigre)	  won	  with	  47	  percent	  of	  the	  votes,	  Barletta	  (Santa	  Fe)	  won	  with	  33	  percent	  of	  the	  votes,	  and	  Isa	  (Salta)	  won	  with	  49	  percent	  of	  the	  votes.	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Indeed,	  Table	  3.7	  shows	  that	  among	  the	  employees	  that	  got	   their	   jobs	  during	  the	  current	  administration,	   we	   find	   more	   mayor	   voters	   and	   more	   supporters	   of	   the	   mayor’s	   party.	  Public	  sector	  employees	  hired	  during	  the	  current	  administration	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  (72%)	  to	   report	   having	   voted	   for	   the	   mayor	   than	   those	   that	   were	   hired	   by	   previous	  administrations	   (53%).	  Moreover,	   employees	   hired	   by	   the	   current	  mayor	   are	   also	  more	  likely	   (42%)	   to	   report	   being	   supporters	   of	   the	   party	   of	   the	   mayor	   than	   those	   hired	   by	  previous	   mayors	   (31%).	   A	   two-­‐tailed	   t-­‐test	   confirms	   that	   both	   differences	   (19	   and	   11	  percentage	  points,	   respectively)	   are	   statistically	   significant	   at	   the	  95	  percent	   level.	  Table	  3.7	  shows	  that	  public	  jobs	  are,	  in	  fact,	  distributed	  mainly	  to	  supporters.	  
Two	   important	   caveats	   are	  worth	  mentioning	  about	   these	   results.	  The	   first	  one	   is	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  employees,	  in	  general,	  are	  over-­‐reporting	  their	  support	  for	  the	  mayor	  and	  his	  party.	  Recall	  that	  both	  questions	  were	  included	  in	  the	  sensitive	  part	  (Part	  B,	  the	  one	  filled	  by	  employees	  themselves)	  of	  the	  questionnaire,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  that	  employees	  were	   over-­‐reporting	   support	   for	   the	   mayor	   so	   absolute	   numbers	   should	   be	   taken	  cautiously.	  	  
The	   second	   caveat	   is	   related	   to	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	   being	   a	  supporter	  and	  getting	  the	  job.	  According	  to	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters.	  The	  data	  shown	  here,	  however,	  is	  also	  consistent	  with	   a	   story	   of	   independent	   citizens	   that	   became	   supporters	   after	   getting	   the	  job.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  have	  simultaneity	  in	  these	  results:	  those	  who	  got	  their	  jobs	  during	  the	  current	  administration	  could	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  identify	  themselves	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  precisely	  because	  the	  mayor	  gave	  them	  a	  job.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  instead	  of	   having	   gotten	   the	   job	   because	   they	  were	   sympathizers	   of	   the	  mayor’s	   political	   party,	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public	  employees	  could	  be	  sympathizers	  of	  the	  mayor’s	  party	  because	  they	  got	  a	  job	  from	  this	  mayor.	  	  
I	   test	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   reverse	   causation	   using	   an	   instrumental	   variable	  approach.	   Following	   Dunning	   and	   Stokes	   (2010),	   I	   use	   a	   question	   about	   the	   party	  identification	   of	   the	   respondents’	   parents	   when	   they	   were	   young	   to	   instrument	   for	   the	  partisan	   identification	   of	   the	   respondents.35	  The	   correlation	   between	   the	   respondent	  identifying	  herself	  with	   the	  party	  of	   the	  mayor	  and	  both	  her	  parents	   identifying	  with	   the	  same	   party	   is	   0.30.36	  In	   simple	   terms,	   an	   instrument	   is	   a	   variable	   that	   is	   related	   to	   the	  independent	  variable,	  and	  is	  only	  related	  to	  the	  outcome	  variable	  through	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  independent	  variable	  (exclusion	  restriction).	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  partisan	  identification	  of	  the	  parents	  when	  the	  employee	  was	  young	  (or	  younger)	  is	  related	  to	  the	  partisan	  identification	  of	   the	   respondent	   because	   party	   identity	   is	   partially	   a	   product	   of	   family	   socialization	  (Dunning	  and	  Stokes	  2010).	  Also,	   it	   is	   generally	  unlikely	   that	  parents’	   identification	  with	  the	   party	   of	   the	   mayor	   when	   the	   employee	   was	   young	   caused	   the	   mayor	   to	   hire	   the	  respondent	  years	  later,	  except	  through	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  parents’	  partisan	  identity	  on	  their	  children’s	   partisan	   identity.	   If	   all	   these	   assumptions	   are	   valid,	   a	   relation	   between	   the	  partisanship	   of	   the	   parents	   and	   the	   respondent	   getting	   a	   public	   sector	   job	   indicates	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  The	  wording	  of	  the	  question	  was:	  “When	  you	  were	  younger,	  remember	  if	  your	  father	  (mother)	   identified	  himself	   with	   any	   political	   party?”	   If	   yes,	   “With	  which	   party	   did	   your	   father	   (mother)	   identify	   himself?”	   In	  Spanish:	   “Cuando	   usted	   era	   mas	   joven,	   ¿recuerda	   si	   su	   padre	   (madre)	   se	   identificaba	   con	   algún	   partido	  político?;	  “¿Con	  cual	  partido	  se	  identificaba	  su	  padre(madre)?”	  36	  The	   correlation	   between	   a	   father	   and	   the	   respondent	   identifying	  with	   the	   party	   of	   the	  mayor	  was	   0.29,	  whereas	   the	   correlation	   with	   the	   mother’s	   party	   identity	   was	   0.36.	   Although	   mother	   and	   father’s	   party	  identification	   was	   highly	   correlated	   (0.54),	   the	   correlation	   was	   not	   perfect	   so	   I	   opted	   to	   use	   the	   partisan	  identification	  of	  both	  parents	  together.	  Dunning	  and	  Stokes	  (2010)	   found	  very	  similar	  correlations	  on	  their	  survey	   of	   Argentinean	   voters.	   Using	   the	   partisanship	   of	   either	   of	   the	   parents	   as	   instrument	   yielded	   were	  similar	  results	  (not	  shown).	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effect	   of	   partisan	   identification	   of	   the	   respondent	   on	   the	   likelihood	   of	   receiving	   a	   public	  sector	  job.	  
Strangely	   enough,	   the	   municipality	   of	   Salta	   stipulates	   in	   its	   “Carta	   Orgánica	  
Municipal”	   (the	   Municipal	   Constitution)	   that	   the	   daughters	   and	   sons	   of	   public	   sector	  employees	  would	  get	  priority	  at	  the	  time	  of	  hiring.	  Among	  the	  389	  respondents	  in	  Salta,	  74	  (19%)	  reported	  getting	  the	  job	  through	  her	  mother	  or	  father	  due	  to	  this	  regulation.	  In	  this	  case,	   the	   exclusion	   restriction	   is	   violated	   because	   the	   instrument	   (the	   ideology	   of	   the	  parents),	  when	  the	  parents	  are	  public	  employees,	  have	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  hiring	  of	  the	  son	  or	  daughter	  that	  is	  not	  through	  the	  family	  socialization	  of	  partisanship.	  For	  this	  reason,	  those	  74	  respondents	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  analysis	  below.37	  
Table	   3.8	   reports	   the	   results	   of	   this	   analysis.	   In	   all	   three	   columns	   the	   dependent	  variable	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  whether	  the	  employee	  got	  his/her	  job	  during	  the	  current	  administration	   (Current	   Mayor).	   The	   main	   independent	   variable	   is	   the	   self-­‐reported	  partisan	  identification	  coded	  1	  for	  employees	  that	  identified	  themselves	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  and	  0	  otherwise	  (Mayor	  Party).	  The	  instrument	  is	  a	  dummy	  variable	  for	  whether	  
both	  of	  the	  respondent’s	  parents	  had	  the	  same	  partisanship	  as	  the	  current	  mayor	  when	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Even	  after	  excluding	   this	  group	  of	  employees,	   the	  exclusion	   restriction	   is	  probably	   the	  most	  problematic	  assumption	   for	   this	   analysis.	   If	   some	   employees	   got	   their	   jobs	   because	   of	   their	   parents,	   the	   exclusion	  restriction	  would	   be	   violated.	   To	   deal	  with	   this	   problem,	   it	  would	   ideal	   to	   have	   the	   information	   about	   the	  specific	  employees	  that	  got	  their	  jobs	  through	  their	  parents.	  Unfortunately,	  although	  an	  open	  ended	  question	  about	  how	  employees	  got	  their	  job	  was	  asked,	  the	  responses	  were	  coded	  by	  enumerators	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  it	   impossible	   to	   separate	   employees	   that	   got	   their	   job	   through	   a	   relative	   from	   those	   that	   got	   it	   through	   a	  friend.	  Only	  in	  Salta,	  due	  to	  the	  regulation	  mentioned	  above,	  data	  was	  collected	  in	  a	  way	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  separate	  those	  who	  got	  their	  jobs	  through	  their	  parents.	  My	  personal	  recollection	  (I	  did	  160	  surveys	  myself)	  is	  that	  very	  few	  employees	  mentioned	  their	  parents	  as	  the	  source	  for	  their	  job.	  As	  a	  robustness	  check,	  I	  run	  the	   IV	   regression	   excluding	   all	   employees	   that	   reported	   having	   obtained	   their	   jobs	   though	   a	   friend	   or	   a	  relative	   in	  Tigre	  and	  Santa	  Fe	   (125	  employees),	  while	   still	   excluding	   the	  Salta	  employees	  mentioned	  above	  (74).	   The	   results	   from	   this	   IV	   regression	   are	   substantively	   equivalent	   to	   the	   one	   reported	   here.	   The	  coefficients	  are	  slightly	  smaller,	  but	  still	  significant	  at	  the	  95%	  level.	  See	  Table	  B1	  In	  Appendix	  B.	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respondent	  was	   young,	   coded	   1	   for	   those	  whose	   parents	   shared	   the	   partisanship	   of	   the	  mayor	  and	  0	  otherwise	  (Mayor	  Party	  Parents).	  Controls	  for	  the	  age	  of	  the	  respondent	  (Age),	  Education	  (Education)	  sex	  (Female),	  and	  municipal	  dummies	  were	  also	  included.	  
	  
Table	  3.8:	  The	  effect	  of	  ideology	  on	  being	  hired	  by	  current	  mayor	  (IV	  regression)	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Current	  Mayor	  	   IV	  Current	  Mayor	  	   Reduced	  Form	  Current	  Mayor	  Mayor	  Party	   0.15***	   0.29***	   	  	   (0.03)	   (0.11)	   	  Mayor	  Party	  Parents	   	   	   0.09***	  	   	   	   (0.03)	  Age	   -­‐0.22***	   -­‐0.22***	   -­‐0.22***	  	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	  Female	   0.06**	   0.06**	   0.05*	  	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	  Education	   0.01	   0.01	   0.01	  	   (0.02)	   (0.02)	   (0.02)	  Salta	   0.13***	   0.09**	   0.17***	  	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   (0.03)	  Santa	  Fe	   0.03	   0.06	   0.03	  	   (0.03)	   (0.04)	   (0.03)	  Constant	   1.01***	   0.97***	   1.04***	  	   (0.06)	   (0.07)	   (0.06)	  	   	   	   	  Observations	   1,004	   1,004	   1,104	  R-­‐squared	   0.32	   0.30	   0.31	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	  The	  age	  variable	  takes	  on	  values	  from	  1	  to	  5,	  corresponding	  to	  respondents	  who	  are	  18-­‐25,	  26-­‐35,	  36-­‐45,	  46-­‐55	  and	  older.	  The	  education	  variable	   takes	  on	  values	   from	  1	   to	  3,	  corresponding	  to	  respondents	  to	  whom	  the	  highest	  education	  completed	  is	  primary	  school,	  secondary	  school,	  and	  university	  or	  tertiary	  education.	  The	  female	  variable	  takes	  the	  value	  1	  when	   the	   respondent	   is	   female,	   and	   0	   otherwise.	   The	   municipality	   of	   Tigre	   is	   the	   base	  category.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses,	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  	  
Column	  1	  reports	  the	  result	  of	  a	  simple	  regression	  in	  which	  Current	  Mayor	  is	  regressed	  on	  the	   respondent’s	   self-­‐reported	  partisan	   identification,	  Column	  2	   reports	   the	   instrumental	  
	  	  
107	  
variable	   regression	   instrumenting	   the	   respondent’s	   partisan	   identification	   with	   the	  partisan	  identification	  of	  her	  parents,	  and	  Column	  3	  reports	  the	  reduced-­‐form	  regression	  in	  which	   Current	   Mayor	   is	   regressed	   directly	   on	   the	   instrument	   Mayor	   Party	   Parents.	   As	  expected	   from	   the	   t-­‐test	   (Table	   3.7	   above),	   the	   naïve	   estimation	   of	   Column	   1	   shows	   a	  strong	  a	  positive	  relation	  between	  the	  employees’	  partisan	  identification	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  and	  getting	  a	   job	  during	  the	  current	  administration.	  The	  instrumental-­‐variable	  estimator	  in	  Column	  2	  yielded	  the	  expected	  positive	  estimated	  coefficient,	  significant	  at	  the	  99%	  level.	  The	  last	  column	  reports	  the	  reduced-­‐form	  regression,	  in	  which	  the	  coefficient	  is	  also	   positive	   and	   significant	   at	   the	   99%	   level.	   In	   sum,	   the	   results	   from	   the	   instrumental	  variable	   regression	   also	   show	   (conditional	   on	   age,	   education,	   sex,	   and	   municipality)	   a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  respondent	  sharing	  her	  partisan	   identification	  with	  the	  current	   mayor	   and	   receiving	   a	   public	   sector	   job	   during	   the	   current	   administration.	   The	  results	  then	  do	  not	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  employees	  becoming	  sympathizers	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  because	  they	  got	  a	  job.	  The	  correlation	  between	  being	  a	  sympathizer	  of	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  and	  getting	  a	   job	  during	  the	  current	  administration	  (cf.	  Table	  3.7)	  cannot	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   reverse	   causation	   story	   of	   employees	   becoming	   partisan	  sympathizers	  after	  getting	  their	  jobs.38	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Dunning	   and	   Stokes	   (2010)	   find	   similar	   (but	   weaker)	   results	   on	   their	   study	   of	   vote	   buying.	   They	  instrumented	  partisan	   ideology	  with	   the	   ideology	  of	   the	  voter’s	   father	  and	   find	   that	   loyal	   supporters	   (core	  voters)	  in	  Argentina	  attract	  more	  campaign	  gifts	  and	  subsidies	  than	  non-­‐supporters	  (swing	  voters).	  They	  also	  present	  evidence	  of	  a	  similar	  effect	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Venezuela.	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3.4	   Political	  Services	  during	  Elections	  
In	   the	   previous	   section,	   I	   showed	   that	   public	   sector	   jobs	   are	   in	   fact	   disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters.	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  2,	  mayors	  use	  the	  ideology	  of	  employees	  at	   the	   time	  of	  hiring	  as	  a	  proxy	   for	   their	  willingness	   to	  provide	  political	  services	  because	  only	   supporters	   can	   credibly	   commit	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   in	   the	   future.	   In	   this	  section,	  I	  present	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  public	  employees—particularly	  supporters—	  do	  provide	   political	   services.	   Indeed,	   many	   low	   and	   middle	   positions	   at	   public	   offices	   are	  distributed	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  maintaining	  a	  network	  of	  activists	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  performs	  a	  number	  of	  different	  political	  activities.	  Activities	  that,	  if	  enough	  and	  successful,	  can	  have	  an	   important	   impact	   on	   electoral	   returns.	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   devoted	   to	  uncovering	  the	  different	  types	  of	  political	  activities	  performed	  by	  public	  employees	  as	  well	  as	  the	  types	  of	  employees	  that	  provide	  those	  services.	  Using	  the	  list	  experiment	  technique	  described	  above,	  I	  estimate	  the	  proportion	  of	  employees	  providing	  three	  different	  types	  of	  political	   services:	   A)	   Helping	   with	   campaigns,	   B)	   Attending	   rallies,	   and	   C)	   Monitoring	  elections.	  Of	   course,	   these	   three	  activities	  are	  not	   the	  only	   types	  of	  political	   services	   that	  political	  employees	  provide,	  but	  they	  are	  definitely	  among	  the	  most	  important	  ones.39	  
	  
3.4.1	  Measuring	  Political	  Services.	  Evidence	  from	  List	  Experiments	  	  
Helping	  with	  Electoral	  Campaigns	   	  Participation	  of	  patronage	  employees	  in	  political	  campaigns	  is	  crucial.	  As	  Kemahlioglu	  (2006)	  shows,	  politicians	  at	  the	  provincial	  and	  local	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  See	  Chapter	  2,	  Section	  2.2	  for	  a	  description	  of	  other	  political	  services	  that	  employees	  often	  provide.	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level	   in	   Argentina	   have	   very	   limited	   resources	   to	   finance	   capital-­‐intensive	   professional	  campaigns	  with	  extensive	  use	  of	  the	  media.	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  “human-­‐intensive”	  activities	  such	  as	  painting	  graffiti,	  plastering	  posters,	  and	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  visits,	  among	  others	  are	  still	  essential	   parts	   of	   campaigning.	   Moreover,	   the	   availability	   of	   “real”	   volunteers	   has	  considerably	   decreased	   over	   the	   years	   (Scherlis	   2009),	  making	   the	   role	   of	   public	   sector	  employees	  even	  more	  important.	  Leaving	  aside	  the	  organization	  and	  participation	  of	  rallies	  (analyzed	   below),	   the	   types	   of	   activities	   that	   are	   organized	   and	   conducted	   during	  campaigns	  are	  diverse.	  	  
One	   activity	   that	   is	   common	   among	   political	   parties,	   especially	   in	   poorer	  neighborhoods,	   is	   organizing	   door-­‐to-­‐door	   campaigns	   (rastrillajes).	   Almost	   always	   this	  activity	   is	   accompanied	  by	   the	  distribution	  of	  paper	  ballots	   (boletas),	   the	   same	  ones	   that	  voters	  would	  find	  on	  Election	  Day	  at	  the	  voting	  booth.	  Argentinean	  elections	  are	  held	  with	  paper	   ballots	   that	   political	   parties	   themselves	   produce.	   The	   distribution	   of	   these	   ballots,	  either	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  or	  on	  a	  busy	  city	  corner,	  on	  the	  weeks	  before	  the	  election	  is	  one	  of	  the	  activities	   that	   all	   Argentinean	   parties	   conduct	   as	   important	   part	   of	   their	   campaigns.	   The	  importance	  of	   this	  activity	   cannot	  be	   stressed	  enough.	   It	  helps	  voters	   to	  get	   to	  know	   the	  candidates	  and	  get	  familiar	  with	  the	  ballot	  they	  intend	  to	  use	  on	  Election	  Day.	  This	  could	  be	  key	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  preferred	  ballot	  at	  the	  voting	  booth,	  which	  often—especially	  when	  national,	   provincial,	   and	   municipal	   elections	   are	   held	   concurrently—	   contains	   an	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overwhelming	  number	  of	  ballots.	   In	   fact,	   the	  day	  of	   the	  election,	  many	  voters	  bring	   their	  ballots	  to	  the	  voting	  booth	  instead	  of	  looking	  for	  one	  in	  the	  polling	  place.40	  	  
Moreover,	   the	  distribution	  of	  paper	  ballots	  before	   the	  election	  has	  been	  related	   to	  vote	   buying.	   A	   common	   practice	   among	   brokers	   is	   to	   hand	   in	   a	   ballot	   together	   with	  handouts	   when	   these	   are	   being	   distributed,	   which	  makes	   it	   clear	   where	   the	   handout	   is	  coming	   from	   and,	   as	   Brusco	   et	   al.	   (2004)	   point	   out	   in	   their	   study	   of	   vote	   buying	   in	  Argentina,	  could	  also	  reinforce	  the	  message	  that	  a	  vote	  is	  expected	  in	  return.41	  
Another	   important	   campaign	   activity	   that	   requires	   “muscle”	   is	   painting	   graffiti,	  hanging	   banners,	   and	  plastering	   posters	  with	   the	   name	  of	   the	   candidate	   or	   the	   party	   on	  empty	  walls.	   This	   is	   also	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   campaigning,	   especially	   for	   local	   politicians	  that	  cannot	  afford	  other,	  more	  expensive	  types	  of	  advertising	  on	  billboards.	  Those	  helping	  with	  the	  campaign	  take	  this	  activity	  very	  seriously,	  to	  the	  point	  of	  fighting	  for	  open	  walls.	  Indeed,	   in	   his	   study	   of	   Argentinean	   brokers,	   Zarazaga	   (2012)	   found	   that	   18	   out	   of	   120	  brokers	   reported	   having	   been	   involved	   in	   shootouts	  with	   other	   brokers	   on	   nights	  when	  they	   were	   painting	   graffiti.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   activities	   mentioned,	   campaigning	   in	  Argentina	   usually	   also	   involves	   organizing	   political	   meetings	   with	   neighbors	   and	   other	  types	  of	  activities	  like	  seminars,	  social	  gatherings,	  and	  cultural	  events.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  In	   a	   survey	   conducted	   in	   three	   Argentinean	   provinces	   in	   2001/2002,	   Brusco	   et	   al.	   (2004)	   find	   that	   15	  percent	  of	  the	  respondents	  reported	  having	  voted	  in	  the	  last	  election	  with	  ballots	  that	  they	  brought	  with	  them	  to	  the	  polling	  place.	  41	  Brusco	  et	  al.	   (2004)	   find	   that	  a	  voter	   that	  votes	  with	  a	  ballot	  provided	  by	  a	  broker	   is	  more	   likely	  also	   to	  have	  received	  handouts;	  and	  a	  person	  who	  receives	  both	  a	  ballot	  and	  a	  handout	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  report	  that	  the	  handout	  influences	  her/his	  vote.	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Table	  3.9	  presents	   the	   result	  of	   a	   list	   experiment	  where	   the	   treatment	   category	   is	  “Work/help	   in	   the	   electoral	   campaign”	   in	   the	   last	   election.42	  It	   shows	   that	   the	   average	  number	  of	  activities	  reported	  by	  employees	  in	  the	  control	  group	  with	  only	  four	  responses	  is	  1.19,	  while	  the	  average	  in	  the	  treatment	  group	  were	  respondents	  had	  also	  the	  treatment	  item	  (political	  campaigns)	  is	  1.41.	  The	  estimate	  percentage	  of	  public	  employees	  that	  helped	  in	  the	  last	  election	  is	  a	  significant	  22	  percent.	  	  
	  
Attending	  Political	  Rallies	  	   Another	  important	  activity	  for	  parties,	  especially	  during	  election	  time,	  is	  to	  conduct	  political	  rallies.	  Although	  today	  rallies	  are	  not	  as	  important	  as	  they	  used	  to	  be	  in	  Argentine	  politics,	  political	  parties	  still	  invest	  a	  lot	  of	  time	  and	  effort	  on	  organizing	  them.	  Crucial	  part	  of	   the	  organization	   is	   to	  make	  sure	  that	  enough	  people	  will	  show	  up.	  Qualitative	  work	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  public	  employees	  (particularly	  non-­‐tenured	  employees)	  and	  beneficiaries	  of	  social	  welfare	  programs	  are	  expected	  to	  turn	  out	  to	  rallies	  (Auyero	   2000;	   Szwarcberg	   2009;	   Zarazaga	   2012).	   To	   facilitate	   and	   increase	   attendance,	  transport	  is	  often	  centrally	  organized.	  As	  a	  35-­‐year-­‐old	  telephone	  operator	  from	  Salta	  told	  me,	   the	   last	   time	   she	   attended	   a	   rally	   was	   when	   a	   councilman	   from	   the	   mayor’s	   party	  started	  his	  mandate:	  “They	  brought	  us	  from	  here	  (the	  municipality)	  …	  they	  told	  us	  we	  had	  to	  support	  him	  (apoyarlo)”.43	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  The	  baseline	  response	  categories	  were:	  “Be	  a	  candidate”	  (Ser	  candidato),	  “Get	  informed	  about	  the	  different	  candidates”	  (Informarse	  sobre	  los	  distintos	  candidatos),	  “Get	  disenfranchised”	  (Impugnar	  el	  voto),	  and	  “Cast	  a	  straight-­‐ticket	  vote	  from	  any	  of	  the	  parties“	  (Votar	  la	  lista	  completa	  de	  algún	  partido).	  The	  treatment	  item	  was:	  “Work/help	   in	   the	   electoral	   campaign”	   (Trabajar/	   ayudar	   en	   la	   campaña	   electoral).	   To	   minimize	   the	  possibility	  of	  “ceiling	  effects”,	  items	  three	  and	  four	  are	  not	  possible	  to	  perform	  on	  the	  same	  election,	  and	  item	  one	  is	  a	  rare	  event.	  43	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  Salta,	  June	  15	  2011.	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Political	   rallies	   play	   a	   number	   of	   different	   roles	   in	   Argentine	   politics.	   First,	   they	  serve	  the	  straightforward	  purpose	  of	  advertising	  and	  allowing	  candidates	  to	  display	  their	  power	  to	  voters	  and	  other	  politicians.	  Second,	  attendance	  at	  rallies	  is	  also	  considered	  a	  way	  for	   potential	   clients	   to	   show	   loyalty	   to	   the	   party—an	   opportunity	   to	   publicly	   display	  support	  (Auyero	  2000;	  Szwarcberg	  2009,	  2013).	  In	  Auyero’s	  words	  (2000,	  163),	  attending	  rallies	   is	   “a	  way	  of	  showing	  a	  broker	   that	  one	   is	   loyal,	   responsible,	  and	  ready	  to	  help	  out	  when	  needed—and	  therefore	  deserving	  of	  a	  job	  if	  and	  when	  one	  becomes	  available”.	  Rallies	  give	  citizens	   the	  opportunity	   to	  be	  visible	   to	  brokers	  and	  politicians,	  publicly	  signal	   their	  support	  and	  their	  willingness	  to	  provide	  political	  services,	  with	  the	  expectation	  of	  getting	  a	  job	  (or	  some	  other	  benefit).	  A	  public	  employee	  from	  Salta	  explained	  this	  point	  bluntly,	  “Acá	  
el	  que	  toca	  el	  bombo,	  tiene	  trabajo”	  (Here,	  whoever	  plays	  the	  drums	  has	  a	  job),	  referring	  to	  the	  usual	  presence	  of	  drums	  in	  political	  rallies	  in	  Argentina.44	  Politicians,	   in	  turn,	  seem	  to	  take	   these	   signaling	   efforts	   seriously.	   An	   employee	   from	   Salta	   that	   helped	   during	   the	  campaign	  and	  now	  works	   in	  close	  proximity	  to	  the	  mayor	  explains	   it	  clearly:	  “If	  a	  person	  has	   contributed	   to	   the	  mayor’s	  victory,	  he/she	  has	  a	   right	   (tiene	  cierto	  derecho)	   [to	  get	  a	  job]”.45	  Finally,	   the	  number	  of	   followers	   that	  each	  broker	  can	  mobilize	   to	   rallies	  provides	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  Salta,	  June	  13	  2011.	  45	  Interview	  with	  the	  author,	  Salta,	  August	  10	  2011.	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party	   leaders	  with	   important	   information	   about	   the	   power	   of	   each	   broker.46	  Rallies	   give	  brokers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  show	  the	  size	  of	  their	  network.47	  
Table	  3.9	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  a	  list	  experiment	  in	  which	  the	  treatment	  category	  is	  “Attend	   Political	   Rallies”	   during	   the	   last	   election.48 	  The	   average	   number	   of	   activities	  reported	   by	   employees	   in	   the	   control	   group	  with	   only	   four	   responses	   is	   1.39,	  while	   the	  average	   in	   the	   treatment	   group	  were	   respondents	   had	   also	   the	   treatment	   item	   (political	  rallies)	  among	  the	  response	  options	  is	  1.60.	  The	  estimate	  percentage	  of	  public	  employees	  that	  attended	  rallies	  during	  the	  last	  election	  is	  a	  significant	  21	  percent.	  
	  
Monitoring	  Elections	  	   Argentine	   political	   parties	   consider	   the	   presence	   of	   partisan	  monitors	   (party	  polling	  officials)	  on	  Election	  Day	  essential	   to	  guaranteeing	   fair	   elections.	  Each	  party	  that	  competes	  in	  an	  election	  has	  the	  right	  to	  assign	  a	  partisan	  monitor	  (fiscal)	  by	  precinct	   (mesa),	   plus	   a	   head	   of	   monitors	   (fiscal	   general)	   by	   school.	   In	   addition	   to	   these	  optional	  partisan	  monitors,	  Argentine	  electoral	   law	  requires	  at	   least	  one	  and	  up	   to	   three	  citizens	   (autoridades	   de	  mesa)	   selected	   by	   the	   government	   to	   monitor	   the	   election	   and	  count	  the	  votes.	  Although	  the	  citizens	  selected	  by	  the	  government	  are	  the	  only	  ones	  with	  legal	  authority	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  any	  electoral	  issue,	  Argentinean	  parties	  consider	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  In	  a	  survey	  of	  800	  brokers	  conducted	  in	  Argentina,	  Stokes	  et	  al.	  (2012,	  169-­‐170)	  asked	  brokers	  what	  was	  the	  most	   important	  activity	   for	  a	  broker	  who	  was	   interested	   in	  a	  political	  career.	  About	  10	  percent	  replied	  that	   mobilizing	   voters	   for	   a	   political	   rally	   was	  more	   important	   than	  mobilizing	   voters	   for	   a	   primary	   or	   a	  general	  election.	  	  47	  Some	   scholars	   have	   argued	   that	   party	   leaders	   use	   this	   information	   to	   monitor	   brokers	   and	   reward	   or	  punish	  them	  according	  to	  their	  ability	  to	  mobilize	  people	  to	  those	  rallies	  (Stokes	  et	  al.	  2012;	  Szwarcberg	  2009,	  2013;	  Zarazaga	  2012).	  48	  The	  baseline	  response	  categories	  were:	  “Participate	  in	  political	  meetings”	  (Participar	  de	  reuniones	  políticas),	  “Vote	  in	  the	  primaries	  of	  any	  party”	  (Votar	  en	  las	  internas	  de	  algún	  partido),	  “Abstain	  from	  voting”(Abstenerse	  
de	  votar,”	  and	  “Get	  informed	  about	  the	  election	  on	  the	  news”	  (Informarse	  acerca	  de	  la	  elección	  en	  las	  noticias).	  The	  treatment	  category	  was:	  “Attend	  political	  rallies”	  (Concurrir	  a	  movilizaciones	  o	  actos	  electorales).	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crucial	  to	  have	  their	  own	  election	  monitors	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  votes	  are	  fairly	  counted	  and	  that	  no	  monitor	  from	  another	  party	  would	  use	  any	  tricks	  to	  steal	  votes.49	  
Monitors	   are	   also	   in	   charge	   of	   ensuring	   that	   there	   are	   enough	  paper	   ballots	   from	  their	  party	  in	  the	  booth	  throughout	  the	  day.	  As	  mentioned,	  Argentinean	  elections	  are	  still	  held	  with	  paper	  ballots	  that	  political	  parties	  themselves	  produce.	  The	  national	  authorities	  are	  in	  charge	  of	  making	  sure	  that	  ballots	  from	  all	  the	  parties	  can	  be	  found	  at	  each	  polling	  station	  throughout	  the	  entire	  Election	  Day.	  However,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  “tricks”	  that	  is	   often	   denounced	   in	   Argentinean	   elections	   is	   that	   political	   parties	   steal	   other	   parties	  ballots	  from	  the	  voting	  booth	  so	  when	  citizens	  go	  to	  vote,	  they	  would	  not	  find	  that	  specific	  ballot.	  The	  official	  monitors	  are	  also	  in	  charge	  of	  making	  sure	  that	  this	  does	  not	  happen,	  but	  parties	  consider	  having	  their	  own	  monitors	  there	  essential	  to	  preventing	  their	  ballot	  from	  being	  stolen	  (or	  to	  try	  to	  steal	  ballots	  from	  other	  parties)	  (see	  also	  Zarazaga	  2012).	  	  
While	   none	   of	   these	   practices	   is	   widespread	   enough	   to	   support	   an	   allegation	   of	  general	   fraud	   several	   incidents	   are	   reported	   during	   every	   election	   in	   Argentina,	   though	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  types	  of	  “tricks”	  that	  can	  be	  used	  when	  counting	  votes	  are	  diverse.	  One	  of	  them	  consists	  of	  dividing	  the	  blank	   or	   null	   votes	   (sometimes	   even	   the	   votes	   for	   minor	   parties)	   among	   the	   parties	   that	   have	   monitors	  present,	  which	   are	   usually	   the	  main	  parties.	  Monitors	   are	   also	   crucial	   in	   the	   event	   of	   a	   vote	   that	  might	   be	  counted	  as	  null	  (usually	  because	  there	  is	  something	  written	  on	  the	  ballot,	  or	  there	  are	  two	  votes	  for	  the	  same	  category	  or	  something	  else	  that	  might	  make	  the	  selection	  less	  clear).	  If	  the	  party	  that	  the	  vote	  might	  go	  for	  has	  no	  monitor	  present,	  the	  chances	  of	  counting	  that	  vote	  as	  null	  are	  higher.	  An	  experienced	  monitor	  would	  argue	  with	   the	   authorities	   to	  make	   it	   count	   for	   his/her	   party.	   Of	   course,	   the	   final	   decision	   on	   all	   these	   issues	   is	  always	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   official	   monitor	   (the	   one	   assigned	   by	   the	   state)	   but	   it	   is	   not	   unusual	   to	   find	  inexperienced	  citizens	  as	  official	  monitors	  that	  do	  not	  know	  the	  rules	  well	  enough	  or	  are	  simply	  not	  willing	  to	  fight	  with	  partisan	  monitors	  over	  a	  vote.	  To	  get	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  the	  work	  of	  monitors,	  once	  I	  finished	  with	  the	   implementation	   of	   the	   survey,	   I	   volunteered	   as	   a	   partisan	  monitor	   for	   the	   Socialist	   Party	   (after	   trying	  unsuccessfully	   to	   become	   an	   official	   one)	   in	   the	   city	   of	   Rosario	   (Santa	   Fe)	   for	   the	   2011	   municipal	   and	  provincial	   elections.	  When	   the	   first	   vote	   that	   could	   or	   could	   not	   be	   counted	   as	   null	   came	   up,	   the	   highest	  official	   authority	   (presidente	  de	  mesa),	  who	  was	   a	   teacher	   in	   her	   early	   twenties,	   told	  me	   and	   the	  monitors	  from	  the	  other	  two	  parties	  to	  decide	  among	  ourselves	  what	  we	  wanted	  to	  do	  with	  that	  vote.	  See	  also	  Zarazaga	  (2012)	  for	  more	  examples	  of	  what	  monitors	  can	  do	  to	  affect	  electoral	  results.	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they	  are	  never	  pervasive	  enough	  to	  change	  the	  result	  of	  a	  general	  election.50	  This	  might	  not	  be	  necessarily	  the	  case	  for	  primary	  elections,	  where	  the	  number	  of	  voters	  needed	  to	  win	  an	  election	  used	  to	  be	  a	  lot	  smaller	  and	  consequently	  the	  opportunities	  for	  changing	  the	  result	  by	  fraud	  considerably	  higher	  (De	  Luca	  et.	  al	  2002,	  2006;	  Zarazaga	  2012).51	  Finally,	  election	  monitors	   are	   also	   considered	   to	   be	   essential	   to	  monitor	   turnout-­‐buying	   and	   vote-­‐buying	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Brusco	  et	  al.	  2004	  and	  Szwarcberg	  2009,	  2012).	  	  
Table	  3.9	  presents	   the	   result	  of	   a	   list	   experiment	  where	   the	   treatment	   category	   is	  “Being	  an	  election	  monitor”	  in	  the	  last	  election.52	  The	  average	  number	  of	  activities	  reported	  by	  the	  respondents	  in	  the	  control	  group	  with	  only	  four	  responses	  is	  0.93,	  while	  the	  average	  in	  the	  treatment	  group	  where	  respondents	  had	  also	  the	  treatment	  item	  (election	  monitor)	  is	  1.05.	  Thus,	  12	  percent	  of	  public	  employees	  reported	  having	  acted	  as	  election	  monitors	  (significant	  at	  the	  95%	  confidence	  level)	  in	  the	  last	  election.53	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  For	  some	  examples	  of	   the	  complaints	   from	  political	  parties	  about	   these	   issues	   that	  were	  reported	  by	   the	  press	   after	   the	   2007	   and	   2011	   elections	   see:	   “Partidos	   opositores	   denuncian	   robo	   de	   boletas”	   (El	   Litoral,	  10/28/07);	  “Vilma	  Ripoll	  también	  denuncia	  fraude	  y	  robo	  de	  boletas”	  (Perfil,	  10/28/07);	  “Principales	  fuerzas	  de	  la	  oposición	  denunciaron	  robo	  de	  boletas”	  (La	  Capital,	  10/28/07);	  “Una	  elección	  donde	  ganó	  la	  denuncia”	  (La	  Nación,	   10/29/07);	   “La	   oposición	   denunció	   robos	   y	   faltantes	   de	   boletas”	   (Clarín,	  08/14/11);	   “Para	   la	  oposición	  fue	  ‘sistematizado	  y	  organizado’	  el	  robo	  de	  boletas”	  (La	  Nación,	  08/15/11).	  51	  In	  contrast	  to	  general	  elections,	  very	  few	  people	  used	  to	  participate	  in	  internal	  party	  elections	  in	  Argentina	  See	  Kemahlioglu	  (2006)	  for	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  internal	  party	  politics	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  patronage	  jobs.	  Since	  the	  2011	  national	  election	  (after	  I	  finished	  the	  survey),	  however,	  primary	  elections	  are	  mandatory	  (both	  for	  parties	  and	  voters)	  for	  presidential	  and	  legislative	  positions.	  In	  August	  2011	  the	  first	  elections	  were	  held	  under	  this	  law	  and	  the	  turnout	  was	  above	  70%.	  	  52	  The	  wording	  was:	  “I	  am	  going	  to	  hand	  you	  a	  card	  that	  mentions	  a	  number	  of	  activities.	  Please,	  I	  would	  like	  for	  you	  to	  tell	  me	  HOW	  MANY	  of	  those	  you	  did	  in	  the	  2009	  (2011)	  elections.	  Please,	  do	  not	  tell	  me	  which	  ones,	  just	  HOW	  MANY.”	  The	  baseline	  categories	  were:	  “Decide	  who	  to	  vote	  for	  at	  the	  last	  minute”	  (Decidir	  el	  voto	  a	  
último	  momento),“Split	  the	  ticket”	  (Cortar	  boleta),	  “Abstain”	  (No	  votar),	  and	  “Cast	  a	  null	  vote”	  (Anular	  el	  voto).	  The	  treatment	  item	  was:	  “Be	  an	  election	  monitor”	  (Ser	  fiscal	  de	  mesa).	  Note	  that	  item	  two,	  three	  and	  four	  are	  impossible	  to	  perform	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  was	  purposely	  done	  to	  minimize	  the	  chances	  of	  “ceiling	  effects”.	  53	  Assessing	   the	   magnitude	   of	   these	   numbers	   can	   be	   difficult	   without	   some	   information	   about	   how	  many	  monitors	  are	  needed	  in	  an	  election.	  In	  Tigre,	  for	  example,	  225,493	  citizens	  were	  registered	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  2009	  election	  and	  there	  were	  652	  voting	  booths	  or	  “mesas”	  (Official	  data	  from	  the	  provincial	  electoral	  authorities,	  
Junta	  Electoral,	  Provincia	  de	  Buenos	  Aires).	  Political	  parties	  usually	  assigned	  one	  monitor	  by	  booth	  plus	  a	  head	  monitor	  —“fiscal	  general”—	  by	  school,	   so	  652	   is	  a	  conservative	  estimate	  since	   it	  does	  not	   include	   the	  head	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Table	  3.9:	  Political	  services.	  List	  experiments	  estimates	  	   	   	   	  
	  
Electoral	  
Campaigns	   Rallies	   Monitoring	  Treatment	   1.60	   1.41	   1.05	  (0.04)	   (0.04)	   (0.03)	  N=586	   N=587	   N=585	  Control	   1.39	   1.19	   0.93	  (0.04)	   (0.03)	   (0.02)	  N=584	   N=582	   N=587	  Treatment	  effect	   0.21**	   0.22**	   0.12**	  (0.06)	   (0.05)	   (0.04)	  N=1170	   N=1169	   N=1172	  	   	   	   	  Note:	  List-­‐experiment	  control	  and	  treatment	  values	  are	  the	  mean	  number	  of	  items	  identified	  by	   respondents	   (Rows	   1	   &	   2).	   Rows	   3	   displays	   the	   average	   treatment	   effects	   (estimated	  proportion	   of	   the	   population	   reporting	   each	   activity).	   Standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses	   and	  number	   of	   subjects	   in	   each	   condition	   display	   below.	   Two-­‐sample	   t-­‐test	   with	   unequal	  variance.	  *	  &	  **	  indicate	  significance	  at	  the	  90	  and	  95	  percent	  levels.	  	  
In	   sum,	   in	   this	   section	   I	   show	   that	   public	   sector	   employees	   do	   in	   fact	   provide	   different	  political	  services.	  The	  use	  of	  list	  experiments	  allowed	  me	  to	  provide	  an	  accurate	  estimate	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  employees	  involved	  in	  each	  political	  service	  during	  the	  last	  election:	  21	  percent	   reported	   helping	   with	   the	   electoral	   campaign,	   22	   percent	   reported	   attending	   a	  political	  rally	  and	  12	  percent	  reported	  monitoring	  the	  election.	  However,	  according	  to	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   developed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   patronage	   jobs	   are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  (because	  only	  supporters	  can	  credibly	  commit	  to	   provide	   political	   services	   in	   the	   future)	   and	   they	   are	   the	   ones	   that	   have	  more	   to	   fear	  from	  a	  change	  in	  administration.	  As	  a	  result,	  an	  empirical	  implication	  of	  the	  theory	  is	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  monitor	  who	   is	   usually	   a	   relatively	   important	   broker.	   Recall	   that	   the	   total	   number	   of	   public	   employees	   in	  Tigre	  was	  2406	  (excluding	  elected	  officials	  and	  high	  rank	  position).	  Provided	  that	   the	  sample	  was	  properly	  drawn,	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  289	  (12%	  of	  2406)	  of	  those	  2406	  employees	  served	  as	  election	  monitors	  in	  the	  2009	  election.	  Therefore	  almost	  half	  (44%,	  289	  out	  of	  652)	  of	  the	  people	  needed	  to	  monitor	  the	  2009	  election	  were	  local	   low	   and	   mid	   level	   public	   sector	   employees,	   though	   only	   around	   1%	   of	   Tigre’s	   voters	   are	   public	  employees.	  Similar	  data	  for	  the	  other	  two	  municipalities	  was	  not	  available.	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we	   should	   find	  more	   supporters	   involved	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   political	   services.	   The	   next	  section	  provides	  evidence	  that	  supporters	  are	  in	  fact	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  services	  study	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  next	  chapter	  provides	  similar	  evidence	  for	  the	  provision	  of	   favors,	   and	   chapter	   5	   tests	   the	  main	   empirical	   implication	   of	   my	   theory—supporters	  believe	  that	  their	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  the	  politician	  that	  hired	  them.	  
	  	  
3.4.2	  Heterogeneous	  Treatment	  Effects	  
According	  to	  the	  argument	  presented	  in	  chapter	  2,	  we	  should	  find	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  supporters	   providing	   political	   services.	   As	   explained,	   mayors	   provide	   patronage	   jobs	   to	  supporters	  because	  only	  supporters	  can	  credibly	  commit	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  in	  the	  future.	  As	  I	  show	  in	  chapter	  5,	  employees	  ideologically	  closer	  to	  the	  mayor	  (those	  perceived	  as	  supporters)	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  have	  more	  to	  fear	  from	  a	  change	  in	  administration,	  which	  makes	   their	   original	   commitment	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   credible	   and	   works	   as	   a	  strong	   incentive	   for	   them	   to	   provide	   political	   services.	   Thus,	   one	   of	   the	   main	   empirical	  implications	  of	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  is	  that	  employees	  ideologically	  closer	  to	   the	   mayor	   (supporters)	   provide	   more	   political	   services.	   Moreover,	   two	   other	  characteristics	   of	   public	   employees	   could	   affect	   their	   provision	   of	   political	   services—the	  level	  of	  education	  and	  the	  type	  of	  contract.	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  2,	  employees	  with	  lower	  levels	   of	   education	   and	   those	   without	   tenure	   have	   more	   to	   lose	   from	   a	   change	   in	  administration	   and	   therefore	   should	   also	   be	   more	   involved	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   political	  services.	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To	   determine	   whether	   the	   provision	   of	   political	   services	   differs	   across	   different	  types	  of	  public	   sector	  employees,	   I	   estimate	   the	  difference-­‐in-­‐means	  across	   sub-­‐groups.	   I	  have	   already	   shown	   in	   section	   3.3	   that	   public	   jobs	   are	   disproportionally	   distributed	   to	  supporters.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	   show	   that	   supporters	   do	   in	   fact	   provide	   relatively	   more	  political	  services	  than	  non-­‐supporters.	  Support	  for	  the	  mayor	  is	  measured	  with	  a	  question	  that	   asked	   respondents	  whether	   they	   identified	   themselves	  with	   the	   party	   of	   the	  mayor	  (Mayor	   Party).54	  Figure	   3.1	   displays	   the	   list-­‐experiment	   estimates	   of	   the	   three	   political	  services	   by	   support	   for	   the	   mayor	   and	   Table	   3.10	   below	   presents	   the	   specific	   numeric	  values	  display	  in	  the	  figure.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  The	  exact	  wording	  of	   the	  question	  was:	   “Do	  you	   identify	  yourself	  with	  any	  party?”	   (¿Se	  identifica	  Ud.	  con	  
algún	  partido	  político?),	  follow	  by:	  “With	  which	  party	  do	  you	  identify	  yourself?”	  (¿Con	  cuál	  partido	  se	  identifica	  
Ud.?).	   These	   questions	  were	   included	   in	   the	   “sensitive”	   part	   of	   the	   questionnaire	   (Part	   B),	   that	   employees	  filled	  out	  by	  themselves.	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Figure	  3.1:	  List-­‐experiment	  estimates	  of	  political	  services	  by	  support	  for	  the	  mayor	  
	  
Note:	  Average	  treatment	  effects	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  the	  control	  group	  (t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	   variance).	  Black	   circles	   indicate	   the	  proportion	  of	   employees	   in	   the	   respective	   subgroup	  that	  performed	   the	  political	   service.	  Horizontal	  black	  bars	   represent	  95%	  confidence	   intervals	  and	  vertical	  lines	   represent	   90%	   confidence	   intervals.	   Dashed	   lines	   (red	   in	   the	   original)	   connecting	   the	   black	   circles	  represent	   the	   differences	   in	   proportion	   across	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters;	   numeric	   values	   of	   these	  differences	  display	  above	  those	  lines.	  *p	  <	  0.10,	  **p<	  0.05,	  ***p<	  0.01.	  	  
























employees	   that	   reported	   identifying	   themselves	  with	   the	  party	  of	   the	   current	  mayor,	   the	  proportion	  of	  those	  helping	  with	  campaigns	   is	  34	  percent,	  while	  the	  proportion	  for	  those	  that	  did	  not	   identify	  with	   the	  party	  of	   the	  mayor	   is	  16	  percent.	  The	  18	  points	  difference	  between	  both	  groups	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  90	  percent	  level.	  We	  find	  a	  similar	  pattern	  for	  the	  other	   two	   political	   services.	   Among	   supporters	   of	   the	   party	   of	   the	   mayor,	   28	   percent	  reported	   attending	   rallies,	   while	   among	   non-­‐supporters	   the	   proportion	   drops	   to	   20	  (although	   the	   8	   points	   difference	   is	   non-­‐significant).	   Finally,	   among	   self-­‐reported	  supporters,	   27	   percent	   were	   election	   monitors	   in	   the	   last	   election,	   while	   among	   non-­‐supporters	  we	  find	  a	  proportion	  that	  is	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  zero.	  The	  difference	  between	   the	   proportion	   of	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters	   that	   reported	   being	   election	  monitors	  in	  the	  previous	  election	  is	  a	  significant	  (at	  the	  95%	  level)	  21	  percentage	  points.	  
As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  2,	  there	  are	  two	  other	  characteristics	  that	  can	  also	  condition	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services:	  the	  type	  of	  contract	  and	  the	  level	  of	  education.	  I	  expect	  employees	  without	  a	   tenure	  contract	   to	  be	  more	   involved	   in	  political	   services	   than	   those	  who	   enjoy	   tenure	   rights	   (Tenure,	   No	   Tenure).	   From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   theory	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  employees	  without	  tenure	  have	  more	  to	  lose	  with	  a	  change	  in	  the	  administration	   (they	   can	   legally	   be	   fired),	  which	  works	   as	   a	   strong	   incentive	   to	   provide	  political	   services	   to	   keep	   the	   mayor	   in	   power.	   Moreover,	   as	   an	   empirical	   fact,	   new	  employees	  are	  regularly	  hired	  under	  temporary	  contracts	  and	  only	  gain	  tenure	  after	  some	  time,	  so	  employees	  hired	  more	  recently	  (most	  probably	  under	  the	  current	  administration)	  are	  both	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  supporters	  and	  to	  be	  on	  temporary	  contracts.55	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  In	  fact,	  the	  correlation	  between	  being	  hired	  by	  the	  current	  administration	  and	  having	  a	  tenure	  contract	  is	  negative	  0.62.	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Finally,	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  public	  employees	  to	  patronage	  contracts	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  employees’	  skill	  and	  labor	  market	  expectations	  (Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2004;	  Robinson	  and	  Verdier	  2002;	  Medina	  and	  Stokes	  2002,	  2007).	  Less	  educated	  workers	  have	  more	   to	   fear	  from	  losing	  their	  jobs,	  so	  it	  is	  also	  expected	  that	  they	  will	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  comply	  with	  their	   part	   of	   the	   patronage	   contract	   and	   provide	   the	   expected	   political	   services.	   I	   then	  expect	   to	   find	   heterogeneous	   effects	   across	   different	   levels	   of	   education.	   To	   explore	   this	  possibility	   I	   study	   the	   treatment	   effect	   across	   employees	  with	   a	   college	   degree	   (College)	  and	   those	  without	   a	   college	   degree	   (No	  College).	   Table	   3.10	   displays	   the	   list	   experiment	  estimates	   by	   these	   subgroups	   for	   the	   three	   political	   services,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   numeric	  values	  displayed	  in	  the	  figure	  above	  for	  Mayor	  Party.	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Table	  3.10:	  Political	  services	  list-­‐experiment	  estimates	  conditional	  on	  
characteristics	  of	  the	  respondent	  	  4	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   	  	   Political	  Campaigns	   Political	  Rallies	   Election	  monitors	  
Mayor	  Party	  Supporter	  
Yes	   0.34***	   0.28**	   0.27***	  (0.08)	   (0.11)	   (0.08)	  N=379	   N=380	   N=381	  No	   0.16***	   0.20***	   0.06	  (0.06)	   (0.06)	   (0.05)	  N=790	   N=790	   N=791	  Difference	  in	  means	   0.18*	   0.08	   0.21**	  (0.10)	   (0.13)	   (0.09)	  N=1169	   N=1170	   N=1172	  
Tenure	  
Yes	   0.26***	   0.23***	   0.02	  (0.07)	   (0.08)	   (0.06)	  N=578	   N=577	   N=579	  No	   0.18***	   0.20**	   0.23***	  (0.07)	   (0.08)	   (0.06)	  N=590	   N=592	   N=592	  Difference	  in	  means	   0.08	   0.02	   0.21**	  (0.10)	   (0.11)	   (0.09)	  N=1168	   N=1169	   N=1171	  
College	  
Yes	   0.14	   0.17	   0.14	  (0.09)	   (0.11)	   (0.09)	  N=265	   N=265	   N=265	  No	   0.24***	   0.22***	   0.12**	  (0.06)	   (0.07)	   (0.05)	  N=901	   N=902	   N=904	  Difference	  in	  means	   0.10	   0.05	   0.02	  (0.10)	   (0.13)	   (0.10)	  N=1166	   N=1166	   N=1169	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	  Average	  treatment	  effects	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  the	  control	  groups.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  calculated	  with	  unequal	  variance;	  *p	  <	  0.10,	  **p<	  0.05,	  ***p<	  0.01.	  	  The	  results	  for	  the	  proportion	  of	  employees	  providing	  political	  services	  among	  those	  who	  enjoy	   tenure	   rights	   and	   those	   who	   do	   not	   enjoy	   those	   rights	   is	   not	   consistent	   across	  services.	   Contrary	   to	   expectations,	   there	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   higher	   proportion	   of	   tenured	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employees	  helping	  with	  campaigns	  and	  attending	  rallies	   (although	   the	  difference	   to	  non-­‐tenured	  employees	  is	  non-­‐significant),	  while	  non-­‐tenured	  employees	  are	  more	  involved	  in	  monitoring	  elections.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2	  posits	  that	  the	  main	  explanatory	  variable	   for	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services	   is	  support	   for	  the	  mayor.	  Supporters	  are	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services	  because	  they	  have	  more	  to	  lose	  from	  a	  change	  in	  administration—supporters	  without	  tenure	  rights	  could	  lose	  their	  jobs	  while	   supporters	  with	   tenure	   rights	   are	   only	   subjected	   to	   negative	   changes	   in	   their	  working	   conditions.	   Non-­‐supporters,	  with	   or	  without	   tenure	   rights,	   have	   nothing	   to	   fear	  from	  a	  new	  government.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  type	  of	  contract	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  a	  good	  predictor	  of	  the	   provision	   of	   services	   can	   be	   interpreted	   as	   evidence	   that	   the	   reason	  why	   employees	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  agreement	  is	  not	  simple	  fear	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs	  (as	  the	  theory	  of	  monitoring	  and	  punishment	  predicts)	  but	  fear	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs	  (or	  negative	  changes	  in	  working	   conditions)	   with	   a	   change	   in	   administration.	   I	   will	   come	   back	   to	   this	   point	   in	  chapter	  5.	  
In	  relation	  to	  education,	  the	  data	  does	  not	  show	  a	  clear	  pattern	  either.	  Less	  educated	  employees	  (without	  a	  college	  degree)	  seem	  to	  be	  more	  involved	  with	  attending	  rallies	  and	  helping	  with	  the	  campaign	  than	  more	  educated	  employees	  but	  the	  difference	  between	  both	  sub-­‐groups	   is	  non-­‐significant.	   For	  monitoring	  elections,	   the	  proportion	  of	  more	  educated	  employees	  that	  provide	  this	  service	  is	  slightly	  higher	  than	  the	  proportion	  of	  less	  educated	  employees,56	  but	   the	   estimate	   is	   not	   significant	   and	   the	   difference	   between	   both	   sub-­‐groups	   is	  small	  and	  non-­‐significant	  either.	  As	   in	   the	  case	  of	   the	   type	  of	  contract,	   the	  self-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  The	  slightly	  different	  results	  for	  monitoring	  elections	  and	  the	  other	  two	  activities	  in	  relation	  to	  education	  is	  not	  surprising	  considering	  that	  monitoring	  elections	  is	  an	  activity	  that	  requires	  more	  sophisticated	  skills	  than	  the	  other	  two.	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enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  predicts	  a	  conditional	  effect	  of	  education	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  services.	  As	  explained,	  less	  educated	  employees	  value	  their	  jobs	  more	  than	  more	  educated	  employees,	   but	   only	   supporters	   fear	   negative	   changes	   with	   a	   new	   administration.	   Non-­‐supporters,	   with	   or	   without	   a	   college	   degree	   have	   nothing	   to	   fear	   from	   a	   new	  administration.	  
More	  precisely	  then,	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2	  predicts	  a	  conditional	  effect	  of	  the	  type	  of	  contract	  and	  education	  on	  the	  provision	  of	  services.	  Among	  supporters,	  those	  without	  tenure	  contracts	  and	  lees	  education	  have	  more	  to	  fear	  from	  a	  new	  administration	  and	  consequently	  should	  be	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  services.	  To	  get	  a	  handle	  on	  this	  issue,	  table	  3.11	  below	  reproduce	  the	  list-­‐experiments	  estimates	  conditional	  on	  being	  a	  supporter	  and	  includes	  controls	  for	  the	  type	  of	  contract	  and	  level	  of	  education.57	  If	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  is	  right	  and	  type	  of	  contract	  and	  education	  have	  a	  conditional	  effect	   on	   the	   provision	   of	   political	   services,	  we	   should	   see	   that	   the	   differences	   in	  means	  between	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  becomes	  bigger	  once	  we	  controlled	  for	  these	  two	  additional	  characteristics.	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  An	   alternative	   strategy	  would	   have	   been	   to	   divide	   the	   data	   into	  more	   subgroups,	   creating	   subgroups	   of	  supporters	  with	  and	  without	  a	  college	  degree	  and	  supporters	  with	  and	  without	   tenure	  rights.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  strategy	  is	  that	  the	  precision	  of	  the	  list	  experiment	  estimate	  depends	  on	  the	  number	  of	  subjects	  in	  each	  particular	  group	  so	  the	  smaller	  the	  subgroup,	  the	  bigger	  the	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  each	  subgroup.	  For	  this	   reason,	   I	   opted	   to	   include	   education	   and	   tenure	   as	   controls	   for	   estimating	   the	   difference	   between	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  of	  the	  mayor,	  instead	  of	  creating	  more	  (smaller)	  subgroups.	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Table	  3.11:	  Difference	  in	  means	  between	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Difference	  in	  means	  across	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  Political	  Campaigns	   0.18*	   0.20**	   0.21**	  (0.10)	   (0.10)	   (0.10)	  N=1169	   N=1165	   N=1165	  Political	  	  Rallies	   0.08	   0.10	   0.11	  (0.13)	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	  N=1170	   N=1166	   N=1166	  Election	  Monitors	   0.21**	   0.20**	   0.20**	  (0.09)	   (0.09)	   (0.09)	  N=1172	   N=1168	   N=1168	  Controls	  for	  College	  &	  Tenure	   NO	   YES	   YES	  Municipal	  Dummies	   NO	   NO	   YES	  
Note:	   Differences	   in	   means	   across	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters	   for	   the	   three	   political	  services	  (Column	  1).	  Column	  2	  includes	  controls	  for	  education	  (College)	  and	  type	  of	  contract	  (Tenure);	   Column	   3	   also	   includes	   municipal	   dummies.	   Standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses	  calculated	  with	  unequal	  variance;	  *p	  <	  0.10,	  **p<	  0.05,	  ***p<	  0.01.	  	  
Indeed,	  table	  3.11	  shows	  that	  controlling	  for	  education	  and	  tenure	  rights	  slightly	  increases	  the	  difference	  in	  means	  between	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  for	  attending	  rallies	  and	  helping	   with	   the	   campaign.	   For	   monitoring	   elections,	   the	   difference	   is	   reduced	   in	   one	  percentage	   point.	   Last	   column	   also	   includes	   controls	   for	   municipalities,	   which	   only	  marginally	  affects	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  differences.	  	  	  
In	  sum,	  the	  empirics	  so	  far	  show	  that—depending	  on	  the	  type	  of	  political	  service—	  between	  12	  and	  22	  percent	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  political	   services	   described	   here.	   Moreover,	   I	   show	   that	   the	   proportion	   of	   employees	  providing	   these	   services	   is	   consistently	   higher	   among	   supporters	   (those	   that	   identify	  themselves	   with	   the	   party	   of	   the	   mayor)	   than	   non-­‐supporters.	   Controlling	   for	   type	   of	  contract	   and	   education—the	   other	   two	   characteristics	   that	   I	   expected	   to	   affect	   the	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provision	   of	   services—	   slightly	   increases	   the	   differences	   between	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters.	  	  
	  
3.5	   Robustness	  Tests	  
The	   results	   of	   this	   chapter	   strongly	   depend	   on	   the	   successful	   implementation	   of	   the	   list	  experiment	   design.	   To	   be	   sure,	   in	   all	   cases	   survey	   results	   depend	   on	   a	   successful	  implementation	  of	  the	  research	  design	  protocol,	  but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  list	  experiments	  the	  bar	  is	  set	  a	  little	  higher.	  As	  with	  any	  other	  experiment,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  have	  problems	  of	  non-­‐	  compliance,	   in	   which	   respondents	   assigned	   to	   treatment	   do	   not	   actually	   receive	   the	  treatment.	  The	  results	  presented	  here	  are	  in	  fact	  what	  are	  called	  intention-­‐to-­‐treat	  effects	  (ITT),	  since	  they	  compare	  the	  responses	  of	  individuals	  assigned	  to	  treatment	  and	  control.	  But	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  individuals	  assigned	  to	  treatment	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  question	  that	  includes	  the	  sensitive	  item	  among	  the	  other	  items	  on	  the	  list)	  did	  not	  actually	  receive	  the	  treatment.	  This	  could	  happen	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons:	  it	  might	  be	  that	  enumerators	  failed	  to	   provide	   clear	   instructions	   or	   distributed	   the	   wrong	   cards,	   or	   it	   might	   be	   that	  respondents	  did	  not	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  instructions	  or	   failed	  to	  read	  carefully	  the	  cards	  with	   the	   listed	   items	   that	   they	   were	   handed.	   It	   is	   also	   crucial	   that	   the	   respondents	  understand	  that	  the	  technique	  guarantees	  the	  anonymity	  of	  their	  responses.	  If	  respondents	  do	  not	  fully	  understand	  that	  their	  answers	  were	  anonymous,	  the	  result	  could	  be	  inaccurate	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responses	  or	  refusals	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  a	   less	  valid	  estimate	  of	   the	   frequency	  of	   the	  activity	  that	  the	  list	  experiment	  intend	  to	  estimate.58	  
One	  way	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   problem	  of	   potential	   non-­‐compliance	   is	   to	   calculate	   the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  on	  the	  treated	  (ATT)—	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  treatment	  on	  those	  who	  actually	  received	   the	   treatment—,	   instead	  of	   the	   intention	   to	   treat	  effects	   (ITT).	  To	   try	   to	  get	  a	  measure	  of	  compliance,	  enumerators	  were	  instructed	  to	  record	  the	  duration	  of	  each	  interview.	   If	   the	   interviews	  were	  too	  short,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	  enumerators	  were	  not	  very	  careful	   or	   respondents	   were	   in	   a	   hurry	   and	   were	   not	   paying	   much	   attention	   to	   the	  questions,	   instructions,	  and	  answers	  they	  were	  providing,	  making	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  did	  not	  actually	  receive	  the	  treatment.	  Thus	  one	  way	  to	  measure	  compliance	  is	  to	  exclude	  those	   respondents	   that	   took	   less	   than	   15	  minutes	   to	   answer	   the	   survey	   (recall	   that	   the	  survey	   lasted,	   on	   average,	   24	  minutes).	   Table	   3.12	   replicates	   the	   results	   of	   the	   analysis	  reported	   in	  Table	  3.10	   (ITT)	   for	   the	  main	   results—namely,	  Mayor	  Party—	  only	   for	   those	  respondents	   that	   took	   15	  minutes	   or	  more	   to	   answer	   the	   survey	   (ATT).59	  The	   results	   of	  both	  analyses	  are	  very	  similar,	  but	  the	  differences	  between	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  are	   slightly	   bigger	   when	   restricting	   the	   sample	   to	   only	   those	   that	   took	   more	   than	   15	  minutes	  to	  complete	  the	  survey.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Note	   that	   if	   respondents	   did	   not	   understand	   or	   did	   not	   believe	   in	   the	   anonymity	   of	   the	   technique	   they	  would	  either	  refuse	  to	  answer	  or	  give	  a	  negative	  answer	  (in	  this	  case,	  an	  unreal	  “0”).	  The	  number	  of	  refusals	  for	   the	   list	   experiments	  was	  very	   low	   (15,	  14,	   and	  12	   respondents	   for	   each	  of	   the	   list	   experiments	   replied	  DN/NA)	  and	  those	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  list	  experiment	  estimates.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  “0”	  responses	  would	  not	   affect	   the	   estimation	   if	   they	  were	   randomly	   distributed	   across	   treatment	   and	   control	   but	  will	   bias	   the	  estimation	  against	  the	  results	  if	  more	  respondents	  in	  the	  treatment	  replied	  “0”	  because	  they	  saw	  the	  sensitive	  item	  on	  the	  list.	  If	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  the	  list	  experiment	  estimates	  presented	  here	  are	  conservative	  estimates.	  59	  Among	   the	   1184	   respondents,	   85	   took	   less	   than	   15	   minutes	   to	   answer	   the	   survey	   and	   time	   was	   not	  reported	  for	  27	  surveys,	  thus	  the	  results	  in	  Table	  3.11	  exclude	  112	  responses.	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Table	  3.12:	  Political	  services	  list	  experiment	  estimates	  conditional	  on	  characteristics	  
of	  the	  respondent,	  excluding	  short	  surveys	  	  4	  	   	  	   	   	   	  	  	   	  	   Political	  Campaigns	   Political	  Rallies	   Election	  	  Monitors	  Whole	  sample	   0.22***	   0.20***	   0.12**	  (0.05)	   (0.06)	   (0.05)	  N=1057	   N=1059	   N=1060	  
	  Mayor	  Party	  	  
Yes	   0.37***	   0.29**	   0.25***	  (0.09)	   (0.12)	   (0.08)	  N=337	   N=338	   N=339	  No	   0.16***	   0.18***	   0.06	  (0.06)	   (0.06)	   (0.05)	  N=720	   N=721	   N=721	  	   0.21*	   0.11	   0.21*	  (0.11)	   (0.13)	   (0.11)	  N=1057	   N=1059	   N=1057	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	  
Note:	  Average	   treatment	  effects	  on	   the	   treated	  (ATT)	  calculated	  as	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  the	  control	  groups	  (excluding	  “non-­‐compliers”,	  those	  who	  spent	  less	  than	  15	   minutes	   in	   completing	   the	   survey).	   Standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses	   calculated	   with	  unequal	  variance;	  *p	  <	  0.10,	  **p<	  0.05,	  ***p<	  0.01	  	  	  
Finally,	   the	   limited	   geographic	   scope	   of	   the	   project—only	   three	   municipalities	   in	   one	  country—	  might	  raise	  concerns	  about	  whether	  these	  results	  could	  apply	  to	  other	  settings.	  However,	   recall	   that	   the	   municipalities	   chosen	   for	   the	   project	   were	   very	   different	   both	  politically	   and	   economically,	  making	   it	  more	   likely	   that	   a	   theory	   that	   applies	   to	   all	   three	  municipalities	  would	  also	  apply	  to	  other	  settings.	  Table	  3.13	  presents	  once	  again	  the	  main	  results	  by	  municipality.	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Table	  3.13:	  Political	  services	  list	  experiment	  estimates	  conditional	  on	  characteristics	  
of	  the	  respondent,	  by	  municipality	  	   	  4	  	   	  	   	   	   	  	   	   Political	  Campaigns	   Political	  Rallies	   Election	  Monitors	  
SALTA	  
Whole	  sample	   0.29***	   0.23**	   0.10	  (0.08)	   (0.11)	   (0.07)	  N=384	   N=385	   N=384	  
Mayor	  Party	  	  
Yes	   0.30**	   0.23	   0.09	  (0.12)	   (0.16)	   (0.09)	  N=203	   N=204	   N=203	  	   0.30***	   0.28**	   0.12	  No	   (0.11)	   (0.14)	   (0.10)	  	   N=181	   N=181	   N=181	  Difference	  	   0.01	   0.05	   0.03	  (0.16)	   (0.21)	   (0.13)	  N=384	   N=385	   N=384	  
SANTA	  
FE	  
Whole	  sample	   0.24***	   0.21**	   0.14*	  (0.09)	   (0.08)	   (0.08)	  N=392	   N=391	   N=395	  
Mayor	  Party	   Yes	  
0.40**	   0.32	   0.33	  (0.19)	   (0.25)	   (0.22)	  N=65	   N=65	   N=66	  No	   0.21**	   0.19**	   0.10	  (0.10)	   (0.09)	   (0.09)	  N=327	   N=326	   N=329	  	   	   	   0.19	   0.13	   0.23	  	   	   Difference	   (0.21)	   (0.26)	   (0.23)	  	   	   	   N=392	   N=391	   N=395	  	   Whole	  sample	   0.13*	   0.21**	   0.14*	  
TIGRE	  
(0.07)	   (0.09)	   (0.07)	  N=393	   N=394	   N=393	  
Mayor	  Party	   Yes	  
0.40***	   0.36*	   0.55***	  (0.14)	   (0.20)	   (0.14)	  N=111	   N=111	   N=112	  No	  	   0.01	   0.13	   0.03	  (0.08)	   (0.08)	   (0.08)	  N=282	   N=283	   N=281	  	   	   	   0.38**	   0.23	   0.58***	  	   	   Difference	   (0.16)	   (0.21)	   (0.16)	  	   	   	   N=393	   N=394	   N=393	  	   	  	   	  	   	   	   	  
Note:	  Average	  treatment	  effects	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  calculated	  with	  unequal	  variance;	  *p	  <	  0.10,	  **p<	  0.05,	  ***p<	  0.01	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In	   general,	   results	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   ones	   reported	   above.	   Recall,	   however,	   that	   the	  statistical	  significance	  of	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  list	  experiment	  depends	  on	  the	  size	  of	  each	  of	  the	   sub-­‐groups	   so	   in	   some	   cases	   the	   list	   experiment	   estimates	   are	   non-­‐significant.	  Moreover,	   the	  use	  of	   list	   experiments	   involves	  a	   trade-­‐off	  between	  bias	  and	  efficiency	   so	  the	  size	  of	   the	  groups	  needed	   to	  be	  able	   to	  obtain	  a	   significant	  estimate	   is	  higher	   than	   it	  would	  have	  been	  with	  a	  direct	  question.	   List	   experiments	   reduce	  bias	  by	  minimizing	   the	  incentives	   for	   respondents	   to	   lie,	   but	   do	   so	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   efficiency	   (the	   standard	   errors	  around	   the	   list	  experiment	  estimates	  are	   larger	   than	   they	  would	  have	  been	  with	  a	  direct	  question	  with	  no	  response	  bias)	  (Blair	  and	  Imai	  2012;	  Corstange	  2009).	  
First,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   all	   three	   activities	   are	   conducted	   in	   the	   three	  municipalities	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  electoral	  monitoring	  in	  Salta,	  it	   was	   possible	   to	   obtain	   significant	   estimates	   in	   all	   cases,	   showing	   that	   in	   all	   three	  municipalities	  public	  sector	  employees	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services.60	  In	   the	  cases	  of	  Santa	  Fe	  and	  Tigre,	   supporters	   reported	  providing	  more	  political	   services	  than	  non-­‐supporters	   for	  each	  of	   the	   three	  political	   services	   studied	  here.	  The	  proportion	  estimated	   for	   each	  political	   activity	   as	  well	   as	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   services	  reported	  by	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  are	  not	  always	  significant,	  but	  the	  proportion	  of	  supporters	  involved	  in	  political	  services	  was	  consistently	  higher	  than	  the	  proportion	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  estimate	  for	  electoral	  monitoring	  in	  Salta	  was	  not	  significant	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  this	  activity	  is	  not	  important	  in	  Salta	  elections	  or	  that	  public	  employees	  are	  not	  involved.	  In	  Salta,	  besides	  partisan	  monitors,	  parties	  allocated	  to	  schools	  on	  Election	  Day	  what	  they	  called	  “Lawyer	  by	  School”	  (Abogado	  por	  Escuela).	  These	  are	  lawyers	  the	  party	  recruits	  to	  be	  present	  on	  election	  day	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  any	  dispute.	  They	  have	  no	   legal	   authority	   and	   there	   is	  no	   legislation	   that	   regulates	   their	   role	   at	   the	  voting	  place.	  This	  was	  confirmed	  in	  many	  interviews	  with	  employees	  that	  were	  in	  charge	  of	  this	  activity	  in	  previous	  elections.	   These	   lawyers	   do	   not	   call	   themselves	   partisan	   monitors,	   although	   their	   role	   on	   the	   day	   of	   the	  election	  is	  very	  similar.	  This	  might	  have	  affected	  the	  estimates	  of	  the	  proportion	  of	  partisan	  monitors.	  Since	  parties	   count	  on	   the	  presence	  of	   these	   lawyers	  at	   each	  voting	  place,	   it	   is	   also	  possible	   that	  parties	  are	   less	  concerned	   with	   the	   deployment	   of	   partisan	   monitors	   and	   their	   presence	   is	   less	   relevant	   than	   in	   other	  municipalities.	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non-­‐supporters	  involved.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Santa	  Fe,	  many	  of	  the	  estimates	  are	  non-­‐significant	  because	  in	  this	  province	  the	  group	  of	  supporters	  is	  smaller	  than	  in	  the	  other	  municipalities,	  yielding	  bigger	  standard	  errors	  (only	  66	  respondents	  identified	  themselves	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor).	  	  
In	   the	   case	   of	   Salta,	   there	   are	   no	   consistent	   differences	   in	   the	   proportion	   of	  supporters	   and	   non-­‐	   supporters	   providing	   services.	   In	   fact,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   attendance	   to	  rallies,	  it	  seems	  that	  non-­‐supporters	  reported	  higher	  participation	  (although	  the	  difference	  is	   not	   significant).	   This	   surprising	   result	   might	   be	   explained	   by	   the	   fact	   that	   Salta	   is	  governed	  by	  a	  coalition	  between	  two	  parties	  (the	  Peronist	  and	  the	  PRS)	  so	  supporting	  the	  party	   of	   the	  mayor	   and	   supporting	   the	  mayor	   (a	   Peronist)	   are	   not	   necessarily	   the	   same	  thing,	   at	   least	   for	   PRS	   supporters.	   Indeed,	   using	   a	   different	   measure	   of	   support	   for	   the	  mayor	  shows	  that	  supporters	  do	  generally	  provide	  more	  services	  than	  non-­‐supporters.	  In	  particular,	   among	   those	   that	   reported	  having	  voted	   for	   the	  mayor	   in	   the	   last	  election,	  29	  percent	   reported	   helping	   with	   the	   electoral	   campaign,	   22	   percent	   reported	   attending	  rallies,	   and	  13	  percent	   reported	  monitoring	  elections	   (compare	   to	  19,	  10,	   and	  8	  percent,	  respectively,	  for	  non-­‐supporters).	  	  
In	  sum,	  even	  with	  the	  mentioned	  caveats,	  the	  results	  are	  broadly	  consistent	  with	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2	  across	  the	  three	  municipalities.	  The	  diversity	  of	  municipalities	   surveyed	  —	  a	  municipality	   from	   the	  poorer	  north	  mainly	  dominated	  by	  the	  Peronist	  party	  (Salta),	  a	  municipality	  from	  the	  relatively	  richer	  and	  more	  competitive	  center	  (Santa	  Fe),	  and	  one	  from	  the	  Conurbano	  Bonaerense	  (Tigre)	  —	  suggests	  that	  the	  findings	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  generalizable	  to	  other	  cases.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  point	  in	  the	  conclusion.	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3.6	   Conclusion	  
This	   chapter	  presents	   the	   first	   (to	   the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge)	   systematic	   evidence	  of	   the	  type	   and	   extent	   of	   political	   services	   that	   public	   sector	   employees	   provide	   to	   the	  mayor.	  This	   evidence	   strongly	   supports	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   developed	   in	  chapter	  2.	  First,	  I	  show	  that	  most	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  through	  informal	  channels.	  Second,	  I	  use	  an	   instrumental	  variable	  design	  to	  show	  that	  public	  sector	   jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	   to	   supporters.	   Third,	   I	   provide	   empirical	   evidence	   that,	   in	   the	   exchange	   of	  public	   sector	   jobs	   for	   political	   support,	   public	   sector	   employees	   provide	   a	   number	   of	  political	  services	  that	  go	  far	  beyond	  their	  electoral	  loyalty.	  They	  attend	  political	  rallies,	  help	  with	   electoral	   campaigns,	   and	   monitor	   elections.	   Using	   different	   techniques	   to	   obtain	  truthful	   responses	  and	   improve	   response	   rates,	   I	   show	   that	  a	   considerable	  proportion	  of	  employees,	  ranging	  from	  12	  to	  22	  percent,	  get	   involved	  in	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  activities	  during	  elections.	  Moreover,	  and	  consistent	  with	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  I	  show	  that	  supporters	  of	  the	  mayor	  are	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  these	  services.	  	  
In	  the	  next	  chapter	  (chapter	  4)	  I	  focus	  on	  an	  activity	  that	  public	  employees	  provide	  in	   between	   elections	   as	   well—namely,	   providing	   favors.	   Chapter	   5	   focuses	   on	  understanding	   why	   public	   employees	   provide	   these	   services	   before,	   during,	   and	   after	  elections.	  As	  explained	  in	  chapter	  2,	  public	  sector	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  supporters	  because	  politicians	  use	  the	  political	  preferences	  of	  citizens	  at	  the	  time	  of	  hiring	  as	  a	  “proxy”	  for	  their	  willingness	  to	  provide	  political	  services.	  However,	  a	  citizen—even	  a	  supporter—	  who	   receives	   a	   job	  with	   the	   implicit	   or	   explicit	   understanding	   that	   she	  will	  return	   the	   favor	   by	   providing	   political	   services	   can	   easily	   renege	   on	   the	   contract	   after	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Chapter	  4	  	  
Making	  it	  Personal.	  Patronage,	  Favors,	  
and	  the	  Personalization	  of	  Public	  
Administration	  	  
“Favoritism	   animates	   machine	   politics,	   favoritism	   not	   just	   in	  
filling	   pick-­‐and-­‐shovel	   jobs,	   but	   in	   a	   vast	   array	   of	   public	  
decisions.”	  (Wolfinger	  1972,	  389)	  
“An	   able	   administrator	   can	   thus	   transform	   a	   routine	  
bureaucratic	   procedure	   into	   a	   personal	   favor,	   just	   as	   the	  
policeman	  can	  exploit	  the	  slightest	  infraction	  of	  the	  law,	  real	  or	  
imaginary,	  to	  create	  a	  network	  of	  personal	  obligations…”	  (Chubb	  
1981,	  120)	  	  
“Insofar	  as	  politicians	  can	  design	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  bureaucratic	  
decisions	  are	  made,	   they	   can	  also	   (at	   least	   indirectly)	   influence	  
the	   set	  of	   citizens	   that	  bring	  demands	  or	  complaints	  before	   the	  
bureaucracy	   for	   redress.	   If	   representation	   before	   the	  
bureaucracy	   has	   distributional	   consequences,	   we	   would	   expect	  
politicians	   to	   design	   the	   rules,	   and	   provide	   extra-­‐governmental	  
means	   (e.g.,	   party	  organizations)	   to	  promote	  access	   to	  decision	  
making	   on	   the	   part	   of	   their	   supporters.”	   (Cox	   and	   McCubbins	  
1986,	  385)	  	  




that	  between	  12	  and	  22	  percent	  of	  the	  employees	  provided	  some	  type	  of	  political	  service	  around	   the	   time	   of	   the	   election.	   However,	   one	   of	   the	   main	   advantages	   that	   incumbents	  enjoy	   by	   using	   public	   sector	   employees	   as	   political	   workers	   is	   that	   the	   patronage	  agreement	   does	   not	   end	   with	   the	   election.	   Patronage	   employees	   continue	   to	   provide	  political	  services	  once	  elections	  are	  over.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  the	  activities	  that	  patronage	  employees	  perform	  in	  between	  elections—the	  provision	  of	  favors.	  
In	  general,	  the	  literature	  on	  clientelism	  refers	  to	  favors	  or	  gifts	  (or	  goods)	  as	  general	  terms	  to	  denote	  the	  types	  of	  “things”	  that	  are	  exchanged	  in	  clientelistic	  relationships.	  Many	  surveys	  on	  clientelism	  use	  a	  question	  that	  asks	  respondents	  whether	  they	  have	  received	  a	  “gift	  or	  a	  favor”	  from	  a	  broker	  or	  political	  activist	  during	  the	  last	  election	  (see,	  for	  example,	  Gonzalez-­‐Ocantos	   et	   al.	   2012).	   Similarly,	   the	   Latin	   American	   Public	   Opinion	   Project	  (Lapop),	  the	  biggest	  ongoing	  survey	  on	  the	  Americas,	  includes	  a	  question	  that	  asks	  whether	  the	  respondent	  has	  been	  offered	  “a	  favor,	  food	  or	  some	  other	  thing	  or	  benefit”.1	  But	  favors	  and	  material	  benefits	  are	  not	  equivalent,	  especially	  when	  the	  actors	  granting	  these	  favors	  are	  public	  employees	  or	  other	  agents	  with	  access	  to	  public	  employees	  and	  state	  resources.	  In	  these	  cases,	  favors	  are	  basically	  “free”	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  public	  employees	  during	  working	  hours,	  on	  a	  salary	  paid	  by	  the	  state,	  while	  technically	  doing	  their	  regular	  jobs,	  can	  provide	  favors	  to	  voters.	  It	  does	  not	  even	  need	  to	  be	  a	  real	  favor—it	  just	  need	  to	  be	  framed	  as	  one.	  Often,	   in	   ways	   that	   I	   will	   describe	   below,	   public	   employees	   can	   turn	   a	   regular	  administrative	  task	  into	  a	  personal	  favor.	  When	  normal	  administration	  becomes	  a	  constant	  personalization	  of	  even	  the	  most	  routine	  tasks,	   favors	  become	  the	  normal	  way	  of	  dealing	  




with	  citizens	  (a.k.a.	  voters)2—and	  the	  personalization	  of	  the	  public	  administration	  can	  be	  easily	  used	  for	  political	  gain.	  	  
In	   fact,	   the	   provision	   of	   favors	   by	   state	   employees	   can	   be	   a	   very	   effective	   and	  extremely	   cheap	   (at	   least,	   from	   the	  point	   of	   view	  of	   the	  politician)	  way	  of	   obtaining	   and	  maintaining	  votes.	  The	  widespread	  use	  of	  discretion—or,	  often	  more	  accurately,	  perceived	  discretion—	   in	   the	   everyday	   tasks	  of	  public	   sector	   employees	   and	   the	  personalization	  of	  things	  that	  need	  to	  get	  solved,	  help	  to	  give	  voters	  the	  impression	  that	  personal	  relations	  are	  key	   for	   getting	   things	   done	   at	   the	   City	  Hall,	   provincial	   or	   national	   administrations.	   Once	  established,	  these	  personal	  connections	  work	  as	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  try	  to	  keep	  things	  as	  they	   are.	   If	   a	   citizen	   has	   established	   a	   personal	   connection	   with	   someone	   in	   the	   public	  sector	  (or	  with	  regular	  access	  to	  it)	  that	  provides	  help	  when	  needed,	  why	  would	  she	  vote	  for	   another	   party?	   Similar	   to	   what	   I	   argued	   in	   chapter	   2	   for	   public	   employees	   under	  patronage	  contracts,	  citizens	  might	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  want	  to	  maintain	  the	  status	  
quo	  by	  keeping	   the	   incumbent	   in	  office	  and	  the	  connection	  to	   the	  state	   intact.	  This	   is	  not	  because	  citizens	  are	  afraid	  of	   losing	  some	  benefit	  or	  access	   to	   the	  state	   if	   the	  bureaucrat	  found	  out	  that	  they	  voted	  against	  the	  incumbent	  and	  nor	  because	  of	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity,	  but	   because	   self-­‐interested	   voters	   that	   live	   in	   clientelistic	   environments	   perfectly	  understand	   the	   benefits	   of	   maintaining	   their	   personal	   connections	   to	   the	   public	  administration.	  




as	   on	   interviews	   and	   informal	   conversations	   with	   public	   employees,	   brokers	   and	  politicians	   to	   study	   the	   provision	   of	   favors	   by	   public	   officials.3	  Based	   on	   this	   evidence,	   I	  show	   that	   a)	   public	   employees	   grant	   favors	   very	   often,	   b)	   supporters	   grant	  more	   favors	  than	  non-­‐supporters,	  c)	  supporters	  get	  asked	  to	  grant	  favors	  more	  often,	  and	  d)	  supporters	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  “helpful.”	  In	  contrast	  to	  most	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  vote	  buying,	  this	  chapter	   presents	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   the	   favor	   provider	   (in	   this	   case,	   the	   public	   sector	  employee)	   instead	   of	   the	   favor	   receiver	   (the	   citizen).	   Of	   course,	   this	   choice	   has	   its	   own	  limitations,	   probably	   the	   main	   one	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   I	   have	   no	   direct	   evidence	   about	   the	  electoral	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  favors—whether	  receiving	  a	  favor	  actually	  affects	  the	  way	  people	  vote.	  	  
The	  reminder	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  draw	  on	  interviews	   and	   informal	   conversations	   carried	   out	   with	   brokers,	   public	   employees	   and	  politicians,	   as	   well	   as	   on	   examples	   from	   the	   existing	   literature	   to	   illustrate	   the	   types	   of	  favors	   that	   are	   provided	   and	   to	   give	   a	   sense	   of	   how	  widespread	   the	   phenomenon	   is.	   In	  section	   two,	   I	   discuss	   the	   way	   patronage	   employees	   (or	   intermediaries)	   manage	   to	  personally	  claim	  credit	  for	  these	  favors.	  In	  section	  three,	  I	  use	  the	  list	  experiment	  technique	  described	   in	   chapter	   3	   to	   estimate	   the	   proportion	   of	   employees	   that	   grant	   favors	   in	   the	  municipalities	   studied.	   Section	   four	   studies	   the	   types	   of	   employees	   that	   are	   more	   often	  involved	   in	   this	   political	   service.	   As	   predicted	   by	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	  developed	   in	  Chapter	  2	  and	   in	   line	  with	   the	   results	  on	  political	   services	  provided	  during	  




elections	   (Chapter	  3),	   I	   show	   that	   supporters	   are	  disproportionally	  more	   involved	   in	   the	  provision	   of	   favors.	   Section	   five	   provides	   evidence	   that	   supporters	   get	   asked	   more	  frequently	  to	  grant	  favors	  than	  non-­‐supporters.	  Section	  six	  shows	  that	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  respond	  differently	  when	  asked	  to	  grant	  a	  favor.	  The	  last	  section	  concludes.	  
	  
4.1	   Granting	  Favors	  	  
The	   literature	   on	   pork-­‐barrel	   politics	   provides	   considerable	   evidence	   that	   rules	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  material	  benefits	  are	  manipulated	  for	  political	  gain	  by	  politicians	  and	   state	   officials	   from	   all	   over	   the	  world.	   In	   Argentina,	   Giraudy	   (2007),	   Lodola	   (2005),	  Nazareno	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  and	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  (2006)	  provide	  evidence	  of	  significant	  discretion	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  workfare	  program	  for	  the	  unemployed	  (Plan	  Trabajar).	   In	  Mexico,	  Magaloni	   (2006)	   finds	   that	   the	   PRI	   favored	  moderately	   competitive	   districts	   with	   social	  programs	   while	   punishing	   those	   controlled	   by	   the	   opposition.	   In	   Peru,	   Schady	   (2000)	  argues	   that	   Fujimori’s	   government	   favored	  marginal	   districts	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   anti-­‐poverty	  programs.	   In	   India,	  Vaishnav	  and	  Sircar	   (2012)	   find	  evidence	  of	  electoral	  bias	   in	  the	   distribution	   of	   public	   school	   building	   funds	   across	   constituencies	   in	   the	   southern	  state	  of	  Tamil	  Nadu;	  while	  Cole	   (2009)	   finds	  electoral	  bias	  across	  administrative	  districts	  on	  agricultural	  credits	  lent	  by	  government-­‐owned	  banks.	  In	  Zambia,	  Baldwin	  (forthcoming)	  finds	  evidence	  that	  in	  chiefdoms	  where	  the	  chief	  has	  a	  good	  relationship	  with	  the	  Member	  of	  Parliament,	  more	  classrooms	  get	  constructed.	  




unemployment	   benefits)	   can	   also	   be	   found	   at	   the	   individual	   level.	   In	   places	   with	   weak	  institutions	   like	   Argentina,	   public	   officials	   (elected	   and	   unelected)	   usually	   have	  considerable	  discretion	  on	  how	  and	  when	  to	  enforce	  the	  rules.4	  In	  this	  situation,	  for	  many	  people—especially	   the	   poor—	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   have	   regular	   access	   to	   someone	   at	   the	  government	  or	  to	  someone	  with	  access	  to	  government	  officials	  who	  can	  provide	  solutions	  to	  specific	  problems	  when	  needed.	  Political	  bias	   then	  can	  be	   found	  both	  at	   the	  aggregate	  level—in	   the	   distribution	   of	   resources	   across	   regions	   or	   groups—	   and	   at	   the	   individual	  level,	   as	   I	   do	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   For	   instance,	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	   (2008a,	   2012)	   shows	   that	  Argentinean	  mayors	  enjoy	  significant	  power	  to	  include	  or	  exclude	  specific	  people	  from	  the	  list	  of	  possible	  beneficiaries	  of	  a	  food	  assistance	  program.	  In	  her	  study	  of	  machine	  politics	  in	  Argentina,	  Szwarcberg	  (2009,	  51)	  also	  describes	  situations	  in	  which	  problems	  are	  solved	  (and	  exceptions	  made)	  at	   the	   individual	   level:	   “Anyone	  visiting	   local	   legislative	  offices	  on	  any	  business	  day	  will	  notice	  people	  waiting	  to	  talk	  with	  a	  councilor	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  he	  or	  she	   can	  help	   solve	  a	  personal	  problem.”	  A	   similar	   scenario	   is	  described	  by	  Chubb	   (1981,	  120)	   in	   the	   city	   of	   Palermo	   where	   “the	   party	   intervenes	   in	   the	   processes	   of	   ordinary	  administration…	   all	   relationships	   are	   highly	   personalized	   and	   politicized,	   even	   those	  regarding	  the	  most	  trivial	  administrative	  procedures.”	  Auyero	  (2000)	  also	  provides	  various	  examples	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  problems	  that	  poor	  people	  get	  solved	  through	  the	  problem-­‐solving	  network	  of	  the	  governing	  Peronist	  Party	  in	  a	  poor	  municipality	  in	  Argentina.	  




The	  poor	  are	  both	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  the	  state	  and	  most	  in	  need	  of	  its	  protection.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Auyero	  (2012,	  118):	  
	  
“Economic	   globalization	   and	   neoliberal	   hegemony	  
notwithstanding,	   the	   state—downsized,	   decentralized	   and/or	  
“hollowed	  out”—still	   is	   a	   key	  actor	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   the	  destitute.	  
Even	   when	   badly	   functioning	   and	   lacking	   basic	   resources,	   the	  
Argentine	   state	   still	   grants	   access	   to	   citizenship	   and	   provides	  
(limited	  but	   vital)	  welfare	  benefits.	   It	   is,	   in	   other	  words,	   deeply	  
‘implicated	  in	  the	  minute	  texture	  of	  everyday	  life’	  of	  the	  poor”	  	  	  
In	   a	   detailed	   ethnography	   of	   poor	   people	   waiting	   in	   a	   welfare	   office,	   Auyero	   (2011)	  describes	  the	  “uncertainty	  and	  arbitrariness	  in	  waiting”	  that	  those	  in	  need	  of	  assistance	  are	  exposed	  to.	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  (2008a)	  also	  describes	  Argentinean	   local	  welfare	  offices	   full	  of	  people	  waiting	  to	  talk	  to	  the	  person	  in	  charge	  (often	  the	  mayor),	  while	  Szwarcberg	  (2009)	  describes	   a	   similar	   scenario	   outside	   councilmen	   offices	   in	   a	   number	   of	   Argentinean	  municipalities.	   It	   is	   not	   just	   the	  macro-­‐level	   functioning	   of	   the	   state,	   but	   often	   the	   daily	  encounters	  with	  public	  officials	  that	  are	  essential	  to	  poor	  people’s	  lives.	  
However,	   the	   need	   for	   favors	   from	   government	   officials—of	   someone	   that	   helps	  when	   dealing	   with	   the	   state—	   is	   certainly	   not	   restricted	   to	   the	   poor.	   For	   instance,	  Szwarcberg	   (2009,	   144)	   cites	   an	   owner	   of	   a	   remisería	   (taxi	   service)	   in	   the	   Conurbano	  
Bonaerense:	  “if	  local	  politicians	  want	  to	  punish	  a	  businessmen	  they	  simply	  enforce	  existing	  local	   regulations.”5	  Similar	   to	   the	   situation	   of	   the	   City	   of	   Palermo	   described	   by	   Chubb	  




(1981,	  119)	  where	  “there	  are	  literally	  thousands	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  vigilant	  police	  officer	  can	  either	  perform	  a	  favor	  or	  make	  life	  miserable	  for	  a	  shopkeeper	  or	  a	  street	  vendor.”	  And,	  of	   course,	   the	   types	   of	   favors	   provided	   not	   by	   mid	   and	   low-­‐level	   positions	   in	   the	  bureaucracy—the	   focus	   of	   this	   dissertation—,	   but	   by	   political	   appointees	   in	   high-­‐level	  positions	   are	   very	   rarely	   about	   the	   poor.	   Government	   activities	   such	   as	   business	   and	  market	   regulations,	   subsidies,	   loans,	   and	   procurement	   contracts	   for	   government	  infrastructure	   are	   all	   activities	   that	   permit	   considerable	   discretion	   and	   case-­‐by-­‐case	  targeting	  (Kitschelt	  and	  Wilkinson	  2007b).	  More	  than	  forty	  years	  ago,	  Wolfinger	  explained	  this	  clearly:	  	  
	  
“(T)here	   is	   no	   reason	  why	   the	  advantages	   of	   political	   influence	  
appeal	   only	   to	   the	   poor.	   In	   places	   where	   the	   political	   culture	  
supports	  expectations	  that	  official	  discretion	  will	  be	  exercised	  in	  
accordance	   with	   political	   considerations,	   the	   constituency	   for	  
machine	   politics	   extends	   across	   the	   socio-­‐economic	   spectrum.	  
People	   whose	   interests	   are	   affected	   by	   governmental	   decisions	  
can	  include	  those	  who	  want	  to	  sell	  to	  the	  government,	  as	  well	  as	  
those	   whose	   economic	   and	   social	   activities	   may	   be	   subject	   to	  
public	  regulation.”	  (Wolfinger	  1972,	  389)	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  diversion	  of	  state	  funds	  for	  political	  activities	  or	  the	  use	  of	  public	  property	  for	   such	   activities	   also	   requires	   supporters	   in	   key	   administrative	   positions	   willing	   to	  collaborate.	  Having	  supporters	  appointed	  to	  relevant	  positions	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  parties	  and	  politicians	  to	  get	  public	  employees	  to	  do	  them	  favors	  or	  make	  exceptions	  of	  this	  kind.	  




In	   this	   dissertation,	   however,	   I	   focus	   on	   the	   favors	   that	   low	   and	   mid-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  grant	  to	  citizens	  and	  those	  who	  often	  act	  on	  their	  behalf	  (brokers).	  Even	  when	  restricting	   the	  analysis	   to	  employees	  at	   low	  and	  middle	  positions,	   the	   type	  of	   favors	   that	  public	   employees	   provide	   to	   others	   is	   extremely	   diverse.	   Some	   of	   the	   employees	  interviewed	   referred,	   for	   instance,	   to	   the	   inclusion	   on	   the	   list	   of	   beneficiaries	   to	  welfare	  benefits.	  One	  public	   employee	   from	  La	  Matanza	   (Buenos	  Aires)	   explained	   to	  me	   that	   the	  way	  they	   found	  most	  of	   the	  cases	  of	  people	   in	  need	   is	   through	  their	  network	  of	  activists:	  “the	  majority	   are	   activists	   (militantes),	   the	   ones	   that	   come	   to	  me	  with	   the	   names	   of	   the	  people	  that	  need	  help…	  many	  of	   them	  [the	  beneficiaries]	  are	  politically	  active	  (participan	  
políticamente)	   and	   I	   know	   them	   personally”.6	  But	   public	   employees	   do	   a	   lot	   more	   than	  distribute	  or	  manipulate	  the	  distribution	  of	  material	  benefits.	  Since	  most	  of	   the	   literature	  has	  been	  focusing	  on	  the	  exchange	  of	  votes	  for	  benefits	  (vote-­‐buying),	  the	  manipulation	  of	  public	   policies	   that	   distribute	   material	   benefits	   has	   gotten	   a	   lot	   of	   attention,	   but	   public	  employees—both	  brokers	  and	  less	  important	  political	  workers—	  provide	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  different	  favors	  beyond	  interfering	  with	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits.	  
The	  day	  I	  interviewed	  the	  employee	  mentioned	  above,	  for	  instance,	  he	  was	  about	  to	  meet	  with	  someone	  (after	  my	  interview)	  who	  was	  trying	  to	  organize	  an	  art	  exhibition	  and	  wanted	   to	   ask	   for	   his	   help	   on	  organizing	   the	   event.	  As	  he	  pointed	  out,	   not	   all	   favors	   are	  about	   “issues	  of	   extreme	  need	  and	  urgency,	  of	   food,”	   instead	   “to	   the	  extent	   that	  you	  can,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Personal	  Interview,	  La	  Matanza,	  August	  10	  2009.	  Recall	  also	  the	  conversation	  reproduced	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  in	  which	  two	  public	  employees	  (both	  important	  brokers)	  were	  discussing	  the	  distribution	  of	   welfare	   benefits	   among	   people	   they	   knew.	   Although	   there	   is	   plenty	   of	   evidence	   (both	   in	   the	   scholarly	  literature	   and	   on	   journalists	   accounts)	   of	   bias	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   material	   benefits	   in	   Argentina,	   it	   is	  extremely	   rare	   to	   find	   anti-­‐poverty	   benefits	   distribute	   to	   the	   non-­‐poor.	   In	   most	   cases,	   it	   is	   not	   about	  distributing	  benefits	  to	  those	  that	  do	  not	  qualify	  to	  get	  the	  benefit,	  but	  about	  which	  ones	  among	  those	  that	  do	  




you	  help	  with	  a	  bunch	  of	  [different]	  things.”7	  Another	  public	  employee	  from	  the	  province	  of	  Buenos	  Aires	  mentioned	  other	  examples:	  	  
	  
“From	   a	   person	   that	   does	   not	   want	   to	   wait	   in	   line	   to	   get	   his	  
driver’s	  license	  and	  he	  calls	  us	  and	  says:	  ‘is	  there	  any	  way	  that	  I	  
can	  get	  the	  license	  without	  having	  to	  wait	  in	  line?’…	  To	  someone	  
that	  has	  a	  problem	  because	  his	  father	  felt	  and	  broke	  his	  leg	  and	  
need	   to	   go	   to	   the	   hospital,	   and	   instead	   of	   calling	   the	   hospital	  
directly,	  he	  calls	  us	  for	  us	  to	  send	  his	  father	  to	  the	  hospital…	  To	  a	  
group	  of	  young	  people	  that	  calls	  me	  because	  they	  want	  to	  meet	  
with	  me	  to	  organize	  a	  party	  at	  the	  university…”8	  	  
Note	   that	   in	   many	   of	   the	   favors	   mentioned	   here,	   more	   than	   one	   person	   needs	   to	   be	  involved.	  Less	  influential	  public	  employees	  could	  probably	  only	  get	  certain	  types	  of	  favors	  done,	  usually	   the	  ones	   that	  are	  closer	   to	  her	  area	  of	  work.	  But	  brokers—often	  patronage	  employees	   themselves—can	  provide	   favors	  on	  such	  a	  variety	  of	   areas	  because	   they	  have	  connections	   to	  other	  patronage	  employees	  at	   the	  municipality	   that	  help	  him	  help	  others.	  Another	   example	   illustrates	   this	  point.	  One	  of	   the	  patronage	   employees	   interviewed	  was	  explaining	  to	  me	  the	  kind	  of	  things	  he	  is	  often	  asked	  to	  do:	  
	  
“Imagine	  a	  guy	  whose	  father	  died	  and	  who	  does	  not	  have	  a	  place	  
to	   hold	   a	   wake	   (…)	   But	   he	   knows	   that	   there	   is	   a	   broker	  
(“referente”)	  who	  is	  a	  friend	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Social	  Welfare	  at	  
the	  Municipality,	  also	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  Cemetery	  (…)	  So	  you	  pick	  
up	   the	   phone	   and	   in	   five	  minutes	   you	   are	   saying:	   ‘go	   see	   Juan,	  




coffin,	   a	   wreath,	   six	   hours	   in	   a	   place	   to	   hold	   a	   wake…’” 9	  (emphasis	  added)	  	  Every	  time	  that	  a	  broker	  gets	  something	  done	  for	  someone,	   there	  are	   in	   fact	  other	  public	  employees	  involved	  (in	  this	  example,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  cemetery)	  in	  making	  these	  things	  happened.	  So	  even	  in	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  brokers	  themselves	  do	  not	  hold	  public	  sector	  jobs,	  they	  use	  their	  connections	  with	  patronage	  employees	  to	  get	  things	  done.10	  Over	  and	  over,	  brokers	  refer	  to	  picking	  up	  the	  phone	  to	  solve	  things	  and	  the	  person	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  phone	  is	  almost	  always	  a	  public	  official.	  When	  the	  favor	  is	  very	  important,	  this	  public	  official	   is	  an	  elected	  official	  or	   someone	   that	  works	   in	  close	  relation	  with	   the	  mayor	  or	  a	  councilman	   (high	   rank	   officials).	  When	   the	   favor	   is	   “small”,	   like	   the	   ones	   I	   study	   in	   this	  dissertation,	  often	  the	  person	  that	  facilitates	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  problem	  is	  a	  low	  or	  mid-­‐	  level	  public	  employee.	  
	  
4.2	  Making	  it	  Personal	  
In	  the	  previous	  section,	  I	  described	  some	  of	  the	  existing	  evidence	  about	  how	  politicians	  and	  public	  officials	  enjoy	  significant	  discretion	  to	  manipulate	  public	  programs	  for	  political	  gain.	  Frequently,	  however,	  patronage	  employees	  do	  not	  manipulate	  the	  rules;	  do	  not	  provide	  any	  




patronage	  employee	  manages	  to	  personally	  claim	  credit	  for	  it—if	  she	  can	  create	  the	  image	  of	   helping.11	  Without	   breaking	   any	   rules,	   maybe	   just	   making	   an	   exception,	   or	   providing	  some	  information	  that	  the	  citizen	  does	  not	  have,	  simply	  doing	  their	  jobs,	  or	  helping	  making	  things	   go	   faster,	   patronage	   employees	   can	   give	   the	   impression	   that	   they	   are	   the	   reason	  things	   went	   through.	   If	   they	  manage	   to	   successfully	   create	   the	   perception	   that	   they	   are	  personally	   responsible—and	   not	   the	   municipality	   as	   an	   institution—	   for	   the	   task	  accomplished,	  they	  can	  claim	  credit	  for	  it.	  Patronage	  employees—especially	  the	  most	  active	  ones,	  the	  brokers—understand	  this	  logic	  perfectly.	  A	  situation	  that	  has	  been	  described	  by	  the	  machine	  politics	  literature	  in	  the	  US	  more	  than	  fifty	  years	  ago:	  
	  
“Nowadays	  there	  is	  little	  that	  the	  machine	  can	  do	  for	  such	  people	  
[the	   poor]	   except	   to	   give	   them	   information	   about	   where	   to	   go	  
and	  whom	  to	  see	  in	  the	  city	  bureaucracy	  and	  (what	  is	  probably	  
more	   important,	   despite	   its	   illusionary	   character)	   to	   give	   them	  
the	   feeling	   that	   they	   have	   a	   friend	   and	   protector.	   The	   ward	  
leader	   cannot	   arrange	   to	   have	   welfare	   payments	   made	   to	  
someone	   not	   entitled	   to	   them;	   he	   can,	   however,	   tell	   a	   needy	  
person	   who	   is	   entitled	   to	   payments	   how	   to	   apply	   for	   them.	   In	  
doing	  so,	  he	  may,	  of	  course,	  manage	  to	  leave	  the	  impression	  that	  
if	  he	  had	  not	  made	  a	  telephone	  call	  and	  used	  “his”	  influence	  as	  a	  
“friend”	  the	  payments	  would	  never	  have	  been	  made.”	  (Bandfield	  
and	  Wilson	  1963,	  121-­‐122)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	   (Chapter	   2,	   2008a)	  makes	   a	   similar	   argument	   about	   how	  mayors	   can	   create	   an	   image	   of	  being	  able	  to	  exercise	  discretion	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  to	  be	  able	  to	  enforce	  the	  clientelistic	  exchange.	  The	  difference	  between	  her	  argument	  and	  mine	   is	   that,	   for	  her,	   this	  personalization	  of	   the	  distribution	  of	  a	  food	  program	  is	  done	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  voters	  that	  the	  politician	  is	  responsible	  for	  program	  distribution	  and	  that	  he	  can	  actually	  punish	  defectors	  (those	  who	  do	  not	  vote	  as	  expected)	  by	  withdrawing	  the	  benefits.	  My	   argument	   is	   different.	   Similar	   to	   what	   I	   argue	   about	   public	   employees	   in	   chapter	   2,	   I	   argue	   here	   that	  voters	  fully	  understand	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  personal	  connection.	  Once	  voters	  are	  able	  to	  get	  favors	  from	  public	  employees	  (or	  some	  intermediary	  between	  them	  and	  public	  employees),	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  incentive	  to	  vote	  to	  keep	   the	   incumbent	   in	   power	   in	   order	   to	   increase	   the	   chances	   of	   the	   public	   employee	   keeping	   her	   job.	  Citizens	  with	  personal	  connections	  with	  the	  administration	  understand	  the	  benefits	  of	  voting	  to	  maintain	  the	  




Patronage	  employees	  are	  fully	  aware	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  these	  personal	  connections	  that	  tend	   to	   facilitate	   credit	   claiming.	   For	   instance,	   in	   discussing	   the	   difference	   between	  collecting	  food	  assistance	  with	  an	  ATM	  card	  and	  in	  a	  bag	  from	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  person	  in	  charge	  of	  distribution,	  a	  public	  employee	  (and	  local	  broker)	  put	  it	  clearly:	  “…	  it	   is	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  because	  the	  ATM	  card	  does	  not	   listen	  to	  you,	  does	  not	  speak	  to	  you,	  does	  not	  understand	   you	   (no	   te	   contiene),	   does	   not	   ask	   you	   how	   you	   are	   doing…”.12	  In	   contrast,	  another	   public	   employee	   interviewed	   claimed	   to	   be	   happy	  with	   the	   new	   system	  of	   ATM	  cards	  because	  that	  would	  actually	  reduce	  poor	  people’s	  “broker	  dependence”	  (dependencia	  
punteril).	   To	   communicate	   this	   change,	   he	  was	   personally	   calling	   all	   the	   beneficiaries	   he	  knew	   and,	   in	   those	   cases	   he	   didn’t	   know	   the	   beneficiary	   personally,	   he	   was	   calling	   the	  activist	  that	  referred	  the	  beneficiaries.13	  	  
There	   is	   in	   fact	   some	   evidence	   in	   the	   literature	   that	   the	   efforts	   of	   brokers	   and	  activists	   to	   create	   or	   reinforce	   the	   personal	   connection	   work.	   A	   passage	   from	   Auyero’s	  well-­‐known	   ethnography	   on	   the	   Peronist	   network	   in	   a	   slum	   in	  Argentina	   illustrates	   this	  point:	  	  
	  
“The	  most	   important	   point	   of	   agreement	   among	   slum-­‐dwellers	  
about	  the	  brokers	  is	  that	  they	  are	  personally	  responsible	  for	  the	  
distribution	   of	   things.	   The	   organization	   that	   grants	   a	   pension,	  
offers	  a	   job,	  or	  gives	  out	  medicine	  or	  a	   food	  package	   is	  not	   the	  
local,	  provincial,	  or	  national	  government,	  but	  Matilde	  or	  Juancito.	  
They	   are	   the	   ones	  who	   really	   care,	  who	   feel	   for	   them,	  who	   are	  
their	   friends	   and	  who—as	   good	   friends—are	   always	   available.	  




testify	   to	   one	   simple—although	   essential—fact:	   it	   is	   not	   the	  
state	   that	   is	   perceived	   as	   the	   distributing	   agency;	   it	   is	  
Matilde	  or	  Juancito.”	  (Auyero	  1999,	  314,	  emphasis	  added)	  	  	  
Note	   that	   in	   this	   example,	   both	   Matilde	   and	   Juancito	   are	   brokers—Matilde	   is	   also	   a	  councilwoman	  and	  Juancito	  is	  a	  local	  public	  employee.	  When	  things	  get	  solved,	  Matilde	  or	  Juancito	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  get	  credit,	  but	  other	  public	  officials	  are	  involved	  in	  getting	  these	  things	  done.	  In	  other	  words,	  brokers—sometimes,	  public	  employees	  themselves—often	  act	  as	  intermediaries	  between	  voters	  and	  other	  patronage	  employees.	  In	  this	  role,	  they	  manage	  to	   claim	  personal	   credit	   for	   things	   that	   are	   in	   fact	  provided	  by	   the	  public	   administration	  with	  state	  resources.	  
	  
4.3	   Granting	  Favors.	  List-­‐Experiment	  Estimates	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  use	  a	  list	  experiment	  (the	  method	  is	  described	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  3)	  to	  study	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  public	  employees	  provide	  favors	  to	  others.	  Table	  4.1	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  a	  list	  experiment	  in	  which	  the	  treatment	  category	  is	  to	  help	  someone	  at	  the	  City	  Hall	   in	   the	   previous	   week.14	  Note	   that	   the	   question	   asks	   about	   helping	   “someone”	   so	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  wording	  was:	  “Now	  I	  am	  going	  to	  hand	  you	  a	  card	  that	  mentions	  a	  number	  of	  activities.	  Please,	  I	  would	  like	  for	  you	  to	  tell	  me	  HOW	  MANY	  of	  those	  you	  did	  in	  the	  last	  week.	  Please,	  do	  not	  tell	  me	  which	  ones,	   just	  HOW	   MANY.”	   The	   baseline	   categories	   were:	   “Talk	   about	   politics	   with	   someone”	   (Hablar	   de	   política	   con	  
alguien),	   “Try	   to	   convince	   someone	   about	   the	   strengths	   and	   weaknesses	   of	   some	   politician”	   (Tratar	   de	  
convencer	  a	  alguien	  sobre	  las	  fortalezas	  y	  debilidades	  de	  algún	  político),	   “Try	   to	  convince	  someone	  about	   the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  of	  some	  policy”	  (Tratar	  de	  convencer	  a	  alguien	  sobre	  las	  fortalezas	  y	  debilidades	  de	  




might	   refer	   to	   directly	   helping	   citizens,	   but	   it	   can	   also	   refer	   to	   help	   other	   patronage	  employees—often	   brokers—help	   citizens.	   As	   described,	   the	   list	   experiment	   technique	   is	  particularly	   useful	   to	   study	   sensitive	   behaviors.15	  It	   works	   by	   guarantying	   the	   complete	  anonymity	   of	   responses	   because	   employees	   are	   not	   asked	   to	   answer	   about	   specific	  activities,	   only	   about	   the	   number	   of	   activities	   done.	   The	   average	   number	   of	   activities	  reported	   by	   employees	   in	   the	   control	   group	  with	   only	   four	   responses	   is	   1.14,	  while	   the	  average	   in	   the	   treatment	  group	  where	   respondents	  has	  also	   the	   treatment	   item	  (provide	  favors)	   is	   1.58.	   Since	   respondents	  were	   randomly	   assigned	   to	   the	   treatment	   and	   control	  groups,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   attribute	   the	   difference	   in	   means	   to	   employees	   who	   report	  providing	   favors.	   The	   estimated	   percentage	   of	   public	   employees	   helping	   others	   with	  errands	   or	   tasks	   at	   the	   City	   Hall	   in	   the	   week	   prior	   to	   the	   interview	   is	   a	   significant	   44	  percent.	  	  
	  
	   	  




Table	  4.1:	  Granting	  favors.	  List-­‐experiment	  estimates	  	  	   	  	  
	  	   Favors	  
Treatment	   1.58	  (0.05)	  N=591	  Control	   1.14	  (0.05)	  N=590	  Treatment	  effect	   0.44***	  (0.07)	  N=1181	  	  	   	  	  
Note:	  List-­‐experiment	  control	  and	   treatment	  values	  are	   the	  mean	  number	  of	   items	   identified	   by	   respondents	   in	   each	   group	   (Rows	   1	   &	   2).	   Rows	   3	  displays	   the	   average	   treatment	   effects	   (estimated	   proportion	   of	   the	  population	  that	  reported	  providing	  favors).	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  and	  number	  of	  subjects	  in	  each	  condition	  (N)	  display	  below.	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance.	  *,**	  &***	  indicate	  significance	  at	  the	  90,	  95	  and	  99	  percent	  levels.	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outside	   employment	   options—	   and	   those	   without	   permanent	   contracts—who	   can	   get	  fired—	  have	  more	  to	  fear	  from	  a	  change	  in	  administration.	  	  
To	   determine	   whether	   the	   provision	   of	   favors	   differs	   across	   different	   types	   of	  employees	  —	  similarly	  to	  what	  I	  did	  in	  Chapter	  3	  to	  study	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  during	  elections—	  I	  calculate	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  size	  of	  the	  list	  experiment	  estimate	  across	  sub-­‐groups.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  support	  for	  the	  mayor	  (Mayor	  Party)	  is	  measured	  by	  a	  question	   that	   asks	   respondents	   whether	   they	   identify	   themselves	   with	   the	   party	   of	   the	  mayor.	   As	   an	   alternative	   measure	   I	   use	   in	   this	   chapter	   Mayor	   Voter,	   employees	   that	  reported	   having	   voted	   for	   the	   mayor	   in	   the	   last	   election.16	  Education	   is	   a	   self-­‐reported	  measure	   of	   having	   a	   college	   degree	   or	   not	   and	   tenure	   is	   also	   a	   self-­‐reported	  measure	   of	  having	  tenure	  rights	  or	  not.	  Table	  4.2	  below	  presents	  the	  list	  experiment	  estimates	  of	  the	  provision	  of	   favors	   for	   the	   four	   subgroups	  mentioned,	  as	  well	   as	   the	  difference	   in	  means	  estimate.	  
	  	   	  




Table	  4.2:	  Making	  favors.	  List-­‐experiment	  estimates	  conditional	  on	  characteristics	  of	  
the	  respondents	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Characteristic	   No	   Yes	   Differences	  in	  Effects	  Mayor	  Voter	   0.25**	   0.54***	   0.29**	   0.20	  (0.25)	   (0.10)	   (0.15)	   (0.15)	  N=430	   N=680	   N=1110	   N=1110	  Mayor	  Party	   0.37***	   0.57***	   0.20	   0.19	  (0.08)	   (0.13)	   (0.16)	   (0.15)	  N=797	   N=384	   N=1181	   N=1181	  Have	  a	  College	  Degree	   0.44**	   0.42**	   0.02	   0.02	  (0.08)	   (0.15)	   (0.17)	   (0.16)	  N=909	   N=267	   N=1178	   N=1178	  Have	  Tenure	   0.50***	   0.38***	   0.12	   0.11	  (0.10)	   (0.10)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	  N=596	   N=584	   N=1180	   N=1180	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	   Average	   treatment	   effects	   calculated	   as	   the	   difference	   between	   the	  treatment	   and	   the	   control	   groups.	   Last	   column	   includes	   municipal	  dummies.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  calculated	  with	  unequal	  variance;	  ***p	  <	  0.01,	  **p<	  0.05,	  *p	  <	  0.1	  	  




Taking	   together,	   these	   results	  provide	   evidence	   that	   supporters	  of	   the	  mayor	   are	   indeed	  more	  likely	  to	  grant	  favors.	  	  
In	  terms	  of	  education,	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  difference	  among	  those	  with	  a	  college	  degree	  and	  those	  without	  one	  (44	  and	  42,	  respectively).	  Although	  more	  research	  is	  needed	  to	   explain	   this	   result,	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   imagine	   that	   to	  be	   able	   to	   grant	   favors,	   employees	  need	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  of	  relative	  power—a	  position	  that	  might	  require	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  education.	   It	   is	   possible	   that	   employees	   at	   low	   levels	   of	   the	   public	   administration	   have	  nothing	   to	  offer	   in	   terms	  of	  assistance,	  while	  mid-­‐level	  employees	   (more	   likely	   to	  have	  a	  college	  degrees)	  have	  positions	  at	  the	  bureaucracy	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  help	  others.	  Finally,	  the	   effect	   of	   the	   type	   of	   contract	   goes	   in	   the	   expected	   direction.	   The	   proportion	   of	  employees	  with	  a	  permanent	  contract	  (Tenure)	  that	  reported	  granting	  favors	  is	  38	  percent,	  compared	  to	  50	  percent	  among	  employees	  without	  a	  permanent	  contract	  (although	  this	  12	  percentage-­‐points	  difference	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant).	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employees	  that	  are	  better	  connected	  politically.	  The	  second	  one	  shows	  a	  different	  attitude	  among	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters—the	   former	   ones	   being	   more	   willing	   (or	   more	  capable)	  to	  help.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  present	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  first	  scenario	  (although	  it	  is	  entirely	  possible	  that	  both	  things	  are	  occurring	  at	  the	  same	  time).	  A	  higher	  proportion	  of	  supporters,	   both	   that	   reported	   voting	   for	   the	   incumbent	  mayor	   (Mayor	  Voter)	   and	   those	  that	  identified	  themselves	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  (Mayor	  Party),	  are	  providing	  favors	  because	  they	  are	  asked	  for	  favors	  more	  often.	  
Outcome	  Variable	   To	   test	   the	   claim	   described	   above	   I	   use	   a	   question	   included	   in	   the	  survey	  described	  in	  Chapter	  3	  that	  asked	  public	  sector	  employees	  about	  the	  frequency	  of	  people	  asking	  for	  favors	  related	  to	  their	  jobs.17	  The	  exact	  wording	  was:	  “How	  frequently	  do	  people	  come	  to	  you	  to	  ask	  you	  for	   favors	  related	  to	  your	  work	  here	  at	   the	  municipality?”	  Responses	  were	  coded	  on	  1-­‐6	  scale:	  (1)	  never,	  (2)	  a	  couple	  of	  times	  a	  year,	  (3)	  a	  couple	  of	  times	  a	  month,	  (4)	  1-­‐2	  times	  a	  week,	  (5)	  3	  times	  a	  week	  and	  more,	  and	  (6)	  every	  day.”18	  
Explanatory	  and	  Control	  Variables	   To	   measure	   support,	   I	   use	   again	   the	   variables	  described	  above,	  Mayor	  Voter	  and	  Mayor	  Party.	  I	  also	  include	  controls	  for	  the	  variables	  that,	  according	   to	   the	   theory	   developed	   in	   Chapter	   2,	   might	   affect	   employees’	   willingness	   to	  provide	  political	  services—namely,	  education	  and	  type	  of	  contract.	  The	  education	  variable	  (College)	   takes	   on	   the	   value	   of	   1	   when	   the	   respondent	   has	   a	   college	   degree	   and	   zero	  otherwise.	   The	   type	   of	   contract	   variable	   (Tenure)	   takes	   on	   the	   value	   of	   1	   when	   the	  respondent	  enjoys	  tenure	  rights	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  The	  models	  also	  include	  controls	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  All	  questions	   included	   in	   this	  chapter	  where	  asked	   in	   the	  survey	  described	   in	  Chapter	  3	  and	  Appendix	  A.	  See	  those	  for	  more	  details	  on	  the	  survey	  and	  its	  implementation.	  18	  The	   exact	  wording	   in	   Spanish	  was:	   “Trabajando	  en	  el	  Estado	   seguramente	  mucha	  gente	   se	   le	  acerca	  para	  
pedirle	  ayuda	  con	  algún	  trámite	  o	  gestión	  en	  la	  municipalidad,	  ¿verdad?	  ¿Con	  qué	  frecuencia	  diría	  Ud.	  que	  se	  le	  




age,	  gender,	  time	  of	  hiring,	  and	  municipality	  to	  control	  for	  regional	  effects.	  The	  age	  variable	  (Age)	  takes	  on	  values	  from	  1	  to	  5,	  corresponding	  to	  respondents	  who	  are	  18-­‐25,	  26-­‐35,	  36-­‐45,	   46-­‐55,	   and	   older	   than	   55.	   The	   gender	   variable	   (Female)	   takes	   on	   the	   value	   of	   1	   for	  female	  respondents	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  The	  time	  of	  hiring	  (Current	  Mayor)	  takes	  the	  value	  of	   1	  when	   the	   respondent	  was	   hired	   by	   the	   current	   administration	   and	   zero	   otherwise.	  Finally,	   the	  models	   also	   include	   a	   variable	   (Reciprocity)	   to	   control	   for	  propensity	   to	  help	  others.	  This	  variable	  was	  measured	  with	  the	  following	  question:	  “How	  much	  do	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	  following	  statement:	  ‘We	  always	  have	  to	  return	  the	  favors	  that	  people	  do	  us’.”	  Respondents	  were	  offered	  the	   following	  choices:	  strongly	  agree,	  agree	  more	  than	  disagree,	  disagree	  more	  than	  agree,	  strongly	  disagree.19	  This	  variable	  takes	  the	  value	  of	  1	  if	  the	   respondent	   said	   she	   “strongly	   agreed”	   or	   “more	   agreement	   than	   disagreement”,	   and	  zero	  otherwise.20	  	  
Results	   Table	   4.3	   presents	   the	   results	   of	   a	   series	   of	   OLS	   regressions	   where	   the	  outcome	   variable	   takes	   on	   values	   from	   1	   to	   6,	   in	   which	   higher	   numbers	   correspond	   to	  higher	   frequencies	   of	   being	   asked	   to	   grant	   favors.	   The	   regression	   results	   reported	   on	  columns	  1	   and	  2	  measure	   support	   using	   previous	   vote	   for	   the	   incumbent	  mayor	   (Mayor	  
Voter),	  whereas	  columns	  3	  and	  4	  measure	  support	  using	  self-­‐identification	  with	  the	  party	  of	   the	   incumbent	   mayor	   (Mayor	   Party).	   Columns	   1	   and	   3	   include	   only	   controls	   for	   age,	  gender,	   education,	   and	   municipality,	   whereas	   results	   in	   columns	   2	   and	   4	   also	   include	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  In	   Spanish:	   “Qué	   tan	   de	   acuerdo	   o	   en	   desacuerdo	   está	   Ud.	   con	   la	   siguiente	   afirmación:	   “Siempre	   hay	   que	  
regresar	   los	   favores	   que	   alguien	   nos	   hace.	   Diría	   Ud.	   que	   está…muy	   de	   acuerdo,	   mas	   de	   acuerdo	   que	   en	  




controls	   for	   type	   of	   contract,	   time	   of	   hiring	   and	   reciprocity.	   The	   main	   results	   from	   the	  different	   models	   are	   quite	   similar	   and	   consistent	   with	   my	   theoretical	   expectations.	   The	  models	   that	   include	   the	   full	   sets	   of	   controls	   (columns	  2	   and	  4)	   provide	   slightly	   stronger	  results	  for	  the	  variables	  of	  interest,	  so	  I	  focus	  on	  interpreting	  these	  results.	  
	  
Table	  4.3:	  Frequency	  of	  favors	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	   Mayor	  Voter	   Mayor	  Party	  Mayor	  Voter	   0.50***	   0.54***	   	   	  	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   	   	  Mayor	  Party	   	   	   0.46***	   0.50***	  	   	   	   (0.12)	   (0.13)	  Age	   0.04	   -­‐0.06	   0.01	   -­‐0.08	  	   (0.04)	   (0.06)	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	  Female	   0.42***	   0.453***	   0.46***	   0.49***	  	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	   (0.12)	  College	   -­‐0.45***	   -­‐0.44***	   -­‐0.55***	   -­‐0.55***	  	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	  Salta	   0.03	   0.03	   0.06	   0.03	  	   (0.14)	   (0.16)	   (0.14)	   (0.16)	  Santa	  Fe	   -­‐0.03	   -­‐0.04	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐0.06	  	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	  Tenure	   	   0.21	   	   0.26	  	   	   (0.17)	   	   (0.16)	  Current	  Mayor	   -­‐0.24	   	   -­‐0.20	  	   	   (0.16)	   	   (0.15)	  Reciprocal	   	   -­‐0.11	   	   -­‐0.10	  	   	   (0.16)	   	   (0.17)	  Constant	   2.76***	   3.15***	   2.98***	   3.34***	  	   (0.20)	   (0.27)	   (0.19)	   (0.27)	  	   	   	   	   	  Observations	   1,096	   1,085	   1,063	   1,054	  R-­‐squared	   0.040	   0.046	   0.042	   0.051	  	  	   	   	   	   	  




As	  expected,	  the	  coefficients	  on	  the	  vote	  for	  the	  mayor	  variable	  and	  the	  identification	  with	  the	   party	   of	   the	  mayor	   variable	   are	   both	   positive	   and	   significant,	   indicating	   that	   being	   a	  supporter	  is	  correlated	  with	  a	  higher	  frequency	  of	  demands	  for	  favors.	  Put	  differently,	  the	  positive	   and	   significant	   relationship	   between	   the	   main	   explanatory	   variables	   and	   the	  outcome	  variable	  indicates	  that	  being	  a	  supporter	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  being	  asked	  for	   favors.	   Being	   a	   supporter	   (both	  Mayor	   Voter	   and	  Mayor	   Party)	   is	   associated	   with	   a	  significant	  0.5	  unit	  increase	  in	  the	  frequency	  of	  demand	  for	  favors	  (recall	  that	  frequency	  is	  measured	  on	  a	  1-­‐6	  scale).	  




of	   relative	   power,	   which	   is	   more	   often	   occupied	   by	   employees	   with	   higher	   levels	   of	  education.	  	  





4.6	   Personal	  Connections	  	  
In	   the	   previous	   section,	   I	   provided	   evidence	   that	   supporters	   get	   asked	   for	   favors	   more	  frequently	   than	   non-­‐supporters.	   In	   the	   next	   section	   I	   provide	   evidence	   that	   looking	   for	  supporters	  to	  get	  help	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  rational	  strategy	  because	  supporters	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  helpful	  (either	  because	  they	  want	  to	  or	  because	  they	  can).	  But	  how	  would	  citizens	  be	  able	  to	   screen	   supporters	   from	   non-­‐supporters?	   In	   the	   cases	   of	   most	   influential	   patronage	  employees—brokers—this	   is	   not	   an	   issue	   because	   they	   are	   usually	   well-­‐known	   by	  everyone.	   However,	   screening	   supporters	   from	   non-­‐supporters	   is	   harder	   for	   regular	  citizens	  when	   referring	   to	   less	   influential	  patronage	  employees.	   In	   this	   section,	   I	  provide	  evidence	  that	  people	  asking	  for	  favors	  are	  able	  to	  target	  supporters	  because	  they	  actually	  
know	  them.	  Favors	  are	  not	  asked	  from	  strangers	  but	  from	  friends	  and	  acquaintances.	  
To	  test	  this	  claim	  I	  use	  the	  following	  question:	  “How	  likely	  is	  that	  the	  person	  who	  is	  asking	  you	  for	  a	   favor	   is:	  a)	  a	   friend	  or	  acquaintance,	  b)	  a	  relative,	  c)	  an	  stranger	  sent	  by	  someone	  you	  know,	  and	  d)	  a	  complete	  stranger.”21	  The	  response	  options	  were	  very	  likely,	  likely,	  not	  very	  likely,	  and	  unlikely.	  I	  coded	  the	  former	  two	  options	  as	  “likely”	  and	  the	  latter	  two	  as	   “unlikely”	   to	   facilitate	   the	  discussion.	  Figure	  4.1	  below	  displays	   the	   responses	   for	  option	   “a”	   (friend	   or	   acquaintance),	   across	   supporters	   (left	   panels)	   and	   non-­‐supporters	  (right	  panels).	  
	  




Figure	  4.1:	  Asking	  favors	  from	  friends	  and	  acquaintances,	  across	  supporters	  and	  
non-­‐supporters	  
	  
























reported	  that	  it	  was	  very	  likely/likely	  that	  the	  person	  that	  asked	  for	  a	  favor	  was	  a	  friend	  or	  an	  acquaintance,	  while	  only	  36	  percent	  responded	  that	  this	  was	  not	  very	  likely	  or	  unlikely.	  In	  contrast,	  among	  those	  that	  do	  not	  identified	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor,	  although	  I	  still	  find	  sliglhtly	  more	  responses	  in	  the	  very	  likely/likely	  category	  (53	  percent),	  the	  difference	  with	  the	  other	  category	  (47	  percent)	  is	  only	  five	  percentage	  points.	  
In	  sum,	  supporters	  get	  asked	  for	  favors	  by	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  friends	  and	  acquaintances,	  suggesting	  that	  people	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  connections.	  When	  possible	   (i.e.	  when	  someone	  knows	  a	  supporter),	   supporters	  are	  chosen	  over	  non-­‐supporters	   (in	   the	   next	   section	   I	   provide	   a	   potential	   reason	   for	   this).	   An	   employee	   from	  Salta	   explained	   to	   me	   the	   importance	   of	   knowing	   the	   right	   person.	   She	   was	   an	  administrative	  employee	  that	  was	  very	  involved	  with	  voluntary	  work	  in	  her	  neighborhood.	  She	  was	  the	  head	  of	  a	  neighborhood	  center	  (centro	  vecinal).	  These	  centers	  usually	  organize	  social	  and	  cultural	  events,	  sometimes	  sports	  and,	  in	  poor	  neighborhoods	  like	  hers,	  they	  are	  usually	  also	  used	   for	   soup	  kitchens	  and	  as	   centers	   for	   the	  distribution	  of	   food	  assistance	  benefits.	   When	   asked	   about	   how	   much	   interest	   she	   had	   in	   politics,	   she	   emphatically	  replied:	  “Very	  interested!	  All	  the	  contacts	  [you	  need]	  to	  bring	  things	  to	  your	  neighborhood	  are	  political	  contacts.”22	  	  
Note	   that	   those	  asking	   for	   favors	  could	  be	  voters	   themselves	  or	  brokers	  acting	  on	  their	  behalf.	  Many	  of	  the	  “friends	  and	  acquaintances”	  that	  ask	  for	  favors	  might	  be	  brokers	  asking	   for	  something	   for	  one	  of	   their	  clients.	  And,	  of	  course,	  brokers	  know	  perfectly	  who	  are	   the	   patronage	   public	   employees	   and	   where	   to	   find	   them.	   Recall	   the	   conversation	  




quoted	   in	   section	   4.1	   about	   a	   broker	   calling	   the	   director	   of	   the	  municipal	   cemetary	   (his	  
friend)	   to	   help	   someone	   organize	   a	   wake.	   Brokers	   themselves	   are	   also	   well-­‐known.	   A	  conversation	  with	  a	  public	  employee	  (and	  broker)	  from	  La	  Matanza	  clearly	  illustrates	  this	  point:	  “For	   instance,	   if	   I	  had	  a	  problem,	  I	  wouldn’t	  think	  about	  calling	  you,”	   I	  said	  to	  him;	  “Because	   you	  don’t	   know	  me,”	   he	   replied.	   So	  he	   explained	   to	  me	   the	  kind	  of	   people	   that	  usually	  come	  to	  him	  asking	  for	  help:	  “All	  kinds	  of	  people	  (…)	  It	  can	  be	  people	  that	  know	  you	  because	  you	  have	  a	  friendship	  relation,	  a	  neighborhood	  relation,	  people	  that	  know	  you	  are	  in	  politics	   (…)	   I	  am	  55	  years	  old	  and	   I	  have	  been	  politically	  active	  (milito)	  since	  age	  16…	  People	  know	  me	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other	  (Alguno	  que	  otro	  me	  conoce).”23	  
In	   sum,	   whether	   the	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   comes	   directly	   from	   a	   patronage	  employee	  or	  from	  a	  broker—who	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  a	  public	  employee	  himself—	  knowing	  the	  right	  person	  is	   fundamental	  to	  getting	  a	  problem	  solved.	  Voters	  might	  know	  a	  broker	  that	  might	  act	  on	  their	  behalf	  or	  they	  might	  know	  a	   less	   influential	  employee.	  Brokers,	   in	  turn,	  are	  known	  by	  everyone	  and	  they	  know,	  better	  than	  anyone,	  who	  can	  be	  asked	  to	  do	  what,	  which	  allows	  them	  to	  provide	  a	  very	  diverse	  portfolio	  of	   favors	  (more	  than	  regular	  employees	  that	  might	  only	  be	  able	  to	  help	  people	  on	  their	  own	  area	  of	  work).	  They	  are,	  in	  Auyero’s	  (2000)	  words,	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  “problem	  solving	  network.”	  
	  
4.7	   Are	  Supporters	  More	  Helpful?	  




theory	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  reason	  supporters	  are	  more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	   of	   political	   services	   (in	   this	   case,	   providing	   favors)	   is	   that	   patronage	   jobs	   are	  disproportionally	  distributed	   to	  supporters	  and	  also	  because	   they	  believe	   that	   their	   fates	  are	   tied	   to	   the	  political	   fate	  of	   the	  mayor.	  Patronage	   jobs	   (and	   their	  working	   conditions)	  held	  by	  supporters	  will	  be	  maintained	  by	  the	  incumbent	  politician	  (their	  patron)	  but	  not	  by	  a	   competing	   politician	   (because	   supporters	   of	   the	   incumbent	   cannot	   credible	   commit	   to	  provide	   political	   services	   for	   the	   opposition).	   Supporters	   then	   have	   large	   incentives	   to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  stay	  in	  power,	  which	  makes	  their	  original	  commitment	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   credible.	   As	   a	   result,	   supporters	   are	   more	  involved	  in	  helping	  those	  that	  asked	  for	  favors	  because	  they	  understand	  that	  it	  is	  on	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  help	  the	  incumbent	  politician	  remain	  in	  power.	  	  
From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   voters,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   perceive	   over	   time	   that	  public	  employees	  that	  support	  the	  mayor	  are	  more	  helpful	  than	  others,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  they	   will	   keep	   on	   asking	   supporters	   for	   help.	   Ideally,	   the	   kind	   of	   evidence	   that	   would	  support	  this	  claim	  would	  be	  some	  sort	  of	  experiment	  in	  which	  the	  same	  favor	  is	  asked	  of	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters	  and	   then	  compare	   their	  responses.	  A	  survey	  of	  voters,	  or	  interviews	  with	   voters	  might	   also	   help	   in	   studying	   this	   issue.	   Instead,	   the	   kind	   of	   data	   I	  present	  here	  is	  indirect	  (based	  on	  the	  responses	  of	  the	  employees),	  but	  still	  provides	  some	  suggestive	   evidence	   of	   a	   different	   response	   across	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters	  when	  asked	  for	  help.	  




favor,	  but	  the	  thing	  she	  is	  asking	  is	  actually	  handled	  by	  another	  office	  or	  person,	  then	  you:	  a)	  tell	  her	  that	  you	  are	  not	  the	  person	  in	  charge	  of	  that,	  b)	  tell	  her	  to	  which	  office	  she	  has	  to	  go,	  or	  c)	  tell	  her	  to	  which	  office	  she	  has	  to	  go	  and	  give	  her	  the	  name	  of	  someone	  that	  you	  know	   at	   that	   office	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   the	   problem	   gets	   solved.”24 	  About	   3	   percent	  responded	  “a”,	  about	  40	  percent	  responded	  “b”,	  and	  about	  57	  percent	  responded	  “c.”25	  To	  test	   whether	   these	   responses	   vary	   across	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters,	   Figure	   4.2	  presents	   the	   set	   of	   responses	   split	   across	   those	   that	   reported	   voting	   for	   the	   incumbent	  mayor	   in	   the	   previous	   election	   and	   those	   that	   do	   not	   (top	   panels)	   and	   those	   that	   self-­‐identified	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  (bottom	  panels).	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  wording	  in	  Spanish	  was:	  “Ahora	  le	  planteo	  una	  situación	  hipotética:	  Supóngase	  que	  alguien	  se	  le	  acerca	  
para	  pedirle	  un	  favor	  pero	  lo	  que	  le	  están	  pidiendo,	  en	  realidad,	  depende	  de	  otra	  oficina	  o	  persona,	  entonces	  Ud.:	  
1)	  le	  dice	  que	  eso	  no	  depende	  de	  Ud.,	  2)	  le	  indica	  a	  cuál	  oficina	  tiene	  que	  dirigirse,	  3)	  le	  indica	  a	  cuál	  oficina	  tiene	  
que	   dirigirse	   y	   le	   dá	   el	   nombre	   de	   alguna	   persona	   que	   Ud.	   conoce	   en	   esa	   oficina	   para	   asegurarse	   de	   que	   el	  




Figure	  4.2:	  Helpful	  responses,	  across	  supporters	  and	  non-­‐supporters.	  
	  
























pattern	  is	  found	  when	  compare	  supporters	  of	  the	  mayor’s	  party	  to	  non-­‐supporters.	  About	  69	   percent	   of	   those	   that	   self-­‐identified	   with	   the	   party	   of	   the	   mayor	   (bottom-­‐left	   panel)	  chose	  the	  more	  helpful	  option	  (“c”),	  while	  29	  percent	  chose	  the	  less	  helpful	  one.	  In	  contrast,	  about	   50	   percent	   of	   non-­‐supporters	   of	   the	   party	   of	   the	  mayor	   chose	   the	   helpful	   option,	  while	  46	  percent	  chose	  the	  less	  helpful	  option.	  
In	  sum,	  supporters	  seem	  more	  prone	  to	  try	  to	  help	  voters	  (or,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  brokers	  on	  behalf	   of	   voters),	   even	   in	   situations	   in	  which	   the	   favor	   asked	   is	   outside	   their	  area	  of	  work.	  To	  be	  sure,	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  that	  supporters	  are	  somehow	  “nicer”	  than	  non-­‐supporters.	  The	  results	  described	  in	  this	  section	  suggest	  that	   it	  might	  make	  perfect	  sense	  for	  citizens	  to	  try	  to	  find	  supporters	  when	  in	  need	  of	  a	  favor.	  Either	  because	  supporters	  are	  more	  eager	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  (favors	  to	  citizens,	  in	  this	  case)	  to	  help	  their	  patron	  stay	   in	   power	   or	   because	   supporters	   are	   better	   equipped	   (they	   might	   know	   the	   “right”	  person	   to	  ask),	   citizens’	  preferences	   for	  asking	   favors	  of	   supporters	  seem	  to	  be	  based	  on	  real	   differences	   in	   supporters’	   responses.26	  In	   fact,	   more	   probably,	   supporters	   are	   both	  more	  eager	  to	  help	  (I	  provide	  evidence	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  argument	  in	  chapter	  5)	  and	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  do	  so	  (because	  they	  might	  know	  more	  people	  in	  positions	  to	  help).	  
	  




4.8	   Conclusion	  
In	  this	  chapter	  I	  provide	  evidence	  that,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  chapter	  2	  and	  the	   patterns	   found	   for	   the	   other	   political	   services	   studied	   in	   chapter	   3,	   supporters	   are	  disproportionally	   more	   involved	   in	   granting	   favors.	   As	   explained,	   supporters	   are	   more	  involved	  in	  all	  the	  four	  types	  of	  political	  services	  studied	  in	  this	  dissertation—monitoring	  elections,	   helping	   with	   electoral	   campaigns,	   attending	   rallies,	   and	  making	   favors—	   both	  because	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  disproportionally	  distributed	  to	  them	  and	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  their	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  electoral	  fate	  of	  the	  mayor	  (I	  provide	  empirical	  evidence	  of	  this	  in	  the	  next	  chapter).	  Patronage	  jobs	  and	  working	  conditions	  held	  by	  supporters	  will	  be	  maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   but	   not	   by	   a	   competing	   politician	   (because	  supporters	  of	   the	   incumbent	   cannot	   credible	   commit	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   for	   the	  opposition).	   As	   a	   result,	   supporters	   have	   large	   incentives	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   to	  help	   the	   incumbent	   stay	   in	   power,	   which	   makes	   their	   original	   commitment	   to	   provide	  political	  services	  a	  credible	  one.	  	  




discussed	  in	  the	   introduction	  to	  this	  section,	  the	  use	  or	  perceived	  use	  of	  discretion	  in	  the	  everyday	  tasks	  of	  public	  employees	  gives	  voters	  the	  impression	  that	  personal	  relations	  are	  key	  for	  getting	  things	  done	  at	   the	  public	  administration.	  Once	  established,	   these	  personal	  connections	  work	   as	   strong	   incentives	   to	  want	   to	  maintain	   the	   status	   quo.	   Citizens	  who	  receive	  help	  from	  state	  officials	  or	  intermediaries	  (brokers)	  understand	  that	  their	  personal	  connection	  has	  been	  critical	  for	  that	  purpose.	  If	  a	  citizen	  established	  a	  personal	  connection	  with	   someone	   in	   the	  public	   administration	   (or	  with	   easy	   access	   to	   it)	   that	  provides	  help	  when	   needed,	   why	   would	   she	   vote	   for	   another	   party?	   In	   line	   with	   my	   argument	   on	  patronage	   employees,	   citizens	   have	   a	   strong	   incentive	   to	   maintain	   the	   status	   quo	   by	  keeping	  the	  incumbent	   in	  office	  and	  their	  connection	  with	  the	  state	   intact.	  Self-­‐interested	  voters	   that	   live	   in	   clientelistic	   environments	   perfectly	   understand	   the	   benefit	   of	  maintaining	  their	  personal	  connections	  to	  the	  public	  administration.	  





Self-­‐	  Enforcing	  Patronage	  Contracts	  
	  
“A	  New	  York	  state	  senator	  explained	  this	  point	  bluntly:	  “‘My	  best	  
captains	  (…)	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  are	  on	  the	  payroll.	  You	  can’t	  get	  
the	   average	   voter	   excited	   about	   who’s	   going	   to	   be	   an	  
Assemblyman	   or	   State	   Senator.	   I’ve	   got	   two	   dozen	   people	  who	  
are	  going	  to	  work	  so	  much	  harder,	  because	   if	   I	   lose,	   they	   lose.’”	  
(cited	  by	  Wolfinger	  1972,	  395).	  	  
	  
Why	  do	  public	  sector	  employees	  provide	  political	  services?	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2,	  since	  the	  exchange	  of	  the	  political	  support	  for	  the	  job	  is	  not	  simultaneous	  and	  the	  law	  cannot	  be	  used	   to	   enforce	   these	   contracts,	   patronage	   contracts	   give	   ample	   opportunities	   for	  deception	   and	   betrayal.	   There	   is	   always	   a	   risk	   that	   once	   the	   public	   sector	   job	   has	   been	  delivered,	  the	  public	  employee	  has	  little	  incentive	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  (James	  2005;	  Robinson	   and	   Verdier	   2003;	   Ujhelyi	   and	   Calvo	   2011).1	  When	   the	   political	   support	   is	  supposed	   to	   be	   provided	   after	   the	   benefit	   is	   received,	   the	   citizen	  who	   receives	   a	   public	  sector	  job	  can	  always	  opt	  to	  renege	  on	  her	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  and	  refuse	  to	  provide	  the	  promised	  support.	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  clientelism	  argues	  that	  clients	  




comply	  with	   their	   side	  of	   the	  agreement	   (either	   in	   terms	  of	  electoral	  or	  broader	  political	  support)	  because	  of	  fear	  of	  punishment	  or	  norms	  of	  reciprocity.	  An	  alternative	  explanation,	  what	   I	   have	  named	  a	   self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage,	   for	  why	  public	   sector	   employees	  under	   patronage	   contracts	   provide	   political	   services	  after	   getting	   their	   jobs	   is	   that	   their	  incentives	  are	  aligned	  with	  those	  of	  the	  politician	  that	  have	  hired	  them.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	   is	   to	   establish	  why	   public	   sector	   employees	  provide	  political	   services.	  Using	   two	  original	  survey	  experiments	  embedded	   in	   the	  survey	  described	   in	  chapter	  3,	   this	  chapter	  tests	  the	  main	  empirical	  implications	  of	  the	  theory.	  




The	   fear	   of	   losing	   their	   jobs	   or	   the	   possibility	   of	   suffering	   negative	   changes	   in	  working	   conditions	   if	   a	   new	   mayor	   from	   the	   opposition	   were	   elected	   provides	   an	  important	  motivation	   for	  public	  employees	   to	  help	   the	   incumbent	  mayor	  stay	   in	  office.	   If	  public	   employees	   think	   that	   their	   jobs	  depend	  on	   the	  mayor	   staying	   in	  power,	   there	   is	   a	  critical	  incentive	  for	  them	  to	  support	  him	  with	  political	  services.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  show	  that	  employees	  under	  patronage	   contracts	  do	  believe	   that	   their	   fates	   are	   tied	   to	   the	   electoral	  fate	   of	   the	   mayor.	   The	   empirical	   innovation	   of	   this	   research	   is	   the	   use	   of	   a	   survey	  experiment	   to	   identify	   the	   potential	   effect	   of	   a	   change	   in	   the	   political	   color	   of	   the	  administration	   on	   different	   types	   of	   public	   employees.	   Specifically,	   a	   randomly	   selected	  subset	   of	   the	   respondents	  were	   asked	   to	   estimate	   the	   likelihood	  of	   losing	   their	   jobs	   and	  suffering	   changes	   in	   working	   conditions	   if	   the	   next	   election	   were	   to	   be	   won	   by	   the	  opposition.	   The	   control	   group	  was	   asked	   the	   same	   questions	   but	  without	   providing	   any	  information	  about	   the	  hypothetical	  winner	  of	   the	   future	  election.	   I	   test	   the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  by	  estimating	  heterogeneous	  treatment	  effects	  across	  different	   types	  of	  public	  employees.	  




tenure	   rights	   cannot	   get	   fired	   so	   they	   are	   only	   subjected	   to	   be	   sidestepped	   or	   demoted,	  which	  could	  be	  very	  important	  for	  certain	  employees	  but	  hardly	  as	  serious	  as	  losing	  their	  job.	  	  
It	  is	  unclear	  how	  we	  should	  expect	  respondents’	  level	  of	  education	  to	  influence	  their	  fear	   of	   losing	   their	   job	  or	   suffering	  negative	   changes	   in	   their	  working	   conditions.	  On	   the	  one	   hand,	  more	   educated	   employees	   are	   harder	   to	   replace	   since	   they	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  have	   valuable	   skills.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   not	   all	   public	   employees	   are	   patronage	  employees	   hired	   in	   exchange	   for	   their	   political	   support.	   Every	   administration—even	   the	  ones	  with	  widespread	  patronage—needs	  to	  dedicate	  some	  resources	  to	  just	  administrate.	  A	   functional	   bureaucracy	   needs	   some	   qualified	   employees,	   who	   were	   hired	   because	   of	  those	   qualifications	   and	   fully	   dedicated	   to	   their	   regular	   (non-­‐political)	   work.	   A	   new	  administration	  would	  most	   likely	   also	   put	   some	   value	   on	   those	   skills,	   so	  more	   educated	  employees	  could	  have	  less	  to	  fear	  from	  a	  change	  in	  administration.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  more	  educated	  employees	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  positions	  of	  relative	  power	  that	  a	  new	  mayor	  would	  probably	  want	  to	  see	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  his	  own	  people.	  	  




support	   this	   explanation.	   Section	   six	   presents	   the	   main	   results	   per	   municipality	   as	   a	  robustness	  test.	  The	  last	  section	  briefly	  concludes.	  
	  
5.1	   Research	  Design	  and	  the	  Survey	  Experiment	  
5.1.1	  An	  Experimental	  Approach	  
Scholars	  studying	  public	  opinion	   in	   the	  US	  have	  been	  using	  survey	  experiments	   for	  more	  than	   two	  decades	  now.2	  The	  use	  of	   survey	  experiments	   in	   comparative	  politics	   is	   a	  more	  recent	   development,	   but	   in	   the	   last	   years—and	   together	   with	   the	   growing	   use	   of	  experiments	   of	   all	   types	   in	   the	   discipline—	   they	   have	   become	   an	   increasingly	   popular	  research	   tool.	   Survey	   experiments	   have	   been	   used	   to	   study	   a	   variety	   of	   topics	   such	   as	  attitudes	   towards	   clientelism	   among	   middle	   class	   voters	   in	   Argentina	   (Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  2008a,	  2012),	   the	   influence	  of	  chiefs’	  preferences	  on	  voting	  behavior	   in	  Zambia	  (Baldwin	  forthcoming),	  the	  effects	  of	  information	  on	  attitudes	  towards	  corruption	  in	  Brazil	  (Winters	  and	  Weitz-­‐Shapiro	  2011),	  the	  role	  of	  feelings	  of	  obligation	  in	  vote	  buying	  arrangements	  in	  Mexico	  (Lawson	  and	  Greene	  2012),	  just	  to	  mention	  a	  few	  examples	  that	  are	  related	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  However,	  to	  the	  best	  of	  my	  knowledge,	  no	  survey	  experiment	  has	  been	  used	  before	  to	  investigate	  what	  sustains	  patronage	  contracts.	  In	  fact,	  even	  traditional	  surveys	  of	  public	  employees	  are	  almost	  non-­‐existent	  in	  the	  contemporary	  political	  science	  literature	  of	  new	  democracies.3	  	  




Survey	   experiments	  provide	   a	   useful	   tool	   to	   test	   the	   empirical	   implications	   of	   the	  self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   developed	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   By	   making	   treatment	  assignment	  exogenous	  to	  observed	  outcomes,	  this	  technique	  is	  extremely	  useful	  to	  identify	  and	   isolate	   mechanisms.	   An	   alternative	   approach	   would	   have	   been	   to	   ask	   the	   question	  directly	   and	   run	   regressions	   controlling	   for	   a	   number	   of	   covariates	   that	   could	   affect	   the	  outcome.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  approach	  in	  this	  particular	  research	  is	  that	  many	  of	  those	  covariates—support	  for	  the	  mayor,	  electoral	  choices,	  partisanship,	  just	  to	  mention	  a	  few—	  could	  be	  subjected	  to	  social	  desirability	  bias.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  employees	  could	  be	  unwilling	   to	   provide	   this	   type	   of	   information	   or—even	   worse—	   provide	   inaccurate	  responses	  if	  they	  think	  that	  their	  jobs	  could	  be	  in	  jeopardy	  for	  their	  responses.	  A	  number	  of	  different	  techniques	  were	  implemented	  (see	  chapter	  3)	  to	  minimize	  this	  issue,	  but	  the	  use	  of	   survey	   experiments	   allows	   me	   to	   avoid	   having	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   the	  techniques	  implemented.	  
	  
5.1.2	  The	  Survey	  Experiments	  
The	  survey	  experiments	  were	  embedded	  on	  an	  original	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  survey	  of	  1184	  public	  sector	   employees	   administered	   across	   the	   Argentinean	  municipalities	   of	   Salta,	   Santa	   Fe,	  and	   Tigre.4	  Respondents	   were	   selected	   from	   a	   random	   sample	   of	   the	   official	   lists	   of	  employees	  at	  each	  municipality	  and	  the	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  during	  working	  hours	  




at	  public	  offices.	  Each	  of	  the	  survey	  experiments	  included	  two	  conditions—treatment	  and	  control—	   so	   two	   versions	   of	   the	   questionnaire	   were	   used.5	  Interviewers	   used	   the	   two	  different	  questionnaires	   in	  sequential	  order,	  assigning	  respondents	  alternatively	  to	  either	  the	  treatment	  or	  the	  control	  group.	  Standard	  randomization	  checks	   find	  no	  evidence	  that	  random	  assignment	  was	  not	  successful.6	  	  
To	   estimate	   public	   sector	   employees’	   perception	   of	   job	   stability,	   all	   respondents	  were	   asked	   to	   estimate	   the	   likelihood	   of	   keeping	   their	   jobs	   at	   the	  municipality	   after	   the	  next	   election.	   Respondents	   selected	   into	   the	   control	   group	   were	   asked	   the	   following	  question:	  
Control	  
On	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10,	  where	  0	  means	  “Not	  at	  all	  likely”,	  and	  10	   means	   “Very	   likely”,	   how	   likely	   is	   that	   you	   will	   continue	  working	  at	  the	  municipality	  next	  year,	  after	  the	  2011	  mayoral	  elections?	  	  To	  facilitate	  the	  response,	  respondents	  were	  handed	  a	  card	  with	  the	  following	  picture:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Not	  at	  all	  likely	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Likely	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Very	  likely	  	  	  DK	  0	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   99	  	  




The	  other	  half	  of	  the	  respondents,	  the	  ones	  selected	  into	  the	  treatment	  group,	  were	  shown	  the	  same	  card	  and	  asked	  the	  following	  question:	  
Treatment	  
On	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10,	  where	  0	  means	  “Not	  at	  all	  likely”,	  and	  10	  means	  “Very	  likely”,	  how	  likely	   is	  that	  you	  will	  continue	  at	  the	  municipality	  next	  year,	  after	  the	  2011	  mayoral	  elections	   if	  
the	  incumbent	  mayor	  is	  not	  reelected	  and	  the	  opposition	  wins?7	  	  To	   estimate	   the	   perception	   of	   public	   employees	   about	   the	   possibility	   of	   changes,	   all	  respondents	  were	  first	  asked	  how	  satisfied	  they	  were	  with	  their	  jobs.	  They	  were	  given	  four	  possible	  responses:	  very	  satisfied,	  satisfied,	  not	  very	  satisfied	  and	  not	  at	  all	  satisfied.8	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  question	  was	  simply	  to	  put	  the	  survey	  experiment	  question	  in	  context.	  After	  this	   framing	   question,	   the	   following	   question	   was	   asked	   to	   the	   group	   of	   respondents	  selected	  into	  the	  control	  group:	  
Control	  
On	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10,	  where	  0	  means	  “Not	  at	  all	  likely”,	  and	  10	  means	  “Very	   likely”,	  how	   likely	  do	  you	   think	   it	   is	   that	   that	  level	  of	   satisfaction	  with	  your	   job	  will	   change	  next	  year,	   after	  the	  2011	  mayoral	  elections?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  wording	  in	  Spanish	  is	  “En	  una	  escala	  de	  0	  a	  10,	  donde	  0	  es	  NADA	  Probable,	  y	  10	  es	  MUY	  Probable,	  ¿Cuan	  
probable	  es	  que	  Ud.	  siga	  trabajando	  en	  la	  municipalidad	  el	  año	  que	  viene,	  luego	  de	  las	  elecciones	  para	  intendente	  




Whereas	  the	  respondents	  selected	  into	  the	  treatment	  group	  were	  asked:	  	  
Treatment	  	  	  
On	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10,	  where	  0	  means	  “Not	  at	  all	  likely”,	  and	  10	  means	  “Very	  likely”,	  how	  likely	  do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  that	  level	  of	   satisfaction	   with	   your	   job	   will	   change	   next	   year,	   after	   the	  2011	  mayoral	  elections	   if	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  is	  not	  reelected	  
and	  the	  opposition	  wins?9	  	  	  
In	  both	  cases,	  respondents	  were	  also	  handed	  the	  card	  with	  the	  scale	   from	  0	  to	  10	  shown	  above.	   Respondents	   were	   assigned	   to	   either	   treatment	   or	   control	   for	   both	   questions.	  Immediately	  after	   this	  question,	  all	   respondents	   from	  both	   the	   treatment	  and	  the	  control	  group	  were	  asked:	  
Do	   you	   think	   that	   your	   situation	   will	   be	   better,	   the	   same	   or	  worse?10	  
	  
5.1.3	  The	  Data	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  survey	  experiments,	   the	  survey	  instrument	  included	  a	  number	  of	  other	  questions	   used	   in	   the	   following	   analysis.	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   survey	   experiments	  described	  above	  and	  the	  list	  experiments	  described	  in	  chapter	  3,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  questions	  from	  identical	  questionnaires.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  In	  Spanish:	  “En	  una	  escala	  de	  0	  a	  10,	  donde	  0	  es	  NADA	  Probable,	  y	  10	  es	  MUY	  Probable	  ¿Cuan	  probable	  cree	  Ud.	  
que	   es	   que	   ese	   nivel	   de	   conformidad	   con	   su	   trabajo	   cambie	   el	   año	   que	   viene,	   luego	   de	   las	   elecciones	   para	  




In	  order	   to	   identify	  support	   for	   the	  mayor	  or	   the	  party	  of	   the	  mayor,	   respondents	  were	  asked	  two	  different	  questions.11	  The	  first	  one	  asked	  them	  for	  whom	  they	  had	  voted	  in	  the	  last	  mayoral	  election.	  Responses	  were	  coded	  one	  if	  the	  respondent	  said	  they	  had	  voted	  for	   the	   current	   mayor	   (Mayor	   Voter)	   in	   the	   last	   mayoral	   election,	   and	   zero	   otherwise.12	  Second,	   respondents	   were	   asked	   to	   report	   if	   they	   identified	   themselves	   with	   a	   political	  party	   and	   those	   that	   replied	   affirmatively	   to	   this	   question	  were	   asked	  with	  which	   party	  they	   identified	   themselves.	   This	   variable	   (Mayor	   Party)	   takes	   on	   the	   value	   of	   one	   if	   the	  respondent	   said	   that	   she	   identified	   herself	   with	   the	   party	   of	   the	   Mayor,	   and	   zero	  otherwise.13	  Respondents	   were	   also	   asked	   about	   their	   type	   of	   contract	   (Tenure)	   and	  responses	   were	   coded	   as	   one	   if	   employees	   reported	   having	   tenure	   rights,	   and	   zero	  otherwise.	  The	  level	  of	  education	  is	  measured	  such	  as	  the	  variable	  College	  takes	  the	  value	  of	  one	  if	  employees	  reported	  having	  a	  college	  degree,	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  
To	   test	   existing	   theories	   of	   reciprocity	   respondents	   were	   asked	   the	   following	  question:	  “How	  much	  do	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  the	   following	  statement:	   ‘We	  always	  have	   to	   return	   the	   favors	   that	   people	   have	   done	   for	   us’.”	   Respondents	  were	   offered	   the	  following	  choices:	  strongly	  agree,	  more	  agreement	  than	  disagreement,	  more	  disagreement	  




than	  agreement,	  strongly	  disagree.14	  This	  variable	  (Reciprocity)	  takes	  the	  value	  of	  one	  if	  the	  respondent	  said	  she	  “strongly	  agreed,”	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  To	  test	  theories	  of	  monitoring,	  respondents	  were	   asked	   the	   following	  question:	   “Do	  you	  believe	   that	   the	   government	  or	  the	   political	   parties	   can	   find	   out	   for	  whom	   someone	   voted?”15	  This	   variable	   (Monitoring)	  takes	   the	   value	   of	   one	   if	   the	   respondent	   said	   YES,	   and	   zero	   otherwise	   with	   DN/NA	  responses	  coded	  as	  missing.	  Table	  5.1	  displays	  the	  summary	  statistics	  for	  these	  variables.	  
	  
Table	  5.1:	  Summary	  statistics	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Variable	   Obs	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev	  Mayor	  Voter	   1113	   0.61	   0.49	  Mayor	  Party	   1184	   0.33	   0.47	  Tenure	   1183	   0.50	   0.50	  College	   1181	   0.23	   0.42	  Monitoring	  	   1038	   0.28	   0.45	  Reciprocity	   1176	   0.66	   0.47	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  
	  
5.2	   Self-­‐	  Enforcing	  Patronage.	  Survey	  Experiment	  Evidence	  
One	   of	   the	  main	   advantages	   of	   randomized	   survey	   experiments	   is	   that	   randomization—when	  successful—	  ensures	  that	  the	  populations	  in	  the	  control	  and	  treatment	  groups	  are,	  on	  average,	  equivalent	  on	  both	  observables	  and	  un-­‐observables.	  This	  allows	  me	  to	  follow	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In	   Spanish:	   “Qué	   tan	   de	   acuerdo	   o	   en	   desacuerdo	   está	   Ud.	   con	   la	   siguiente	   afirmación:	   “Siempre	   hay	   que	  
regresar	   los	   favores	   que	   alguien	   nos	   hace.	   Diría	   Ud.	   que	   está…muy	   de	   acuerdo,	   mas	   de	   acuerdo	   que	   en	  
desacuerdo,	  mas	  en	  desacuerdo	  que	  de	  acuerdo,	  o	  muy	  en	  desacuerdo.”	  15	  The	   wording	   in	   Spanish	   was:	   “Si	   bien	   el	   voto	   es	   secreto	   ¿Cree	   Ud.	   que	   el	   gobierno	   o	   los	   partidos	   políticos	  




convention	   of	   using	   difference	   of	  means	   (t-­‐tests)	   to	   analyze	   the	   experimental	   results.16	  I	  have	  also	  corroborated	  the	  main	  results	  with	  regression	  analyses	  in	  which	  the	  treatment	  is	  included	   as	   an	   independent	   variable	   along	  with	   other	   controls.	   After	   analyzing	   the	  main	  treatment	  effects,	  the	  core	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  tested	  by	  examining	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  public	  employees	  mentioned	  above—namely	  support	   for	   the	  mayor,	   type	  of	  contract	  and	  education—that	  condition	  the	  size	  of	  the	  main	  treatment	  effect.	  
	  
5.2.1	  Perception	  of	  Job	  Stability	  
To	  test	  whether	  employees	  fear	  losing	  their	  jobs	  if	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  loses	  the	  election	  all	  respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  estimate	  (on	  a	  scale	  from	  0	  to	  10)	  the	  likelihood	  of	  keeping	  their	  jobs	  at	  the	  municipality	  after	  the	  next	  election.	  A	  randomly	  selected	  subset	  was	  also	  told:	   “if	   the	   incumbent	   mayor	   is	   not	   reelected	   and	   the	   opposition	   wins.”17	  Because	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  All	  the	  difference	  of	  mean	  tests	  reported	  here	  were	  calculated	  using	  Welch’s	  approximation	  to	  account	  for	  potential	  unequal	  variances	  between	  the	  groups.	  The	  standard	  errors	  obtained	  with	  the	  Welch	  approximation	  only	  differ	  marginally	  from	  the	  ones	  obtained	  with	  a	  standard	  student	  t-­‐test	  (which	  assumes	  equal	  variance	  across	  groups).	  17	  A	  slightly	  different	  question	  was	  used	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Salta	  because	  of	   the	  timing	  of	   the	  upcoming	  mayoral	  election.	   For	   political	   reasons	   beyond	  my	   control	   (explained	   in	   Appendix	   A),	   the	   survey	   in	   Salta	   had	   to	   be	  postponed	  until	  after	  the	  municipal	  and	  provincial	  elections	  were	  held.	  Consequently,	  the	  surveys	  in	  Santa	  Fe	  and	  Tigre	  were	  conducted	  around	  a	  year	  before	  the	  following	  provincial	  and	  mayoral	  elections	  whereas	  the	  survey	  in	  Salta	  was	  conducted	  right	  after	  the	  elections	  and	  almost	  four	  years	  before	  the	  next	  ones.	  The	  main	  issue	  with	   this	  was	   that	  a	   lot	  of	  employees	   in	  Salta	   that	  did	  not	  have	   tenure	  at	   the	   time	  of	   the	  survey	  were	  expecting	   to	   get	   tenure	   in	   the	   next	   four	   years	   and	   this	   expectation	   affects	   their	   responses	   to	   the	   question	  about	  job	  stability.	  To	  get	  around	  this	  problem,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Salta,	  another	  question	  was	  asked	  right	  after	  the	  one	  described	  above:	  “Now	  imagine	  that	  the	  next	  mayoral	  elections,	  instead	  of	  being	  in	  2015,	  would	  be	  next	  year.	  In	  this	  same	  scale	  (0	  to	  10),	  how	  likely	  is	  that	  you	  keep	  on	  working	  at	  the	  municipality	  next	  year,	  after	  these	   hypothetical	   elections	   (if	   the	   incumbent	   mayor	   is	   not	   reelected	   and	   the	   opposition	   wins)?	   (“Ahora	  
imagínese	  que	  las	  próximas	  elecciones	  para	  intendente,	  en	  lugar	  de	  ser	  en	  2015,	  fueran	  EL	  AÑO	  QUE	  VIENE.	  En	  
esta	  misma	  escala,	   ¿Cuan	  probable	   es	  que	  Ud.	   siga	   trabajando	  en	   la	  municipalidad	  el	  año	  que	  viene,	   luego	  de	  




individuals	  who	  received	  the	  treatment	  were	  randomly	  selected,	  differences	   in	  responses	  across	  the	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  extra	  information	  received	  by	   the	   treatment	   group.	   These	   results,	   nonetheless,	   are	   corroborated	   with	   regression	  analyses	  in	  which	  the	  survey	  experiment	  treatment	  is	  included	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  along	  with	  controls	  for	  tenure,	  age,	  gender,	  education	  and	  municipality	  (results	  reported	  in	  Table	  C1	  in	  Appendix	  C).	  Table	  5.2	  presents	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  with	  the	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  below.	  
	  
Table	  5.2:	  Likelihood	  of	  keeping	  the	  job,	  across	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  …	  if	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  is	  not	  be	  reelected	  and	  the	  opposition	  wins?	  (treatment)	   7.75	  (0.12)	  N=563	  
…	  ?	  (control)	  	   8.15	  (0.11)	  N=568	  
Treatment	  effect	   -­‐0.41**	  (0.16)	  N=1131	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance	  	  	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  
	  




effect	  is	  a	  significant	  0.41	  difference	  (at	  the	  95percent	  level).	  Public	  employees	  in	  general	  fear	  losing	  their	  jobs	  if	  the	  next	  election	  were	  to	  be	  won	  by	  the	  opposition.18	  	  
However,	   employees	  with	   tenure—who	   cannot	   be	   legally	   fired—	  should	  probably	  not	   fear	   loosing	   their	   jobs,	   regardless	   of	   any	   electoral	   result.	   An	   employee	   from	   the	  personnel	  office	  at	  Tigre	  explained	   it	  clearly.	  When	  asked	  about	  what	  happened	  with	   the	  change	   of	   administration	   in	   2007	   (recall	   that	   Tigre	   was	   governed	   by	   the	   same	   party	  between	   1987	   and	   2007,	   and	   a	  mayor	   from	   a	   different	   party	  was	   elected	   in	   2007),	   she	  replied:	   “After	   20	   years	   of	   the	   same	   administration	   things	   are	   complicated,	   people	   are	  afraid	   (…)	   the	   permanent	   employees	   are	   not,	   but	   the	   ones	   on	   temporary	   contracts	   are	  afraid”.	  Interestingly—and	  in	  line	  with	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  theory	  developed	  here—she	  then	  explained	  to	  me	  that	   in	  the	  end	  not	  that	  many	  people	  were	  fired,	  only	  the	  ones	  that	  were	  “very	  politically	  involved	  with	  the	  previous	  administration.”19	  	  




groups	  and	  type	  of	  contract	  and	  Table	  5.3	  presents	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  with	  the	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  below	  across	  types	  of	  employment	  contracts.	  
	  
Figure	  5.1:	  Frequency	  distribution	  across	  treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  and	  type	  of	  
contract	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Table	  5.3:	  Likelihood	  of	  keeping	  the	  job	  for	  tenure	  and	  non-­‐tenure	  employees	  	   	   	   	  	   Tenure	   Non-­‐tenure	   Differences	  in	  Effect	  …	  if	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  is	  not	  reelected	  and	  the	  opposition	  wins?	  (treatment)	   9.34	   6.28	   	   	  (0.08)	   (0.18)	   	   	  N=270	   N=293	   	   	  
…	  ?	  (control)	  	   9.36	   6.90	   	   	  (0.09)	   (0.17)	   	   	  N=289	   N=279	   	   	  
Treatment	  effect	   -­‐0.03	   -­‐0.62**	   -­‐0.60**	   -­‐0.59**	  (0.12)	   (0.25)	   (0.28)	   (0.27)	  N=559	   N=572	   N=1131	   N=1131	  Municipal	  Dummies	   	   	   NO	   YES	  	   	   	   	   	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  	  
As	  expected,	  the	  treatment	  effect	  is	  much	  stronger	  for	  the	  non-­‐tenured	  employees.	  Among	  employees	  that	  do	  not	  enjoy	  job	  security	  the	  treatment	  effect	  is	  a	  significant	  0.62	  (compare	  to	  a	  non-­‐significant	  0.03	  for	  tenured	  employees).	  The	  difference	  in	  effects	  between	  tenured	  and	   untenured	   employees	   is	   a	   significant	   0.60	   (at	   the	   95	   percent	   level),	   even	   when	  including	  indicator	  variables	  for	  municipality	  (last	  column).	  	  




no	   one	   talks	   too	   much	   about	   politics	   because	   of	   this.”20 	  Indeed,	   the	   main	   empirical	  implication	  of	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  is	  that	  supporters	  of	  the	  incumbent	  have	  more	  to	  fear	  than	  non-­‐supporters	  from	  a	  change	  in	  the	  administration.	  I	  expect	  then	  that	  employees	  ideologically	  closer	  to	  the	  mayor	  –namely,	  Mayor	  Voter	  and	  Mayor	  Party—	  estimate	  a	  higher	   likelihood	  of	   losing	   their	   jobs	   if	   the	   incumbent	  mayor	  were	   to	   lose	   the	  next	  election.	  	  
There	   are	   two	  other	   characteristics	   that	   the	   theory	  predicts	   to	   have	   a	   conditional	  effect	   on	   individual	   perception	   of	   job	   security—education	   and	   type	   of	   contract.	   I	   have	  shown	  already	  that	  employees	  with	  tenure	  rights	  do	  not	  fear	  losing	  their	  jobs.	  However,	  I	  will	  provide	  evidence	  in	  the	  next	  section	  that	  they	  do	  fear	  things	  changing	  for	  the	  worse	  at	  work	  if	  a	  mayor	  from	  a	  different	  party	  won	  the	  election.	  In	  relation	  to	  education,	  I	  expect	  those	   with	   lower	   levels	   of	   education—more	   easily	   replaceable—	   to	   estimate	   a	   higher	  likelihood	   of	   losing	   their	   jobs	   if	   the	   incumbent	  mayor	  were	   to	   lose	   the	   next	   election.	  To	  determine	   whether	   these	   types	   of	   employees	   react	   more	   strongly	   to	   the	   hypothetical	  electoral	   outcome,	   I	   examine	   heterogeneity	   in	   the	   treatment	   by	   estimating	   conditional	  average	  treatment	  effects	  (CATE).	   I	  do	  this	  simply	  by	  estimating	  causal	  effects	  separately	  for	   different	   subgroups	   of	   the	   population.21	  Figure	   5.2	   presents	   such	   effects.	   Lines	   1-­‐3	  display	  the	  results	  already	  discussed	  to	  facilitate	  the	  comparison.	  Since	  tenured	  employees	  cannot	  be	  fired,	  I	  present	  the	  effect	  for	  the	  whole	  sample	  (black	  dots)	  and	  the	  effect	  without	  tenured	   employees	   (white	  dots)	   for	   each	   subgroup	  of	   employees.	  As	   expected,	   excluding	  




tenured	   employees	   makes	   all	   the	   effects	   stronger	   in	   the	   predicted	   directions	   (however,	  since	  the	  number	  of	  observations	  is	  reduced,	  standard	  errors	  become	  bigger).	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.2:	  Likelihood	  of	  keeping	  the	  job,	  heterogeneous	  treatment	  effects	  
	  	  
Note:	  Average	  treatment	  effects	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  the	  control	  group	  (t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance).	  Black	  circles	   indicate	   the	   treatment	  effect	   for	  all	  employees	  within	  that	  subgroup;	  white	  circles	  restrict	  the	  sample	  only	  to	  non-­‐tenured	  employees.	  Horizontal	  black	   bars	   represent	   95%	   confidence	   intervals	   and	   vertical	   lines	   represent	   90%	   confidence	  intervals.	  Numbers	  above	  the	  diagonal	  lines	  (red	  in	  the	  original)	  connecting	  the	  white	  dots	  indicate	  the	  differences	  in	  effects	  across	  respondents	  with	  and	  without	  each	  characteristic	  for	  non-­‐tenured	  employees.	  Robust	  standard	  errors;	  ***p<0.01,	  **p<0.05,	  *p<0.1.	  	  
























As	   the	   figure	   shows	   quite	   clearly,	   supporters	   who	   receive	   the	   hypothetical	   about	   a	  candidate	   from	   the	   opposition	   winning	   the	   election	   respond	   quite	   differently	   to	   the	  question	   about	   the	   likelihood	   of	   keeping	   their	   jobs	   from	   those	   that	   do	   not	   hear	   the	  hypothetical.	  In	  fact,	  hearing	  the	  hypothetical	  about	  the	  opposition	  winning	  has	  no	  effect	  on	  the	   future	   expectations	   of	   non-­‐supporters	   of	   keeping	   working	   at	   the	   municipal	  administration.	  First,	  the	  difference	  in	  effects	  between	  those	  untenured	  employees	  (white	  dots)	  who	  reported	  having	  voted	  for	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  (line	  5)	  and	  those	  that	  did	  not	  (line	  4)	  is	  a	  significant	  (at	  the	  99	  percent	  level)	  2.06	  difference.	  Recall	  that	  the	  scale	  was	  0	  to	  10	  so	   this	  means	   that	   those	  who	  had	  voted	   for	   the	  current	  mayor	   feel,	  on	  average,	  20	  percent	   less	   confident	   about	   keeping	   their	   jobs	   if	   the	   opposition	   wins.	   Even	   when	  comparing	  the	  whole	  sample	  (black	  dots),	  there	  is	  still	  a	  1.30	  significant	  difference	  between	  voters	  and	  non-­‐voters.	  Results	  are	  similar	  when	  using	  the	  alternative	  measure	  of	  support.	  The	   difference	   between	   those	   untenured	   employees	  who	   identified	   themselves	  with	   the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  (line	  7)	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  (line	  6)	  is	  a	  significant	  (at	  the	  90	  percent	  level)	  0.94,	   indicating	  that	  the	  supporters	  of	  the	  mayor’s	  party	  feel	  on	  average	  around	  10	  percent	   less	   secure	   about	   keeping	   their	   jobs	   if	   the	   opposition	   wins.	   Again,	   even	   when	  comparing	   party	   supporters	   and	   non-­‐supporters	   across	   the	   entire	   sample	   (black	   dots)	  there	  is	  a	  0.71	  difference	  (significant	  at	  the	  95	  percent	  level).	  




mentioned	  earlier,	  employees	  with	  higher	  skills	  might	  be	  valuable	  for	  a	  new	  administration	  (regardless	  of	  partisan	  affiliation)	  and	  the	  results	  presented	  here	  suggest	   that	  employees	  with	   a	   college	   degree	   are	   aware	   of	   this.	   The	   difference	   in	   effects	   between	   untenured	  employees	  with	  and	  without	  a	  college	  degree	   is	  0.97	  (significant	  at	   the	  90	  percent	   level),	  indicating	  that	  employees	  with	  a	  college	  degree	  feel,	  on	  average,	  10	  percent	  more	  confident	  about	  keeping	  their	  jobs	  with	  a	  change	  in	  the	  administration.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   provision	   of	   favors,	   low	   skilled	   workers	   are	   generally	   more	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services.	  In	  line	  with	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (2004),	  I	  have	  argued	   that	   public	   employees	   are	   more	   inclined	   to	   support	   the	   incumbent	   with	   their	  services	  when	  their	  market	  alternatives	  outside	  the	  state	  are	  fewer,	  which	  is	  often	  the	  case	  with	   lower	   skilled	   workers.	   The	   results	   here	   provide	   an	   additional	   incentive	   for	   less	  educated	   employees	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   to	   the	   mayor	   to	   try	   to	   keep	   him	   in	  power—they	  feel	  particularly	  insecure	  about	  the	  likelihood	  of	  maintaining	  their	  jobs	  with	  a	  new	  administration	  from	  a	  different	  party.	  
	  
5.2.2	  Perception	  of	  Job	  Changes	  	  




assigned	  to	  different	  activities.	  A	  tenured	  employee	  from	  Santa	  Fe	  that	  has	  been	  working	  at	  the	  municipality	  since	  1985	  explains:	  	  
	  
“The	   fear	   [for	   a	   tenured	   employee](…)	   is	   about	   changing	   jobs,	  
changing	   the	   place	   of	   work,	   it	   is	   about	   being	   sent	   somewhere	  
else,	   somewhere	  where	  he	  does	  not	  know	  how	   to	  do	   the	   job,	  or	  
where	   he	   doesn’t	   have	   much	   to	   do,	   or	   too	   far	   away	   from	   his	  
house,	   or	   with	   a	   different	   schedule,	   or	   without	   the	   extra	  
monetary	  benefits	  that	  his	  current	  jobs	  allows	  him	  to	  earn…	  A	  lot	  
of	  things	  can	  be	  changed…”	  	  
And,	  in	  fact,	  she	  argues,	  there	  were	  a	  few	  cases	  like	  these	  when	  the	  administration	  changed	  from	  the	  Radicals	  to	  the	  Peronists	  in	  2007:	  “Old	  employees	  have	  been	  sidestepped	  a	  little,	  their	  participation	  has	  been	  restricted,	  I	  know	  of	  people	  that	  had	  to	  ask	  to	  be	  transferred	  to	  another	   area	  because	   there	  was	  no	   room	   for	   them	  anymore	  where	   they	  used	   to	  work…”	  Despite	  this,	  she	  added,	  some	  employees	  kept	  on	  doing	  “their	  own	  thing”	  [showing	  support	  for	  the	  opposition],	  creating	  problems	  with	  the	  current	  administration	  and	  risking	  “being	  sent	  somewhere	  else.”	  She	  finished	  this	  portrait	  of	  the	  situation	  by	  adding:	  “I	  am	  not	  saying	  this	  happens,	  all	  I	  am	  saying	  is	  that	  you’re	  afraid	  of	  it,	  it	  is	  your	  salary,	  your	  livelihood…”	  For	  this	  reason,	  she	  explains,	  she	  always	  tries	  to	  “stay	  [politically]	  neutral”22	  	  




all	  the	  bosses	  changed	  and	  “it	  was	  difficult	  at	  the	  beginning,	  sometimes	  politics	  get	  mixed	  up	  with	  work”	   and	   the	   new	  bosses	  were	   suspicious	   of	   the	   old	   employees	   (había	  recelo),	  they	  perceived	  them	  “almost	  as	  criminals.”23	  
To	   determine	   whether	   public	   sector	   employees	   are	   in	   fact	   afraid	   of	   this	   type	   of	  changes	  if	  a	  new	  mayor	  from	  the	  opposition	  were	  to	  be	  elected,	  I	  again	  use	  a	  hypothetical	  about	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  next	  election.	  Employees	  were	  first	  asked	  to	  report	  their	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  with	  their	  current	  job.	  The	  majority	  of	  them	  reported	  being	  satisfied	  (59%)	  and	  very	   satisfied	   (31%),	   while	   8	   percent	   reported	   being	   little	   satisfied,	   and	   only	   eight	  respondents	  (0.7%)	  reported	  being	  not	  at	  all	  satisfied	  with	  his	  job	  (6	  respondents	  (0.5%)	  did	   not	   answer	   the	   question).24	  After	   this	   question,	   respondents	   were	   asked	   about	   the	  likelihood	  of	  that	  level	  of	  satisfaction	  changing	  after	  the	  next	  election.	  All	  respondents	  were	  asked	   to	   estimate	   (on	   a	   scale	   from	   0	   to	   10)	   the	   likelihood	   of	   the	   reported	   level	   of	  satisfaction	  with	  their	  jobs	  changing	  after	  the	  next	  election.	  A	  random	  half	  was	  also	  told:	  “if	  the	   incumbent	  mayor	   is	  not	   reelected	  and	   the	  opposition	  wins.”	  Then,	   respondents	  were	  asked	   whether	   they	   think	   that	   their	   situation	   would	   be	   better,	   the	   same	   or	   worse.	   To	  compare	   the	   results	   across	   treatment	   and	   control	   groups,	   responses	   were	   coded	   1	   for	  better,	  0	   for	  no	  change	  expected,	   and	   -­‐1	   for	  worse.25	  Figure	  5.3	   shows	   the	  distribution	  of	  




responses	   across	   treatment	   and	   control	   groups	   and	   Table	   5.4	   presents	   the	   average	  treatment	  effect	  with	  the	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses	  below.	  
	  
Figure	  5.3:	  Direction	  of	  change	  in	  job	  satisfaction,	  across	  treatment	  and	  control	  
groups	  
	  	  
Table	  5.4:	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  your	  situation	  would	  be	  better,	  the	  same	  or	  worse?	  	   …	  if	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  is	  not	  be	  reelected	  and	  the	  opposition	  wins?	  (treatment)	   0.13	  (0.03)	  N=499	  
…?	  (control)	   0.36	  (0.02)	  N=528	  
	  Treatment	  effect	   -­‐0.23***	  (0.03)	  N=1027	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  *p	  <	  0.10,	  **p<	  0.05,	  ***p<	  0.01	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  there	  were	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  non-­‐responses.	  The	  other	  question,	  more	  straightforward,	  was	  easier	  to	  understand	  and	  there	  were	  very	  fewer	  non-­‐responses.	  I	  then	  decided	  to	  use	  only	  this	  second	  question.	  

















Indeed,	   respondents	  who	  were	   told	   the	   hypothetical	   about	   the	   current	  mayor	   losing	   the	  next	  election	  and	  the	  opposition	  winning	  respond	  quite	  differently	  from	  those	  who	  did	  not	  hear	  any	   information	  about	   the	  electoral	  outcome.	  Whereas	   the	  average	  response	  among	  the	  control	  group	  was	  0.36,	   the	  average	   for	   those	  that	  received	  the	  treatment	  was	  0.13.26	  The	   average	   treatment	   effect	   is	   a	   significant	   0.23	   difference.	   The	   negative	   sign	   indicates	  that,	  on	  average,	  public	  sector	  employees	  think	  that	  their	  situation	  would	  be	  worse	   if	   the	  opposition	  were	  to	  win	  the	  following	  election.27	  Finally,	  Figure	  5.4	  presents	  the	  differences	  in	   the	   size	   of	   the	   treatment	   effect	   across	   different	   subsets	   of	   the	   population.	   The	  expectations	  here	  are	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  I	  expect	  employees	  ideologically	  closer	  to	  the	  mayor	  (Mayor	  Voter	  and	  Mayor	  Party)	  and	  those	  with	  less	  education	  (College)	  to	  be	  more	  prone	   to	   think	   that	   the	  change	  would	  be	   for	   the	  worse.28	  Although	   I	  am	  more	  agnostic	   about	   this	   expectation,	   employees	   with	   tenure	   (Tenure)—that	   have	   in	   general	  been	   in	   the	   job	   longer	   and	   even	   possibly	   already	   experiences	   a	   change	   in	   the	  administration—	  might	  be	  less	  afraid	  of	  suffering	  negative	  changes.	  
	  




Figure	  5.4:	  Likelihood	  of	  change,	  heterogeneous	  treatment	  effects	  
	  	  
Note:	  Average	  treatment	  effects	  calculated	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  the	  control	  group	  (t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance).	  Black	  circles	   indicate	   the	   treatment	  effect	   for	  employees	  within	  that	  subgroup.	  Horizontal	  black	  bars	  represent	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  and	   vertical	   lines	   represent	   90%	   confidence	   intervals.	   Numbers	   above	   the	   diagonal	   lines	  (red	  in	  the	  original)	  indicate	  the	  differences	  in	  effects	  across	  respondents	  with	  and	  without	  each	  characteristic.	  Robust	  standard	  errors;	  ***p<0.01,	  **p<0.05,	  *p<0.1.	  
	  




















information.	   In	   contrast,	   hearing	   the	   hypothetical	   about	   the	   opposition	   winning	   has	   a	  significantly	  smaller	  effect	  on	  the	  future	  expectations	  of	  change	  among	  non-­‐supporters.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  main	  treatment	  effect	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	   the	   respondents	  predicted	  by	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	  of	   patronage—namely	   support	  for	  the	  mayor.	  First,	  the	  difference	  in	  effects	  between	  employees	  who	  reported	  having	  vote	  for	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  (line	  5)	  and	  those	  that	  did	  not	  (line	  4)	  is	  a	  significant	  (at	  the	  99	  percent	  level)	  0.21.	  Recall	  that	  the	  scale	  in	  this	  case	  is	  -­‐1	  to	  1	  so	  0.21	  indicates	  that	  those	  who	  had	  voted	  for	  the	  current	  mayor	  are,	  on	  average	  10	  percent	  more	  negative	  about	  the	  changes	   in	  working	   conditions	   if	   the	   opposition	  wins.	   The	   difference	   in	   effects	   between	  those	  that	  identify	  with	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not	  (lines	  6	  and	  7)	  is	  0.25	  (significant	   at	   the	   99	   percent	   level).	   And	   both	   the	   magnitude	   of	   the	   difference	   and	   its	  significance	  remains	  unchanged	  after	  including	  controls	  for	  municipalities	  (see	  Table	  C4	  in	  Appendix	  C).	  
Employees	  with	  tenure,	  as	  predicted,	  also	  feel	  less	  afraid	  than	  untenured	  employees	  of	   a	   new	  mayor	   from	   the	   opposition	   getting	   into	   power.	   The	   difference	   in	   effects	   across	  respondents	  with	  and	  without	   tenure	   is	  0.13	  (significant	  at	   the	  95	  percent	   level).	  Finally,	  the	   effect	   across	   different	   levels	   of	   education	   is	   not	   conclusive.	   The	   difference	   between	  those	  with	  a	  college	  degree	  and	  those	  without	  a	  college	  degree	  is	  not	  significant	  and	  it	  goes	  against	   the	   expectations.	   Possibly,	   this	   result	   reflects	   the	   fact	   that	  more	   educated	   public	  sector	  employees	  tend	  to	  hold	  jobs	  in	  which	  the	  potential	  for	  change	  is	  larger	  than	  in	  low	  skilled	  jobs.	  	  




strong	   incentives	   to	   try	   to	  keep	  things	  as	   they	  are.	  The	  results	  clearly	   indicate	   that	   those	  that	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  supporters	  by	   the	  opposition	  are	  afraid	  of	   losing	   their	   jobs	  or	  things	  changing	  for	  the	  worse	  with	  a	  new	  administration,	  which	  is	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services	  that	  could	  help	  keep	  the	  incumbent	  in	  office.	  	  
	  
5.3	   Regression	  Analysis	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  corroborated	  the	  difference-­‐of-­‐means	  (t-­‐test)	  results	  discussed	  so	  far	  with	  regression	   analysis	   in	   which	   the	   experimental	   treatment	   is	   included	   as	   an	   independent	  variable.	   This	   type	   of	   analysis	   allows	  me	   to	   control	   for	   confounding	   factors.	   I	   estimate	   a	  series	   of	   regressions	   with	   interactions	   between	   the	   main	   characteristics	   of	   interest	  according	  to	   the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage—Mayor	  Party	  and	  Mayor	  Voter—with	  treatment	  assignment	   for	  both	  survey	  experiments	  along	  with	  controls	   for	  age	  (Age),	   sex	  (Female),	   education	   (College),	   time	   of	   hiring	   (Current	   Contract)	   and	   type	   of	   contract	  (Tenure).29	  Importantly,	   this	   type	   of	   analysis	   also	   allows	   me	   to	   control	   for	   the	   main	  alternative	   theories	   to	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage—reciprocity	   and	   fear	   of	  punishment.	  	  
To	  control	   for	   the	  monitoring	  and	   fear	  of	  punishment	   theory,	   I	  asked	  respondents	  whether	   they	   thought	   that	   the	   government	   or	   the	   political	   parties	   could	   find	   out	   about	  individual	   voting	   behavior.	   Surprisingly	   for	   a	   country	   with	   no	   serious	   allegations	   of	  electoral	   fraud	   since	   the	   return	   of	   democracy	   in	   1983,	   24	   percent	   of	   the	   respondents	  




believe	  that	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  the	  government	  or	  political	  parties	  to	  violate	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot,	  63	  percent	  replied	  that	  this	  was	  not	  possible,	  and	  12	  percent	  replied	  that	  they	  did	  not	  know.	  Recall	  that	  the	  survey	  instrument	  had	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  local	  authorities	  so	  a	  direct	  question	  about	  whether	  employees	  were	  afraid	  of	  being	  punished	  by	  the	  mayor	  if	   they	   failed	   to	   collaborate	   by	   providing	   political	   services	   was	   not	   possible.	   The	   logic	  behind	  asking	  a	  question	  about	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  monitoring	  political	  services	   has	   to	   do	  with	   the	   fact	   that	  monitoring	   voting	   is	   harder	   than	  monitoring	   other	  activities,	   such	   as	   attending	   rallies	   and	   helping	   with	   electoral	   campaigns.	   Thus,	   the	  expectation	   is	   that	   if	  respondents	  think	  that	  voting	   is	   in	   fact	  being	  monitored	  they	  would	  also	   think	   the	   same	   for	   the	   other	   activities	   that	   are	   easier	   to	  monitor.	   If	   the	  monitoring	  theory	  were	  correct,	  individuals	  who	  believe	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot	  can	  be	  violated	  would	  be	  more	   likely	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  than	  the	  ones	  that	  do	  not,	  out	  of	   fear	  of	  being	  monitored	  and	  punished.	  All	  negative	  responses	  for	  this	  variable	  (Monitoring)	  were	  coded	  as	  0	  and	  positive	  responses	  were	  coded	  as	  1	  whereas	  “Don’t	  Know”	  answers	  were	  coded	  as	  missing.30	  
In	  order	  to	  control	  for	  the	  norms	  of	  reciprocity	  alternative,	  I	  asked	  respondents	  how	  much	   they	  agreed	  or	  disagreed	  with	   the	   following	  statement:	   “We	  always	  have	   to	   return	  the	  favors	  that	  people	  have	  done	  for	  us”.	  Respondents	  were	  offered	  the	  following	  choices:	  strongly	   agree,	  more	   agreement	   than	  disagreement,	  more	  disagreement	   than	   agreement,	  strongly	   disagree.	   Those	   who	   answered	   strongly	   agree	   are	   coded	   as	   being	   subject	   to	   a	  




norm	  of	  reciprocity.	  This	  variable	  (Reciprocity)	  then	  takes	  the	  value	  of	  1	  if	  the	  respondent	  said	  she	   “strongly	  agree”,	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  Most	  of	   the	  respondents	   (66percent)	  were	  coded	  as	  reciprocal	   individuals.31	  Table	  5.5	  presents	   the	  regression	  results.	  The	   left	  panel	  presents	   the	   results	   for	   the	   perception	   of	   job	   stability	   experiment	   so	   the	   dependent	  variable	   ranges	   from	   0	   to	   10.	   The	   right	   panel	   presents	   the	   results	   for	   the	   direction	   of	  change	   experiment	   so	   the	   dependent	   variable	   ranges	   from	   -­‐1	   to	   1.	   For	   both	   cases,	   I	  corroborated	  the	  results	  with	  the	  two	  different	  measures	  of	  political	  support	  (Mayor	  Voter	  and	  Mayor	  Party).	   	  




Table	  5.5:	  OLS	  analyses	  of	  the	  survey	  experiments	  	   	   	  
	  	  
Likelihood	  of	  staying	  	  
in	  the	  job	  
Change	  for	  better	  
	  or	  worse	  Treatment*	  Mayor	  Voter	   -­‐1.05***	   -­‐1.38***	   	   	   -­‐0.20***	   -­‐0.22***	   	   	  (0.28)	   (0.31)	   	   	   (0.07)	   (0.08)	   	   	  Treatment*	  Mayor	  Party	   	   	   -­‐0.71**	   -­‐0.72**	   	  	   	   -­‐0.26***	   -­‐0.25***	  	   	   (0.29)	   (0.30)	   	  	   	   (0.07)	   (0.08)	  Treatment	   0.29	   0.55**	   -­‐0.09	   -­‐0.06	   -­‐0.11**	   -­‐0.12*	   -­‐0.15***	   -­‐0.17***	  	   (0.22)	   (0.25)	   (0.16)	   (0.18)	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   (0.04)	   (0.05)	  Mayor	  Voter	   0.58***	   0.66***	   	   	   0.09*	   0.11*	   	   	  	   (0.21)	   (0.22)	   	   	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   	   	  Mayor	  Party	   	   	   0.50**	   0.46**	   	  	   	   0.21***	   0.21***	  	   	   	   (0.21)	   (0.22)	   	  	   	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	  Female	   -­‐0.01	   0.01	   -­‐0.03	   -­‐0.02	   0.02	   -­‐0.00	   0.02	   -­‐0.00	  	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	   (0.14)	   (0.15)	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	  Age	   0.01	   0.01	   0.01	   0.01	   -­‐0.00	   -­‐0.00	   -­‐0.00	   -­‐0.00	  	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   (0.00)	   (0.00)	   (0.00)	   (0.00)	  Salta	   -­‐0.54***	   -­‐0.54**	   -­‐0.52***	   -­‐0.51**	   0.17***	   0.18***	   0.16***	   0.17***	  	   (0.20)	   (0.21)	   (0.19)	   (0.20)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	  Santa	  Fe	   -­‐1.54***	   -­‐1.45***	   -­‐1.50***	   -­‐1.40***	   0.08*	   0.11**	   0.09**	   0.11**	  	   (0.19)	   (0.21)	   (0.18)	   (0.20)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	  College	   0.08	   -­‐0.07	   0.07	   -­‐0.08	   -­‐0.13***	   -­‐0.14***	   -­‐0.10**	   -­‐0.10**	  	   (0.18)	   (0.19)	   (0.17)	   (0.18)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.04)	   (0.05)	  Tenure	   2.50***	   2.43***	   2.44***	   2.35***	   -­‐0.05	   -­‐0.06	   -­‐0.06	   -­‐0.07	  	   (0.21)	   (0.23)	   (0.20)	   (0.22)	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	  Current	  Mayor	   -­‐1.05***	   -­‐0.91***	   -­‐0.99***	   -­‐0.87***	   0.04	   0.01	   -­‐0.00	   -­‐0.03	  	   (0.20)	   (0.21)	   (0.19)	   (0.20)	   (0.05)	   (0.06)	   (0.05)	   (0.05)	  Monitoring	   	   -­‐0.06	   	   -­‐0.01	   	  	   -­‐0.01	   	   -­‐0.01	  	   	   (0.17)	   	   (0.16)	   	  	   (0.04)	   	   (0.04)	  Reciprocity	   	   -­‐0.20	   	   -­‐0.23	   	  	   -­‐0.03	   	   -­‐0.02	  	   	   (0.16)	   	   (0.16)	   	  	   (0.04)	   	   (0.04)	  Constant	   7.35***	   7.35***	   7.48***	   7.56***	   0.29***	   0.37***	   0.32***	   0.39***	  	   (0.39)	   (0.43)	   (0.37)	   (0.40)	   (0.10)	   (0.11)	   (0.09)	   (0.10)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  Observations	   1,054	   917	   1,120	   980	   962	   835	   1,017	   888	  R-­‐squared	   0.36	   0.35	   0.34	   0.32	   0.08	   0.09	   0.09	   0.09	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  




The	  regression	  analyses	  confirm	  the	  results	  obtained	  from	  the	  difference	  in	  means	  analysis	  discussed	   in	   section	  5.2.	   Indeed,	  even	  after	   controlling	   for	   confounding	   factors,	  Table	  5.5	  shows	   that	   being	   a	   supporter	   of	   the	   mayor	   (measured	   either	   as	  Mayor	   Voter	   or	  Mayor	  
Party)	  conditions	  the	  average	  treatment	  effect	  in	  the	  predicted	  direction.	  Mayor	  supporters	  are	  both	  more	  afraid	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs	  and	  suffering	  chances	  for	  the	  worse	  if	  a	  new	  mayor	  from	  the	  opposition	  were	  to	  win	  the	  next	  election.	   Including	  controls	   for	   the	  belief	  about	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot	  and	  about	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity	  does	  not	  substantively	  affect	  any	  of	   the	  main	   predictions.	   In	   fact,	   the	   coefficients	   on	   these	   two	   variables	   (Monitoring	   and	  
Reciprocity)	  are	  not	  significant.	  The	  regression	  analyses	  then	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   developed	   in	   this	   dissertation	   and	   with	   the	   difference	   in	  means	  analyses	  conducted	  in	  section	  5.2.	  	  




employees,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  the	  type	  of	  incentive	  alignment	  upon	  which	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	   of	   patronage	   is	   constructed.	   The	   next	   section	   explores	   the	   incentives	   behind	   the	  political	   behavior	   of	   these	   other	   types	   of	   employees	   and	   examines	   in	   more	   detail	   the	  explanatory	  power	  of	  alternative	  theories.	  
	  
5.4	   Alternative	  Explanation	  I:	  Fear	  of	  Punishment	  




Besides	  helping	  with	  the	  organization	  of	  rallies,	  employees	  also	  helped	  before	  and	  during	  the	  day	  of	  the	  election	  (always	  a	  Sunday	  in	  Argentina).	  In	  the	  two	  weeks	  prior	  to	  the	  2009	  election,	   Laura	   and	   her	   co-­‐workers	   were	   asked	   by	   their	   boss	   to	   take	   turns	   at	   the	   local	  Peronist	  office	  (local	  partidario)	  to	  help	  citizens	  with	  questions	  about	  the	  electoral	  register	  (typically	  to	  find	  out	  the	  address	  of	  their	  assigned	  voting	  booth).	  During	  the	  Sunday	  of	  the	  election,	  some	  employees	  worked	  as	  election	  monitors	  while	  others	  —like	  Laura—	  helped	  by	  delivering	  lunch	  to	  the	  partisan	  monitors.	  Interestingly,	  Laura	  had	  gotten	  the	  job	  at	  the	  municipality	   during	   the	   previous	   administration	   thanks	   to	   a	   relative	   that	   participated	   in	  politics	  with	   the	  Radical	  Party	   (one	  of	   the	  parties	   in	   the	  opposition).	  And	   today,	   she	   still	  identifies	  herself	  with	  the	  Radical	  Party,	  she	  is	  affiliated	  to	  that	  party,	  and	  had	  voted	  in	  the	  last	  Radical	  primary	  in	  2010.	  However,	  as	  most	  people	  in	  her	  office,	  she	  contributes	  to	  the	  Peronist	  party	  campaigning	  during	  and	  after	  her	  working	  office	  hours.34	  	  




reason	  for	  them	  to	  be	  afraid	  of	  being	  fired	  if	   the	  administration	  changed	  (they	  have	  been	  longer	   in	   the	   job	  and	  they	  often	  have	   tenure)	  and	  they	  are	  also	   less	   likely	   to	  believe	   that	  things	  would	  be	  worse	  with	  a	  new	  mayor	  from	  a	  different	  party.	   In	   fact,	  as	   in	  the	  case	  of	  Laura,	  they	  might	  even	  support	  an	  opposition	  party.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  their	  incentives	  are	  aligned	  with	  the	  incentives	  of	  the	  current	  mayor	  and	  that	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  can	  explained	  their	  behavior.	  What	   is	   the	  reason	  then	   for	  employees	  like	  Laura	  to	  provide	  political	  services?	  
In	   order	   to	   convince	   these	   types	   of	   employees—whose	   incentives	   are	   not	   aligned	  with	   the	   incentives	   of	   the	   mayor—to	   collaborate	   and	   provide	   political	   services	   for	   the	  mayor,	  the	  cost	  of	  non-­‐collaboration	  needs	  to	  be	  increased.	  To	  make	  non-­‐supporters	  help	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  favors,	  some	  “external”	  encouragement	  seems	  necessary.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	   show	   that	   these	  types	   of	   employees	   are	   sometimes	  motivated	  by	   fear	   of	   punishment	  or	  more	  subtly,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Laura,	  the	  loss	  of	  some	  benefits	  that	  comes	  with	  doing	  what	  the	  boss	  asks	  (even	  when	  it	  is	  not	  part	  of	  the	  job).	  	  
To	  test	  this	  prediction	  I	  used	  the	  question	  described	  above	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  monitoring	   voting	   behavior	   and	   the	   list	   experiment	   estimates	   of	   political	   services	   from	  chapters	  3	  and	  4.	  To	  estimate	  whether	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  is	  conditional	  on	  individual	  beliefs	   about	   the	   secrecy	   of	   the	   ballot	   I	   compare	   the	   political	   services	   list	   experiment	  estimates	  across	  the	  subgroup	  of	  respondent	  that	  believe	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot	  can	  be	  violated	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  Table	  5.6	  presents	  these	  results.35	  	  




Table	  5.6:	  Believe	  the	  government/parties	  can	  find	  out	  about	  voting	  behavior	  
	   	   	  
Believe	   Yes	   No	  
Differences	  in	  	  
Effects	  
Favors	  
0.51***	   0.44***	   0.07	   0.0002	   0.01	  (0.14)	   (0.09)	   (0.17)	   (0.17)	   (0.17)	  N=289	   N=748	   N=1037	   N=1037	   N=1030	  
Election	  	  Monitors	  
0.19**	   0.13**	   0.07	   0.01	   0.01	  (0.08)	   (0.05)	   (0.10)	   (0.10)	   (0.10)	  N=289	   N=742	   N=1031	   N=1031	   N=1025	  
Campaigns	  
0.26***	   0.15**	   0.11	   0.13	   0.13	  (0.09)	   (0.06)	   (0.11)	   (0.11)	   (0.11)	  N=288	   N=739	   N=1027	   N=1027	   N=1021	  
Political	  Rallies	  
0.36***	   0.18**	   0.18	   0.17	   0.17	  (0.12)	   (0.07)	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	  N=287	   N=741	   N=1028	   N=1028	   N=1022	  With	  Municipal	  Dummies	  	   NO	   YES	   YES	  Other	  Controls	   NO	   NO	   YES	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
Note:	  Table	  reports	  estimated	  difference	  between	   treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  according	  to	  each	  of	  the	  four	  list	  experiments	  conditional	  on	  beliefs	  about	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot.	  The	  last	  three	  columns	  report	  differences	  in	  effects.	  Last	  column	  includes	  the	  following	  controls:	  Age,	   Female,	   College	   and	  Mayor	  Party.	  A	   control	   for	   tenure	  was	  not	   included	  because	   it	   is	  highly	   correlated	  with	   Current	  Mayor;	  Mayor	   Voter	  was	   not	   included	   because	   it	   is	   highly	  correlated	  with	  Mayor	  Party.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  	  Table	   5.6	   indicates	   that	   respondents	   who	   believe	   that	   the	   secrecy	   of	   the	   ballot	   can	   be	  violated	  (column	  1)	  reported	  slightly	  higher	  proportions	  of	  all	   four	  political	  services	  than	  those	   who	   believe	   in	   the	   secrecy	   of	   the	   ballot	   (column	   2),	   especially	   for	   the	   last	   two	  activities—attending	   rallies	   and	   helping	   with	   campaigns.	   In	   all	   four	   cases,	   though,	   the	  difference	  in	  effects	  is	  not	  significant.	  	  




explain	   about	   the	   behavior	   of	   employees	   that	   were	   not	   chosen	   by	   the	   current	  administration.	   Employees	   appointed	   by	   previous	   administrations	   (or	   at	   least	   some	   of	  them)	  might	  be	  the	  ones	  subjected	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  encouragement	  or	  negative	  incentive	  that	  the	  theory	  of	  monitoring	  predicts.	  A	  closer	   look	  at	  the	  monitoring	  hypothesis	  would	  then	  consist	  of	   exploring	   the	   results	   according	   to	  whether	   the	   respondents	  were	  hired	  during	  the	  current	  administration	  or	  during	  previous	  ones.	  Figure	  5.5	  presents	  the	  results	  of	  this	  analysis.36	  




Figure	  5.5:	  Believe	  the	  government	  can	  find	  out	  about	  individual	  voting	  behavior	  
	  	  
Note:	   Estimated	   difference	   between	   treatment	   and	   control	   groups	   according	   to	   the	   list	  experiments.	  Circles	  indicate	  the	  proportion	  of	  employees	  in	  each	  subgroup	  that	  performed	  the	   respective	   political	   service:	   black	   circles	   indicate	   employees	   that	   do	   not	   believe	   the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot	  can	  be	  violated	  while	  white	  circles	  indicate	  those	  who	  believe	  it	  can	  be	  violated.	  The	  variable	  Monitoring	   is	  coded	  with	  “DK”	  answers	  as	  missing	  values.	  Horizontal	  black	  bars	  represent	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  and	  vertical	  lines	  represent	  90%	  confidence	  intervals.	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  	  The	   figure	   shows	   that	   believing	   that	   the	   secrecy	   of	   the	   ballot	   can	   be	   violated	   among	  employees	   hired	   by	   the	   previous	   administration	   has	   a	   small	   conditional	   effect	   (in	   the	  predicted	   direction)	   on	   the	   likelihood	   of	   providing	   at	   least	   one	   of	   the	   political	   services	  
Do you believe that the government or the political






























studied	  here—namely	  attending	  rallies.37	  Among	  new	  employees	  (hired	  during	  the	  current	  administration)	   the	  difference	   in	   the	  proportion	  of	   the	   four	  political	   services	  provided	   is	  very	   similar	   across	   those	  who	  believe	   that	   voting	   is	   in	   fact	   secret	   and	   those	  who	  do	  not	  believe	  that.	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  employees	  appointed	  by	  the	  current	  administration—the	  ones	  whose	  behavior	  is	  explained	  by	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage—doubting	  the	  secrecy	   of	   the	   ballot	   has	   no	   conditional	   effect	   on	   their	   provision	   of	   services.	   For	   the	  employees	  that	  were	  hired	  by	  previous	  administrations,	   the	  difference	  between	  believing	  or	   not	   that	   voting	   is	   in	   fact	   secret	   seems	   to	  matter	   for	   one	   particular	   type	   of	   service—attending	   rallies.	   There	   also	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   small,	   though	   not	   significant,	   effect	   in	   the	  predicted	  direction	  for	  campaigns.	  




whose	  participation	  in	  political	  activities	  was	  described	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  section—was	  in	  charged	  of	  delivering	  food	  to	  the	  monitors	  during	  the	  2009	  election,	  and	  not	  acting	  as	  an	  election	  monitor	  herself.	  
The	  other	  two	  activities	  are	  easier	  to	  monitor	  and	  do	  not	  require	  the	  same	  level	  of	  loyalty	  as	  being	  an	  election	  monitor.	  Among	  old	  employees	  that	  believe	  that	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot	  can	  be	  violated,	  31	  percent	  (significant	  at	  the	  95%)	  reported	  having	  helped	  with	  the	  electoral	  campaign	  during	  the	  last	  election	  whereas	  only	  11	  percent	  (non	  significant)	  of	  those	  that	  believe	  voting	  is	  in	  fact	  secret	  reported	  having	  helped	  with	  the	  campaign.	  While,	  this	   21	   percentage	   points	   difference	   between	   both	   groups	   is	   non-­‐significant,	   it	   is	  considerably	   bigger	   than	   the	   difference	   between	   those	   that	   believe	   in	   the	   secrecy	   of	   the	  ballot	  and	  those	  that	  do	  not	  for	  new	  employees	  (3	  non-­‐significant	  percentage	  points	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction).	  




Indeed,	  qualitative	  work	  has	  pointed	  out	  that	  public	  employees	  and	  beneficiaries	  of	  social	  welfare	  programs	  are	  often	  expected	  to	  turn	  out	  to	  rallies	  (Auyero	  2000,	  Szwarcberg	  2009).	  How	   these	   “expectations”	   translate	   into	   people	   actually	   attending	   a	   political	   rally	  might	   vary.	   Sometimes,	   “‘gratitude’	   goes	  without	   saying	   because	   it	   almost	   always	   comes	  without	  asking.	  [...]	  On	  a	  few	  occasions,	  attendance	  is	  explicitly	  required.	  Yet	  such	  requests	  are	  seldom	  phrased	  as	  orders,	  obligations;	  rather,	  they	  are	  usually	  phrased	  as	  invitations”	  (Auyero	   2000,	   161).	   On	   other	   occasions,	   attendance	   to	   rallies	   is	   strictly	   monitored.	  According	   to	   Szwarcberg	   (2009,	   15),	   brokers	   use	   lists	   with	   the	   names	   of	   “machine	  members,	  beneficiaries	  of	  welfare	  programs,	  public	  employees,	  neighborhood	  community	  organizers,	   and	   party	   activists	   whose	   problems	   they	   have	   solved,	   are	   solving,	   or	   are	  thinking	  about	  solving	   in	   the	   future.	  Everyone	  who	  had	  come	  to	  ask	   for	  help	  or	  who	  had	  been	  offered	  assistance	  without	  asking	  is	  on	  these	  lists	  and	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  at	  the	  rally”	  (see	  also	  Zarazaga	  2012).	  
My	  own	  research	  also	  suggests	   that	  public	  employees	  are	  often	   taken	  to	  rallies	  by	  local	  authorities	  during	  and	  after	  their	  working	  hours.	  As	  a	  35	  year	  old	  telephone	  operator	  from	   Salta	   told	  me,	   the	   last	   time	   she	   attended	   a	   rally	  was	  when	   a	   councilman	   from	   the	  mayor’s	  party	  started	  his	  mandate:	  “They	  brought	  us	  from	  here	  (the	  municipality)	  …	  they	  told	  us	  we	  had	   to	  support	  him.”39	  To	  get	  a	  handle	  at	  this	   issue,	  respondents	  were	  asked	  if	  they	  had	  attended	  a	  rally	  in	  the	  last	  three	  months	  and	  who	  did	  they	  go	  with	  to	  that	  rally	  (or	  the	  last	  one	  they	  attended	  if	  they	  reported	  attending	  more	  than	  one).	  Consistent	  with	  the	  




evidence	  presented	  here,	  among	  the	  280	  respondents	  that	  reported	  attending	  a	  rally	  in	  the	  previous	  three	  months,	  41	  percent	  reported	  attending	  it	  with	  co-­‐workers.40	  
	  
5.5	   Alternative	  Explanation	  II:	  Norms	  of	  Reciprocity	  	  
In	   contrast	   to	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   developed	   in	   chapter	   2	   and	   the	  monitoring	   theory	   just	   discussed,	   others	   have	   argued	   that	   clientelistic	   contracts	   are	  sustained	  on	  norms	  of	   reciprocity	   (Finan	  and	  Schechter	  2012;	  Lawson	  and	  Greene	  2012;	  Scott	  1972).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  clients	  behave	  according	  to	  their	  patrons’	  wishes	  out	  of	  a	   sense	   of	   gratitude.	   In	   the	   particular	   case	   under	   study	   here,	   this	   means	   that	   public	  employees	   provide	   political	   services	   to	   the	   mayor	   out	   of	   gratitude	   for	   getting	   the	   job.	  According	  to	  this	  theory	  then,	  employees	  who	  believe	  in	  norms	  of	  reciprocity	  and	  who	  own	  their	   jobs	   to	   the	   current	   mayor	   should	   be	   more	   involved	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   political	  services.	  	  




Table	  5.7:	  Political	  services	  by	  reciprocity,	  for	  employees	  hired	  during	  current	  
administration	  	   	   	   	   	  
Believe	  
Strongly	  Agree	   Other	  answers	   Differences	  in	  Effects	  
Favors	  
0.44***	   0.68***	   -­‐0.24	   -­‐0.15	   -­‐0.05	  (0.13)	   (0.18)	   (0.22)	   (0.22)	   (0.22)	  N=356	   N=177	   N=533	   N=533	   N=529	  
Election	  Monitors	  
0.29***	   0.13	   0.16	   0.22*	   0.21	  (0.08)	   (0.11)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	  N=352	   N=177	   N=529	   N=529	   N=526	  
Campaigns	  
0.28***	   0.04	   0.24	   0.18	   0.16	  (0.09)	   (0.12)	   (0.16)	   (0.15)	   (0.15)	  N=351	   N=176	   N=527	   N=527	   N=524	  
Political	  Rallies	  
0.32***	   -­‐0.04	   0.37*	   0.34*	   0.23	  (0.12)	   (0.14)	   (0.19)	   (0.18)	   (0.18)	  N=352	   N=177	   N=529	   N=529	   N=526	  Municipal	  dummies	   	  	   NO	   YES	   YES	  Other	  Controls	   	  	   NO	   NO	   YES	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	  Table	  reports	  estimated	  difference	  between	   treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  according	  to	  each	  of	  the	  four	  list	  experiments	  conditional	  on	  beliefs	  about	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot.	  Last	  three	  columns	  report	  differences	  in	  effects.	  Last	  column	  includes	  the	  following	  controls:	  Age,	  Female,	  College	  and	  Mayor	  Party.	  A	  control	  for	  tenure	  was	  not	  included	  because	  it	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  Current	  Mayor;	  Mayor	  Voter	  was	  not	  included	  because	  it	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  Mayor	  Party.	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	  




that	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   states	   as	   the	   more	   relevant	   to	   explain	   the	  provision	   of	   political	   services.	   More	   importantly,	   reciprocal	   individuals	   tend	   to	   be	  supporters	  (both	  measured	  as	  Mayor	  Party	  and	  Mayor	  Voter)	  and	  less	  educated.	  
In	  sum,	  although	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  strongly	  agreeing	  with	  the	  reciprocity	  statement	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  at	   least	  some	  of	  the	  political	  services,	  the	   difference	   in	   effects	   between	   reciprocal	   and	   non-­‐reciprocal	   respondents	   are	   not	  significant	  once	  other	  controls	  are	  included.	  	  
	  
5.6	   Robustness	  check	  	  
Finally,	  as	  with	  any	  other	  project	  with	  a	  limited	  geographic	  scope,	  there	  could	  be	  concerns	  about	  whether	  these	  results	  would	  apply	  to	  other	  settings.	  Recall,	  however,	  that	  the	  three	  municipalities	  chosen	  for	  the	  project	  were	  very	  different	  both	  politically	  and	  economically,	  making	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  a	  theory	  that	  applies	  to	  all	  three	  municipalities	  would	  also	  apply	  to	   other	   places.	   Table	   5.8	   presents	   once	   again	   the	  main	   results	   for	  mayor	   supporters—
Mayor	  Voters	   and	  Mayor	  Party—	  divided	  by	  municipality	   for	   the	   two	  survey	  experiments	  discussed	  in	  section	  5.2.	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Table	  5.8:	  Political	  services	  list-­‐experiment	  estimates	  conditional	  on	  being	  a	  
supporter,	  across	  municipalities	  	  4	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Likelihood	  of	  staying	  	  in	  the	  job	   Change	  for	  better	  	  or	  worse	  	  	   No	   Yes	   Difference	  in	  Effects	   No	   Yes	   Difference	  in	  Effects	  
SALTA	  
Mayor	  voters	   1.37**	   -­‐0.49*	   1.86***	   -­‐0.27*	   -­‐0.20**	   -­‐0.07	  (0.57)	   (0.27)	   (0.64)	   (0.15)	   (0.07)	   (0.16)	  N=65	   N=278	   N=343	   N=57	   N=261	   N=318	  Mayor	  Party	  	   0.34	   -­‐0.53	   0.87*	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.30***	   0.20*	  (0.37)	   (0.32)	   (0.49)	   (0.09)	   (0.09)	   (0.12)	  N=163	   N=192	   N=355	   N=156	   N=171	   N=327	  
SANTA	  
FE	  
Mayor	  voters	   0.20	   -­‐0.98*	   1.18*	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐0.26**	   0.24**	  (0.45)	   (0.56)	   (0.71)	   (0.07)	   (0.09)	   (0.11)	  N=219	   N=164	   N=383	   N=202	   N=148	   N=350	  Mayor	  Party	  	   -­‐0.47	   0.18	   -­‐0.64	   -­‐0.11*	   -­‐0.23	   0.12	  (0.38)	   (0.81)	   (0.93)	   (0.06)	   (0.17)	   (0.15)	  N=326	   N=65	   N=391	   N=296	   N=61	   N=357	  
TIGRE	  
Mayor	  voters	   0.01	   -­‐1.40***	   1.41***	   -­‐0.17*	   -­‐0.51***	   0.34**	  (0.32)	   (0.33)	   (0.49)	   (0.09)	   (0.08)	   (0.12)	  N=133	   N=205	   N=338	   N=122	   N=181	   N=303	  Mayor	  Party	  	   -­‐0.15	   -­‐2.16***	   2.02***	   -­‐0.22***	   -­‐0.69***	   0.47***	  (0.23)	   (0.52)	   (0.49)	   (0.06)	   (0.13)	   (0.13)	  N=275	   N=110	   N=385	   N=249	   N=94	   N=343	  	  	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Two-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance.	  	  Standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1	  
	  The	   results	   by	  municipality	   presented	   in	   Table	   5.8	   are	   broadly	   consistent	  with	   the	   ones	  obtained	   when	   pulling	   the	   three	   municipalities	   together.	   A	   partial	   exception	   is	   the	  municipality	   of	   Santa	   Fe	   when	  measuring	   support	   with	   the	  Mayor	   Party	   variable	   in	   the	  stability	  survey	  experiment	  and	  the	  municipality	  of	  Salta	  when	  measuring	  support	  with	  the	  
Mayor	   Voter	   variable	   in	   the	   change	   experiment.	   In	   both	   cases,	   the	   coefficient	   for	   the	  difference	  in	  effects	  estimation	  has	  the	  opposite	  sign	  (although	  is	  not	  significant)	  to	  the	  one	  predicted	   by	   the	   theory	   and	   obtained	   for	   the	  whole	   sample.	  Note,	   however,	   that	   in	   both	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cases,	  the	  reduced	  sample	  sizes	  caused	  by	  the	  limited	  number	  of	  employees	  from	  the	  party	  of	  the	  mayor	  in	  Santa	  Fe	  (65	  respondents)	  and	  employees	  that	  did	  not	  report	  voting	  for	  the	  mayor	  in	  Salta	  (57	  respondents)	  make	  the	  estimation	  more	  difficult.	  Similarly,	  in	  Santa	  Fe	  when	   measuring	   support	   for	   the	   mayor	   with	   the	   Mayor	   Party	   variable	   in	   the	   change	  experiment,	  the	  result	  is	  not	  significant	  (although	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  coefficient	  is	  as	  expected).	  
	  
5.7	   Conclusion	  
The	   theory	  developed	   in	  chapter	  2	  proposed	  a	  novel	  explanation	   for	   the	  sustainability	  of	  patronage	  contracts.	  By	  treating	  both	  patrons	  and	  clients—in	  this	  case,	  public	  employees—	  as	  active	  agents	  with	  clear	  individual	  interests,	  it	  departs	  from	  existing	  explanations	  based	  either	   on	   feelings	   of	   reciprocity	   or	   fear	   of	   punishment.	   According	   to	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	  theory	   of	   patronage,	   public	   sector	   employees	   provide	   political	   services	   to	   the	   mayor	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  on	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  keep	  the	  incumbent	  mayor	  in	  power.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  commitment	  problem	  that	  arise	  in	  patronage	  contracts	  because	  of	  the	  non-­‐simultaneity	  of	  the	  exchange	  of	  public	  jobs	  for	  political	  services	  disappears	  because	  of	  the	  alignment	  of	  interests	  between	  the	  mayor	  and	  the	  patronage	  employees.	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  used	  two	  survey	  experiments	  embedded	  in	  an	  original	  survey	  of	   public	   employees	   to	   test	   the	  main	   empirical	   predictions	   of	   this	   theory.	   The	   results	   of	  both	   experiments	   strongly	   support	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   and	   draw	  attention	   to	   the	   interests	   and	   strategic	   behavior	   of	   clients,	   rather	   than	   treating	   them	   as	  non-­‐strategic	   actors,	   overly	   driven	   by	   short-­‐term	   responses	   to	   the	   actions	   of	   patrons.	  Public	   employees	   who	   support	   the	   mayor,	   either	   measured	   as	   self-­‐reported	   voting	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behavior	  or	   as	   identification	  with	   the	  party	  of	   the	  mayor,	   are	  more	  afraid	  of	   losing	   their	  jobs	   or	   things	   changing	   for	   the	   worse	   if	   a	   new	   mayor	   from	   the	   opposition	   were	   to	   be	  elected.	  	  





	  This	   dissertation	   has	   set	   out	   to	   answer	   two	   main	   questions:	   what	   do	   public	   sector	  employees	   do	   that	   affects	   electoral	   competition	   and	  why	   do	   they	   do	   it.	   In	   the	   preceding	  chapters,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  public	  employees	  under	  patronage	  contracts	  provide	  political	  services	   to	   the	  patron	  that	  hires	   them.	  These	  diverse	  political	  services—attending	  rallies,	  helping	  with	  campaigns,	  monitoring	  elections,	  and	  granting	  favors,	  just	  to	  mention	  the	  ones	  studied	  in	  this	  dissertation—	  are	  essential	  for	  obtaining	  and	  maintaining	  electoral	  support.	  The	   ability	   that	   some	   incumbents	   enjoy	   in	   contexts	   of	   weak	   civil	   service	   systems	   to	  distribute	   public	   sector	   jobs	   to	   those	   that	   would	   provide	   political	   services	   yields	  incumbents	  with	  a	  very	  powerful	  electoral	  tool.	  	  
Patronage	  contracts,	  however,	  are	  risky.	  Since	  the	  exchange	  of	   the	   job	   for	  political	  support	   is	   not	   simultaneous	   and	   the	   law	   cannot	   be	   used	   to	   enforce	   such	   agreements,	  defection	  and	  betrayal	  are	  always	  a	  possibility.	   In	   this	  dissertation,	   I	  have	   focused	  on	  the	  commitment	   problems	   that	   arise	   from	   the	   non-­‐simultaneity	   of	   the	   exchange	   when	   the	  public	  sector	  job	  is	  distributed	  with	  the	  expectation	  of	  obtaining	  political	  support	  from	  the	  client	  in	  the	  future.	  A	  citizen	  who	  receives	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  with	  the	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  understanding	   that	   she	  will	   provide	   political	   services	   in	   return	   can	   easily	   renege	   on	   her	  side	   of	   the	   agreement	  after	   getting	   the	   job.	  Why	  would	   public	   sector	   employees	   comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  patronage	  agreement	  after	  receiving	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  job?	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This	  dissertation	  suggests	  a	  novel	  explanation	  for	  why	  public	  sector	  employees	  (the	  clients)	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  patronage	  contract	  even	  after	  obtaining	  the	  job	  from	  the	  politician	  (the	  patron).	  Departing	  from	  existing	  explanations,	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  posits	  that	  public	  employees	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  agreement	  because	  they	  believe	  that	  their	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  their	  patron.	  Patrons	  do	  not	  need	  to	   monitor	   clients	   and	   threaten	   to	   punish	   non-­‐compliers.	   To	   make	   patronage	   contracts	  work,	   politicians	   only	   need	   to	   be	   able	   to	   screen	   supporters	   from	   non-­‐supporters	   and	  distribute	  patronage	  contracts	  only	  to	  the	  former.	  When	  patronage	  jobs	  are	  distributed	  to	  supporters,	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   self-­‐sustaining.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   because	   only	  supporters—whose	  fates	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  political	  fate	  of	  the	  politician	  that	  hired	  them—	  can	  credibly	   commit	   to	   provide	   political	   support	   in	   the	   future.	   Patronage	   jobs	   and	   working	  conditions	   held	   by	   perceived	   supporters	  will	   be	  maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	   politician	  (their	   patron)	   but	   not	   by	   a	   competing	   politician	   (because	   supporters	   of	   the	   incumbent	  cannot	  credibly	  commit	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  for	  the	  opposition).	  Once	  perceived	  as	  a	   supporter	   of	   the	   incumbent	   politician,	   patronage	   employees	   have	   low	   expectations	   of	  keeping	  their	  jobs	  and	  working	  conditions	  if	  the	  opposition	  were	  to	  win.	  	  
The	   actual	   firing	   or	   demotion	   of	   public	   employees	   may	   happen	   only	   rarely,	   in	  certain	   very	   specific	   places,	   or	   for	   certain	   types	   of	   employees.	   Nonetheless,	   the	   fact	   that	  employees	   believe	   in	   this	   possibility	   is	   enough	   of	   an	   incentive	   to	   support	   their	   patron.	  When	  something	  as	  valuable	  as	  one’s	  livelihood	  is	  at	  stake,	  clients	  might	  be	  less	  willing	  to	  take	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   wrong.	   Supporters	   then	   have	   large	   incentives	   to	   provide	   political	  services	   to	   help	   their	   patron	   to	   stay	   in	   power.	   In	   other	  words,	  when	   supporters	   get	   the	  patronage	   jobs,	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   incentive-­‐compatible	   and	   the	   commitment	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problem	  associated	  with	  the	  non-­‐simultaneity	  of	  the	  exchange	  disappears.	  Supporters	  with	  patronage	   jobs	  understand	   that	   it	   is	   in	   their	   best	   interest	   to	  provide	  political	   services	   to	  help	   the	   incumbent	   politician	   remain	   in	   power	   and	   this	   alignment	   of	   interests	   between	  patrons	  and	  clients	  makes	  patronage	  contracts	  self-­‐sustaining.	  
The	   empirical	   evidence	   provided	   in	   chapters	   3,	   4	   and	   5	   is	   consistent	   with	   this	  theory.	  The	  list	  and	  survey	  experiment	  results	  show	  that	  supporters	  are	  indeed	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  political	  services	  and	  that	  they	  are	  more	  afraid	  than	  non-­‐supporters	  of	  losing	  their	  jobs	  or	  suffering	  negative	  changes	  in	  working	  conditions	  with	  a	  change	  in	  administration.	  Once	  we	  take	  into	  account	  the	  incentive	  alignment	  predicted	  by	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage,	  the	  role	  of	  monitoring	  and	  punishment	  is	  limited	  to	  certain	   types	   of	   employees	   and	   certain	   type	   of	   services.	   Employees	   hired	   by	   previous	  administrations,	  often	   from	  a	  different	  party	  of	   the	  current	  mayor,	  have	  no	   fear	  of	   losing	  their	  jobs	  or	  experiencing	  changes	  for	  the	  worse	  if	  a	  new	  mayor	  from	  a	  different	  party	  gets	  into	  power.	  For	  these	  types	  of	  employees,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  the	  type	  of	  incentive	  alignment	  upon	  which	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage	  is	  constructed.	  The	  theory	  of	  reciprocity,	  in	  turn,	  finds	  very	  weak	  support	  in	  the	  data.	  	  
The	   empirical	   results	   from	   the	   three	   Argentinean	   municipalities	   included	   in	   this	  dissertation	  provide	  strong	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage.	  But	   can	   the	   theory	   developed	   in	   this	   dissertation	   help	   to	   explain	   the	   functioning	   of	  patronage	  appointments	   in	  other	  places?	  While	   I	  do	  not	  have	   the	  data	   to	   test	   the	   theory	  systematically	   in	   other	   countries,	   this	   section	   presents	   additional	   evidence	   from	   Latin	  America	  as	  an	  out	  of	  sample	  test	  of	  the	  theory	  and	  to	  provide	  more	  confidence	  about	  the	  external	   validity	  of	   the	   argument.	   I	   draw	  attention	   to	   a	   series	  of	   patterns	   found	   in	  other	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Latin	  American	  countries	   that	  are	   consistent	  with	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	  of	  patronage,	  increasing	   the	   likelihood	   of	   the	   portability	   of	   the	   theory	   and	   the	   findings	   of	   this	  dissertation.	   In	   the	   following	  pages	   I	   describe	   the	   remarkably	  weak	  Latin	  American	   civil	  service	   systems	   and	  provide	   evidence	   that,	   in	   line	  with	   the	   empirical	   implications	   of	  my	  theory	   of	   patronage,	   there	   is	   partisan	   bias	   in	   hiring	   decisions	   and	   patronage	   employees	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  fear	  losing	  their	  jobs	  or	  suffering	  negative	  changes	  in	  their	  working	  conditions	  with	  a	  new	  administration.	  	  
	  
6.1	   Beyond	  the	  Argentine	  Case	  
As	   mentioned	   in	   the	   introduction	   to	   this	   dissertation,	   patronage	   is	   a	   widespread	  phenomenon	   that	   has	   been	   found	   in	   countries	   all	   over	   the	   world.	   Scholars	   have	   found	  patronage	  appointments	  in	  settings	  as	  diverse	  as	  Italy	  (Chubb	  1981,	  1982;	  Golden	  2003),	  Greece	  (Papakostas	  2001;	  Pappas	  2009),	  the	  United	  Sates	  (Banfield	  and	  Wilson	  1963;	  Folke	  et	   al.	   2011;	   Johnston	   1979;	  Wolfinger	   1972),	   Bulgaria,	   Hungary	   and	   the	   Czech	   Republic	  (Kopecký	  and	  Spirova	  2011),	  Nigeria	  (Bratton	  2008),	  and	  Ghana	  and	  South	  Africa	  (Kopecký	  2011),	  among	  others.	  However,	   the	  mere	  fact	   that	  patronage	   jobs	  exist	  beyond	  Argentina	  does	   not	   constitute	   evidence	   that	   the	   theory	   developed	   in	   this	   dissertation	   helps	   us	  understand	  how	  patronage	  actually	  works	   in	  other	  places.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  describe	  some	  characteristics	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  Latin	  American	  public	  administrations	  that	  are	  key	  for	  the	   theory	   developed	   here.	   Certainly,	   I	   am	   not	   claiming	   that	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	  patronage	  can	  explain	  the	  way	  patronage	  works	  in	  all	  the	  countries	  mentioned	  above,	  nor	  can	   it	   probably	   explain	   all	   Latin	   American	   cases.	   The	   goal	   of	   this	   section	   is	   to	   provide	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evidence	   that	   the	   empirical	   implications	   of	   the	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   are	  compatible	  with	  patterns	  observed	  beyond	  the	  three	  municipalities	  studied	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters.	  
According	   to	   the	   argument	   advanced	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   patronage	   jobs	   are	  disproportionally	   distributed	   to	   supporters	   (because	   only	   them	   can	   credibly	   commit	   to	  provide	  political	   support),	  whose	   fates	  are	   tied	   to	   the	  political	   fate	  of	   the	  politicians	   that	  hire	   them.	   Patronage	   employees	   believe	   that	   their	   jobs	   and	   working	   conditions	   will	   be	  maintained	   by	   the	   incumbent	   but	   not	   by	   a	   competing	   politician	   (because	   incumbents’	  supporters	   cannot	   credible	   commit	   to	   provide	   political	   services	   for	   the	   opposition).	  Supporters	   then	  have	   large	   incentives	   to	  provide	  political	  services	   to	  help	   the	   incumbent	  stay	   in	   power,	   which	   makes	   their	   original	   commitment	   to	   provide	   political	   services	  credible.	  Even	  supporters	  that	  cannot	  be	  fired	  (those	  with	  tenure)	  believe	  that	  they	  might	  suffer	  negative	  consequences	  on	  their	  working	  conditions	  with	  a	  new	  administration.	  
Certainly,	  a	  weak	  civil	  service	  system	  is	  a	  precondition	  for	  any	  theory	  of	  patronage.	  The	   theory	   developed	   here	   is	   a	   theory	   about	   the	   commitment	   issues	   associated	   with	  patronage	  contracts	  but	   these	   types	  of	  contracts	  are	  only	  possible	   in	  contexts	  of	  weak	  or	  non-­‐existent	  civil	  service	  systems—like	  the	  ones	  found	  in	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries.	  The	  argument	  does	  not	  carry	  much	  explanatory	  power	   in	  contexts	  with	  strict	  regulations	  about	   hiring	   and	   firing,	  where	   appointments	   to	   public	   jobs	   are	   fully	   based	   on	  merit	   and	  dismissals	  are	  only	  a	  product	  of	  bad	  performance.	  However,	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  strong	  civil	  service	  system	  does	  not	  in	  itself	  imply	  that,	  as	  predicted	  by	  my	  theory	  of	  patronage,	  there	  is	  partisan	  bias	   in	   the	  distribution	  of	   jobs	  or	   that	  patronage	   employees	   are	   afraid	  of	   losing	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their	   jobs	   or	   of	   suffering	   negative	   changes	   in	   working	   conditions	   with	   a	   new	  administration.	  	  
Two	  other	  practices	  found	  in	  Latin	  American	  public	  administrations	  are	  consistent	  with	   the	  main	   empirical	   implications	   of	   the	   theory:	   partisan	  bias	   in	   hiring	  decisions	   and	  fear	   of	   negative	   changes	   (turnover	   of	   public	   employees	   in	   the	   extreme	   cases)	  with	   new	  administrations.	   In	   this	   section,	   after	   providing	   a	   general	   description	   of	   Latin	   American	  civil	   service	   systems,	   I	   rely	   on	   secondary	   literature	   to	   show	   that	   political	   hiring	   does	  happen	   and	   that	   public	   employees	   have	   good	   reasons	   to	   fear	   a	   change	   in	   the	  administration.	  	  
Latin	  American	  Weak	  Civil	  Service	  Systems	   All	   Latin	   American	   countries	   have	  constitutionally	   recognized	   career	   public	   services	   and	   laws	   that	   institute	   these	   systems	  (Iacoviello	  2006).	  These	  systems	  recognize	   the	   legitimacy	  of	  some	  political	  appointments	  for	  high-­‐level	  positions	  (as	  in	  all	  countries),	  often	  institute	  tenure	  rights	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  employees,	  and	  in	  many	  cases	  mandate	  the	  selection	  of	  these	  (non-­‐political)	  employees	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  merit.	  Many	  countries	   in	  the	  region	  have	   introduced	  rules	  about	  merit-­‐based	  competition	  for	  recruitment	  of	  new	  employees,	  but	  implementation	  has	  been	  haphazard	  in	  most	  cases	  (Iacoviello	  2006;	  Longo	  2006a;	  Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010).	  In	  practice,	   in	  most	  Latin	  American	   countries,	   civil	   service	   systems	   co-­‐exist	  with	   political	   criteria	   for	   hiring,	   firing,	  and	  promotions	  (Grindle	  2012;	  Iacoviello	  2006).	  	  
In	   2006,	   the	   IDB	   conducted	   an	   evaluation	   of	   civil	   services	   in	   18	   Latin	   American	  countries	  (Echevarría	  2006)	  according	  to	  which	  Latin	  American	  public	  administrations	  can	  be	  classified	  in	  three	  main	  groups	  based	  on	  their	  level	  of	  professionalization.	  In	  some	  Latin	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American	   countries,	   particularly	   in	   Central	   America	   (with	   the	   exception	   of	   Costa	   Rica),	  hiring	   occurs	   only	   through	   political	   connections.	   The	   partisan	   bias	   in	   recruitment	   is	   so	  widespread	  that	  in	  some	  of	  the	  countries	  in	  this	  group	  it	   is	  possible	  to	  guess	  the	  partisan	  affiliation	   of	   public	   employees	   based	   on	   the	   year	   they	   were	   hired	   (Iacoviello	   2006).	   In	  others—among	  them	  Argentina—some	  formal	  criteria	   for	   the	  selection	  and	  promotion	  of	  employees	  based	  on	  merit	  exists	  but	  it	   is	  poorly	  implemented	  and	  co-­‐exists	  with	  political	  criteria.	   Finally,	   other	   countries—Brazil	   and	   Chile—have	   solid	   merit	   systems	   for	   the	  recruitment	  and	  promotion	  of	  public	  employees	  (Iacoviello	  2006;	  Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010).1	  
Figure	  6.1	  reproduces	  the	  findings	  on	  merit	  criteria	  of	  the	  IDB	  study.	  It	  is	  based	  on	  an	   index	   that	   measures	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   “objective,	   technical,	   and	   professional	  procedures	   exist	   and	   are	   followed	   to	   recruit,	   select,	   promote,	   compensate	   and	   dismiss	  employees”	   (Zuvanic	   et	   al.	   2010,	   152).	   Low	   values	   on	   the	   0	   to	   100	   scale	   indicate	   the	  absence	  of	  merit	  criteria	  while	  high	  values	  indicate	  the	  use	  of	  this	  criteria.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  mechanisms	   for	   hiring	   and	   firing	   (meritocratic	   or	   politicized)	   are	   not	   the	   only	   characteristics	   of	   civil	  service	  systems	  that	  are	   important	   to	  establish	   the	  professionalization	  of	   the	  public	  administration	  and	  the	  strength	   of	   the	   civil	   service	   system.	   Other	   characteristics	   such	   as	   functional	   capacity	   or	   flexibility	   are	   also	  important.	   However,	   the	   present	   or	   absence	   of	   merit	   criteria	   for	   hiring	   and	   firing	   is	   the	   most	   important	  characteristic	  of	  civil	  service	  systems	  for	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation.	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Figure	  6.1:	  Merit	  index	  in	  Latin	  American	  countries	  
	  Source:	  Echevarría	  2006	  	  
	  As	  Figure	  6.1	  clearly	  shows	  the	  merit	  index	  indicates	  that	  the	  institutionalized	  use	  of	  merit	  criteria	  for	  selection,	  promotion	  and	  dismissal	  of	  Latin	  American	  public	  sector	  employees	  is	  infrequent.	  The	  average	  for	  the	  region	  is	  33	  points	  (out	  of	  100),	  ranging	  from	  2	  points	  for	  Panama	  to	  87	  points	   for	  Brazil.	  Argentina,	  with	  52	  points,	   is	  considered	   to	  be	  among	   the	  countries	   with	   intermediate	   development	   of	   civil	   service	   (together	   with	   Colombia,	  Uruguay,	   Mexico,	   and	   Venezuela),	   where	   merit-­‐based	   practices	   co-­‐exist	   with	   political	  patronage	  (Iacoviello	  2006;	  Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
























































































the	  IDB	  index	  (Grindle	  2012).2	  The	  most	  obvious	  way	  to	  maintain	  the	  patronage	  system	  is	  “simple	   failure	   to	   observe	   laws	   and	   regulations”	   (Grindle	   2012,	   150).	   For	   instance,	   in	  Guatemala,	  the	  civil	  service	  law	  was	  passed	  in	  1968	  but	  its	  regulatory	  framework	  was	  only	  put	   in	   place	   in	   1998	   (Iacoviello	   2006).	   In	   El	   Salvador,	   the	   civil	   service	   law	   (1961)	   was	  modified	   several	   times,	   but	   the	   regulatory	   framework	   was	   never	   established	   (Iacoviello	  2006;	   Iturburu	   2012a).	   In	   Venezuela,	   the	   civil	   service	   law	   was	   passed	   in	   1975	   and	   the	  regulatory	  framework	  was	  put	  in	  place	  in	  2002,	  almost	  thirty	  years	  later	  (Iacoviello	  2006).	  	  
Another	  common	  mechanism	  used	  to	  maintain	  the	  discretion	  in	  hiring—in	  this	  case,	  without	   contravening	   civil-­‐service	   laws	   and	   regulations—	   is	   the	   widespread	   use	   of	  temporary	   appointments.	   The	   systematic	   use	   of	   temporary	   contracts	   gives	   governments	  the	  advantage	  of	  avoiding,	  not	  only	  restrictions	  on	  recruitment,	  but	  often	  the	  tenure	  system	  as	  well,	  giving	  politicians	  more	  autonomy	  to	  both	  hire	  and	  fire.	  And,	  of	  course,	  temporary	  employees	  have	  more	  to	  fear	  with	  a	  new	  administration—permanent	  employees	  might	  be	  afraid	   of	   a	   negative	   change	   in	   working	   conditions	   with	   a	   new	   administration,	   but	  temporary	  employees	  could	  lose	  their	  jobs.	  Recall	  that	  one	  of	  the	  empirical	  implications	  of	  the	   theory	   developed	   in	   this	   dissertation	   is	   that	   temporary	   employees	   that	   support	   the	  politician	   in	   power	  will	   be	  more	   enthusiastic	   collaborators	   than	   those	  who	   enjoy	   tenure	  rights.	  Having	  so	  much	  to	  lose	  works	  as	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  provide	  political	  services	  to	  try	   to	   keep	   their	   patrons	   in	   power.	   The	   proportion	   of	   temporary	   employees	   then	   is	   an	  important	   characteristic	   of	   public	   administrations	   with	   significant	   impact	   on	   the	  predictions	  of	  the	  theory.	  And,	  as	  the	  examples	  below	  show,	  the	  use	  of	  temporary	  contracts	  is	  a	  very	  popular	  practice	  among	  Latin	  American	  administrations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  See	  Grindle	  2012,	  pages	  227-­‐239	  for	  a	  detailed	  description	  and	  examples	  of	  these	  practices.	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For	  instance,	  in	  El	  Salvador,	  the	  only	  reform	  that	  was	  introduced	  to	  change	  the	  Civil	  Service	   Law	   (1961)	  was	   conducted	   in	   the	  1990s	   to	  deal	  with	   the	   situation	  of	   temporary	  employees	  that	  constituted	  40	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  personnel	  at	  that	  time	  (Longo	  2006a).3	  By	  2012	  the	  number	  of	  temporary	  contracts	  in	  the	  national	  administration	  was	  reduced	  to	  21	  percent,	  but	  public	  enterprises	  and	  decentralized	  agencies	  still	  had	  37.5	  percent	  of	  their	  employees	   under	   these	   contracts	   (Iturburu	   2012a).	   In	   Peru,	   about	   40	   percent	   of	   public	  sector	  employees	  work	  under	  temporary	  contracts;	  while	  in	  Dominican	  Republic	  a	  quarter	  of	   public	   employees	   is	   on	   such	   contracts	   (Iacoviello	   2006).	   In	   Argentina,	   Honduras,	   and	  Uruguay	   the	   proportion	   of	   temporary	   employees	   is	   about	   15	   percent,	   but	   there	   is	  significant	   variation	   across	   areas	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   some	  agencies	  have	  more	   temporary	  than	  tenured	  employees	  (Iacoviello	  2006).4	  
Note	  that	  the	  merit	   index	  discussed	  above	  is	  based	  on	  a	  general	  assessment	  of	  the	  national	  civil	  services,	  but	  there	  is	  significant	  variation	  across	  different	  agencies	  and	  levels	  of	   government.	   Different	   types	   of	   bureaucracies	   can	   exist	   within	   the	   same	   country	  (Gingerich	  2006,	  forthcoming;	  Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010),	  and	  lower	  levels	  of	  the	  administration	  (provinces	  and	  municipalities)	  are	  usually	  more	  politicized.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Argentina,	  the	  Central	   Bank	   is	   considered	   an	   institution	   where	   meritocratic	   principles	   prevail	   over	  political	  ones	  in	  the	  process	  of	  hiring,	  firing,	  and	  promotions.5	  The	  national	  bureaucracy,	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Since	  2004,	  the	  year	  when	  the	  research	  for	  the	  IDB	  report	  was	  conducted,	  the	  Salvadorian	  Civil	  Service	  Law	  was	  modified	  many	  more	  times,	  but	  no	  regulatory	  framework	  has	  yet	  been	  passed	  (Iturburu	  2012a).	  4	  For	   instance,	   in	   Uruguay,	   in	   2004,	   the	  Ministry	   of	   Transportation	   had	   85	   percent	   of	   its	   employees	   under	  temporary	  contracts;	  while	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Tourism	  had	  50	  percent	  (Iacoviello	  2006).	  5	  All	   Latin	   American	   countries,	   even	   the	   ones	   with	   the	   weakest	   meritocratic	   systems,	   have	   areas	   of	   the	  administration	   that	   are	   more	   professionalized.	   For	   instance,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Commerce	   and	   Production	   in	  Venezuela,	   the	   Customs	   Office	   in	   Bolivia,	   and	   the	   Secretary	   of	   Labor,	   the	   Administration	   and	   Personnel	  National	   Office	   (ONAP),	   the	   Comptroller	   General's	   Office,	   and	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   in	   Dominican	   Republic	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turn,	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  in	  an	  intermediate	  level	  where	  political	  and	  meritocratic	  criteria	  co-­‐exist,	  often	  unevenly,	  across	  sectors.	  And,	  at	   the	  other	  end	  of	   the	  spectrum,	  provincial	  and	  municipal	  bureaucracies	  are	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  more	  politicized	  (Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010).	   Even	   a	   country	   that	   ranks	   high	   on	   its	   use	   of	  meritocratic	   criteria	   at	   the	   national	  administration	   like	   Chile,	   has	   regional	   and	   municipal	   administrations	   where	   the	  discretionary	  criteria	  is	  more	  pronounced	  (Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2012;	  Leyton	  Navarro	  2006).	  
Partisan	  Bias	  in	  Hiring	  and	  Firing	   A	  quote	  from	  Grindle	  (2012,	  151-­‐152)	  provides	  a	  vivid	  illustration	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  (at	  least	  some)	  Latin	  American	  administrations:	  
	  
“Many	  of	  the	  patronage	  systems	  in	  Latin	  America	  resembled	  the	  
kind	   of	   electoral	   partisanship	   and	   rotation	   in	   office	   founded	   in	  
the	  United	  States	   in	   the	  nineteenth	  century.	  With	  each	  election,	  
even	  when	  the	  same	  party	  was	  returned	  to	  office,	  jobs	  were	  lost,	  
shifted	  and	  allocated	  to	  party	  stalwarts	  who	  had	  been	  helpful	  in	  
winning	   the	   election.	   Frequently,	   the	   first	   year	   of	   a	   new	  
administration	  was	   one	   in	  which	   little	  was	   accomplished	   other	  
than	  recruiting	  personnel	  and	  making	  plans	   for	  new	   initiatives.	  
Similarly,	   the	   final	  year	  of	  an	  administration,	   taking	  pace	   in	  an	  
election	  year,	  was	  often	  a	   time	  of	  poor	  performance	  as	  officials	  
engaged	  widely	  in	  electoral	  mobilization	  or	  worked	  to	  establish	  
alliances	  to	  ensure	  they	  could	  find	  jobs	  after	  the	  election.”	  	  
Finding	  direct	  evidence	  of	  political	  bias	  in	  hiring	  decisions	  is	  not	  easy.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction	   of	   this	   dissertation,	   systematic	   data	   on	   patronage	   is	   very	   hard	   to	   find	   and	  generate.	   However,	   some	   Latin	   American	   administrations	   are	   so	   politicized	   that	   there	   is	  little	  doubt	  about	  the	  political	  bias	  in	  hiring	  decisions.	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  a	  survey	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Longo	  2006a).	  See	  also	  Gingerich	  (forthcoming)	  for	  more	  examples	  and	  evidence	  of	  within	  country	  variation	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Bolivia,	  Brazil,	  and	  Chile.	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conducted	  in	  2008	  in	  the	  Dominican	  Republic’s	  public	  administration,	  70	  percent	  of	  hires	  are	  based	  on	  recommendations	  and	  political	  influence	  (Iacoviello	  2009a).	  In	  Panama,	  only	  18	  percent	   of	   the	  national	   public	   administration	   is	   considered	   to	  be	   formally	  part	   of	   the	  public	   administration	   (acreditado),	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   public	   administration	   is	   subjected	   to	  discretionary	   appointments	   and	   dismissals	   (Longo	   2006b).	   In	   El	   Salvador,	   the	   law	   gives	  priority	  to	  internal	  candidates	  when	  there	  is	  an	  opening,	  and	  only	  when	  this	  process	  fails	  the	  law	  stipulates	  the	  call	  for	  an	  open	  competition.	  In	  reality,	  open	  competitions	  are	  never	  called	  and	  internal	  competitions	  are	  politicized	  (Iacoviello	  2006).	  
The	   strong	   politicization	   of	   hiring	   decisions	   “reinforces	   the	   process,”	   generating	  strong	   incentives	   for	   new	   incumbents	   to	   hire	   new,	   more	   loyal	   employees.	   Each	   new	  administration	   has	   “reasons	   to	   have	   no	   confidence	   in	   the	   competence	   and	   loyalty	   of	  employees	   appointed	   by	   previous	   administrations,”	   which	   in	   turn	   motivates	   the	  appointment	   of	   new	   bureaucrats	   (Iacoviello	   2006,	   544).	  Where	   employees	   can	   be	   easily	  fired,	   this	   search	   for	   loyal	   employees	  might	   translate	   in	  high	   rates	  of	   turnover	  with	  each	  change	  in	  the	  administration.	  Since	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  guarantee	  job	  stability	  for	   public	   employees,	   the	   distrust	   on	   old	   employees	   that	   cannot	   be	   fired	   end	   up	   often	  generating	  “parallel	  bureaucracies”	  of	  new,	  more	  responsive,	  employees.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  practice	  of	  sidestepping	  employees	  hired	  by	  previous	  administrations,	  working	  conditions	  of	  the	  old	  employees	  might	  suffer	  considerably.	  
The	   fear	   of	   suffering	   negative	   changes	   or	   even	   losing	   one’s	   job	   with	   a	   new	  administration	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   reasonable	   expectation	   in	  many	   Latin	   American	   countries.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Ecuador,	  Guatemala,	  Honduras,	  Nicaragua,	  Panama,	  and	  Peru,	  there	  is	  mass	  replacement	   of	   public	   employees	   with	   each	   change	   of	   administration	   (Iacoivello	   2006;	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Zuvanic	   et	   al.	   2010).	   In	   Panama,	   during	  Mireya	  Moscoso’s	   administration,	   about	   twenty-­‐five	  thousand	  public	  employees	  were	  fired	  and	  replaced	  with	  supporters	  (Longo,	  2006b).	  And	  this	  was	  not	  an	  exception	  since	  high	   instability	  and	  the	  turnout	  generated	  with	  each	  change	   in	   the	   administration	   have	   been	   present	   in	   Panama’s	   public	   administration	   for	   a	  long	   time	   (Strazza	   2012).	   In	   the	  Dominican	  Republic,	   about	   three	   thousand	   civil	   servant	  (funcionarios	  de	  la	  Carrera	  Administrativa)	  that	  were	  supposed	  to	  be	  under	  the	  protection	  of	   the	   tenure	  system	   lost	   their	   jobs	   in	  2004	  as	  a	   result	  of	  a	   change	   in	   the	  administration	  (Longo	   2006b).	   In	   Guatemala,	   labor	   unions	   and	   NGOs	   estimate	   that	   massive	   firings	  (barridas)	   with	   changes	   in	   administration	   affect	   between	   20	   and	   30	   percent	   of	   the	  administration	   (Iturburu	   2012b).	   I	   am	   certainly	   not	   claiming	   that	   the	   turnover	   of	   public	  personnel	   is	   something	   that	   happens	   every	   time,	   or	   to	   a	  majority	   of	   workers	  with	   each	  change	  in	  the	  administration.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  occurs	  frequently	  might	  be	  enough	  to	  affect	  the	  behavior	  of	  employees.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  being	  fired	  is	  a	  plausible	  expectation,	  it	  does	  not	  need	  to	  happen	  to	  many	  people	  or	  too	  often.	  The	  mere	  possibility	  of	  losing	  one’s	  job	  (or	  suffering	  negative	  changes)	  with	  a	  new	  administration	  might	  be	  enough	  to	  affect	  the	  behavior	  of	  patronage	  employees.	  	  
	  
6.2	   Exploring	  Three	  “Other”	  Cases	  
Can	   the	  self-­‐enforcing	   theory	  of	  patronage	  help	  explain	  patronage	  appointments	   in	  other	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America?	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  draw	  on	  secondary	  evidence	  from	  three	  cases	  to	  show	   in	  more	  detail	   that	   the	  patterns	   found	   in	   the	   three	  municipalities	  studied	   in	   this	  dissertation	  are	  also	  present	  in	  other	  settings.	  In	  each	  case—following	  the	  structure	  from	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section	   6.1—,	   I	   describe	   the	   strengths	   and	  weaknesses	   of	   the	   civil	   service	   system	   and	   I	  provide	  evidence	  that,	  in	  line	  with	  the	  empirical	  implications	  of	  the	  self	  enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage,	   there	   is	  partisan	  bias	   in	  hiring	  decisions	  and	  patronage	  employees	  have	  good	  reasons	  to	  fear	  losing	  their	  jobs	  or	  suffer	  negative	  changes	  in	  their	  working	  conditions	  with	  a	   new	   administration.	   I	   first	   present	   evidence	   from	   Argentina	   to	   show	   that	   the	   three	  municipalities	  chosen	  were	  not	  outliers,	  but	  representative	  of	  the	  patterns	  found	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  Then	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  countries,	  one	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  widely	  politicized	  bureaucracy—Bolivia—	   and	   one	   considered	   to	   have	   a	   bureaucracy	   that	   is	   closer	   to	   the	  meritocratic,	  Weberian	  ideal—Chile.	  
Argentina	   At	   the	   outset	   of	   the	   1990s,	   the	   majority	   of	   Argentinean	   national	   public	  employees	   were	   appointed	   by	   discretion	   and	   obtained	   tenure	   after	   one	   year	   of	   service	  (Grindle	  2012).	  There	  was	  no	  meritocratic	  system	  of	   recruitment	   in	  place	  but—since	   the	  Constitution	  of	  1949/1957	  (Article	  14bis)—	  job	  stability	  was	  constitutionally	  guaranteed	  for	   public	   employees,	   limiting	   the	   extent	   of	   personnel	   turnover	   when	   administrations	  changed. 6 	  As	   a	   result,	   many	   employees	   could	   be	   brought	   into	   the	   system	   through	  patronage,	  but	  remained	  on	  the	  public	  sector	  through	  a	  system	  of	  tenure	  (Grindle	  2012).	  In	  1991	  a	  new	  civil	  service	  career	  system	  was	  introduced,	  creating	  SINAPA	  (Sistema	  Nacional	  
de	   la	   Profesión	   Administrativa).	   Among	   the	   main	   characteristics	   of	   the	   reform	   was	   the	  introduction	   of	   open	   competitions	   and	   meritocratic	   criteria	   for	   hiring	   and	   promotions.7	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	   1949	   Constitution	   (passed	   during	   Perón’s	   presidency)	   was	   largely	   ignored	   during	   the	   1957	   reform,	  which	   based	   the	   new	   text	   on	   the	   1853	   Constitution.	   The	   one	   notable	   exception	   was	   Article	   14	   bis,	  guaranteeing	  job	  stability	  for	  public	  employees,	  which	  was	  carried	  over	  from	  the	  1949	  Constitution.	  	  7	  Together	   with	   the	   civil	   service	   reform	   and	   other	   market-­‐oriented	   reforms	   introduced	   in	   the	   1990s,	   the	  national	  administration	  was	  downsized	  massively,	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  public	  employees	  from	  347,000	  to	  200,000	  (Grindle	  2012,	  187).	  Local	  administrations	  were	  not	  affected	  (Gibson	  and	  Calvo	  2000).	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The	  system	  had	  a	  good	  start	  and	  by	  1999,	  25	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  national	  administration	  had	  been	  recruited	  under	  the	  new	  rules	  (Ferraro	  2012).	  
However,	   the	  new	  civil	   service	   system	   introduced	  by	   the	  1991	  reform	  was	  not	  an	  obstacle	  to	  “massive	  political	  appointments	  a	  few	  years	  thereafter”	  (Ferraro	  2011,	  172).	  By	  2007,	  the	  percentage	  of	  SINAPA	  employees	  in	  the	  national	  administration	  was	  reduced	  to	  17	   percent	   (Ferraro	   2012,	   170),	   and	   by	   the	   end	   of	   2000s	   the	   system	   “had	   been	   largely	  pushed	   to	   the	   margin”	   by	   a	   resurgence	   of	   patronage	   appointments	   (Grindle	   2012,	   215;	  Iacoviello	  and	  Zuvanic	  2006a).8	  Moreover,	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (2012)	  the	  establishment	  of	  SINAPA	  was	  simultaneous	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  local	  administrations	  to	  which	  SINAPA	   did	   not	   apply	   (see	   also	   Gibson	   and	   Calvo	   2000).	   At	   the	   national	   level,	   different	  types	  of	  temporary	  contracts	  were	  used	  to	  avoid	  civil	  service	  regulations.	  The	  widespread	  use	  of	  temporary	  contracts	  to	  bypass	  the	  system	  ended	  up	  creating	  a	  parallel	  bureaucracy	  of	   temporary	   employees	   (Ferraro	   2011;	   Grindle	   2012;	   Iacoviello	   and	   Zunavic	   2006a).	  Given	  the	  variety	  of	  these	  contracts,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  estimate	  with	  precision	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  use,	   estimations	   vary	   from	   19	   percent	   in	   2001	   (Calvo	   and	  Murillo	   2012),	   14	   percent	   in	  2002	  (excluding	  military,	  security,	  education	  and	  health,	  Bambaci	  et	  al.	  2007)	  and	  around	  15	   percent	   in	   2006	   (Iacoviello	   2006).9	  Moreover,	   there	   is	   significant	   variation	   across	  agencies	  and	  temporary	  contracts	  are	  used	  more	  widely	  at	  the	  local	   level.10	  Regardless	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See	  Grindle	  (2012,	  215-­‐216)	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  variety	  of	  mechanisms	  that	  were	  used	  to	  bypass	  the	  civil	  service	  system.	  9	  The	  source	  of	  the	  data	  in	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (2012)	  is	  a	  survey	  conducted	  in	  2001	  (SIEMPRO),	  which	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  capturing	  all	  the	  different	  types	  of	  temporary	  contracts	  used	  in	  Argentina	  (including	  free-­‐lance	  contracts	  and	  internships)	  that	  are	  usually	  under-­‐reported	  by	  the	  authorities.	  10	  At	   the	   end	   of	   2004,	   the	   Argentine	   Ministry	   of	   Social	   Welfare	   had	   302	   permanent	   employees	   and	   1054	  employees	   on	   temporary	   contracts,	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Economics	   had	   2104	   permanent	   employees	   and	   1123	  temporary,	   and	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Education	   had	   885	   permanent	   employees	   and	   778	   temporary	   (Iacoviello	  2006).	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  these	  pages,	  early	  2013,	  a	  newspaper	  denounced	  that	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Labor	  in	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the	  initial	  type	  of	  contract,	  many	  “off-­‐schedule”	  employees	  are	  regularly	  eligible	  for	  tenure	  after	  some	  time	  in	  service	  (Grindle	  2012;	  Scherlis	  2009).11	  
Systematic	  direct	  evidence	  of	  partisan	  bias	  in	  hiring	  decisions	  is	  hard	  to	  obtain,	  but	  a	  nationally	  representative	  survey	  conducted	  in	  2007	  by	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (forthcoming)	  provides	  some	  convincing	  indicators.	  They	  show	  that	  proximity	  to	  party	  activists	  of	  the	  two	  main	   Argentinean	   parties	   (UCR	   and	   PJ)	   is	   a	   statistically	   significant	   predictor	   of	   a	  respondent’s	  expectation	  of	  receiving	  a	  public	  sector	  job.	  And	  the	  effect	  is	  strong:	  knowing	  one	  standard	  deviation	  more	  activists	  than	  the	  prevalence	  rate	  increases	  the	  expectation	  of	  being	  offered	  a	  job	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  by	  around	  nine	  percent	  for	  the	  PJ	  and	  five	  percent	  for	  the	  UCR.	  Moreover,	  the	  percentage	  of	  respondents	  (among	  the	  general	  population)	  that	  estimates	  their	  probability	  of	  obtaining	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  election	  as	  very	  likely	  is	  about	  five	  percent	  for	  the	  PJ	  and	  three	  percent	  for	  the	  UCR.	  	  
Massive	   firings	   with	   changes	   in	   the	   administration	   for	   political	   reasons	   are	   not	  common	   in	   the	   national	   administration	   (Iacoviello	   and	   Zuvanic	   2006a)	   but	   individual	  examples	   are	   still	   possible	   to	   find,	   especially	   for	   local	   administrations	   that	   are	   generally	  more	   politicized	   than	   the	   national	   administration.	   For	   instance,	   when	   the	   new	   Peronist	  mayor	   of	   Merlo	   (Buenos	   Aires	   province)	   assumed	   office	   in	   1989	   (Raúl	   Othacehé),	   1200	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Argentina	   had	   65	   percent	   of	   its	   employees	   on	   temporary	   contracts	   (La	  Nación,	   “En	  Trabajo,	   el	   65%	  de	   los	  empleados	  son	  contratados,”	  January	  21,	  2013).	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  according	  to	  the	  head	  and	  the	  director	  of	  the	  personnel	   office	   in	   Tigre	   (Buenos	   Aires),	   municipalities	   in	   that	   area	   usually	   have	   an	   equal	   number	   of	  permanent	   and	   temporary	   employees	   (Personal	   Interview,	   Tigre,	   July	   15	   2010).	   Also,	   recall	   the	   number	   of	  employees	   with	   temporary	   contracts	   in	   the	   municipalities	   studied	   in	   the	   empirical	   chapters	   of	   this	  dissertation	  range	  from	  80	  percent	  in	  Tigre,	  to	  40	  percent	  in	  Santa	  Fe	  and	  25	  percent	  in	  Salta.	  11	  Since	  1992,	  public	  sector	  labor	  legislation	  stipulates	  annual	  negotiations	  over	  salaries	  and	  benefits	  with	  the	  unions.	   These	   annual	   meetings	   provide	   the	   setting	   for	   the	   unions	   to	   bargain	   over	   contracts,	   which	   make	  tenure	  rights	  more	   likely	   to	  many	  workers	  hired	  under	  short-­‐term	  contracts	   that	  did	  not	  originally	  entitled	  tenure	   rights	   (not	   even	   after	   a	   year)	   (Grindle	   2012).	   It	   has	   also	   been	   argued	   that	   tenure	   rights	   were	  distributed	  to	  temporary	  workers	  in	  reward	  of	  demonstrated	  loyalty	  (Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2012).	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public	   employees	   (supporters	   of	   the	   old	  mayor)	   lost	   their	   jobs,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  previous	   mayor	   was	   also	   a	   Peronist	   (O’Donnell	   2005).12	  Another	   interesting	   example	   is	  described	   in	   Stokes	   et	   al.	   (2012).	   In	   this	   case	   the	   turnover	   of	   public	   employees	  was	   not	  caused	  by	  a	  lost	  election	  but	  by	  a	  divorce.	  In	  Córdoba,	  the	  Peronist	  Juan	  Manuel	  de	  la	  Sota	  was	   elected	   governor	   in	   1999	   and	   reelected	   in	   2003;	   his	   wife	   Olga	   Riutort	   was	   put	   in	  charge	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Government.	  When	  they	  divorced	  in	  2005,	  one	  thousand	  people	  lost	  their	  jobs	  (as	  reported	  by	  a	  broker	  from	  Riutort’s	  faction	  in	  an	  interview).	  
More	  often,	  employees	  hired	  by	  previous	  administrations	  are	  not	  fired	  but	  ignored,	  demoted,	   or	   bypassed.	   Since	   employees	   are	   routinely	   hired	   discretionally	   by	   the	  administration	   in	   power	   and	   then	   locked	   in	   their	   positions	   with	   permanent	   contracts,	  politicians	  do	  not	  trust	  employees	  hired	  by	  previous	  administrations	  (Bambaci	  et	  al.	  2007;	  Ferraro	  2011;	   Scherlis	  2009).	  An	   interview	  cited	  by	  Ferraro	   (2011,	  162)	  with	  a	  minister	  from	   President	   De	   La	   Rua’s	   administration	   (1999-­‐2001)	   describing	   his	   organizational	  strategy	  illustrates	  this	  point:	  
	  
“The	   received	   administrative	   units	   […]	   were	   either	   eliminated	  
(dissolved	  in	  the	  organizational	  chart)	  or	  ‘neutralized’	  (not	  given	  
any	  substantial	  work	  at	  all).	  Policy	  initiatives	  were	  placed	  under	  
the	   responsibility	   of	   new	   units	   called	   programs,	   managed	   and	  
staffed	  entirely	  with	  political	  appointees.	  The	  minister	  defended	  
this	   strategy	  with	   two	   arguments:	   a)	   each	   new	   administration	  
requires	  new	  bureaucratic	  structures	  and	  personnel	  to	  carry	  put	  
its	  policies;	  b)	  career	  civil	  servants	  remained	  loyal	  to	  the	  former	  
administration	   because,	   in	   fact,	   they	   were	   political	   appointees	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Ironically,	  the	  previous	  mayor	  (Gustavo	  Green),	  when	  the	  relationship	  between	  him	  and	  Othacehé	  was	  good,	  distributed	   public	   sector	   jobs	   to	   Othacehé’s	   supporters	   (following	   a	   request	   from	   Othacehé)	   in	   order	   to	  finance	  their	  work	  during	  the	  campaign	  (see	  O’Donnell	  2006,	  165).	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and	  the	  previous	  open	  competitions	  to	  fill	  these	  posts	  were	  mere	  
simulations.”	  	  
This	  testimony	  shows	  one	  of	  the	  sources	  of	  politicians’	  distrust	  of	  public	  employees	  in	  the	  Argentinean	   administration:	   “a	   lack	   of	   loyalty	   resulting	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   permanent	  bureaucrats	   are	   political	   appointees—of	   the	   previous	   administration—in	   disguise”	  (Ferraro	   2011,	   162).13 	  Note	   that	   this	   distrust	   for	   employees	   appointed	   by	   previous	  administrations	  and	  the	  consequent	  hiring	  of	  new,	  more	  loyal	  ones	  can	  serve	  very	  different	  purposes.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   political	   appointments	   can	   help	   to	   solve	   basic	  problems	   of	   delegation	   and	   control.	   Politicians	   want	   to	   appoint	   bureaucrats	   that	   will	  implement	  their	  preferred	  policies	  and	  hiring	   loyal	  employees—more	  responsive	  to	  their	  bosses—	   is	   one	  way	   of	   trying	   to	   achieve	   that	   goal.14	  But,	   of	   course,	   the	   search	   for	  more	  responsive	  employees	  might	  also	  be	  associated	  with	  the	  types	  of	  political	  services	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  as	  well	  as	  other	  types	  of	  “services,”	  like	  enabling	  or	  tolerating	  corruption	   (both	   for	   personal	   and	   political	   gains),	   and	   different	   forms	   of	   particularistic	  distribution	  such	  as	  clientelism	  and	  pork	  barrel.15	  Nevertheless,	   the	  practice	  of	  bypassing	  the	   merit	   system	   and	   sidestepping	   the	   permanent	   bureaucracy	   has	   become	   standard	  practice	   in	  Argentine	  administration.	  Frequently,	  new,	  “more	  trustworthy”	  employees	  are	  hired	  by	  expanding	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  officials,	  by	  restructuring	  or	  eliminating	  existing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Ferraro	  (2011)	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  only	  partially	  true—for	  him,	  there	  is	  a	  general	  distrust	  of	  permanent	  civil	  servants	  that	  goes	  beyond	  perceived	  political	  loyalties.	  The	  interview	  is	  still	  indicative	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  fear	  of	  suffering	  negative	  changes	  in	  working	  conditions	  (because	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  sidestepping	  the	  employees	  appointed	  by	  previous	  administrations)	  is	  plausible	  in	  the	  Argentinean	  administration.	  14	  This	   is	  what	  Müller	   (2006)	   calls	   “power	  patronage.”	  Chapter	  2	  discusses	   the	  different	   types	  of	  patronage	  appointments	  and	  the	  services	  associated	  with	  it.	  15	  See	  Scherlis	  (2009,	  139-­‐143)	  for	  a	  description	  of	  three	  highly	  politicized	  agencies	  in	  the	  current	  Argentine	  administration	  and	  the	  different	  types	  of	  political	  services	  that	  they	  provide	  to	  the	  government:	  the	  national	  news	  agency	  (Telam),	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Welfare	  and	  the	  National	  Statistics	  Office	  (INDEC).	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organizations	   and	   creating	   new	   ones,	   or	   by	   creating	   new	   job	   tittles	   and	   responsibilities	  (Grindle	  2012;	  Iacoviello	  and	  Zuvanic	  2006a).	  
Similarly	  to	  what	  happens	  with	  the	  national	  administration,	  most	  local	  governments	  have	   some	   sort	   of	   civil	   service	   regulation	   that	   includes	   open	   competition	   for	   hires	   and	  tenure	   rights	   (recall	   that	   this	   is	   guaranteed	   by	   the	   National	   Constitution),	   but	   these	  regulations	   are	   easily	   sidestepped	   with	   the	   widespread	   use	   of	   temporary	   contracts	  (Scherlis	  2009).	  As	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  massive	  firings	  are	  not	  particularly	  common	  with	  changes	  in	  administration.	  In	  general,	  all	  top	  and	  some	  mid-­‐level	  bureaucrats	  are	  replaced	  together	  with	  “those	  who	  are	  more	  openly	  linked	  to	  a	  previous	  government,”	  but	  the	  rest	  of	  the	   jobs	   are	   usually	   maintained	   (Scherlis	   2009,	   182).	   Despite	   these	   similarities,	   lower	  levels	   of	   government	   are	   more	   politicized	   than	   the	   national	   administration	   (Calvo	   and	  Murillo	  2012;	  Scherlis	  2009).	  Moreover,	   the	  types	  of	  services	  that	  are	  usually	  required	  at	  the	   local	   level	   are	  more	   in	   line	  with	   the	   ones	   studied	   in	   this	   dissertation.	   Indeed,	   at	   the	  national	  level,	  control	  over	  key	  areas	  of	  government	  (either	  to	  solve	  problems	  of	  delegation	  and	  control	  or	  for	  “less	  noble”	  purposes)	  and	  their	  resources	  is	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  patronage	  appointments;	  at	  the	  local	  level	  the	  distribution	  of	  patronage	  jobs	  to	  maintain	  a	  network	  of	  activists	  on	  the	  ground	  is	  much	  more	  common	  (Scherlis	  2009).	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  state	  jobs	  are	   used	   “to	   organize,	   run,	   and	   mobilize	   extended	   electoral	   machines	   on	   the	   ground”	  (Scherlis	  2009,	  220).16	  
Bolivia	   The	   Bolivian	   public	   administration	   has	   been	   described	   as	   a	   “patronage	  bureaucracy”	   (Zuvanic	   et	   al.	   2010),	   “approaching	   the	   neo-­‐patrimonial	   ideal	   type”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  In	   fact,	   in	   his	   analysis	   of	   patronage	   appointments	   in	   four	   Argentinean	   provinces,	   Scherlis	   (2009,	   251)	  concludes	  that:	  “no	  party	  can	  develop	  electoral	  machines	  without	  first	  controlling	  the	  state	  agencies	  that	  can	  provide	  the	  necessary	  financial,	  organizational,	  and	  human	  resources	  to	  do	  so.”	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(Gingerich	   2006,	   forthcoming),	   and	   plagued	   with	   “bureaucratic	   informality”	   and	  “patronage	  appointments”	   (World	  Bank	  2000).	  According	   to	   a	  World	  Bank	   report	   (2000,	  17),	  Bolivian	  bureaucracy	  is	  characterized	  by	  “(l)ow	  administrative	  capacities	  due	  to	  a	  high	  rate	   of	   personnel	   turnover,	   frequent	   and	   pervasive	   political	   interference	   in	   public	  management,	  weakness	  and/or	  non-­‐compliance	  of	   formal	   administrative	  procedures	  and	  control,	  and	  systemic	  corruption....”	  According	  to	  the	  index	  described	  in	  section	  6.1,	  Bolivia	  is	   among	   the	   countries	   with	   the	   weakest	   merit	   systems,	   in	   which	   there	   is	   a	   strong	  politicization	  of	  decisions	  on	  public	  employees’	   selection	  and	  dismissal	   (Iacoviello	  2006).	  With	   22	   points,	   Bolivia	   is	   below	   Argentina	   (52	   points)	   and	   below	   the	   Latin	   American	  average	  (33	  points),	  but	  still	  far	  from	  the	  worst	  cases	  of	  Panama	  (2	  points)	  and	  El	  Salvador	  (9	  points).	  	  
Since	  the	  1980s,	  Bolivia	  has	  been	  implementing	  institutional	  reforms	  and	  attempts	  to	   create	   a	   meritocratic	   system	   in	   its	   public	   administration.	   However,	   until	   today	   those	  efforts	  have	  only	  translated	  into	  very	  limited	  changes,	  creating	  “meritocratic	  enclaves”	  (like	  the	  Customs	  Office)	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  national	  administration	  that	  is	  basically	  a	  “patronage	  bureaucracy”	   (Zuvanic	   et	   al.	   2010).	   Political	   criteria	   continue	   to	  dominate	   the	  process	  of	  hiring	   and	   firing,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   few	   institutions	   that	   were	   reached	   by	   the	  institutional	   reforms	   have	   hired	   personnel	   through	   open	   public	   competitions	   (Iacoviello	  and	  Zuvanic	  2006b;	  Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010).	  
Political	   connections	   are	   crucial	   for	   personnel	   decisions.	   A	   survey	   of	   738	   public	  employees	   at	   different	   hierarchical	   levels	   from	   15	   different	   agencies	   conducted	   by	   the	  World	  Bank	  in	  1999	  supports	  this	  claim.	  Respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  estimate	  the	  ratio	  of	  public	  employees	  perceived	   to	  have	  been	  hired	   for	  political	   reasons	   in	   the	  agency	  where	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they	  worked,	  and	  the	  average	  for	  these	  responses	  was	  43	  percent	  (World	  Bank	  2000).	  As	  mentioned,	   when	   hires	   are	   political,	   new	   incumbents	   have	   good	   reasons	   to	   distrust	   old	  employees	  and	  to	  want	  to	  hire	  new	  (more	  loyal)	  employees,	  which	  in	  turn	  politicizes	  firing	  decisions.	   In	   a	   more	   recent	   survey,	   conducted	   in	   2003	   across	   14	   different	   institutions	  (1038	  public	  employees	  were	  interviewed)	  respondents	  were	  asked	  to	  rank	  the	  following	  factors	   of	   greatest	   importance	   for	   dismissal	   in	   their	   institutions:	   poor	   performance,	  unethical	   behavior,	   insubordination,	   and	   political	   factors.	   32	   percent	   of	   respondents	  indicated	  that	  in	  their	  institutions	  political	  factors	  were	  the	  most	  important	  determinant	  of	  dismissals	  (Gingerich	  2006).	   In	  the	  same	  line,	  68	  percent	  of	  respondents	   indicated	  that	   it	  was	   “highly	   probable”	   or	   “probable”	   that	   they	  would	   lose	   their	   posts	   in	   the	   near	   future	  (Gingerich	  2006,	  forthcoming).	  
Moreover,	   the	   survey	  conducted	  by	   the	  World	  Bank	   in	  1999	   (2000,	  13)	  described	  above	   provides	   a	   good	   sense	   of	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   excessively	   high	   rates	   of	   personnel	  turnover	  often	  generated	  by	  the	  search	  of	  “loyal”	  employees:	  	  
	  
[O]nly	  33	  percent	  of	  public	  employees	  were	  working	  in	  the	  same	  
agency	   as	   in	   1995,	   and	   58	   percent	  were	  working	   in	   the	   public	  
sector	   in	  1995.	  Since	  1997,	   the	  year	  of	   the	   last	  election,	  around	  
one-­‐third	   of	   public	   employees	   are	   estimated	   to	   have	   left	   the	  
public	   sector	  and	  only	  52	  percent	  are	   still	  working	   in	   the	   same	  
agency	   as	   they	  were	   in	   1997.	   Only	   9	   percent	   of	   current	   public	  
employees	  believe	  they	  will	  be	  working	  in	  the	  same	  agency	  in	  five	  
years.	  Also,	  53.6	  percent	  of	  public	  employees	  reported	  as	  likely	  or	  
very	   likely	   the	   possibility	   of	   losing	   their	   jobs,	   and	   74	   percent	  
believe	   that	   the	   high	   staff	   turnover	   is	   a	   "serious"	   or	   "very	  




In	   sum,	   the	   weak	   Bolivian	   service	   system	   gives	   ample	   opportunities	   for	   patronage	  appointments	   that	   Bolivian	   politicians	   use	   in	   their	   advantage	   for	   political	   gain.	   As	  described	   at	   length	   for	   the	   Argentinean	   municipalities	   studied	   in	   this	   dissertation,	  patronage	  appointments	  tend	  to	  make	  those	  public	  employees	  “respond	  primarily	  to	  their	  patrons	  and	  perform	  functions	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  among	  their	  official	  duties”	  (World	  Bank	   2000,	   45).	   Bolivian	   parties	   rely	   on	   the	   bureaucracy	   for	   political	   support	   that	   goes	  beyond	  the	  official	  duties	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  job.	  Parties	  require	  public	  employees	  to	  pay	  contributions	  and	  participate	  in	  campaign	  events	  (World	  Bank	  2000).17	  
Chile	   On	   the	  opposite	   side	  of	   the	  spectrum,	   the	  Chilean	  national	  public	   sector	   is	  usually	  considered	   to	  be	  closely	  approximating	   the	  conditions	  of	  a	  highly	  professional,	  Weberian	  ideal	   type	  bureaucracy.	  Chilean	  “meritocratic	  bureaucracy”	   is	  not	  only	  characterized	  by	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  (isolation	  from	  political	  manipulation),	  but	  also	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  technical	  capacity	  (Zuvanic	  et	  al.	  2010).	  According	  to	  the	  merit	  index	  described	  in	  section	  6.1,	  Chile	   is	  classified	  (together	  with	  Brazil	  and	  Costa	  Rica)	  among	  the	  countries	  with	  the	  strongest	  merit	  systems	  in	  which	  there	  is	  widespread	  acceptance	  of	  meritocratic	  principles	  for	   selection,	   promotion	   and	   dismissal	   of	   public	   employees	   (Iacoviello	   2006).	   With	   62	  points,	  Chile	  is	  way	  above	  the	  Latin	  American	  average	  of	  33	  points	  and	  above	  the	  Argentina	  score	  of	  52	  points,	  but	  still	  far	  from	  the	  best	  case	  of	  Brazil	  (87	  points).	  By	  2009,	  the	  Chilean	  merit	  index	  increased	  to	  78	  points	  (Iacoviello	  2009b).	  
In	   Chile,	   public	   employees	   have	   enjoyed	   tenure	   rights	   since	   1960	   (Grindle	   2012)	  and	   since	   1989	   the	   Administrative	   Statute	   (Estatuto	   Administrativo)	   establishes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	   the	  World	  Bank	   survey	   described	   above,	   30	   percent	   of	   the	   employees	   interviewed	   reported	   to	   having	  made	  some	  contribution	  to	  a	  political	  party	  (World	  Bank	  2000).	  Unfortunately,	  there	  is	  no	  similar	  question	  in	  this	  survey	  about	  participating	  in	  electoral/political	  events.	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competition	  for	  entry	  into	  the	  public	  administration.	  Moreover,	  since	  2003	  the	  New	  Deal	  on	  Public	   Employment	   (Ley	   de	   Nuevo	   Trato)	   also	   introduces	   merit	   criteria	   for	   high-­‐level	  political	  appointments	  through	  the	  High	  Level	  Public	  Management	  System	  (Sistema	  de	  Alta	  
Dirección	  Pública),	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  fully	  discretionary	  political	  positions	  from	  3100	  to	   650	   (Grindle	   2012).18	  However,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Argentina	   and	   many	   other	   Latin	  American	  countries,	  the	  existence	  of	  temporary	  contracts	  (contrata)	  allows	  hiring	  outside	  the	   system.	   Employees	   under	   temporary	   contracts	   in	   Chile	   not	   only	   do	   not	   enjoy	   job	  stability,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  hired	  without	  an	  open	  competition.19	  	  
According	  to	  survey	  data	  reported	  in	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  (2012),	  temporary	  contracts	  increased	   in	   Chile	   over	   the	   last	   decade.	  Whereas	   the	   1996	   survey	   reports	   19	   percent	   of	  public	   employees	   on	   temporary	   contracts,	   the	   2006	   survey	   reports	   27	   percent	   of	  employees	  working	  under	  these	  types	  of	  contracts.20	  Nevertheless,	  the	  level	  of	  stability	  in	  the	   national	   public	   sector	   is	   high,	   even	   for	   those	   with	   temporary	   contracts	   (Iacoviello	  2009b).	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  same	  center-­‐left	  coalition	  (Concertación)	  won	  the	  presidency	  four	  times	   consecutively	   (1990,	   1994,	   2000,	   2006)	   might	   have	   been	   an	   important	   factor	  favoring	  this	  stability.	  However,	  in	  2010	  Sebastián	  Piñera,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  a	  right-­‐wing	  coalition,	  became	  president	  and	  the	  new	  administration	  “worked	  to	  reclaim	  positions	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	   new	   recruitment	   system	   (overseen	   by	   a	   political	   commission)	   put	   some	   limits	   on	   discretionary	  appointments	  but	  “left	  considerable	  room	  for	  discretion	  by	  hiring	  officials”	  (Grindle	  2012,	  224).	  Candidates	  for	  open	  positions	  are	  selected	  based	  on	  merit	  and	  included	  on	  lists	  of	  three	  or	  five	  candidates	  (depending	  on	  the	  position),	  but	  the	  final	  decision	  among	  those	  finalists	  is	  made	  by	  a	  politician	  at	  his/hers	  own	  discretion.	  If	  none	  of	  the	  candidates	  is	  chosen,	  the	  position	  can	  remained	  open.	  19	  There	  are	  two	  main	  types	  of	  temporary	  contracts	  in	  the	  Chilean	  administration:	  those	  subjected	  to	  renewal	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  year	  (a	  contrata)	  and	  those	  that	  can	  be	  fired	  at	  any	  time	  (a	  honorarios).	  20	  According	  to	  official	  sources,	  the	  number	  of	  employees	  “a	  contrata”	   is	  even	  higher	  (around	  50%),	  but	  this	  number	   includes	   those	  employees	  with	  permanent	  contracts	   (de	  planta)	   that	  are	  working	  at	  a	  different	   job	  position	   but	   can	   return	   to	   his/hers	   former	   position	   later	   (Dipres	   2012).	   Unfortunately,	   there	   is	   no	   official	  information	  on	  the	  proportion	  of	  employees	  under	  this	  situation	  readily	  available.	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were	  filled	  through	  the	  new	  high	  level	  appointment	  system	  so	  that	  they	  could	  be	  assigned	  to	  political	  appointees”	  (Grindle	  2012,	  226).	  
Despite	   the	   implementation	   of	   civil	   service	   reforms,	   political	   connections	   and	  political	   ideology	  still	   seem	  to	  matter	   for	  appointments	   in	   the	  public	  administration.	   In	  a	  nationally	   representative	   survey	   conducted	   by	   Calvo	   and	   Murillo	   (forthcoming),	   the	  percentage	  of	  respondents	  that	  estimate	  their	  probability	  of	  obtaining	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  election	  as	  very	  likely	  is	  about	  five	  percent	  for	  all	  five	  Chilean	  parties	  (recall	  that	   it	  was	   five	  percent	  and	   three	  percent	   for	   the	  Argentinean	  PJ	   and	  UCR,	   respectively).	  Moreover,	   in	   Chile—where	   parties	   are	   more	   easily	   placed	   on	   a	   left-­‐right	   ideological	  spectrum—,	   the	   perceived	   likelihood	   of	   being	   offered	   a	   public	   sector	   job	   decreases	  with	  ideological	  distance	  to	  each	  of	  the	  five	  parties.	  Proximity	  to	  party	  activists	  of	  the	  PS	  or	  the	  PPD	   also	   increased	   the	   perceived	   likelihood	   of	   being	   offered	   a	   job—the	   effect	   is	   also	  positive	  but	  not	  significant	  for	  the	  DC,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  effect	  for	  the	  UDI	  and	  RN	  (Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  forthcoming).21	  
Unquestionably,	   political	   networks	   have	   a	   more	   crucial	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	  expectations	  of	  obtaining	  a	  public	  sector	  job	  in	  Argentina	  than	  in	  Chile	  (Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2012),	   but	   the	   role	   of	   politics	   cannot	   be	   completely	   ignored	   even	   in	   one	   of	   the	   most	  meritocratic	   systems	   in	   Latin	  America.	   Although	   the	   national	   administration	   is	   generally	  characterized	   by	   high	   levels	   of	   stability,	   in	   the	   survey	   conducted	   by	   Gingerich	   (2006,	  forthcoming)	   described	   above,	   40	   percent	   of	   Chilean	   respondents	   estimated	   that	   it	   was	  “highly	  probably”	  or	  “probable”	  that	  they	  would	  lose	  their	  jobs	  in	  the	  near	  future	  (compare	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  PS=	  Partido	  Socialista;	  PPD=	  Partido	  por	  la	  Democracia;	  DC=	  Democracia	  Cristiana;	  UDI=	  Unión	  Demócrata	  Independiente;	  RN=	  Renovación	  Nacional.	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to	  68	  percent	   in	   the	  Bolivian	   case).22	  Moreover,	   local	   administrations—as	   in	  Argentina—	  tend	   to	   be	   more	   politicized	   than	   the	   national	   administration	   (Calvo	   and	   Murillo	   2012;	  Leyton	   Navarro	   2006).	   A	   city	   councilman	   from	   Concertación	   explains	   bluntly:	   “in	   the	  municipalities	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  base	  for	  employment	  because	  there	  is	  no	  High	  Management	  System	   (…)	   in	   general,	   many	   local	   [political]	   operators	   have	   taken	   refuge	   in	   the	  municipality”	  (cited	  in	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2012,	  15).	  	  
As	   in	   Argentina—although	   probably	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent—	   being	   afraid	   of	   suffering	  negative	   changes	  with	   a	   change	   in	   the	   administration	  might	   still	   seem	  plausible	   to	   some	  Chilean	  employees	  (especially	  at	  the	  local	  level).	  Another	  interview	  with	  a	  Chilean	  mayor	  in	  2009	  talking	  about	  his	  retirement	  illustrates	  this	  point:	  	  
	  
“I	   have	  not	   retired	   from	   [name	  of	   the	  municipality	  where	  he	   is	  
mayor]	  because	  this	  is	  a	  very	  large	  municipality	  and	  I	  have	  many	  
pending	  assignments,	  and,	  moreover,	   I	  have	  not	  told	  my	  people.	  
There	  is	  a	  very	  large	  team	  of	  people	  working	  with	  me	  here,	  they	  
depend	  directly	  on	  me,	  and	  therefore	  I	  cannot	  make	  the	  decision	  
on	  my	  own.	  If	  I	   leave,	  around	  500	  people	  fall	  [lose	  their	  jobs]…”	  (cited	  in	  Calvo	  and	  Murillo	  2012,	  15)	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  change	  in	  administration	  in	  2010,	  after	  twenty	  years	  of	  Concertación,	  shows	  that	   suffering	  negative	   changes	   (or	   losing	   the	   job)	  with	   a	  new	  administration	  was	   also	   a	  very	   real	   possibility	   in	   the	   national	   administration.	   Only	   three	   months	   after	   Piñera’s	  inauguration	  (March	  2010),	  1400	  public	  employees	  were	  fired	  and	  another	  1200	  contracts	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For	   Chile,	   the	   survey	   included	   595	   public	   employees	   across	   6	   agencies	   (Gingerich	   2006).	   Note	   that	   the	  survey	  was	  conducted	  in	  2004,	  before	  the	  High	  Level	  Public	  Management	  System	  was	  fully	  implemented.	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that	  were	  subjected	  to	  renewal	  were	  terminated.	  The	  president	  justified	  the	  massive	  firings	  on	  the	  bases	  that	  the	  people	  fired	  were	  political	  activists	  (operadores	  políticos).23	  By	  August	  2012,	   of	   the	   529	   high-­‐level	   bureaucrats	   that	   were	   hired	   through	   the	   High	   Level	   Public	  Management	   System	   and	   were	   still	   in	   office,	   473	   (89%)	   were	   hired	   during	   Piñera’s	  administration.	  Although	  some	  bureaucrats	  resigned	  their	  positions,	  some	  were	  reassigned	  to	  new	  positions	  and	  some	  managed	   to	   finish	   their	  original	  3-­‐year	   contract,	   the	  majority	  (56%)	  of	  high	  levels	  officials	  that	  were	  in	  the	  administration	  when	  Piñera	  took	  office	  were	  fired	  (Garrido	  2013).24	  
In	   sum,	   even	   in	   a	   country	   like	   Chile	   that	   is	   considered	   to	   have	   one	   of	   the	   most	  professionalized	  public	  administrations	  in	  the	  region,	  there	  is	  evidence	  consistent	  with	  the	  self-­‐enforcing	  theory	  of	  patronage.	  Section	  6.1	  and	  6.2	  have	  provided	  secondary	  evidence	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  theory	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  might	  carry	   strong	   explanatory	   power	   in	   other	   countries	   in	   Latin	   America.	   In	   the	   following	  sections,	  I	  discuss	  broader	  implications	  of	  my	  theory	  of	  patronage.	  
	  
6.3	   Taking	  Clients	  Seriously	  
Most	  of	   the	   literature	  on	  clientelism	  focuses	  on	  elite	   level	  strategies	  and	  usually	  portrays	  clients	   as	   myopic,	   nonstrategic,	   and/or	   mainly	   driven	   by	   short-­‐term	   reactions	   to	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  “Piñera	  justificó	  despidos	  masivos	  en	  el	  sector	  público"	  (Emol,	  June	  10	  2010).	  See	  also	  “Gobierno	  desvinculó	  a	  1373	  personas	  y	  no	  renovó	  1255	  contratos	  hasta	  el	  31	  de	  mayo”	  (El	  Mercurio,	  June	  10	  2010);	  “PRSD	  y	  ANEF	  amenazan	  con	  acusación	  constitucional	  contra	  Lavín	  por	  despidos”	  (Emol,	  June	  13	  2010);	  and	  “PS	  solidariza	  con	  paro	  de	  ANEF	  y	  denuncia	  hostigamiento	  a	  funcionarios	  públicos”	  (Emol,	  August	  26	  2010).	  24	  Cited	  by	  Garrido	   (2013),	  based	  on	   information	  obtained	   from	  the	  High	  Level	  Public	  Management	  System.	  Note	   that	   the	   president	   can	   legally	   fire	   all	   bureaucrats	   hired	   under	   this	   system,	   even	   before	   the	   contract	  expires.	  The	  main	  difference	  is	  that	  in	  the	  case	  in	  which	  the	  period	  of	  the	  contract	  is	  ended	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period,	  employees	  receive	  severance	  pay	  (Garrido	  2013).	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actions	   of	   politicians.	   For	   instance,	   one	   of	   the	   ongoing	   debates	   in	   the	   literature	   is	   the	  core/swing	  debate.	  Do	  parties	  target	  core	  or	  swing	  voters?	  In	  this	  elite-­‐centered	  debate—as	   Nichter	   2009	   points	   out—	   citizens’	   strategies	   are	   completely	   ignored.	   Not	   only	   are	  citizens	   passive	   actors	   whose	   only	   role	   is	   to	   accept	   or	   reject	   the	   clientelistic	   offer	   that	  parties	  distribute,	   they	  are	  also	  assumed	  to	  be	  sincere	   in	   their	  political	  preferences,	  with	  preferences	  that	  are	  exogenous	  and	  unchanged	  over	  time.	  The	  preferences	  of	  swing	  voters	  might	   be	   more	   or	   less	   conditional	   on	   what	   the	   parties	   do,	   but	   core	   voters,	   from	   this	  perspective,	   are	   assumed	   to	   have	   an	   ideological	   commitment	   to	   their	   party	   that	   is	  exogenous	   to	   past	   and/or	   future	   material	   redistribution.25	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   most	  theories	   of	   voting	   behavior	   portray	   voters	   as	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   their	   own	   well-­‐being,	  core	  clients	   in	  the	  clientelistic	   literature	  are	  often	  assumed	  to	  be	  non-­‐instrumental	  voters,	  only	  motivated	  by	  their	  unconditional	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party.	  	  
In	  fact,	  the	  literature	  on	  clientelism	  is	  plagued	  with	  arguments	  that	  imply	  some	  sort	  of	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  rationality	  of	   the	  client	  and	   the	  rationality	  of	   the	  other	  actors	  (non-­‐clients,	  the	  patron	  and/or	  the	  broker).	  Take,	   for	  instance,	  the	  theories	  of	  reciprocity	  discussed	   in	   chapter	  2.	  According	   to	   these	   theories,	   clients	   comply	  with	   their	   side	  of	   the	  clientelistic	  agreement	  by	  providing	  political	  support	  because	  they	  want	  to	  help	  the	  person	  that	  helped	  them	  (either	  with	  a	  handout,	  a	   favor,	  a	   job,	  or	  something	  else).	  To	  the	  extent	  that	   these	   theories	   are	   about	   clientelism,	   the	   goal	   of	   the	   patron	   is	   clear—he	   wants	   to	  extract	   political	   support	   from	   his	   clients.	   While	   patrons	   and	   brokers	   are	   then	   self-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  An	  important	  exception	  to	  this	  is	  the	  forthcoming	  book	  by	  Magaloni	  et	  al.	  (2012),	  in	  which	  they	  argue	  that	  political	  parties	  invest	  in	  core	  supporters	  to	  maintain	  their	  loyalty.	  They	  do	  not	  take	  the	  preferences	  of	  core	  voters	   as	   static	   and	   independent	   from	   the	   redistribution	   of	   welfare,	   rather	   they	   argue	   that	   voter’s	  commitments	  to	  a	  party	  are	  “inevitably	  shaped	  by	  the	  history	  of	  welfare	  benefit	  distribution”	  (122).	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interested	   strategic	   actors	   with	   clear	   instrumental	   goals,	   clients	   are	   noble	   and	   altruistic	  individuals	  that	  care	  about	  “doing	  the	  right	  thing.”	  
According	  to	  the	  theories	  of	  monitoring	  and	  punishment—also	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2—,	  clients	  comply	  with	  their	  side	  of	  the	  deal	  because	  they	  are	  afraid	  that	  the	  patron	  will	  punish	  them	  if	   they	   fail	   to	  do	  so.	  This	  perspective	  also	  suggests	  a	  different	  rationality	   for	  the	  behavior	  of	  clients	  (vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  other	  voters).	  In	  general,	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  any	  rational	  theory	   of	   voting	   is	   that	   voters	   chose	   parties	   and	   politicians	   that	   make	   them	   better	   off.	  When	   the	   empirical	   reality	   does	   not	   match	   this	   assumption,	   scholars	   try	   to	   explain	   the	  “anomaly”.	  For	   instance,	  when	  poor	  voters	  support	  right-­‐wing	  parties—typically	  opposed	  to	   redistribution—,	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   something	   out	   of	   the	   ordinary	   is	   happening	   that	  makes	   citizens	   vote	   against	   their	   interests.	   Under	   “normal	   circumstances,”	   it	   is	   assumed	  that	   it	   is	   rational	   for	  voters	   to	   reward	  or	  punish	  candidates	  according	   to	  what	   they	  have	  done	  or	  could	  do	  in	  the	  future	  to	  make	  them	  better	  off.	  
From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  theories	  of	  monitoring	  and	  punishment,	  in	  contrast,	  the	  fact	  that	  clients	  receive	  something	  from	  a	  patron	  that	  makes	  them	  better	  off	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  secure	  their	  support.	  The	  assumption	  being	  that	  clients	  would	  rather	  collect	  the	  benefit	  but	  behave	   in	  some	  other	  way	  different	   from	  supporting	   the	  politician	  who	  provided	   the	  benefit,	  either	  supporting	  another	  politician	  or	  not	  supporting	  anyone	  (Zucco	  2010).	  While	  rational	   voters	   in	  most	   voting	   theories	   are	   assumed	   to	   support	   the	  politician	   that	  would	  make	  them	  better	  off,	   this	   is	  not	  enough—from	  this	  perspective—	  to	  explain	  the	  political	  behavior	   of	   clients.	   As	   in	   the	   core/swing	   debate,	   the	   assumption	   here	   is	   that	   voters’	  preferences	   are	   somehow	   orthogonal	   and/or	   unaffected	   by	   the	   distribution	   of	   material	  benefits.	  Clients	  in	  this	  literature	  need	  some	  enforcement	  mechanism	  (beyond	  the	  benefit	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itself)	  that	  would	  guarantee	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  support	  and	  the	  success	  of	  the	  clientelistic	  exchange.	  
In	   contrast,	   the	  argument	  put	   forward	   in	   this	  dissertation	   suggests	   that	   clients	  do	  not	  act	  qualitatively	  differently	  from	  other	  voters.26	  Clients,	  as	  any	  other	  citizen,	  care	  about	  their	  own	  well-­‐being.	  They	  are	  not	  necessarily	  more	  noble	  and	  altruistic	  than	  others,	  and	  they	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  “forced	  into”	  supporting	  a	  politician	  that	  makes	  them	  better	  off.	  As	  any	  other	  voter,	  clients	  can	  chose	  to	  support	  the	  politician	  that	  guarantees	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  benefit	  because	  they	  understand	  it	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  do	  so.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  clients	  believe	  that	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  benefit	  is	  conditional	  on	  the	  patron	  remaining	  in	  a	  position	  of	  power,	   clients	  have	  an	   incentive	   to	  help	   the	  patron	  achieve	   this	  goal.	   In	   the	  specific	  clientelistic	  case	  discussed	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  public	  employees	  have	  an	  incentive	  to	   help	   the	  politician	   that	   hired	   them	   to	   stay	   in	   power,	  which	   in	   turn	   explains	  why	   they	  comply	   with	   the	   patronage	   agreement	   and	   provide	   the	   services	   needed	   to	   ensure	   the	  electoral	  success	  of	  the	  politician.	  When	  the	  clientelistic	  exchange	  is	  incentive-­‐compatible,	  neither	  feeling	  of	  reciprocity	  nor	  monitoring	  and	  punishment	  are	  necessary	   to	  sustain	  the	  exchange.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  patrons	  and	  clients	  share	  the	  same	  interests,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  any	  external	  enforcement	  mechanism.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  voters	  are	   less	  myopic,	  more	  rational	  and	  better	   judges	  of	  their	  own	  interests	  than	  the	  recent	  literature	  on	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  often	  assumes.	  For	  instance,	  Zucco	  (forthcoming)	  shows	  that	  a	  non-­‐clientelistic	   conditional	   cash	   transfer	   (CCT)	   program	   in	   Brazil	   is	   associated	   with	   more	   votes	   for	   the	  incumbent	  party,	  suggesting	  that	  voter	  responses	  to	  CCTs	  are	  similar	  to	  retrospective	  economic	  voting.	  De	  la	  O	  (2013)	  in	  turn	  shows	  that	  the	  programmatic	  Mexican	  CCT	  program	  fostered	  support	  for	  the	  incumbent.	  These	  two	  examples	  are	  particularly	  significant	  because	  the	  type	  of	  voters	  that	  are	  targeted	  with	  CCT	  programs	  (the	  poor)	  are	  the	  same	  that	  are	  the	  targeted	  of	  clientelism.	  As	  Zucco	  (2010)	  points	  out,	  voter	  response	  to	  CCTs	  is	  similar	   to	   ordinary	   retrospective	   economic	   voting.	   Even	   without	   discretion,	   monitoring	   and	   punishment,	  policies	  that	  make	  voters	  better	  off	  are	  rewarded	  at	  the	  polls.	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6.4	   Implications	  for	  Other	  Forms	  of	  Clientelism	  	  
The	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   advanced	   in	   this	   dissertation	   has	  implications	  for	  the	  theory	  of	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  more	  generally.	  A	  direct	  implication	  of	  my	  theory	  of	  patronage	  is	  that	  monitoring	  and	  reciprocity	  are	  not	  always	  necessary	  for	  a	  clientelistic	  exchange	   to	   take	  place.	  Whether	   the	  benefit	  exchanged	   is	  a	  public	  sector	   job,	  cash,	  food	  or	  a	  favor,	  this	  dissertation	  argues	  that	  self-­‐sustaining	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  are	  possible	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  monitoring	  and	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity.	  	  
Departing	   from	   existing	   explanations,	   I	   argue	   that	   clients	   can	  make	   an	   active	   and	  strategic	  decision	  to	  support	  their	  patron	  because	  they	  think	  that	  it	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	   do	   so.	   The	   self-­‐enforcing	   theory	   of	   patronage	   suggests	   that	   clients	   provide	   political	  services	   to	   their	  patrons,	  not	   as	   a	   short-­‐term	  reaction	   to	   the	  patron’s	   actions	  or	  because	  they	   are	   thankful,	   but	   because	   they	   understand	   that	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	   benefit	   is	  conditional	  on	   the	  patron	   remaining	   in	   the	  position	  of	  power	   that	   grants	   access	   to	   these	  benefits.	  Whether	   it	   is	  a	  public	  sector	   job,	  some	  material	  benefit,	  or	  a	   favor,	  when	  clients	  believe	  that	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  benefit	  is	  tied	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  patron,	  clientelistic	  agreements	   become	   self-­‐sustaining.	   When	   clients	   believe	   that	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	  benefit	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  patron	  or	  broker	  maintaining	  his	  position	  of	  power,	  they	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  support	  the	  patron	  to	  help	  him	  stay	  in	  that	  position.	  Either	  by	  providing	  electoral	  support	  or	  through	  the	  political	  services	  studied	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  clients	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  keep	  on	  supporting	  the	  patron.	  As	  shown	  by	  Auyero’s	  (2000)	  research,	  patrons	   and	   brokers	   seem	   to	   be	   fully	   aware	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   this	   and	   they	   make	  significant	  efforts	  to	  generate	  and	  maintain	  this	  belief	  among	  clients:	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“With	   each	   problem	   that	   they	   solve	   for	   a	   client,	   brokers	   are	  
continually	   better	   positioning	   themselves	   so	   that,	   at	   election	  
time,	   they	  will	   essentially	  be	  able	   to	  blackmail	   their	   clients,	   the	  
implied	  threat	  being	  that,	  if	  the	  broker	  and	  his	  or	  her	  patron	  are	  
forced	  from	  office,	  the	  broker’s	  clients	  will	  no	  longer	  receive	  the	  
benefits	  of	  the	  social	  programs	  established	  by	  the	  patron	  and	  run	  
by	  the	  broker.”	  Auyero	  (2000,	  123)	  	  
	  
With	  the	  exception	  of	  Auyero	  (2000)	  and—more	  recently—Zarazaga	  (2012),	  the	  literature	  on	   clientelism	   has	  mainly	   ignored	   this	   alternative	  mechanism	   to	   sustain	   the	   clientelistic	  exchange	  and,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  adopts	  a	  definition	  of	  clientelism	  that	  implies	  the	  existence	  of	   monitoring	   and	   punishment.27	  The	   alternative	   mechanism	   for	   the	   sustainability	   of	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  that	  I	  develop	  in	  this	  dissertation	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  taking	   the	   interests	  and	  actions	  of	  clients	  more	  seriously.	   In	  doing	  so,	   it	  makes	  clear	   that	  clients	  might	  simply	  want	  to	  ensure	  their	  broker	  or	  the	  politician	  behind	  the	  broker	  get	  the	  support	  needed	  to	  maintain	  the	  position	  that	  allows	  for	  the	  flow	  of	  benefits	  to	  continue.	  
Note	  that	  I	  am	  not	  arguing	  that	  fear	  of	  punishment	  (or	  even	  feelings	  of	  reciprocity)	  are	  never	  present	   in	   clientelistic	   exchanges	  or	   that	   they	  are	  not	  possible,	   but	   rather	   that	  neither	  of	  these	  two	  factors	  are	  necessary	  characteristics	  of	  these	  types	  of	  arrangements.	  As	  I	   have	   shown	   in	   this	   dissertation,	   clientelistic	   exchanges	   are	   possible	   without	   coercion.	  Certainly,	  the	  absence	  of	  coercion	  might	  be	  interpreted	  in	  a	  positive	  light.	  As	  Stokes	  et	  al.	  (2012,	  354)	  argue,	   “the	  voter	  who	   faces	  no	  conditionality	  has	  greater	  autonomy	  than	  the	  voter	  who	  faces	  possible	  sanctions	  if	  the	  defects.”	  However,	  if	  clientelistic	  contracts	  can	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	   also	   van	   de	   Valle	   (2007,	   63-­‐64)	   for	   the	   description	   of	   two	   cases	   (Benin	   and	   Nigeria)	   where	   the	  clientelistic	  exchange	  is	  also	  sustained	  with	  no	  “instrumentality.”	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self-­‐sustaining	  without	  punishment,	  clientelism	  becomes	  cheaper,	  very	  hard	  to	  detect	  and	  even	  harder	  to	  curb.	  	  
If	   the	   patron	   (or	   broker)	   does	   not	   need	   to	   invest	   to	   identify	   non-­‐compliers	   and	  credibly	  commit	  to	  punish	  them,	  the	  cost	  of	  clientelism	  gets	  reduced	  significantly.28	  For	  a	  patron	  to	  be	  able	  to	  monitor	  clients	  and	  punish	  those	  who	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  their	  promise,	  a	  lot	  of	  resources	  need	  to	  be	  invested	  in	  costly	  machines.	  Certainly,	  the	  cost	  of	  clientelism	  does	  not	   completely	   disappear	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   monitoring	   and	   punishment.	   Recall	   that	   for	  clientelistic	   contracts	   to	  be	   self-­‐enforcing	   clients	  need	   to	  believe	   that	   the	   continuation	  of	  the	   benefit	   is	   conditional	   on	   the	   patron	   or	   broker	   maintaining	   his	   position	   of	   power—which	  gives	  access	  to	  the	  benefits	  distributed.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  patronage,	  once	  public	  sector	  jobs	  have	  been	  distributed	  to	  supporters,	  the	  relationship	  between	  being	  in	  power	  and	  the	  ability	   to	   distribute	   jobs	   is	   straightforward	   and	  patrons	   do	   not	   need	   to	   invest	   expensive	  resources	   in	   convincing	  patronage	  employees	   that	   their	   jobs	  are	   tied	   to	   the	   reelection	  of	  the	  incumbent.	  However,	  in	  other	  cases,	  patrons	  and	  brokers	  might	  need	  to	  invest	  more	  in	  personally	  claiming	  credit	  for	  the	  benefits	  distributed	  and	  in	  “creating	  the	  appearance	  that	  were	  they	  not	  there,	  the	  benefits	  would	  not	  be	  delivered”	  (Auyero	  et	  al	  2009,	  5).	  While	  this	  continuous	  effort	  of	  linking	  the	  benefit	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  patron	  in	  the	  position	  of	  power	   is	   not	   free,	   it	   is	   substantially	   cheaper	   than	   the	   alternative	   of	   identifying	   non-­‐compliers	  and	  punishing	  them.	  
Moreover,	  without	  coercion	  and	  threats	  of	  punishment,	  clientelism	  is	  also	  harder	  to	  detect	  and	  curb.	  Convincing	  clients	  that	  the	  benefit	  is	  contingent	  on	  the	  patron’s	  success	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This	  reduction	  in	  cost	  would	  also	  be	  true	  if	  the	  theories	  of	  reciprocity	  were	  corrected.	  I	  focus	  in	  this	  section	  in	  the	  theories	  of	  monitoring	  and	  punishment,	  which	  are	  the	  most	  popular	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  clientelism.	  
	  	  
246	  
a	   significantly	   more	   subtle	   mechanism	   than	   threating	   to	   punish	   non-­‐compliers.	   More	  importantly,	   it	   is	   perfectly	   legal.	   Threating	   citizens	   to	   vote	   in	   a	   certain	   way,	   abstain,	   or	  provide	  any	   type	  of	  political	   support	   is	   clearly	   illegal.	  Often,	   these	   threats	  are	  only	  made	  explicit	   in	  private	  settings	  so	  clientelistic	  arrangements	  are	  still	  hard	   to	  detect.	  However,	  when	   clientelistic	   exchanges	   are	   self-­‐enforcing	   and	   patrons	   only	   need	   to	   make	   clients	  believe	   that	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	   benefit	  might	   be	   at	   risk	   if	   he	   loses	   the	   election,	   the	  arrangement	   becomes	   legal.	   In	   fact,	   this	   type	   of	   “campaign”	   is	   almost	   undistinguishable	  from	  the	   type	  of	  campaign	   that	  any	  programmatic	  politician	  might	  conduct.	  Campaigning	  on	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   opposition	   might	   fail	   to	   maintain	   certain	   policies—fiscal	   austerity,	  support	  for	  education,	  a	  conditional	  cash	  transfer	  program,	  or	  any	  other	  policy	  subjected	  to	  change—	   is	   perfectly	   legal	   and	   a	   very	   common	   campaign	   strategy.	   There	   is	   nothing	  substantively	   different	   in	   these	   types	   of	   promises.	   Both	   types	   of	   politicians—clientelistic	  and	   programmatic	   —try	   to	   tie	   the	   continuation	   of	   a	   certain	   policy	   or	   benefit	   to	   their	  continuation	  in	  power.	  
In	   this	  way,	   clientelism	  becomes	   even	   less	   visible	   and	   harder	   to	   limit.	   In	   the	   end,	  curbing	   clientelism	   gets	   reduced	   to	   limiting	   the	   discretion	   of	   politicians	   and	   brokers	   to	  distribute	   benefits.	   In	   the	   case	   studied	   here,	   patronage	   contracts	   are	   sustained	   by	   the	  ability	   of	   the	   politician	   to	   distribute	   jobs	   to	   supporters,	   who	   believe	   that	   their	   jobs	   are	  contingent	   on	   the	   success	   of	   their	   patron.	   This	   belief	   is	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   new	  incumbent	   will	   have	   the	   same	   discretion	   as	   the	   old	   one	   to	   hire	   his	   supporters	   and	  supporters	  of	   the	  previous	  administration	  will	   suffer	   the	  consequences.	  Only	   limiting	   the	  discretion	  of	  politicians	  could	  prevent	  them	  from	  choosing	  supporters	  over	  non-­‐supporters	  for	   jobs	   and	   in	   turn	   change	   the	   clients’	   belief	   that	   their	   job	   is	   tied	   to	   the	   success	   of	   the	  
	  	  
247	  
patron.	  More	  generally,	   clientelistic	   exchanges	  depend	  on	   the	  discretion	  of	   the	  patron	  or	  broker	   to	  distribute	  benefits.	  When	  benefits	  are	  distributed	  discretionally,	   clients	   tend	   to	  think	   that	   the	   continuation	   is	   tied	   to	   the	   patron	   that	   distributes	   them.	   Only	   limiting	   the	  original	  discretion	  in	  the	  distribution,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  curb	  the	  type	  of	  clientelistic	  exchange	  describe	  here	  that	  is	  not	  sustain	  in	  any	  illegal	  mechanism	  of	  enforcement.	  	  	  
	  
6.5	  What’s	  So	  Wrong	  with	  Patronage?	  
As	   O’Donnell	   (2010,	   13-­‐18)	   points	   out,	   most	   non-­‐normative	   conceptualizations	   of	  democracy	   (including	   those	   that	   claim	   to	  be	  minimalistic)	   contain	   two	  distinct	   elements.	  First,	   they	   always	   explicitly	   include	   the	   element	   of	   competitive	   elections	   for	   most	  important	   governmental	   positions.	   Second,	   sometimes	   less	   explicitly,	   they	   add	   some	  “surrounding	   conditions”	   (external	   to	   the	   electoral	   process	   itself)	   that	   are	   necessary	  or/and	   sufficient	   for	   the	   existence	   of	   real	   competitive	   and	   fair	   elections.	   In	   other	  words,	  democracies	   can	  be	   thought	  as	   containing	  elements	   that	   regulate	   in	  a	  particular	  way	   the	  “access	   to	   power”	   as	   well	   as	   the	   “exercise	   of	   power”	   (Mazucca	   2010).	   As	   described	   by	  Mazzuca	   (2010,	   343)	   a	   key	   distinction	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   power	   is	   “whether	   goods	   and	  services	   are	   provided	   according	   to	   universal/general	   standards,	   like	  merit	   and	   need,	   or	  particularistic	   decisions	   based	   on	   personal	   connections	   and	   the	   ruler’s	   discretion.”	   An	  important	  characteristic	  of	  patronage—	  one	  that	  shares	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  misuse	  of	  state	  resources	   like	   pork-­‐barrel	   and	   the	  manipulation	   of	   targeted	  public	   programs—	   is	   that	   it	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  affect	  both	  the	  access	  to	  power	  and	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  dimensions	  of	  democracy.	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Concerning	  the	  electoral	  component	  (access	  to	  power),	  when	  clients	  believe	  that	  is	  in	  their	  best	  interest	  to	  help	  their	  patron	  stay	  in	  power—as	  in	  the	  theory	  developed	  here—	  the	   possibility	   of	   distributing	   patronage	   jobs	   provides	   a	   self-­‐sustaining	   incumbency	  advantage	  with	  potentially	  important	  effects	  on	  electoral	  outcomes.	  Elections	  might	  still	  be	  competitive,	  but	  with	  the	  political	  use	  of	  state	  resources	  by	  the	  incumbent	  party	  to	  finance	  political	   workers,	   elections	   are	   less	   fair	   for	   the	   non-­‐incumbent	   parties.	   In	   general,	   the	  literature	  on	  clientelism	  has	  mainly	  discussed	  the	  problems	  with	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  effects	  on	  and	  around	  elections.	  Most	  authors	  focus	  on	  discussing	  the	  effects	  of	  clientelism	  in	  relation	  to	  political	  competition	  and	  the	  way	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  affect	  representation,	  (vertical)	  accountability	  and	  the	  choice	  of	  leaders	  (Stokes	  et	  al.	  2012).	  	  
Undeniably,	  patronage	   shares	   these	  damaging	  effects	  on	   the	  quality	  of	  democratic	  competition	  with	  other	  forms	  of	  clientelism.	  First,	  with	  fair	  competition,	  elections	  provide	  information	  about	  the	  distribution	  of	  citizens’	  preferences,	  which	  makes	  it	  easier	  for	  these	  preferences	   to	  be	   represented	   and	   translated	   into	  public	  policies	   (Stokes	  2007,	   2009).	   If	  incumbents	   have	   an	   unfair	   advantage,	   elections	   tend	   to	   be	   less	   informative	   about	   the	  distribution	   of	   citizens’	   preferences,	   damaging	   the	   quality	   of	   representation	   and	   the	  accountability	  of	  the	  system.	  Second,	  fair	  competition	  makes	  politicians	  more	  “responsive”,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  provides	  an	  incentive	  for	  politicians	  to	  act	  so	  as	  to	  obtain	  or	  maintain	  citizens	   support	   at	   the	   ballot	   box.	   When	   competition	   is	   less	   fair,	   politicians	   have	   more	  opportunities	   to	   ignore	   voters’	   preferences.	   Finally,	   when	   elections	   are	   less	   informative	  about	  citizens’	  preferences,	  and	  performance	  in	  office	  is	  not	  the	  main	  driven	  of	  reelection	  or	  termination	  of	  mandates,	  the	  choice	  of	  leaders	  gets	  affected	  (Stokes	  et	  al.	  2012).	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However,	   the	   distribution	   of	   patronage	   jobs	   implies	   the	   manipulation	   of	   state	  resources	   for	  political	   gain	  and	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   resources	  used	  are,	  by	  definition,	  public	  resources,	  mark	  a	  fundamental	  distinction	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  clientelism.	  While	  other	  forms	  of	  clientelistic	  exchanges	  (vote-­‐buying	  or	  turnout-­‐buying)	  can	  be	  implemented	  using	  state	  resources,	   they	   can	   also	   be	   deployed	   by	   non-­‐incumbent	   politicians	   using	   private	   or	  partisan	   funds.	   Being	   in	   power	   is	   always	   an	   advantage	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   implementing	  clientelistic	  agreements,	  but	  when	  the	  type	  of	  benefit	  exchanged	  is	  a	  public	  sector	  job,	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition.	  
In	   this	   sense,	   patronage	   has	  much	   in	   common	  with	   the	  manipulation	   of	   targeted	  public	   programs	   (such	   as	   scholarships,	   food	   distribution	   programs,	   and	   conditional	   cash	  transfer	   programs)	   and	   pork	   barrel	   politics.	   Any	   strategy	   designed	   to	   win	   votes	   will,	   if	  successful,	   affect	   electoral	   competition	   and,	   consequently,	   the	   choice	   of	   leaders,	   the	  accountability	   of	   the	   system,	   and	   the	   quality	   of	   representation	   (Stokes	   et	   al.	   2012).	  However,	  when	   these	  strategies	  are	   implemented	   from	  the	  state	  with	  state	  resources	   (as	  the	  ones	  mentioned),	  it	  is	  not	  just	  about	  affecting	  the	  access	  to	  power	  but	  also	  the	  exercise	  of	   power	   (Mazzuca	   2010).	   Patronage	   contracts	   are	   designed	   to	   finance	   political	  workers	  and	   thus	   they	  will—when	  successful—have	  an	  effect	  on	  political	   competition,	   generating	  the	  same	  negative	  consequences	  as	  other	  types	  of	  clientelistic	  exchanges.	  But	  the	  fact	  that	  state	   resources	   are	   used	  makes	   patronage	   contracts	   fundamentally	   different	   from	   other	  clientelistic	  agreements.	  	  
The	   existence	   of	   political	   bias	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   public	   sector	   jobs	   affects	   the	  independence	   of	   the	   public	   administration	   and	   raises	   serious	   concerns	   about	   the	  possibility	   of	   equal	   treatment	   by	   the	   state.	  When	   jobs	   are	   distributed	   discretionally	   and	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according	  to	  political	  criteria,	  employees	  “owe”	  their	  jobs	  to	  the	  politician	  that	  hired	  them.	  This	  lack	  of	  independence	  could	  in	  turn	  generate	  a	  lack	  of	  impartiality	  vis	  à	  vis	  citizens.	  As	  the	   evidence	   presented	   in	   chapter	   4	   shows,	   knowing	   the	   right	   person	   in	   the	   public	  administration	  can	  make	  an	  important	  difference	  in	  getting	  things	  done.	  More	  generally,	  in	  patronage	  democracies,	   knowing	  a	   state	  official	   “increases	  a	  voter’s	   chances	  of	  obtaining	  valued	  state	  resources	  and	  services”	  (Chandra	  2004,	  87).	  Proximity	  to	  a	  state	  official	  and	  need,	   however,	   do	   not	   always	   go	   together	   and	   this	   generates	   serious	   problems	   of	   equal	  access	   to,	  and	  equal	   treatment	  by	   the	  state.	  Moreover,	   those	  with	  access	   to	  state	  officials,	  have	  a	  strong	  incentive	  to	  keep	  on	  supporting	  the	  politician	  in	  power	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  the	  connection	   to	   the	   state	   remains	   safe.	   This	   situation,	   in	   turn,	   fosters	   the	   incumbency	  advantage	  and	  helps	  to	  reproduce	  the	  unequal	  access	  to	  the	  state.	  
Whether	  clientelistic	  exchanges	   involve	  the	  use	  of	  public	  offices	  and	  public	  money	  or	   not	   has	   important	   political	   consequences	   that	   make	   these	   kinds	   of	   exchanges	  particularly	   damaging	   for	   democracy.	   Abuses	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   power	   such	   as	   the	  distribution	  of	  patronage	  jobs,	  the	  manipulation	  of	  targeted	  public	  programs	  or	  pork	  barrel	  politics	  are	  all	  non-­‐programmatic	  forms	  of	  distributive	  politics	  that	  have	  an	  effect	  both	  on	  the	   access	   to	   power	   and	   on	   the	   exercise	   of	   power.	   Once	   in	   power,	   the	   use	   of	   public	  resources	  for	  political	  gain	  provides	  an	  unfair	  advantage	  over	  non-­‐incumbent	  parties.	  The	  abuses	  in	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  dimension	  reinforces	  the	  unfairness	  in	  the	  access	  to	  power	  dimension,	  guaranteeing	  that	  the	  electoral	  playing	  field	  will	  remain	  skewed	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  incumbent	  party.	  	  
This	  discussion	  suggests	  that	  building	  a	  democratic	  society	  is	  not	  just	  about	  getting	  the	  political	  regime	  right,	  but	  also	  about	  getting	  the	  state	  right.	  Unequal	  access	  to	  the	  state,	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Appendix	  A:	  Survey	  Methodology	  
The	   survey	   consisted	   of	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   interviews	   of	   1184	   low	   and	   mid-­‐level	   local	   public	  sector	   employees	   in	   the	  Argentinean	  municipalities	   of	   Salta	   (province	   of	   Salta),	   Santa	   Fe	  (province	   of	   Santa	   Fe)	   and	   Tigre	   (province	   of	   Buenos	   Aires).1	  Together	   with	   a	   team	   of	  research	   assistants,	   we	   interviewed	   around	   400	   employees	   in	   each	   municipality.	   The	  survey	  was	  administered	  between	  August	  10	  and	  December	  30	  2010	  in	  Santa	  Fe,	  between	  August	  11	  and	  November	  26	  2010	  in	  Tigre,	  and	  from	  June	  6	  to	  August	  11	  2011	  in	  Salta.2	  It	  was	   preceded	   by	   a	   pilot	   administered	   in	   Santa	   Fe	   between	   July	   22	   and	   July	   29	   2010	  consisting	  of	  40	  cases.	  On	  average,	  survey	  interviews	  lasted	  24	  minutes.	  
A	   random	  sample	  based	  on	   the	  official	   list	   of	  public	   employees	   (excluding	  elected	  officials	   and	   high-­‐level	   positions)	   was	   generated	   within	   each	   municipality.	   The	   selected	  employees	   were	   then	   directly	   approached	   to	   interview	   at	   public	   offices	   during	   their	  working	  hours.	  Interviewers	  were	  provided	  with	  the	  list	  of	  names	  of	  public	  employees	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  survey	  methodology	  and	  the	  survey	  instrument	  were	  approved	  under	  Columbia	  University	  IRB	  protocol	  IRB-­‐AAAE9968.	  2	  The	   survey	   in	   Salta	  was	   scheduled	   to	  be	   conducted	   in	  November	   and	  December	  2010	  but	   changes	   in	   the	  electoral	  calendar	  generated	  by	  the	  death	  of	  the	  main	  presidential	  pre-­‐	  candidate	  (Nestor	  Kirchner)	  made	  the	  authorities	   in	   Salta	   reluctant	   to	   allow	  me	   to	   conduct	   the	   survey	   on	   the	   scheduled	   dates.	   They	   were	   both	  worried	  about	  sharing	  the	  list	  of	  public	  sector	  employees	  with	  me	  and	  about	  the	  questionnaire	  itself.	  The	  time	  was	   particularly	   complicated	   for	   them,	   they	   argued,	   because	   early	   elections	   were	   called	   (primaries	   for	  January	  2011	  and	  general	  elections	  for	  April	  2011)	  and	  2000	  employees	  were	  been	  considered	  for	  tenure	  at	  the	   time.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   local	   authorities	   agreed	   to	   give	   me	   the	   information	   and	   authorization	  necessary	   to	   conduct	   the	   survey,	  only	  after	   the	  elections.	  As	  a	   result,	   the	   survey	   in	  Salta	  was	  administered	  after	  the	  April	  2011	  provincial	  elections	  (when	  both	  the	  governor	  and	  the	  mayor	  were	  reelected),	  but	  before	  the	  October	  2011	  national	  elections.	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were	   selected	   and	   the	   addresses	   of	   their	   respective	   places	   of	   work.	   In	   cases	   where	   the	  selected	   employee	  was	   not	   at	   the	   place	   of	  work	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   visit,	   or	   preferred	   to	  answer	   the	   survey	   at	   a	   different	   time	   or	   day,	   interviewers	   were	   instructed	   to	   make	   an	  appointment	  to	  return	  later.3	  If	  the	  selected	  employee	  refused	  to	  answer	  the	  survey,	  or	  the	  interview	  could	  not	  be	  conducted	  after	   the	  second	  attempt,	   the	  respondent	  was	  replaced	  with	  the	  following	  name	  on	  the	  list.	  Interviewers	  were	  instructed	  to	  make	  detailed	  records	  of	   failed	   interviews.	   Since	   there	  were	   survey	  and	   list	   experiment	  questions	  embedded	   in	  the	   survey	   with	   two	   conditions—treatment	   and	   control—,	   two	   versions	   of	   the	  questionnaire	   were	   used.	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   survey	   and	   the	   list	   experiment	  questions,	   respondents	  were	  asked	  questions	   from	   identical	  questionnaires.	   Interviewers	  used	   the	   two	   different	   questionnaires	   in	   sequential	   order,	   assigning	   respondents	  alternatively	  to	  either	  the	  treatment	  or	  the	  control	  group.	  
Interviewers	   were	   recruited	   from	   Humanities	   and	   Social	   Science	   departments	   in	  Santa	   Fe,	   Salta	   and	   Buenos	   Aires	   and	   were	   either	   advanced	   undergraduate	   or	   recently	  graduated	   students.4	  For	   the	   purpose	   of	   survey	   verification,	   basic	   information	   about	   the	  employees	  (age,	  years	  in	  the	  position,	  and	  type	  of	  contract)	  was	  obtained	  from	  each	  of	  the	  municipalities	   and	   was	   not	   distributed	   to	   the	   enumerators.	   If	   this	   information	   did	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In	   some	   specific	   cases,	   the	   public	   employees	   preferred	   to	   make	   an	   appointment	   to	   meet	   after	   hours.	  Interviewers	  were	   instructed	   to	   agree	  with	   these	   kinds	   of	   requests	   at	   their	   convenience.	   Some	   interviews	  were	  also	  scheduled	  by	  phone	  in	  those	  cases	  were	  the	  employee	  worked	  from	  home,	  in	  a	  place	  different	  from	  what	  the	  record	  indicated,	  or	  at	  a	  different	  time.	  Some	  employees—particularly	  those	  working	  on	  the	  area	  of	  health	  such	  as	  ambulance	  drivers,	  nurses	  and	  doctors,	  and	  those	  working	  in	  security—	  worked	  weekend	  and	  night	  shifts.	  An	  extra	  effort	  was	  made	  to	  interview	  them,	  but	  unfortunately	  because	  of	  security	  reasons,	  some	  of	  the	  places	  were	  not	  safe	  enough	  to	  access	  by	  night.	  As	  a	  result,	  workers	  that	  worked	  night	  shifts	  might	  be	  slightly	  under-­‐represented.	  4	  The	   enumerators	  were:	   Anastasia	   Peralta	   Ramos,	   Ignacio	   Cesar,	   Ignacio	   Puente	   and	  Nicolas	   Schujman	   in	  Tigre;	  Leilen	  Lua	  Bouchet,	  Nahuel	  Avalos	  Theules,	  Alejandro	  Núñez	  Avendaño	  and	  Leonardo	  Pez	  in	  Santa	  Fe;	  and	  Sofia	  Checa,	  Marcela	  Godoy,	  Mariana	  Godoy,	  Mariana	  Macazaga,	  Gonzalo	  Rodriguez,	  and	  Ludovica	  Pian	  in	  Salta.	  I	  conducted	  interviews	  myself	  in	  the	  three	  municipalities	  as	  well.	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match	  the	  one	  reported	  by	  the	  interviewer	  in	  the	  survey	  instrument	  beyond	  the	  reasonable	  expected	  mistakes,	   further	  verification	  was	  conducted	  on	   the	   interviews	  administered	  by	  that	   interviewer.	  This	   second	   round	  of	   verification	  was	  done	   in	  person	   (by	  me)	  with	   the	  respondents.5	  The	   contact	   rate	   for	   the	   survey	  was	   59	   percent,	   the	   response	   rate	  was	   56	  percent,	   the	   cooperation	   rate	   95	   percent,	   and	   the	   refusal	   rate	   3	   percent.	   The	  margin	   of	  error	  was	  2.7%.6	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  With	   this	  methodology,	   one	   enumerator	  was	   identified	   that	  was	   fabricating	   the	   responses.	  The	   full	   set	   of	  interviews	  conducted	  by	  her	  was	  replaced	  by	  a	  new	  set	  conducted	  by	  a	  different	  interviewer.	  There	  was	  no	  need	  to	  replace	  the	  names	  of	  employees	  selected	  because	  the	  entire	  set	  of	   interviews	  was	  fabricated	  so	  the	  new	  enumerator	  used	  the	  original	  selected	  names.	  6	  Rates	  calculated	  according	  to	  the	  American	  Association	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Research.	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Table	  A1:	  Survey	  sample	  representativeness	  (Salta)	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	   Variable	   Employees	  in	  the	  survey	   All	  employees	  	   	   N	   %	   N	   %	  	  	   Observations	   389	   	  	   4263	   	  	  
Gender	  
	   	   	   	  	   Male	   228	   58.61	   2701	   63.35	  	   Female	   161	   41.39	   1562	   36.65	  Start	  working	  with	  current	  mayor	   211*	   54.24	   1491**	   46.75	  
Older	  than	  40	  years	  old	  	   230	   59.13	   2121***	   70.04	  
Tenure	   	   	   	   	  	   With	  tenure	   242	   62.21	   2992****	   77.11	  	   No	  tenure	   146	   37.53	   888****	   22.89	  Secretary	   	   	   	   	  	   Finance	   106	   27.25	   732	   17.17	  	   Public	  Works	   68	   17.48	   788	   18.48	  	   Government	   40	   10.28	   522	   12.24	  	   Chief	  of	  Cabinet	   38	   9.77	   514	   12.06	  	   Commerce	  &	  Participation	   25	   6.43	   175	   4.11	  
	  
Social	  Assistance	   19	   4.88	   318	   7.46	  	   Planning	  and	  Development	   19	   4.88	   124	   2.91	  	   General	  Secretary	  	   16	   4.11	   185	   4.34	  	   Environment	   12	   3.08	   266	   6.24	  	   Missing	  &	  Others	   47	   12.08	   639	   14.99	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  *1	  missing	  observation	  **1074	  missing	  observations	  ***1235	  missing	  observations	  ****383	  missing	  observations	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Table	  A2:	  Survey	  sample	  representativeness	  (Santa	  Fe)	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Variable	   Employees	  included	  in	  the	  survey	   All	  employees	  	   	   N	   %	   N	   %	  	  	   Observations	   395	   	  	   4528	   	  	  
Gender	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Male	   235	   59.49	   2917	   64.42	  	   Female	   160	   40.51	   1611	   35.58	  Start	  working	  with	  current	  mayor	   141	   35.70	   1949**	   44.87	  
Older	  than	  40	  years	  old	  	   270*	   67.94	   2765***	   63.34	  
Tenure	   	   	   	   	  	   With	  tenure	   256	   64.81	   2484	   54.86	  	   No	  tenure	   139	   35.19	   2044	   45.14	  Secretary	   	   	   	   	  	   Culture	   20	   5.06	   307	   6.78	  	   Government	   25	   6.33	   415	   9.17	  	   Finance	  &	  Economy	   50	   12.66	   370	   8.17	  	   Social	  Development	   143	   36.20	   1579	   34.87	  	   Control	   38	   9.62	   550	   12.15	  	   Urban	  Planning	   21	   5.32	   190	   4.20	  	   Public	  Works	   52	   13.16	   718	   15.86	  	   Production	   15	   3.80	   100	   2.21	  	  	   Others	  and	  missing	   31	   7.85	   299	   6.60	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  *	  2	  observations	  missing	  **	  184	  observations	  missing	  ***	  163	  observations	  missing	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Table	  A3:	  Survey	  sample	  representativeness	  (Tigre)	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Variable	   Employees	  in	  the	  survey	   All	  employees	  	   	   N	   %	   N	   %	  	  	   Observations	   400	   	  	   2406	   	  	  
Gender	  
	   	   	   	  	   Male	   193	   48.25	   1323	   54.99	  	   Female	   207	   51.75	   1083	   45.01	  Start	  working	  with	  current	  mayor	   184*	   46.00	   1034***	   45.37	  
Older	  than	  40	  years	  old	  	   192**	   48.61	   1201***	   52.70	  
Tenure	   	   	   	   	  	   With	  tenure	   88	   22.00	   475	   19.74	  	   No	  tenure	   312	   78.00	   1931	   80.26	  Secretary	   	   	   	   	  	   Sanitary	  Policy	  and	  HR	   127	   31.99	   896	   37.24	  	   Public	  Services	   105	   26.45	   590	   24.52	  	   Community	  Promotion	   51	   12.85	   317	   13.18	  	   Citizen	  Protection	   37	   9.32	   160	   6.65	  	   Finance	  and	  Administration	   23	   5.79	   87	   3.62	  	   Institutional	  Relations	   12	   3.02	   83	   3.45	  	   Public	  Investment	   11	   2.77	   55	   2.29	  	   Urban	  Control	   9	   2.27	   32	   1.33	  	   Public	  Revenue	   9	   2.27	   63	   2.62	  	  	   Others	   16	   4.03	   123	   5.11	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  *	  2	  missing	  observations	  **	  5	  missing	  observations	  ***	  127	  missing	  observations	  	  	   	  
Table	  A4:	  Covariate	  balance	  across	  type	  of	  questionnaires,	  by	  municipality	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	   Tigre	   Santa	  Fe	   Salta	   Whole	  Sample	  
Variable	   Type	  1	   Type	  2	   Type	  1	   Type	  2	   Type	  1	   Type	  2	   Type	  1	   Type	  2	  Observations	   199	   201	   196	   199	   196	   193	   591	   593	  Female	   0.55	   0.48	   0.41	   0.40	   0.40	   0.42	   0.46	   0.44	  Age	   39.33	   39.65	   44.63	   44.80	   43.86	   43.11	   42.61	   42.51	  Education	   6.37	   6.11	   5.30	   5.11	   5.56	   5.63	   5.74	   5.62	  Salary	   3.08	   3.14	   2.56	   2.62	   2.59	   2.67	   2.74	   2.81	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Note:	  The	  balanced	  distribution	  of	  the	  variables	  across	  the	  two	  conditions	  suggests	  that	  the	  groups	  are	  fairly	  equivalent	   on	   observable	   characteristics	   and	   that	   the	   randomization	   was	   successful	   in	   each	   of	   the	   three	  municipalities.	  None	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  control	  and	  treatment	  groups	  are	  statistically	  significant	  (at	  the	  95	  percent	  confidence	  level).	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Table	  A5:	  Covariate	  balance	  across	  type	  of	  questionnaires,	  by	  enumerator	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Type	  1	   Type	  2	   Total	  Alejandro	   42	   43	   85	  Anastasia	   41	   39	   80	  Gonzalo	   28	   29	   57	  Ignacio	  C.	   39	   39	   78	  Ignacio	  P.	   43	   44	   87	  Leilen	   23	   23	   46	  Leonardo	   23	   22	   45	  Ludovica	   16	   15	   31	  Marcela	   41	   41	   82	  Mariana	  G.	   7	   6	   13	  Mariana	  M.	   29	   29	   58	  Nahuel	   100	   103	   203	  Nicolás	   44	   46	   90	  Sofía	   36	   33	   69	  Virginia	  (me)	   79	   81	   160	  
Total	   591	   593	   1184	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Appendix	  B.	  Additional	  Tables	  for	  Chapter	  3	  
Table	  B1:	  The	  effect	  of	  ideology	  on	  being	  hired	  by	  current	  mayor	  (IV	  regression),	  
excluding	  employees	  that	  go	  their	  job	  through	  their	  parents	  (in	  Salta)	  and	  through	  
friends	  or	  relatives	  (in	  Santa	  Fe	  and	  Tigre)	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	   Current	  Mayor	  	   IV	  Current	  Mayor	  	   Reduced	  Form	  Current	  Mayor	  Mayor	  Party	   0.16***	   0.24**	   	  	   (0.03)	   (0.12)	   	  Mayor	  Party	  Parents	   	   	   0.08**	  	   	   	   (0.04)	  Age	   -­‐0.21***	   -­‐0.22***	   -­‐0.22***	  	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	   (0.01)	  Female	   0.06*	   0.06*	   0.05*	  	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	  Education	   0.00	   0.00	   0.01	  	   (0.02)	   (0.02)	   (0.02)	  Salta	   0.08**	   0.06	   0.14***	  	   (0.04)	   (0.05)	   (0.03)	  Santa	  Fe	   -­‐0.02	   -­‐0.01	   -­‐0.01	  	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	  Constant	   1.05***	   1.02***	   1.07***	  	   (0.07)	   (0.08)	   (0.07)	  	   	   	   	  Observations	   824	   824	   910	  R-­‐squared	   0.30	   0.30	   0.29	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	  The	  age	  variable	  takes	  on	  values	  from	  1	  to	  5,	  corresponding	  to	  respondents	  who	  are	  18-­‐25,	  26-­‐35,	  36-­‐45,	  46-­‐55	  and	  older.	  The	  education	  variable	   takes	  on	  values	   from	  1	   to	  3,	  corresponding	  to	  respondents	  to	  whom	  the	  highest	  education	  completed	  is	  primary	  school,	  secondary	  school,	  and	  university	  or	  tertiary	  education.	  The	  female	  variable	  takes	  the	  value	  one	  when	  the	  respondent	  is	  female,	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  The	  municipality	  of	  Tigre	  was	  excluded	  to	   avoid	  multicollinearity.	   Robust	   standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses,	   ***	   p<0.01,	   **	   p<0.05,	   *	  p<0.1	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Appendix	  C.	  Additional	  Tables	  for	  Chapter	  5	  
	  
Table	  C1:	  OLS	  analyses	  of	  perception	  of	  job	  stability	  survey	  experiment	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  Stab	  	  	   Likelihood	  of	  staying	  in	  the	  job	  after	  the	  next	  election	  New	  mayor	  treatment	   -­‐0.41**	   -­‐0.43***	   -­‐0.33**	  	   (0.16)	   (0.15)	   (0.13)	  Tenure	   	   	   3.01***	  	   	   	   (0.20)	  College	   	   -­‐0.15	   0.08	  	   	   (0.20)	   (0.18)	  Female	   	   -­‐0.16	   -­‐0.06	  	   	   (0.17)	   (0.15)	  Age	   	   0.81***	   0.20***	  	   	   (0.07)	   (0.08)	  Salta	   	   0.07	   -­‐0.86***	  	   	   (0.17)	   (0.18)	  Santa	  Fe	   	   -­‐0.85***	   -­‐1.74***	  	   	   (0.21)	   (0.20)	  Constant	   8.15***	   5.98***	   6.87***	  	   (0.11)	   (0.27)	   (0.26)	  	   	   	   	  Observations	   1,131	   1,128	   1,128	  R-­‐squared	   0.01	   0.15	   0.33	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  




Table	  C2:	  Likelihood	  of	  keeping	  the	  job,	  heterogenous	  treatment	  effects	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  	   Whole	  Sample	   Employees	  without	  Tenure	  Characteristic	   No	   Yes	   Difference	  in	  Effects	   No	   Yes	   Difference	  in	  Effects	  Have	  Tenure	   -­‐0.62**	   -­‐0.03	   -­‐0.60**	   -­‐0.59**	   	  	   	   	   	  (0.25)	   (0.12)	   (0.28)	   (0.27)	   	  	   	   	   	  N=572	   N=559	   N=1131	   N=1131	   	  	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  Mayor	  Voter	   0.34	   -­‐0.96***	   1.30***	   1.21***	   0.65	   -­‐1.41***	   2.06***	   1.79***	  (0.27)	   [0.21]	   (0.35)	   (0.34)	   (0.46)	   (0.31)	   (0.55)	   (0.48)	  N=417	   N=647	   N=1064	   N=1064	   N=184	   N=348	   N=532	   N=532	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  Mayor	  Party	   -­‐0.18	   -­‐0.89***	   0.71**	   0.71**	   -­‐0.32	   -­‐1.26***	   0.94*	   0.99**	  (0.20)	   (0.28)	   (0.35)	   (0.35)	   (0.30)	   (0.44)	   (0.53)	   (0.47)	  N=764	   N=367	   N=1131	   N=1131	   N=378	   N=194	   N=572	   N=572	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  College	  Degree	   -­‐0.52***	   0.01	   -­‐0.53	   -­‐0.54	   -­‐0.97***	   0.002	   -­‐0.97*	   -­‐0.79*	  (0.19)	   (0.32)	   (0.39)	   (0.39)	   (0.32)	   (0.38)	   (0.54)	   (0.47)	  N=871	   N=257	   N=1128	   N=1128	   N=387	   N=183	   N=570	   N=570	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  Municipal	  Dummies	   	   NO	   YES	   	  	   	  	   NO	   YES	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	   In	   each	  panel,	   the	   first	   two	   columns	   show	   the	   average	   treatment	   effects	   calculated	   as	   the	  difference	  between	  the	  treatment	  and	  the	  control	  group	  (t-­‐test	  with	  unequal	  variance).	  The	  last	  two	  columns	  show	  the	  difference	   in	  effects	  across	   respondents	  with	  and	  without	  each	  characteristic,	   and	   the	   last	   column	   includes	  controls	  for	  municipalities.	  Values	  in	  the	  left	  panel	  refer	  to	  the	  whole	  sample.	  Values	  in	  the	  right	  panel	  refer	  only	  to	  employees	  without	  tenure.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Table	  C3:	  OLS	  analyses	  of	  perception	  of	  changes	  for	  better	  or	  worse	  survey	  
experiment	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  Stab	  	  	   Likelihood	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  job	  after	  the	  next	  election	  New	  mayor	  treatment	   -­‐0.23***	   -­‐0.23***	   -­‐0.23***	  	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	  Tenure	   	   	   -­‐0.06	  	   	   	   (0.04)	  College	   	   -­‐0.10**	   -­‐0.10**	  	   	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	  Female	   	   0.02	   0.02	  	   	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	  Age	   	   -­‐0.03*	   -­‐0.02	  	   	   (0.01)	   (0.02)	  Salta	   	   0.16***	   0.18***	  	   	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	  Santa	  Fe	   	   0.06	   0.08*	  	   	   (0.04)	   (0.04)	  Constant	   0.36***	   0.39***	   0.37***	  	   (0.02)	   (0.06)	   (0.06)	  	   	   	   	  Observations	   1,027	   1,024	   1,023	  R-­‐squared	   0.04	   0.07	   0.07	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	  The	  results	  were	  substantively	  equivalent	  when	  using	  ordered	  probit	  so	  OLS	  results	  are	   reported	   for	   simplicity.	  The	   tenure	  variable	   takes	   the	  value	  of	  1	   for	   tenure	  employees,	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  The	  college	  variable	   takes	   the	  value	  of	  1	   for	  employees	  with	  a	   college	  degree,	   and	  zero	  otherwise.	  The	   female	  variable	   takes	   the	  value	  of	  1	   for	  women,	   and	  zero	  otherwise.	  The	  age	  variable	  takes	  on	  values	  from	  1	  to	  5,	  corresponding	  to	  respondents	  who	  are	   18-­‐25,	   26-­‐35,	   36-­‐45,	   46-­‐55	   and	   more	   than	   55.	   The	   municipality	   of	   Tigre	   (the	   base	  category)	   was	   excluded.	   Robust	   standard	   errors	   in	   parentheses;	   ***	   p<0.01,	   **	   p<0.05,	   *	  p<0.1	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Table	  C4:	  Likelihood	  of	  changes	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  heterogenous	  treatment	  effects	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  Characteristic	   No	   Yes	   Difference	  	  in	  Effect	  	   	   	   	   	  Have	  Tenure	   -­‐0.29***	   -­‐0.16***	   -­‐0.13**	   -­‐0.13*	  (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.07)	   (0.07)	  N=521	   N=505	   N=1026	   N=1026	  	   	   	   	   	  Mayor	  Voter	   -­‐0.10**	   -­‐0.31***	   0.21***	   0.21***	  (0.05)	   (0.05)	   (0.07)	   (0.07)	  N=381	   N=590	   N=971	   N=971	  	   	   	   	   	  Mayor	  Party	   -­‐0.15***	   -­‐0.40***	   0.25***	   0.25***	  (0.04)	   (0.07)	   (0.07)	   (0.07)	  N=701	   N=326	   N=1027	   N=1027	  	   	   	   	   	  College	  Degree	   -­‐0.21***	   -­‐0.28***	   0.07	   0.07	  (0.04)	   (0.07)	   (0.08)	   (0.08)	  N=799	   N=225	   N=1024	   N=1024	  	   	   	   	   	  Municipal	  dummies	   	   NO	   YES	  	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Note:	   First	   two	   columns	   show	   the	   average	   treatment	   effects	   calculated	   as	   the	   difference	  between	   the	   treatment	   and	   the	   control	   group	   (t-­‐test	  with	   unequal	   variance).	   The	   last	   two	  columns	   show	   the	   difference	   in	   effects	   across	   respondents	   with	   and	   without	   each	  characteristic.	  The	  last	  column	  includes	  controls	   for	  municipalities.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Table	  C5:	  Believe	  the	  government	  can	  find	  out	  about	  individual	  voting	  behavior	  
(Monitoring)	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  





Favors	   0.38***	   0.45**	   0.06	   0.02	   0.03	  (0.13)	   (0.21)	   (0.24)	   (0.24)	   (0.23)	  N=406	   N=148	   N=554	   N=554	   N=550	  Election	  Monitors	   0.03	   0.16	   0.13	   0.10	   0.09	  (0.07)	   (0.12)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	   (0.14)	  N=403	   N=148	   N=551	   N=551	   N=547	  





(0.14)	   (0.20)	   (0.25)	   (0.24)	   (0.24)	  N=340	   N=140	   N=480	   N=480	   N=477	  Election	  Monitors	   0.25***	   0.20*	   0.05	   0.13	   0.13	  (0.08)	   (0.11)	   (0.15)	   (0.15)	   (0.15)	  N=337	   N=140	   N=477	   N=477	   N=475	  
Campaigns	   0.22**	   0.19	   0.03	   0.003	   0.02	  (0.09)	   (0.13)	   (0.17)	   (0.16)	   (0.16)	  N=336	   N=139	   N=475	   N=475	   N=473	  Political	  Rallies	   0.26**	   0.20	   0.06	   0.07	   0.01	  (0.11)	   (0.20)	   (0.21)	   (0.21)	   (0.20)	  N=338	   N=139	   N=477	   N=477	   N=475	  Municipal	  dummies	   NO	   YES	   YES	  Other	  Controls	   NO	   NO	   YES	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  Note:	  Table	  reports	  estimated	  difference	  between	   treatment	  and	  control	  groups	  according	  to	  each	  of	  the	  four	  list	  experiments	  conditional	  on	  beliefs	  about	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  ballot.	  Last	  three	  columns	  report	  differences	  in	  effects.	  Last	  column	  includes	  the	  following	  controls:	  Age,	  Female,	  College	  and	  Mayor	  Party.	  A	  control	  for	  tenure	  was	  not	  included	  because	  it	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  Current	  Mayor;	  Mayor	  Voter	  was	  not	  included	  because	  it	  is	  highly	  correlated	  with	  Mayor	  Party.	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  ***	  p<0.01,	  **	  p<0.05,	  *	  p<0.1.	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Table	  C6:	  Covariate	  balance	  across	  those	  who	  believe	  that	  voting	  is	  secret	  and	  those	  
that	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  can	  find	  out	  about	  individual	  voting	  behavior	  	  	   	   	   	  
	  	  
Secrecy	  of	  
the	  ballot	  can	  
be	  violated	  
Voting	  is	  
secret	   	  Observations	   289	   749	   	  (28%)	   (72%)	   	  Age	   41.2	   42.6	   1.42	  (0.70)	   (0.42)	   (0.82)	  Female	   0.48	   0.45	   -­‐0.03	  (0.03)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  Current	  Mayor	   0.49	   0.46	   -­‐0.03	  	   (0.03)	   (0.18)	   (0.03)	  Tenure	   0.46	   0.48	   0.02	  (0.03)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  Mayor	  Voter	   0.66	   0.64	   -­‐0.02	  (0.03)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  Mayor	  Party	   0.34	   0.36	   0.02	  (0.03)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  College	   0.29	   0.23	   -­‐0.06**	  (0.03)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  	  	   	   	   	  
Note:	  Table	  reports	  proportions	  with	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses.	  Last	  column	  reports	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  groups	  for	  each	  of	  the	  characteristics	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  Observations	   776	   400	   	  (66%)	   (34%)	   	  Age	   43	   41.6	   1.42**	  (0.43)	   (0.59)	   (0.73)	  Female	   0.41	   0.51	   -­‐0.09***	  (0.02)	   (0.03)	   (0.03)	  Current	  Mayor	   0.46	   0.45	   0.01	  	   (0.02)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  Tenure	   0.51	   0.46	   0.05	  (0.02)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  Mayor	  Voter	   0.65	   0.55	   0.10***	  (0.02)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  Mayor	  Party	   0.36	   0.26	   0.09***	  (0.02)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	  College	   0.17	   0.35	   -­‐0.18***	  (0.01)	   (0.02)	   (0.03)	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